| # Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB or console service. |
| type shell, domain, mlstrustedsubject; |
| type shell_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type; |
| |
| # Create and use network sockets. |
| net_domain(shell) |
| |
| # logcat |
| read_logd(shell) |
| control_logd(shell) |
| # logcat -L (directly, or via dumpstate) |
| allow shell pstorefs:dir search; |
| allow shell pstorefs:file r_file_perms; |
| |
| # Root fs. |
| allow shell rootfs:dir r_dir_perms; |
| |
| # read files in /data/anr |
| allow shell anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; |
| allow shell anr_data_file:file r_file_perms; |
| |
| # Access /data/local/tmp. |
| allow shell shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms; |
| allow shell shell_data_file:file create_file_perms; |
| allow shell shell_data_file:file rx_file_perms; |
| allow shell shell_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms; |
| |
| # Read and delete from /data/local/traces. |
| allow shell trace_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink }; |
| allow shell trace_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name write }; |
| |
| # Access /data/misc/profman. |
| allow shell profman_dump_data_file:dir { write remove_name r_dir_perms }; |
| allow shell profman_dump_data_file:file { unlink r_file_perms }; |
| |
| # Read/execute files in /data/nativetest |
| userdebug_or_eng(` |
| allow shell nativetest_data_file:dir r_dir_perms; |
| allow shell nativetest_data_file:file rx_file_perms; |
| ') |
| |
| # adb bugreport |
| unix_socket_connect(shell, dumpstate, dumpstate) |
| |
| allow shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms; |
| allow shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; |
| allow shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; |
| |
| allow shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms; |
| allow shell input_device:chr_file r_file_perms; |
| |
| r_dir_file(shell, system_file) |
| allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms; |
| allow shell toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms; |
| allow shell tzdatacheck_exec:file rx_file_perms; |
| allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms; |
| allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms; |
| |
| r_dir_file(shell, apk_data_file) |
| |
| # Set properties. |
| set_prop(shell, shell_prop) |
| set_prop(shell, ctl_bugreport_prop) |
| set_prop(shell, ctl_dumpstate_prop) |
| set_prop(shell, dumpstate_prop) |
| set_prop(shell, exported_dumpstate_prop) |
| set_prop(shell, debug_prop) |
| set_prop(shell, powerctl_prop) |
| set_prop(shell, log_tag_prop) |
| set_prop(shell, wifi_log_prop) |
| # Allow shell to start/stop traced via the persist.traced.enable |
| # property (which also takes care of /data/misc initialization). |
| set_prop(shell, traced_enabled_prop) |
| # adjust is_loggable properties |
| userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, log_prop)') |
| # logpersist script |
| userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, logpersistd_logging_prop)') |
| # Allow shell to start/stop heapprofd via the persist.heapprofd.enable |
| # property. |
| set_prop(shell, heapprofd_enabled_prop) |
| # Allow shell to start/stop traced_perf via the persist.traced_perf.enable |
| # property. |
| set_prop(shell, traced_perf_enabled_prop) |
| # Allow shell to start/stop gsid via ctl.start|stop|restart gsid. |
| set_prop(shell, ctl_gsid_prop) |
| # Allow shell to enable Dynamic System Update |
| set_prop(shell, dynamic_system_prop) |
| # Allow shell to mock an OTA using persist.pm.mock-upgrade |
| set_prop(shell, mock_ota_prop) |
| |
| userdebug_or_eng(` |
| # "systrace --boot" support - allow boottrace service to run |
| allow shell boottrace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; |
| allow shell boottrace_data_file:file create_file_perms; |
| set_prop(shell, persist_debug_prop) |
| ') |
| |
| # Read device's serial number from system properties |
| get_prop(shell, serialno_prop) |
| |
| # Allow shell to read the vendor security patch level for CTS |
| get_prop(shell, vendor_security_patch_level_prop) |
| |
| # Read state of logging-related properties |
| get_prop(shell, device_logging_prop) |
| |
| # Read state of boot reason properties |
| get_prop(shell, bootloader_boot_reason_prop) |
| get_prop(shell, last_boot_reason_prop) |
| get_prop(shell, system_boot_reason_prop) |
| |
| # Allow reading the outcome of perf_event_open LSM support test for CTS. |
| get_prop(shell, init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop) |
| |
| # allow shell access to services |
| allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list; |
| # don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service |
| # TODO: why is this so broad? Tightening candidate? It needs at list: |
| # - dumpstate_service (so it can receive dumpstate progress updates) |
| allow shell { |
| service_manager_type |
| -apex_service |
| -dnsresolver_service |
| -gatekeeper_service |
| -incident_service |
| -installd_service |
| -iorapd_service |
| -netd_service |
| -system_suspend_control_service |
| -virtual_touchpad_service |
| -vold_service |
| -vr_hwc_service |
| -default_android_service |
| }:service_manager find; |
| allow shell dumpstate:binder call; |
| |
| # allow shell to get information from hwservicemanager |
| # for instance, listing hardware services with lshal |
| hwbinder_use(shell) |
| allow shell hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list; |
| |
| # allow shell to look through /proc/ for lsmod, ps, top, netstat, vmstat. |
| r_dir_file(shell, proc_net_type) |
| |
| allow shell { |
| proc_asound |
| proc_filesystems |
| proc_interrupts |
| proc_loadavg # b/124024827 |
| proc_meminfo |
| proc_modules |
| proc_pid_max |
| proc_slabinfo |
| proc_stat |
| proc_timer |
| proc_uptime |
| proc_version |
| proc_vmstat |
| proc_zoneinfo |
| }:file r_file_perms; |
| |
| # allow listing network interfaces under /sys/class/net. |
| allow shell sysfs_net:dir r_dir_perms; |
| |
| r_dir_file(shell, cgroup) |
| allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr }; |
| allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr }; |
| |
| # statvfs() of /proc and other labeled filesystems |
| # (yaffs2, jffs2, ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, f2fs, squashfs, overlay) |
| allow shell { proc labeledfs }:filesystem getattr; |
| |
| # stat() of /dev |
| allow shell device:dir getattr; |
| |
| # allow shell to read /proc/pid/attr/current for ps -Z |
| allow shell domain:process getattr; |
| |
| # Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes |
| allow shell selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms; |
| allow shell selinuxfs:file r_file_perms; |
| |
| # enable shell domain to read/write files/dirs for bootchart data |
| # User will creates the start and stop file via adb shell |
| # and read other files created by init process under /data/bootchart |
| allow shell bootchart_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; |
| allow shell bootchart_data_file:file create_file_perms; |
| |
| # Make sure strace works for the non-privileged shell user |
| allow shell self:process ptrace; |
| |
| # allow shell to get battery info |
| allow shell sysfs:dir r_dir_perms; |
| allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:dir r_dir_perms; |
| allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms; |
| |
| # Allow access to ion memory allocation device. |
| allow shell ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; |
| |
| # |
| # filesystem test for insecure chr_file's is done |
| # via a host side test |
| # |
| allow shell dev_type:dir r_dir_perms; |
| allow shell dev_type:chr_file getattr; |
| |
| # /dev/fd is a symlink |
| allow shell proc:lnk_file getattr; |
| |
| # |
| # filesystem test for insucre blk_file's is done |
| # via hostside test |
| # |
| allow shell dev_type:blk_file getattr; |
| |
| # read selinux policy files |
| allow shell file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; |
| allow shell property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; |
| allow shell seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; |
| allow shell service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms; |
| allow shell sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms; |
| |
| # Allow shell to start up vendor shell |
| allow shell vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms; |
| |
| # Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. Allow shell to |
| # execute them. |
| recovery_only(` |
| allow shell rootfs:file rx_file_perms; |
| ') |
| |
| ### |
| ### Neverallow rules |
| ### |
| |
| # Do not allow shell to hard link to any files. |
| # In particular, if shell hard links to app data |
| # files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion |
| # of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security |
| # bugs, so we want to ensure the shell user never has this |
| # capability. |
| neverallow shell file_type:file link; |
| |
| # Do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands |
| neverallowxperm shell domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls; |
| |
| # limit shell access to sensitive char drivers to |
| # only getattr required for host side test. |
| neverallow shell { |
| fuse_device |
| hw_random_device |
| port_device |
| }:chr_file ~getattr; |
| |
| # Limit shell to only getattr on blk devices for host side tests. |
| neverallow shell dev_type:blk_file ~getattr; |
| |
| # b/30861057: Shell access to existing input devices is an abuse |
| # vector. The shell user can inject events that look like they |
| # originate from the touchscreen etc. |
| # Everyone should have already moved to UiAutomation#injectInputEvent |
| # if they are running instrumentation tests (i.e. CTS), Monkey for |
| # their stress tests, and the input command (adb shell input ...) for |
| # injecting swipes and things. |
| neverallow shell input_device:chr_file no_w_file_perms; |