blob: f98be3d3c15405230c7226f874ecad190a5a2f95 [file] [log] [blame]
# network manager
type netd, domain;
type netd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(netd)
allow netd self:capability { net_admin net_raw kill };
allow netd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
allow netd self:netlink_route_socket *;
allow netd self:netlink_nflog_socket *;
allow netd self:rawip_socket *;
allow netd self:udp_socket *;
allow netd node:udp_socket node_bind;
allow netd port:udp_socket name_bind;
allow netd self:unix_stream_socket *;
allow netd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms;
allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
# For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush.
# XXX Split /proc/sys/net into its own type.
allow netd proc:file write;
# For /sys/modules/bcmdhd/parameters/firmware_path
# XXX Split into its own type.
allow netd sysfs:file write;
# Set dhcp lease for PAN connection
unix_socket_connect(netd, property, init)
allow netd system_prop:property_service set;
# Connect to PAN
domain_auto_trans(netd, dhcp_exec, dhcp)
allow netd dhcp:process signal;
# Needed to update /data/misc/wifi/hostapd.conf
# TODO: See what we can do to reduce the need for
# these capabilities
allow netd self:capability { dac_override chown fowner };
allow netd wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow netd wifi_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
# Allow netd to spawn hostapd in it's own domain
domain_auto_trans(netd, hostapd_exec, hostapd)
allow netd hostapd:process signal;
# Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
domain_auto_trans(netd, dnsmasq_exec, dnsmasq)
allow netd dnsmasq:process signal;
# Allow netd to start clatd in its own domain
domain_auto_trans(netd, clatd_exec, clatd)
allow netd clatd:process signal;
# Support netd running mdnsd
# TODO: prune this back further
allow netd ctl_default_prop:property_service set;
allow netd device:sock_file write;
###
### Neverallow rules
###
### netd should NEVER do any of this
# Block device access.
neverallow netd dev_type:blk_file { read write };
# Kernel memory access.
neverallow netd kmem_device:chr_file { read write };
# Setting SELinux enforcing status or booleans.
# Conditionally allowed to system_app for SEAndroidManager.
neverallow netd kernel:security { setenforce setbool };
# Load security policy.
neverallow netd kernel:security load_policy;
# ptrace any other app
neverallow netd { domain }:process ptrace;
# Write to /system.
neverallow netd system_file:dir_file_class_set write;
# Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data
neverallow netd { app_data_file system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write;