| # network manager |
| type netd, domain, mlstrustedsubject; |
| type netd_exec, exec_type, file_type; |
| |
| net_domain(netd) |
| # in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, grant netd priv_sock_ioctls. |
| allowxperm netd self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls; |
| |
| r_dir_file(netd, cgroup) |
| allow netd system_server:fd use; |
| |
| allow netd self:capability { net_admin net_raw kill }; |
| # Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are |
| # triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other |
| # than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if |
| # the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid |
| # bit was even set. We do not appear to truly need this capability |
| # for netd to operate. |
| dontaudit netd self:capability fsetid; |
| |
| allow netd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; |
| allow netd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write; |
| allow netd self:netlink_nflog_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; |
| allow netd self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; |
| allow netd self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read nlmsg_write }; |
| allow netd self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; |
| allow netd self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; |
| allow netd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms; |
| allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms; |
| not_full_treble(`allow netd vendor_file:file x_file_perms;') |
| allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms; |
| |
| # Acquire advisory lock on /system/etc/xtables.lock |
| allow netd system_file:file lock; |
| |
| r_dir_file(netd, proc_net) |
| # For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush. |
| allow netd proc_net:file rw_file_perms; |
| |
| # Enables PppController and interface enumeration (among others) |
| r_dir_file(netd, sysfs_type) |
| # Allows setting interface MTU |
| allow netd sysfs:file write; |
| |
| # TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me? |
| allow netd sysfs_usb:file write; |
| |
| # TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related |
| # work. However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them. |
| # Why? |
| allow netd self:capability { dac_override chown }; |
| |
| # Needed to update /data/misc/net/rt_tables |
| allow netd net_data_file:file create_file_perms; |
| allow netd net_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; |
| allow netd self:capability fowner; |
| |
| # Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain |
| allow netd dnsmasq:process signal; |
| |
| # Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain |
| allow netd clatd:process signal; |
| |
| set_prop(netd, ctl_mdnsd_prop) |
| |
| # Allow netd to publish a binder service and make binder calls. |
| binder_use(netd) |
| add_service(netd, netd_service) |
| allow netd dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write }; |
| |
| # Allow netd to call into the system server so it can check permissions. |
| allow netd system_server:binder call; |
| allow netd permission_service:service_manager find; |
| |
| # Allow netd to talk to the framework service which collects netd events. |
| allow netd netd_listener_service:service_manager find; |
| |
| # Allow netd to operate on sockets that are passed to it. |
| allow netd netdomain:{ |
| tcp_socket |
| udp_socket |
| rawip_socket |
| tun_socket |
| } { read write getattr setattr getopt setopt }; |
| allow netd netdomain:fd use; |
| |
| # give netd permission to read and write netlink xfrm |
| allow netd self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write nlmsg_read }; |
| |
| ### |
| ### Neverallow rules |
| ### |
| ### netd should NEVER do any of this |
| |
| # Block device access. |
| neverallow netd dev_type:blk_file { read write }; |
| |
| # ptrace any other app |
| neverallow netd { domain }:process ptrace; |
| |
| # Write to /system. |
| neverallow netd system_file:dir_file_class_set write; |
| |
| # Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data |
| neverallow netd { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write; |
| |
| # only system_server, dumpstate and netd may interact with netd over binder |
| neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate -netd } netd_service:service_manager find; |
| neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate } netd:binder call; |
| neverallow netd { domain -system_server -servicemanager userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:binder call; |