public/hal_neverallows.te

# only HALs responsible for network hardware should have privileged
# network capabilities
neverallow {
  halserverdomain
  -hal_bluetooth_server
  -hal_wifi_server
  -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
  -rild
} self:capability { net_admin net_raw };

# Unless a HAL's job is to manage network hardware, it should not be
# using network sockets.
neverallow {
  halserverdomain
  -hal_gnss # TODO b/36085168 b/35757613
  -hal_wifi_server
  -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
  -rild
} domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;

###
# HALs are defined as an attribute and so a given domain could hypothetically
# have multiple HALs in it (or even all of them) with the subsequent policy of
# the domain comprised of the union of all the HALs.
#
# This is a problem because
# 1) Security sensitive components should only be accessed by specific HALs.
# 2) hwbinder_call and the restrictions it provides cannot be reasoned about in
#    the platform.
# 3) The platform cannot reason about defense in depth if there are
#    monolithic domains etc.
#
# As an example, hal_keymaster and hal_gatekeeper can access the TEE and while
# its OK for them to share a process its not OK with them to share processes
# with other hals.
#
# The following neverallow rules, in conjuntion with CTS tests, assert that
# these security principles are adhered to.
#
# Do not allow a hal to exec another process without a domain transition.
# TODO remove exemptions.
neverallow {
  halserverdomain
  -hal_dumpstate_server
  -rild
} { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
# Do not allow a process other than init to transition into a HAL domain.
neverallow { domain -init } halserverdomain:process transition;
# Only allow transitioning to a domain by running its executable. Do not
# allow transitioning into a HAL domain by use of seclabel in an
# init.*.rc script.
neverallow * halserverdomain:process dyntransition;