app.te - LeafOS-Project/android_system_sepolicy - Gitiles

 ###
 ### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
 ###
 ### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
 ### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
 ### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
 ### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
 ###

 # Dalvik Compiler JIT Mapping.
 allow appdomain self:process execmem;
 allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;

 # Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
 allow appdomain zygote:fd use;

 # gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
 # valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
 allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;

 # gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
 allow appdomain self:process ptrace;

 # Read system properties managed by zygote.
 allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;

 # Notify zygote of death;
 allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;

 # Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
 allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
 allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;

 # child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
 allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };

 # Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
 allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
 allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
 allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };

 # Communication with other apps via fifos
 allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

 # Communicate with surfaceflinger.
 allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };

 # App sandbox file accesses.
 allow appdomain app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;

 # lib subdirectory of /data/data dir is system-owned.
 allow appdomain system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain system_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans open execmod };

 # Keychain and user-trusted credentials
 allow appdomain keychain_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain keychain_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;

 # Access to OEM provided data and apps
 allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;

 # Execute the shell or other system executables.
 allow appdomain shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 allow appdomain system_file:file rx_file_perms;

 # Execute dex2oat when apps call dexclassloader
 allow appdomain dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;

 # Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
 allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write };

 # Write to /data/anr/traces.txt.
 allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
 allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };

 # Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
 allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
 allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
 allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };

 # Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
 allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
 # Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
 # So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
 allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

 # Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
 # They need that to render the standard UI.
 allow appdomain gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };

 # Use the Binder.
 binder_use(appdomain)
 # Perform binder IPC to binder services.
 binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
 # Perform binder IPC to other apps.
 binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)

 # Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
 # hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
 # Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
 # are examined.
 allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };

 # Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
 # to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
 allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
 allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
 allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
 # Backup ability using 'adb backup'
 allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;

 # Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
 allow appdomain media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };

 # Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
 allow appdomain radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };

 # Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
 # Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
 # cropping or taking user photos.
 allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };

 # Access SDcard via the fuse mount.
 allow appdomain fuse:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain fuse:file create_file_perms;

 # Access OBBs (vfat images) mounted by vold (b/17633509)
 allow appdomain vfat:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain vfat:file r_file_perms;

 # Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
 # http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
 #
 # USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
 # and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
 allow appdomain usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
 allow appdomain usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };

 # For art.
 allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;

 # /data/dalvik-cache/profiles
 allow appdomain dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:dir { search getattr };
 allow appdomain dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:file rw_file_perms;

 # Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
 allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
 allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;

 # Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
 allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain apk_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };

 # /data/resource-cache
 allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

 ###
 ### CTS-specific rules
 ###

 # For cts/tools/device-setup/TestDeviceSetup/src/android/tests/getinfo/RootProcessScanner.java.
 # Reads /proc/pid/status and statm entries to check that
 # no unexpected root processes are running.
 # Also for cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/VoldExploitTest.java
 # Reads /proc/pid/cmdline of vold.
 allow appdomain domain:dir { open read search getattr };
 allow appdomain domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };

 # For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
 # testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
 allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
 # Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.

 # For cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/SELinuxTest.java
 # Check SELinux policy and contexts.
 selinux_check_access(appdomain)
 selinux_check_context(appdomain)
 # Validate that each process is running in the correct security context.
 allow appdomain domain:process getattr;

 # logd access
 read_logd(appdomain)
 control_logd(appdomain)
 # application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
 allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;

 allow appdomain keystore:keystore_key { test get insert delete exist saw sign verify };

 use_keystore(appdomain)

 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
 ### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
 ###

 # Superuser capabilities.
 # bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm.
 neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
 neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability2 *;

 # Block device access.
 neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };

 # Access to any of the following character devices.
 neverallow appdomain {
     audio_device
     camera_device
     dm_device
     radio_device
     gps_device
     rpmsg_device
 }:chr_file { read write };

 # Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
 neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };

 neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
     { read write };
 neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
     { read write };
 neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };

 # Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
 neverallow appdomain
     self:{
         netlink_socket
         netlink_firewall_socket
         netlink_tcpdiag_socket
         netlink_nflog_socket
         netlink_xfrm_socket
         netlink_audit_socket
         netlink_ip6fw_socket
         netlink_dnrt_socket
     } *;

 # These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
 # Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
 # of rooting vulns in the past.
 neverallow appdomain self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };

 # Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
 neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;

 # Unix domain sockets.
 neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
 neverallow appdomain installd_socket:sock_file write;
 neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -radio -shell -system_app -nfc }
     property_socket:sock_file write;
 neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
 neverallow appdomain vold_socket:sock_file write;
 neverallow appdomain zygote_socket:sock_file write;

 # ptrace access to non-app domains.
 neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;

 # Write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
 neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file write;

 # signal access to non-app domains.
 # sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
 # signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
 # All others prohibited.
 neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process
     { sigkill sigstop signal };

 # Transition to a non-app domain.
 # Exception for the shell domain, can transition to runas, etc.
 neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:process
     { transition dyntransition };

 # Write to rootfs.
 neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

 # Write to /system.
 neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

 # Write to entrypoint executables.
 neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

 # Write to system-owned parts of /data.
 # This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
 # specified in file_contexts.  Define a different type for portions
 # that should be writable by apps.
 # Exception for system_app for Settings.
 neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
     system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

 # Write to various other parts of /data.
 neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow appdomain gps_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
     apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
     apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
     apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
     apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow { appdomain -shell }
     shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
     bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow appdomain
     keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow appdomain
     systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow appdomain
     wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
 neverallow appdomain
     dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
     { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

 # Access to factory files.
 neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
 neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;

 # Write to various pseudo file systems.
 neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
     sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
 neverallow appdomain
     proc:dir_file_class_set write;

 # Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
 neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
     kernel:system { syslog_mod syslog_console };
 neverallow { appdomain -system_app -shell }
     kernel:system syslog_read;

 # Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
 # i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
 neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;

 # Ability to set system properties.
 neverallow { appdomain -system_app -radio -shell -bluetooth -nfc }
     property_type:property_service set;
	###
	### Domain for all zygote spawned apps
	###
	### This file is the base policy for all zygote spawned apps.
	### Other policy files, such as isolated_app.te, untrusted_app.te, etc
	### extend from this policy. Only policies which should apply to ALL
	### zygote spawned apps should be added here.
	###

	# Dalvik Compiler JIT Mapping.
	allow appdomain self:process execmem;
	allow appdomain ashmem_device:chr_file execute;

	# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
	allow appdomain zygote:fd use;

	# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
	# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
	allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;

	# gdbserver for ndk-gdb ptrace attaches to app process.
	allow appdomain self:process ptrace;

	# Read system properties managed by zygote.
	allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file read;

	# Notify zygote of death;
	allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;

	# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
	allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
	allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;

	# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
	allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };

	# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
	allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
	allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
	allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };

	# Communication with other apps via fifos
	allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
	allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };

	# App sandbox file accesses.
	allow appdomain app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
	allow appdomain app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;

	# lib subdirectory of /data/data dir is system-owned.
	allow appdomain system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow appdomain system_data_file:file { execute execute_no_trans open execmod };

	# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
	allow appdomain keychain_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow appdomain keychain_data_file:file r_file_perms;
	allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;

	# Access to OEM provided data and apps
	allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;

	# Execute the shell or other system executables.
	allow appdomain shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
	allow appdomain system_file:file rx_file_perms;

	# Execute dex2oat when apps call dexclassloader
	allow appdomain dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;

	# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
	allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write };

	# Write to /data/anr/traces.txt.
	allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
	allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };

	# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
	allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
	allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
	allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };

	# Write to /proc/net/xt_qtaguid/ctrl file.
	allow appdomain qtaguid_proc:file rw_file_perms;
	# Everybody can read the xt_qtaguid resource tracking misc dev.
	# So allow all apps to read from /dev/xt_qtaguid.
	allow appdomain qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

	# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
	# They need that to render the standard UI.
	allow appdomain gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };

	# Use the Binder.
	binder_use(appdomain)
	# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
	binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
	# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
	binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)

	# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
	# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
	# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
	# are examined.
	allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };

	# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
	# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
	allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr };
	allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr };
	allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
	# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
	allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;

	# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
	allow appdomain media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };

	# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
	allow appdomain radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };

	# Read and write system app data files passed over Binder.
	# Motivating case was /data/data/com.android.settings/cache/*.jpg for
	# cropping or taking user photos.
	allow untrusted_app system_app_data_file:file { read write getattr };

	# Access SDcard via the fuse mount.
	allow appdomain fuse:dir create_dir_perms;
	allow appdomain fuse:file create_file_perms;

	# Access OBBs (vfat images) mounted by vold (b/17633509)
	allow appdomain vfat:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow appdomain vfat:file r_file_perms;

	# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
	# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
	#
	# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
	# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
	allow appdomain usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
	allow appdomain usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };

	# For art.
	allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;

	# /data/dalvik-cache/profiles
	allow appdomain dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:dir { search getattr };
	allow appdomain dalvikcache_profiles_data_file:file rw_file_perms;

	# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
	allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
	allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;

	# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
	allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow appdomain apk_data_file:file { rx_file_perms execmod };

	# /data/resource-cache
	allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
	allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

	###
	### CTS-specific rules
	###

	# For cts/tools/device-setup/TestDeviceSetup/src/android/tests/getinfo/RootProcessScanner.java.
	# Reads /proc/pid/status and statm entries to check that
	# no unexpected root processes are running.
	# Also for cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/VoldExploitTest.java
	# Reads /proc/pid/cmdline of vold.
	allow appdomain domain:dir { open read search getattr };
	allow appdomain domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };

	# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
	# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
	allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
	# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.

	# For cts/tests/tests/security/src/android/security/cts/SELinuxTest.java
	# Check SELinux policy and contexts.
	selinux_check_access(appdomain)
	selinux_check_context(appdomain)
	# Validate that each process is running in the correct security context.
	allow appdomain domain:process getattr;

	# logd access
	read_logd(appdomain)
	control_logd(appdomain)
	# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
	allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;

	allow appdomain keystore:keystore_key { test get insert delete exist saw sign verify };

	use_keystore(appdomain)

	###
	### Neverallow rules
	###
	### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
	###

	# Superuser capabilities.
	# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm.
	neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability *;
	neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } self:capability2 *;

	# Block device access.
	neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };

	# Access to any of the following character devices.
	neverallow appdomain {
	audio_device
	camera_device
	dm_device
	radio_device
	gps_device
	rpmsg_device
	}:chr_file { read write };

	# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
	neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };

	neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
	{ read write };
	neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
	{ read write };
	neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };

	# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
	neverallow appdomain
	self:{
	netlink_socket
	netlink_firewall_socket
	netlink_tcpdiag_socket
	netlink_nflog_socket
	netlink_xfrm_socket
	netlink_audit_socket
	netlink_ip6fw_socket
	netlink_dnrt_socket
	} *;

	# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
	# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
	# of rooting vulns in the past.
	neverallow appdomain self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };

	# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
	neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;

	# Unix domain sockets.
	neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
	neverallow appdomain installd_socket:sock_file write;
	neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -radio -shell -system_app -nfc }
	property_socket:sock_file write;
	neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;
	neverallow appdomain vold_socket:sock_file write;
	neverallow appdomain zygote_socket:sock_file write;

	# ptrace access to non-app domains.
	neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;

	# Write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
	neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file write;

	# signal access to non-app domains.
	# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
	# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
	# All others prohibited.
	neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process
	{ sigkill sigstop signal };

	# Transition to a non-app domain.
	# Exception for the shell domain, can transition to runas, etc.
	neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:process
	{ transition dyntransition };

	# Write to rootfs.
	neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

	# Write to /system.
	neverallow appdomain system_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

	# Write to entrypoint executables.
	neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

	# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
	# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
	# specified in file_contexts. Define a different type for portions
	# that should be writable by apps.
	# Exception for system_app for Settings.
	neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
	system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

	# Write to various other parts of /data.
	neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow appdomain gps_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
	apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
	apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
	apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
	apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow { appdomain -shell }
	shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
	bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow appdomain
	keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow appdomain
	systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow appdomain
	wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
	neverallow appdomain
	dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
	{ create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

	# Access to factory files.
	neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
	neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;

	# Write to various pseudo file systems.
	neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
	sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
	neverallow appdomain
	proc:dir_file_class_set write;

	# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
	neverallow { appdomain -system_app }
	kernel:system { syslog_mod syslog_console };
	neverallow { appdomain -system_app -shell }
	kernel:system syslog_read;

	# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
	# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
	neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;

	# Ability to set system properties.
	neverallow { appdomain -system_app -radio -shell -bluetooth -nfc }
	property_type:property_service set;