| # Life begins with the kernel. |
| type kernel, domain, domain_deprecated, mlstrustedsubject; |
| |
| allow kernel self:capability sys_nice; |
| |
| # Allow init relabel itself. |
| allow kernel rootfs:file relabelfrom; |
| allow kernel init_exec:file relabelto; |
| # TODO: investigate why we need this. |
| allow kernel init:process share; |
| |
| # cgroup filesystem initialization prior to setting the cgroup root directory label. |
| allow kernel unlabeled:dir search; |
| |
| # Mount usbfs. |
| allow kernel usbfs:filesystem mount; |
| allow kernel usbfs:dir search; |
| |
| # Initial setenforce by init prior to switching to init domain. |
| # We use dontaudit instead of allow to prevent a kernel spawned userspace |
| # process from turning off SELinux once enabled. |
| dontaudit kernel self:security setenforce; |
| |
| # Write to /proc/1/oom_adj prior to switching to init domain. |
| allow kernel self:capability sys_resource; |
| |
| # Init reboot before switching selinux domains under certain error |
| # conditions. Allow it. |
| # As part of rebooting, init writes "u" to /proc/sysrq-trigger to |
| # remount filesystems read-only. /data is not mounted at this point, |
| # so we could ignore this. For now, we allow it. |
| allow kernel self:capability sys_boot; |
| allow kernel proc_sysrq:file w_file_perms; |
| |
| # Allow writing to /dev/__kmsg__ which was created prior to |
| # loading policy |
| allow kernel tmpfs:chr_file write; |
| |
| # Set checkreqprot by init.rc prior to switching to init domain. |
| allow kernel selinuxfs:file write; |
| allow kernel self:security setcheckreqprot; |
| |
| # MTP sync (b/15835289) |
| # kernel thread "loop0", used by the loop block device, for ASECs (b/17158723) |
| allow kernel { priv_app untrusted_app }:fd use; |
| # privileged apps have moved to the priv_app domain. Determine |
| # if this permission is still needed. b/25331459 |
| auditallow kernel untrusted_app:fd use; |
| allow kernel sdcard_type:file { read write }; |
| |
| # Allow the kernel to read OBB files from app directories. (b/17428116) |
| # Kernel thread "loop0" reads a vold supplied file descriptor. |
| # Fixes CTS tests: |
| # * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountObbNormal |
| # * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountTwoObbs |
| allow kernel vold:fd use; |
| allow kernel app_data_file:file read; |
| allow kernel asec_image_file:file read; |
| |
| domain_auto_trans(kernel, init_exec, init) |
| |
| ### |
| ### neverallow rules |
| ### |
| |
| # The initial task starts in the kernel domain (assigned via |
| # initial_sid_contexts), but nothing ever transitions to it. |
| neverallow domain kernel:process { transition dyntransition }; |
| |
| # The kernel domain is never entered via an exec, nor should it |
| # ever execute a program outside the rootfs without changing to another domain. |
| # If you encounter an execute_no_trans denial on the kernel domain, then |
| # possible causes include: |
| # - The program is a kernel usermodehelper. In this case, define a domain |
| # for the program and domain_auto_trans() to it. |
| # - You failed to setcon u:r:init:s0 in your init.rc and thus your init |
| # program was left in the kernel domain and is now trying to execute |
| # some other program. Fix your init.rc file. |
| # - You are running an exploit which switched to the init task credentials |
| # and is then trying to exec a shell or other program. You lose! |
| neverallow kernel { file_type fs_type -rootfs }:file { entrypoint execute_no_trans }; |