blob: 8c1fdbfa0f6fa33910f4b34036ff50c7e86c8a50 [file] [log] [blame]
###
### Apps that run with the system UID, e.g. com.android.system.ui,
### com.android.settings. These are not as privileged as the system
### server.
###
typeattribute system_app coredomain, mlstrustedsubject;
app_domain(system_app)
net_domain(system_app)
binder_service(system_app)
# android.ui and system.ui
allow system_app rootfs:dir getattr;
# Read and write /data/data subdirectory.
allow system_app system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_app system_app_data_file:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
# Read and write to /data/misc/user.
allow system_app misc_user_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_app misc_user_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Access to apex files stored on /data (b/136063500)
# Needed so that Settings can access NOTICE files inside apex
# files located in the assets/ directory.
allow system_app apex_data_file:dir search;
allow system_app staging_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# Read wallpaper file.
allow system_app wallpaper_file:file r_file_perms;
# Read icon file.
allow system_app icon_file:file r_file_perms;
# Write to properties
set_prop(system_app, arm64_memtag_prop)
set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_prop)
set_prop(system_app, debug_prop)
set_prop(system_app, system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported_bluetooth_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported_system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported3_system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, gesture_prop)
set_prop(system_app, logd_prop)
set_prop(system_app, net_radio_prop)
set_prop(system_app, usb_control_prop)
set_prop(system_app, usb_prop)
set_prop(system_app, log_tag_prop)
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_app, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
auditallow system_app net_radio_prop:property_service set;
auditallow system_app usb_control_prop:property_service set;
auditallow system_app usb_prop:property_service set;
# Allow Settings to enable Dynamic System Update
set_prop(system_app, dynamic_system_prop)
# ctl interface
set_prop(system_app, ctl_default_prop)
set_prop(system_app, ctl_bugreport_prop)
# Allow developer settings to query gsid status
get_prop(system_app, gsid_prop)
# Create /data/anr/traces.txt.
allow system_app anr_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow system_app anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Settings need to access app name and icon from asec
allow system_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;
# Allow system apps (like Settings) to interact with statsd
binder_call(system_app, statsd)
# Allow system apps to interact with incidentd
binder_call(system_app, incidentd)
# Allow system app to interact with Dumpstate HAL
hal_client_domain(system_app, hal_dumpstate)
allow system_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
# TODO: scope this down? Too broad?
allow system_app {
service_manager_type
-apex_service
-dnsresolver_service
-dumpstate_service
-installd_service
-iorapd_service
-lpdump_service
-mdns_service
-netd_service
-system_suspend_control_internal_service
-system_suspend_control_service
-tracingproxy_service
-virtual_touchpad_service
-vold_service
-default_android_service
}:service_manager find;
# suppress denials for services system_app should not be accessing.
dontaudit system_app {
dnsresolver_service
dumpstate_service
installd_service
iorapd_service
mdns_service
netd_service
virtual_touchpad_service
vold_service
}:service_manager find;
# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
dontaudit system_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
allow system_app keystore:keystore_key {
get_state
get
insert
delete
exist
list
reset
password
lock
unlock
is_empty
sign
verify
grant
duplicate
clear_uid
user_changed
};
allow system_app keystore:keystore2_key {
delete
get_info
grant
rebind
update
use
};
# Allow Settings to manage WI-FI keys.
allow system_app wifi_key:keystore2_key {
delete
get_info
rebind
update
use
};
# settings app reads /proc/version
allow system_app {
proc_version
}:file r_file_perms;
# Settings app writes to /dev/stune/foreground/tasks.
allow system_app cgroup:file w_file_perms;
allow system_app cgroup_v2:file w_file_perms;
control_logd(system_app)
read_runtime_log_tags(system_app)
get_prop(system_app, device_logging_prop)
# allow system apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
# modify them other than to connect
allow system_app system_server:udp_socket {
connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };
# Settings app reads ro.oem_unlock_supported
get_prop(system_app, oem_unlock_prop)
# Allow system apps to act as Perfetto producers.
perfetto_producer(system_app)
###
### Neverallow rules
###
# app domains which access /dev/fuse should not run as system_app
neverallow system_app fuse_device:chr_file *;
# Apps which run as UID=system should not rely on any attacker controlled
# filesystem locations, such as /data/local/tmp. For /data/local/tmp, we
# allow writes to files passed by file descriptor to support dumpstate and
# bug reports, but not reads.
neverallow system_app shell_data_file:dir { no_w_dir_perms open search read };
neverallow system_app shell_data_file:file { open read ioctl lock };