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/*
* Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#define LOG_TAG "keymaster_hidl_hal_test"
#include <cutils/log.h>
#include <vector>
#include "Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h"
#include <cutils/properties.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <keymasterV4_1/attestation_record.h>
#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test::add_tag_from_prop;
// Not to dump the attestation by default. Can enable by specify the parameter
// "--dump_attestations" on lunching VTS
static bool dumpAttestations = false;
namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0 {
bool operator==(const AuthorizationSet& a, const AuthorizationSet& b) {
return std::equal(a.begin(), a.end(), b.begin(), b.end());
}
} // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0
namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1 {
inline ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, Tag tag) {
return os << toString(tag);
}
namespace test {
using std::string;
using std::tuple;
namespace {
char nibble2hex[16] = {'0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
'8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f'};
string bin2hex(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& data) {
string retval;
retval.reserve(data.size() * 2 + 1);
for (uint8_t byte : data) {
retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & (byte >> 4)]);
retval.push_back(nibble2hex[0x0F & byte]);
}
return retval;
}
inline void dumpContent(string content) {
std::cout << content << std::endl;
}
struct AuthorizationSetDifferences {
string aName;
string bName;
AuthorizationSet aWhackB;
AuthorizationSet bWhackA;
};
std::ostream& operator<<(std::ostream& o, const AuthorizationSetDifferences& diffs) {
if (!diffs.aWhackB.empty()) {
o << "Set " << diffs.aName << " contains the following that " << diffs.bName << " does not"
<< diffs.aWhackB;
if (!diffs.bWhackA.empty()) o << std::endl;
}
if (!diffs.bWhackA.empty()) {
o << "Set " << diffs.bName << " contains the following that " << diffs.aName << " does not"
<< diffs.bWhackA;
}
return o;
}
// Computes and returns a \ b and b \ a ('\' is the set-difference operator, a \ b means all the
// elements that are in a but not b, i.e. take a and whack all the elements in b) to the provided
// stream. The sets must be sorted.
//
// This provides a simple and clear view of how the two sets differ, generally much
// easier than scrutinizing printouts of the two sets.
AuthorizationSetDifferences difference(string aName, const AuthorizationSet& a, string bName,
const AuthorizationSet& b) {
AuthorizationSetDifferences diffs = {std::move(aName), std::move(bName), {}, {}};
std::set_difference(a.begin(), a.end(), b.begin(), b.end(), std::back_inserter(diffs.aWhackB));
std::set_difference(b.begin(), b.end(), a.begin(), a.end(), std::back_inserter(diffs.bWhackA));
return diffs;
}
#define DIFFERENCE(a, b) difference(#a, a, #b, b)
void check_root_of_trust(const RootOfTrust& root_of_trust) {
char vb_meta_device_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
if (property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state", vb_meta_device_state, "") == 0) return;
char vb_meta_digest[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
EXPECT_GT(property_get("ro.boot.vbmeta.digest", vb_meta_digest, ""), 0);
EXPECT_EQ(vb_meta_digest, bin2hex(root_of_trust.verified_boot_hash));
// Verified boot key should be all 0's if the boot state is not verified or self signed
HidlBuf empty_boot_key(string(32, '\0'));
char vb_meta_bootstate[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
auto& verified_boot_key = root_of_trust.verified_boot_key;
auto& verified_boot_state = root_of_trust.verified_boot_state;
EXPECT_GT(property_get("ro.boot.verifiedbootstate", vb_meta_bootstate, ""), 0);
if (!strcmp(vb_meta_bootstate, "green")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, V4_0::KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_VERIFIED);
EXPECT_NE(verified_boot_key, empty_boot_key);
} else if (!strcmp(vb_meta_bootstate, "yellow")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, V4_0::KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_SELF_SIGNED);
EXPECT_NE(verified_boot_key, empty_boot_key);
} else if (!strcmp(vb_meta_bootstate, "orange")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, V4_0::KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED);
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_key, empty_boot_key);
} else if (!strcmp(vb_meta_bootstate, "red")) {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, V4_0::KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_FAILED);
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_state, V4_0::KM_VERIFIED_BOOT_UNVERIFIED);
EXPECT_EQ(verified_boot_key, empty_boot_key);
}
}
bool tag_in_list(const KeyParameter& entry) {
// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter
// the key lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
auto tag_list = {
Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID, Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, Tag::EC_CURVE,
Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE, Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL,
Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,
};
return std::find(tag_list.begin(), tag_list.end(), (V4_1::Tag)entry.tag) != tag_list.end();
}
AuthorizationSet filter_tags(const AuthorizationSet& set) {
AuthorizationSet filtered;
std::remove_copy_if(set.begin(), set.end(), std::back_inserter(filtered), tag_in_list);
return filtered;
}
void check_attestation_record(AttestationRecord attestation, const HidlBuf& challenge,
AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,
AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced,
SecurityLevel expected_security_level) {
EXPECT_EQ(41U, attestation.keymaster_version);
EXPECT_EQ(4U, attestation.attestation_version);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_security_level, attestation.attestation_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_security_level, attestation.keymaster_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(challenge, attestation.attestation_challenge);
check_root_of_trust(attestation.root_of_trust);
// Sort all of the authorization lists, so that equality matching works.
expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
attestation.software_enforced.Sort();
attestation.hardware_enforced.Sort();
expected_sw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
expected_hw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced);
AuthorizationSet attestation_sw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced);
AuthorizationSet attestation_hw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced)
<< DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced)
<< DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced);
}
X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
return X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr /* allocate new */, &p, blob.size()));
}
bool check_certificate_chain_signatures(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& cert_chain) {
// TODO: Check that root is self-signed once b/187803288 is resolved.
for (size_t i = 0; i < cert_chain.size() - 1; ++i) {
X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i]));
X509_Ptr signing_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i + 1]));
if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) {
return false;
}
EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
if (!signing_pubkey.get()) {
return false;
}
if (!X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get())) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
} // namespace
using std::string;
using DeviceUniqueAttestationTest = Keymaster4_1HidlTest;
TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, NonStrongBoxOnly) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED,
convert(AttestKey(
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain)));
CheckedDeleteKey();
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED,
convert(AttestKey(
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo")),
&cert_chain)));
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, Rsa) {
if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
HidlBuf app_id("foo");
ErrorCode result =
convert(AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
&cert_chain));
// It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
if (dumpAttestations) {
for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
}
auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
check_attestation_record(
attestation, challenge,
/* sw_enforced */
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
/* hw_enforced */
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
.Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
.Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
.Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level()),
SecLevel());
}
TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, Ecdsa) {
if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
HidlBuf app_id("foo");
ErrorCode result =
convert(AttestKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
&cert_chain));
// It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
if (dumpAttestations) {
for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
}
auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
check_attestation_record(
attestation, challenge,
/* sw_enforced */
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
/* hw_enforced */
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
.Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
.Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
.Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level()),
SecLevel());
}
TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
// Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
"ro.product.manufacturer");
add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
HidlBuf app_id("foo");
AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
builder.push_back(tag);
ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
// It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
if (dumpAttestations) {
for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
}
auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
.Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
.Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
check_attestation_record(
attestation, challenge,
/* sw_enforced */
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
hw_enforced, SecLevel());
}
}
TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.EcdsaSigningKey(256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
// Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
auto attestation_id_tags =
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
.Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
.Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
.Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
.Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
.Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
.Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
invalid.size())
.Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
HidlBuf app_id("foo");
AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
.Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
<< "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
}
}
INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_4_1_HIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
} // namespace test
} // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
if (argv[i][0] == '-') {
if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--dump_attestations") {
dumpAttestations = true;
}
}
}
int status = RUN_ALL_TESTS();
ALOGI("Test result = %d", status);
return status;
}