prebuilts/api/34.0/private/app_neverallows.te - LeafOS-Project/android_system_sepolicy - Gitiles

 ###
 ### neverallow rules for untrusted app domains
 ###

 define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{
   ephemeral_app
   isolated_app
   isolated_app_all
   isolated_compute_app
   mediaprovider
   mediaprovider_app
   untrusted_app
   untrusted_app_25
   untrusted_app_27
   untrusted_app_29
   untrusted_app_30
   untrusted_app_all
 }')
 # Receive or send uevent messages.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;

 # Receive or send generic netlink messages
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_socket *;

 # Read or write kernel printk buffer
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps kmsg_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;

 # Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
 # best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps { debugfs_type -debugfs_kcov }:file read;
 neverallow {all_untrusted_apps userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')} debugfs_type:{ file lnk_file } read;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
 # Only trusted components of Android should be registering
 # services.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps service_manager_type:service_manager add;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to use VendorBinder
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to connect to the property service
 # or set properties. b/10243159
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_socket:sock_file write;
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_type:property_service set;

 # net.dns properties are not a public API. Disallow untrusted apps from reading this property.
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps } net_dns_prop:file read;

 # radio_cdma_ecm_prop properties are not a public API. Disallow untrusted apps from reading this property.
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps } radio_cdma_ecm_prop:file read;

 # Shared libraries created by trusted components within an app home
 # directory can be dlopen()ed. To maintain the W^X property, these files
 # must never be writable to the app.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps app_exec_data_file:file
   { append create link relabelfrom relabelto rename setattr write };

 # Block calling execve() on files in an apps home directory.
 # This is a W^X violation (loading executable code from a writable
 # home directory). For compatibility, allow for targetApi <= 28.
 # b/112357170
 neverallow {
   all_untrusted_apps
   -untrusted_app_25
   -untrusted_app_27
   -runas_app
 } { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file execute_no_trans;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to invoke dex2oat. This was historically required
 # by ART for compiling secondary dex files but has been removed in Q.
 # Exempt legacy apps (targetApi<=28) for compatibility.
 neverallow {
   all_untrusted_apps
   -untrusted_app_25
   -untrusted_app_27
 } dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
 # This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
 # enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
 # constraints.  As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
 # on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
 # permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
 # never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
 # and an untrusted app is allowed fork permission to itself.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps mlstrustedsubject:process fork;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to hard link to any files.
 # In particular, if an untrusted app links to other app data
 # files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
 # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
 # bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted apps never have this
 # capability.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps file_type:file link;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to access network MAC address file
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_net:file no_rw_file_perms;

 # Do not allow any write access to files in /sys
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_type:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

 # Apps may never access the default sysfs label.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;

 # Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
 # ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
 neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps domain:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{
   socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
   netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
   netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
   netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
   netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
   netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
   netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket
   ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket
   atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
   bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
   alg_socket nfc_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
 } *;

 # Apps can read/write an already open vsock (e.g. created by
 # virtualizationservice) but nothing more than that (e.g. creating a
 # new vsock, etc.)
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:vsock_socket ~{ getattr getopt read write };

 # Disallow sending RTM_GETLINK messages on netlink sockets.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
 neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };

 # Disallow sending RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} messages on netlink sockets.
 neverallow {
   all_untrusted_apps
   -untrusted_app_25
   -untrusted_app_27
   -untrusted_app_29
   -untrusted_app_30
 } domain:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
 # internal storage or sdcard.
 # World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
 # with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
 # application un-installation.
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } {
   fs_type
   -sdcard_type
   -fuse
   file_type
   -app_data_file            # The apps sandbox itself
   -privapp_data_file
   -app_exec_data_file       # stored within the app sandbox directory
   -media_rw_data_file       # Internal storage. Known that apps can
                             # leave artfacts here after uninstall.
   -user_profile_data_file   # Access to profile files
   userdebug_or_eng(`
     -method_trace_data_file # only on ro.debuggable=1
     -coredump_file          # userdebug/eng only
   ')
 }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };

 # No untrusted component except mediaprovider_app should be touching /dev/fuse
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider_app } fuse_device:chr_file *;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to directly open the tun_device
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file open;
 # The tun_device ioctls below are not allowed, to prove equivalence
 # to the kernel patch at
 # https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/11cee2be0c2062ba88f04eb51196506f870a3b5d%5E%21
 neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file ioctl ~{ FIOCLEX FIONCLEX TUNGETIFF };

 # Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:dir ~search;

 # Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
 # Create a more specific label if needed
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
   proc
   proc_asound
   proc_kmsg
   proc_loadavg
   proc_mounts
   proc_pagetypeinfo
   proc_slabinfo
   proc_stat
   proc_swaps
   proc_uptime
   proc_version
   proc_vmallocinfo
   proc_vmstat
 }:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

 # /proc/filesystems is accessible to mediaprovider_app only since it handles
 # external storage
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps - mediaprovider_app } proc_filesystems:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

 # Avoid all access to kernel configuration
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps config_gz:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

 # Do not allow untrusted apps access to preloads data files
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps preloads_data_file:file no_rw_file_perms;

 # Locking of files on /system could lead to denial of service attacks
 # against privileged system components
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps system_file:file lock;

 # Do not permit untrusted apps to perform actions on HwBinder service_manager
 # other than find actions for services listed below
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:hwservice_manager ~find;

 # Do not permit access from apps which host arbitrary code to the protected services
 # The two main reasons for this are:
 # 1. Protected HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because
 #    vendor code does not have a way to understand apps or their relation to
 #    caller UID information and, even if it did, those services either operate
 #    at a level below that of apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity
 #    for authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption for all added
 #    vendor services is that they treat all their clients as equally authorized
 #    to perform operations offered by the service.
 # 2. HAL servers contain code with higher incidence rate of security issues
 #    than system/core components and have access to lower layes of the stack
 #    (all the way down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing
 #    the Android security model.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps protected_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps protected_service:service_manager find;

 # SELinux is not an API for untrusted apps to use
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps selinuxfs:file no_rw_file_perms;

 # Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
 # are running in an emulated environment.
 # b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
 # https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
 # This will go away in a future Android release
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -untrusted_app_25 } proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps proc_tty_drivers:file ~r_file_perms;

 # Untrusted apps are not allowed to use cgroups.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup:file *;
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup_v2:file *;

 # /mnt/sdcard symlink was supposed to have been removed in Gingerbread. Apps
 # must not use it.
 neverallow {
   all_untrusted_apps
   -untrusted_app_25
   -untrusted_app_27
 } mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file *;

 # Only privileged apps may find the incident service
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps incident_service:service_manager find;

 # Do not allow untrusted app to read hidden system proprerties.
 # We do not include in the exclusions other normally untrusted applications such as mediaprovider
 #  due to the specific logging use cases.
 # Context: b/193912100
 neverallow {
   all_untrusted_apps
   -mediaprovider
   -mediaprovider_app
 } { userdebug_or_eng_prop }:file read;

 # Do not allow untrusted app to access /dev/socket/mdnsd since U. The socket is
 # used to communicate to the mdnsd responder. The mdnsd responder will be
 # replaced by a java implementation which is integrated into the system server.
 # For untrusted apps running with API level 33-, they still have access to
 # /dev/socket/mdnsd for backward compatibility.
 neverallow {
   all_untrusted_apps
   -untrusted_app_25
   -untrusted_app_27
   -untrusted_app_29
   -untrusted_app_30
   -untrusted_app_32
 } mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
 neverallow {
   all_untrusted_apps
   -untrusted_app_25
   -untrusted_app_27
   -untrusted_app_29
   -untrusted_app_30
   -untrusted_app_32
 } mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;

 # Do not allow untrusted apps to use anonymous inodes. At the moment,
 # type transitions are the only way to distinguish between different
 # anon_inode usages like userfaultfd and io_uring. This prevents us from
 # creating a more fine-grained neverallow policy for each anon_inode usage.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:anon_inode *;
	###
	### neverallow rules for untrusted app domains
	###

	define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{
	ephemeral_app
	isolated_app
	isolated_app_all
	isolated_compute_app
	mediaprovider
	mediaprovider_app
	untrusted_app
	untrusted_app_25
	untrusted_app_27
	untrusted_app_29
	untrusted_app_30
	untrusted_app_all
	}')
	# Receive or send uevent messages.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;

	# Receive or send generic netlink messages
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_socket *;

	# Read or write kernel printk buffer
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps kmsg_device:chr_file no_rw_file_perms;

	# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
	# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps { debugfs_type -debugfs_kcov }:file read;
	neverallow {all_untrusted_apps userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')} debugfs_type:{ file lnk_file } read;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to register services.
	# Only trusted components of Android should be registering
	# services.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps service_manager_type:service_manager add;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to use VendorBinder
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps vndservice_manager_type:service_manager *;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to connect to the property service
	# or set properties. b/10243159
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_socket:sock_file write;
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_type:property_service set;

	# net.dns properties are not a public API. Disallow untrusted apps from reading this property.
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps } net_dns_prop:file read;

	# radio_cdma_ecm_prop properties are not a public API. Disallow untrusted apps from reading this property.
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps } radio_cdma_ecm_prop:file read;

	# Shared libraries created by trusted components within an app home
	# directory can be dlopen()ed. To maintain the W^X property, these files
	# must never be writable to the app.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps app_exec_data_file:file
	{ append create link relabelfrom relabelto rename setattr write };

	# Block calling execve() on files in an apps home directory.
	# This is a W^X violation (loading executable code from a writable
	# home directory). For compatibility, allow for targetApi <= 28.
	# b/112357170
	neverallow {
	all_untrusted_apps
	-untrusted_app_25
	-untrusted_app_27
	-runas_app
	} { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file execute_no_trans;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to invoke dex2oat. This was historically required
	# by ART for compiling secondary dex files but has been removed in Q.
	# Exempt legacy apps (targetApi<=28) for compatibility.
	neverallow {
	all_untrusted_apps
	-untrusted_app_25
	-untrusted_app_27
	} dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
	# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
	# enforced via levelFrom=user in seapp_contexts and the mls
	# constraints. As there is no direct way to specify a neverallow
	# on attribute assignment, this relies on the fact that fork
	# permission only makes sense within a domain (hence should
	# never be granted to any other domain within mlstrustedsubject)
	# and an untrusted app is allowed fork permission to itself.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps mlstrustedsubject:process fork;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to hard link to any files.
	# In particular, if an untrusted app links to other app data
	# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
	# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
	# bugs, so we want to ensure untrusted apps never have this
	# capability.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps file_type:file link;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to access network MAC address file
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_net:file no_rw_file_perms;

	# Do not allow any write access to files in /sys
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs_type:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

	# Apps may never access the default sysfs label.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps sysfs:file no_rw_file_perms;

	# Restrict socket ioctls. Either 1. disallow privileged ioctls, 2. disallow the
	# ioctl permission, or 3. disallow the socket class.
	neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps domain:{ icmp_socket rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{ netlink_route_socket netlink_selinux_socket } ioctl;
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:{
	socket netlink_socket packet_socket key_socket appletalk_socket
	netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket
	netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_audit_socket
	netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket
	netlink_iscsi_socket netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket
	netlink_netfilter_socket netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket
	netlink_rdma_socket netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket
	ax25_socket ipx_socket netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket
	atmsvc_socket rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
	bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket ieee802154_socket caif_socket
	alg_socket nfc_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
	} *;

	# Apps can read/write an already open vsock (e.g. created by
	# virtualizationservice) but nothing more than that (e.g. creating a
	# new vsock, etc.)
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:vsock_socket ~{ getattr getopt read write };

	# Disallow sending RTM_GETLINK messages on netlink sockets.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
	neverallow priv_app domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };

	# Disallow sending RTM_GETNEIGH{TBL} messages on netlink sockets.
	neverallow {
	all_untrusted_apps
	-untrusted_app_25
	-untrusted_app_27
	-untrusted_app_29
	-untrusted_app_30
	} domain:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_getneigh;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
	# internal storage or sdcard.
	# World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
	# with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
	# application un-installation.
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } {
	fs_type
	-sdcard_type
	-fuse
	file_type
	-app_data_file # The apps sandbox itself
	-privapp_data_file
	-app_exec_data_file # stored within the app sandbox directory
	-media_rw_data_file # Internal storage. Known that apps can
	# leave artfacts here after uninstall.
	-user_profile_data_file # Access to profile files
	userdebug_or_eng(`
	-method_trace_data_file # only on ro.debuggable=1
	-coredump_file # userdebug/eng only
	')
	}:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };

	# No untrusted component except mediaprovider_app should be touching /dev/fuse
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider_app } fuse_device:chr_file *;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to directly open the tun_device
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file open;
	# The tun_device ioctls below are not allowed, to prove equivalence
	# to the kernel patch at
	# https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/11cee2be0c2062ba88f04eb51196506f870a3b5d%5E%21
	neverallowxperm all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file ioctl ~{ FIOCLEX FIONCLEX TUNGETIFF };

	# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps anr_data_file:dir ~search;

	# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
	# Create a more specific label if needed
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
	proc
	proc_asound
	proc_kmsg
	proc_loadavg
	proc_mounts
	proc_pagetypeinfo
	proc_slabinfo
	proc_stat
	proc_swaps
	proc_uptime
	proc_version
	proc_vmallocinfo
	proc_vmstat
	}:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

	# /proc/filesystems is accessible to mediaprovider_app only since it handles
	# external storage
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps - mediaprovider_app } proc_filesystems:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

	# Avoid all access to kernel configuration
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps config_gz:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

	# Do not allow untrusted apps access to preloads data files
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps preloads_data_file:file no_rw_file_perms;

	# Locking of files on /system could lead to denial of service attacks
	# against privileged system components
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps system_file:file lock;

	# Do not permit untrusted apps to perform actions on HwBinder service_manager
	# other than find actions for services listed below
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps *:hwservice_manager ~find;

	# Do not permit access from apps which host arbitrary code to the protected services
	# The two main reasons for this are:
	# 1. Protected HwBinder servers do not perform client authentication because
	# vendor code does not have a way to understand apps or their relation to
	# caller UID information and, even if it did, those services either operate
	# at a level below that of apps (e.g., HALs) or must not rely on app identity
	# for authorization. Thus, to be safe, the default assumption for all added
	# vendor services is that they treat all their clients as equally authorized
	# to perform operations offered by the service.
	# 2. HAL servers contain code with higher incidence rate of security issues
	# than system/core components and have access to lower layes of the stack
	# (all the way down to hardware) thus increasing opportunities for bypassing
	# the Android security model.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps protected_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps protected_service:service_manager find;

	# SELinux is not an API for untrusted apps to use
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps selinuxfs:file no_rw_file_perms;

	# Access to /proc/tty/drivers, to allow apps to determine if they
	# are running in an emulated environment.
	# b/33214085 b/33814662 b/33791054 b/33211769
	# https://github.com/strazzere/anti-emulator/blob/master/AntiEmulator/src/diff/strazzere/anti/emulator/FindEmulator.java
	# This will go away in a future Android release
	neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -untrusted_app_25 } proc_tty_drivers:file r_file_perms;
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps proc_tty_drivers:file ~r_file_perms;

	# Untrusted apps are not allowed to use cgroups.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup:file *;
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup_v2:file *;

	# /mnt/sdcard symlink was supposed to have been removed in Gingerbread. Apps
	# must not use it.
	neverallow {
	all_untrusted_apps
	-untrusted_app_25
	-untrusted_app_27
	} mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file *;

	# Only privileged apps may find the incident service
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps incident_service:service_manager find;

	# Do not allow untrusted app to read hidden system proprerties.
	# We do not include in the exclusions other normally untrusted applications such as mediaprovider
	# due to the specific logging use cases.
	# Context: b/193912100
	neverallow {
	all_untrusted_apps
	-mediaprovider
	-mediaprovider_app
	} { userdebug_or_eng_prop }:file read;

	# Do not allow untrusted app to access /dev/socket/mdnsd since U. The socket is
	# used to communicate to the mdnsd responder. The mdnsd responder will be
	# replaced by a java implementation which is integrated into the system server.
	# For untrusted apps running with API level 33-, they still have access to
	# /dev/socket/mdnsd for backward compatibility.
	neverallow {
	all_untrusted_apps
	-untrusted_app_25
	-untrusted_app_27
	-untrusted_app_29
	-untrusted_app_30
	-untrusted_app_32
	} mdnsd_socket:sock_file write;
	neverallow {
	all_untrusted_apps
	-untrusted_app_25
	-untrusted_app_27
	-untrusted_app_29
	-untrusted_app_30
	-untrusted_app_32
	} mdnsd:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	# Do not allow untrusted apps to use anonymous inodes. At the moment,
	# type transitions are the only way to distinguish between different
	# anon_inode usages like userfaultfd and io_uring. This prevents us from
	# creating a more fine-grained neverallow policy for each anon_inode usage.
	neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:anon_inode *;