unconfined.te

#######################################################
#
# This is the unconfined template. This template is the base policy
# which is used by daemons and other privileged components of
# Android.
#
# Historically, this template was called "unconfined" because it
# allowed the domain to do anything it wanted. Over time,
# this has changed, and will continue to change in the future.
# The rules in this file will be removed when no remaining
# unconfined domains require it, or when the rules contradict
# Android security best practices. Domains which need rules not
# provided by the unconfined template should add them directly to
# the relevant policy.
#
# The use of this template is discouraged.
######################################################

allow unconfineddomain self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace sys_rawio mknod sys_module audit_write audit_control linux_immutable };
allow unconfineddomain self:capability2 ~{ mac_override mac_admin };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setcheckreqprot setbool setsecparam };
allow unconfineddomain kernel:system ~{ syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };
allow unconfineddomain domain:process {
    fork
    sigchld
    sigkill
    sigstop
    signull
    signal
    getsched
    setsched
    getsession
    getpgid
    setpgid
    getcap
    setcap
    share
    getattr
    noatsecure
    siginh
    setrlimit
    rlimitinh
};
allow unconfineddomain domain:fd *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:dir r_dir_perms;
allow unconfineddomain domain:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow unconfineddomain domain:{ fifo_file file } rw_file_perms;
allow unconfineddomain domain:socket_class_set *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:ipc_class_set *;
allow unconfineddomain domain:key *;
allow unconfineddomain {fs_type dev_type}:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } ~relabelto;
allow unconfineddomain {
    file_type
    -keystore_data_file
    -property_data_file
    -system_file
    -exec_type
    -security_file
    -shell_data_file
}:{ dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } ~relabelto;
allow unconfineddomain exec_type:{ file dir lnk_file } ~{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
allow unconfineddomain system_file:{ dir lnk_file } ~{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
allow unconfineddomain system_file:file ~{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename entrypoint };
allow unconfineddomain {fs_type -usermodehelper -proc_security}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execmod execute relabelto};
allow unconfineddomain {dev_type -kmem_device}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execmod execute relabelto};
allow unconfineddomain {
    file_type
    -keystore_data_file
    -property_data_file
    -system_file
    -exec_type
    -security_file
    -shell_data_file
}:{ chr_file file } ~{entrypoint execmod execute relabelto};
allow unconfineddomain { rootfs system_file exec_type }:file execute;
allow unconfineddomain node_type:node *;
allow unconfineddomain node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } node_bind;
allow unconfineddomain netif_type:netif *;
allow unconfineddomain port_type:socket_class_set name_bind;
allow unconfineddomain port_type:{ tcp_socket dccp_socket } name_connect;
allow unconfineddomain domain:peer recv;
allow unconfineddomain { domain -init }:binder { call transfer set_context_mgr };
allow unconfineddomain { property_type -security_prop }:property_service set;