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/*
* Copyright (C) 2019 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#define LOG_TAG "VtsHalIdentityEndToEndTest"
#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredentialStore.h>
#include <android/hardware/identity/support/IdentityCredentialSupport.h>
#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
#include <cppbor.h>
#include <cppbor_parse.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <future>
#include <map>
#include <tuple>
#include "Util.h"
namespace android::hardware::identity {
using std::endl;
using std::make_tuple;
using std::map;
using std::optional;
using std::string;
using std::tuple;
using std::vector;
using ::android::sp;
using ::android::String16;
using ::android::binder::Status;
using ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthToken;
using ::android::hardware::keymaster::VerificationToken;
using test_utils::validateAttestationCertificate;
class EndToEndTests : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
public:
virtual void SetUp() override {
credentialStore_ = android::waitForDeclaredService<IIdentityCredentialStore>(
String16(GetParam().c_str()));
ASSERT_NE(credentialStore_, nullptr);
halApiVersion_ = credentialStore_->getInterfaceVersion();
}
sp<IIdentityCredentialStore> credentialStore_;
int halApiVersion_;
};
TEST_P(EndToEndTests, hardwareInformation) {
HardwareInformation info;
ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&info).isOk());
ASSERT_GT(info.credentialStoreName.size(), 0);
ASSERT_GT(info.credentialStoreAuthorName.size(), 0);
ASSERT_GE(info.dataChunkSize, 256);
}
tuple<bool, string, vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>
extractFromTestCredentialData(const vector<uint8_t>& credentialData) {
string docType;
vector<uint8_t> storageKey;
vector<uint8_t> credentialPrivKey;
vector<uint8_t> sha256Pop;
auto [item, _, message] = cppbor::parse(credentialData);
if (item == nullptr) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
const cppbor::Array* arrayItem = item->asArray();
if (arrayItem == nullptr || arrayItem->size() != 3) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
const cppbor::Tstr* docTypeItem = (*arrayItem)[0]->asTstr();
const cppbor::Bool* testCredentialItem =
((*arrayItem)[1]->asSimple() != nullptr ? ((*arrayItem)[1]->asSimple()->asBool())
: nullptr);
const cppbor::Bstr* encryptedCredentialKeysItem = (*arrayItem)[2]->asBstr();
if (docTypeItem == nullptr || testCredentialItem == nullptr ||
encryptedCredentialKeysItem == nullptr) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
docType = docTypeItem->value();
vector<uint8_t> hardwareBoundKey = support::getTestHardwareBoundKey();
const vector<uint8_t>& encryptedCredentialKeys = encryptedCredentialKeysItem->value();
const vector<uint8_t> docTypeVec(docType.begin(), docType.end());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> decryptedCredentialKeys =
support::decryptAes128Gcm(hardwareBoundKey, encryptedCredentialKeys, docTypeVec);
if (!decryptedCredentialKeys) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
auto [dckItem, dckPos, dckMessage] = cppbor::parse(decryptedCredentialKeys.value());
if (dckItem == nullptr) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
const cppbor::Array* dckArrayItem = dckItem->asArray();
if (dckArrayItem == nullptr) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
if (dckArrayItem->size() < 2) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
const cppbor::Bstr* storageKeyItem = (*dckArrayItem)[0]->asBstr();
const cppbor::Bstr* credentialPrivKeyItem = (*dckArrayItem)[1]->asBstr();
if (storageKeyItem == nullptr || credentialPrivKeyItem == nullptr) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
storageKey = storageKeyItem->value();
credentialPrivKey = credentialPrivKeyItem->value();
if (dckArrayItem->size() == 3) {
const cppbor::Bstr* sha256PopItem = (*dckArrayItem)[2]->asBstr();
if (sha256PopItem == nullptr) {
return make_tuple(false, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
sha256Pop = sha256PopItem->value();
}
return make_tuple(true, docType, storageKey, credentialPrivKey, sha256Pop);
}
TEST_P(EndToEndTests, createAndRetrieveCredential) {
// First, generate a key-pair for the reader since its public key will be
// part of the request data.
vector<uint8_t> readerKey;
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerCertificate =
test_utils::generateReaderCertificate("1234", &readerKey);
ASSERT_TRUE(readerCertificate);
// Make the portrait image really big (just shy of 256 KiB) to ensure that
// the chunking code gets exercised.
vector<uint8_t> portraitImage;
test_utils::setImageData(portraitImage);
// Access control profiles:
const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {// Profile 0 (reader authentication)
{0, readerCertificate.value(), false, 0},
// Profile 1 (no authentication)
{1, {}, false, 0}};
// It doesn't matter since no user auth is needed in this particular test,
// but for good measure, clear out the tokens we pass to the HAL.
HardwareAuthToken authToken;
VerificationToken verificationToken;
authToken.challenge = 0;
authToken.userId = 0;
authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
authToken.mac.clear();
verificationToken.challenge = 0;
verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
verificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
verificationToken.mac.clear();
// Here's the actual test data:
const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries = {
{"PersonalData", "Last name", string("Turing"), vector<int32_t>{0, 1}},
{"PersonalData", "Birth date", string("19120623"), vector<int32_t>{0, 1}},
{"PersonalData", "First name", string("Alan"), vector<int32_t>{0, 1}},
{"PersonalData", "Home address", string("Maida Vale, London, England"),
vector<int32_t>{0}},
{"Image", "Portrait image", portraitImage, vector<int32_t>{0, 1}},
};
const vector<int32_t> testEntriesEntryCounts = {static_cast<int32_t>(testEntries.size() - 1),
1u};
HardwareInformation hwInfo;
ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
string cborPretty;
sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_,
true /* testCredential */));
string challenge = "attestationChallenge";
test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge,
{1} /* atteestationApplicationId */);
ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
<< attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
validateAttestationCertificate(attData.attestationCertificate, attData.attestationChallenge,
attData.attestationApplicationId, true);
// This is kinda of a hack but we need to give the size of
// ProofOfProvisioning that we'll expect to receive.
const int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize = 262861 - 326 + readerCertificate.value().size();
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
ASSERT_TRUE(
writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), testEntriesEntryCounts)
.isOk());
optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
// Uses TestEntryData* pointer as key and values are the encrypted blobs. This
// is a little hacky but it works well enough.
map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
encryptedBlobs, true));
}
vector<uint8_t> credentialData;
vector<uint8_t> proofOfProvisioningSignature;
ASSERT_TRUE(
writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature)
.isOk());
// Validate the proofOfProvisioning which was returned
optional<vector<uint8_t>> proofOfProvisioning =
support::coseSignGetPayload(proofOfProvisioningSignature);
ASSERT_TRUE(proofOfProvisioning);
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(proofOfProvisioning.value(), 32, {"readerCertificate"});
EXPECT_EQ(
"[\n"
" 'ProofOfProvisioning',\n"
" 'org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl',\n"
" [\n"
" {\n"
" 'id' : 0,\n"
" 'readerCertificate' : <not printed>,\n"
" },\n"
" {\n"
" 'id' : 1,\n"
" },\n"
" ],\n"
" {\n"
" 'PersonalData' : [\n"
" {\n"
" 'name' : 'Last name',\n"
" 'value' : 'Turing',\n"
" 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, 1, ],\n"
" },\n"
" {\n"
" 'name' : 'Birth date',\n"
" 'value' : '19120623',\n"
" 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, 1, ],\n"
" },\n"
" {\n"
" 'name' : 'First name',\n"
" 'value' : 'Alan',\n"
" 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, 1, ],\n"
" },\n"
" {\n"
" 'name' : 'Home address',\n"
" 'value' : 'Maida Vale, London, England',\n"
" 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
" },\n"
" ],\n"
" 'Image' : [\n"
" {\n"
" 'name' : 'Portrait image',\n"
" 'value' : <bstr size=262134 sha1=941e372f654d86c32d88fae9e41b706afbfd02bb>,\n"
" 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, 1, ],\n"
" },\n"
" ],\n"
" },\n"
" true,\n"
"]",
cborPretty);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> credentialPubKey = support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(
attData.attestationCertificate[0].encodedCertificate);
ASSERT_TRUE(credentialPubKey);
EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(proofOfProvisioningSignature,
{}, // Additional data
credentialPubKey.value()));
writableCredential = nullptr;
// Extract doctype, storage key, and credentialPrivKey from credentialData... this works
// only because we asked for a test-credential meaning that the HBK is all zeroes.
auto [exSuccess, exDocType, exStorageKey, exCredentialPrivKey, exSha256Pop] =
extractFromTestCredentialData(credentialData);
ASSERT_TRUE(exSuccess);
ASSERT_EQ(exDocType, "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl");
// ... check that the public key derived from the private key matches what was
// in the certificate.
optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialKeyPair =
support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(exCredentialPrivKey);
ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialKeyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialPubKey =
support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(exCredentialKeyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialPubKey);
ASSERT_EQ(exCredentialPubKey.value(), credentialPubKey.value());
// Starting with API version 3 (feature version 202101) we require SHA-256(ProofOfProvisioning)
// to be in CredentialKeys (which is stored encrypted in CredentialData). Check
// that it's there with the expected value.
if (halApiVersion_ >= 3) {
ASSERT_EQ(exSha256Pop, support::sha256(proofOfProvisioning.value()));
}
// Now that the credential has been provisioned, read it back and check the
// correct data is returned.
sp<IIdentityCredential> credential;
ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_
->getCredential(
CipherSuite::CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256,
credentialData, &credential)
.isOk());
ASSERT_NE(credential, nullptr);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEphemeralKeyPair = support::createEcKeyPair();
ASSERT_TRUE(readerEphemeralKeyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEphemeralPublicKey =
support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(readerEphemeralKeyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->setReaderEphemeralPublicKey(readerEphemeralPublicKey.value()).isOk());
vector<uint8_t> ephemeralKeyPair;
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->createEphemeralKeyPair(&ephemeralKeyPair).isOk());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralPublicKey = support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(ephemeralKeyPair);
// Calculate requestData field and sign it with the reader key.
auto [getXYSuccess, ephX, ephY] = support::ecPublicKeyGetXandY(ephemeralPublicKey.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(getXYSuccess);
cppbor::Map deviceEngagement = cppbor::Map().add("ephX", ephX).add("ephY", ephY);
vector<uint8_t> deviceEngagementBytes = deviceEngagement.encode();
vector<uint8_t> eReaderPubBytes = cppbor::Tstr("ignored").encode();
cppbor::Array sessionTranscript = cppbor::Array()
.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceEngagementBytes))
.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, eReaderPubBytes));
vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptEncoded = sessionTranscript.encode();
vector<uint8_t> itemsRequestBytes =
cppbor::Map("nameSpaces",
cppbor::Map()
.add("PersonalData", cppbor::Map()
.add("Last name", false)
.add("Birth date", false)
.add("First name", false)
.add("Home address", true))
.add("Image", cppbor::Map().add("Portrait image", false)))
.encode();
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(itemsRequestBytes, 32, {"EphemeralPublicKey"});
EXPECT_EQ(
"{\n"
" 'nameSpaces' : {\n"
" 'PersonalData' : {\n"
" 'Last name' : false,\n"
" 'Birth date' : false,\n"
" 'First name' : false,\n"
" 'Home address' : true,\n"
" },\n"
" 'Image' : {\n"
" 'Portrait image' : false,\n"
" },\n"
" },\n"
"}",
cborPretty);
vector<uint8_t> encodedReaderAuthentication =
cppbor::Array()
.add("ReaderAuthentication")
.add(sessionTranscript.clone())
.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, itemsRequestBytes))
.encode();
vector<uint8_t> encodedReaderAuthenticationBytes =
cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedReaderAuthentication).encode();
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerSignature =
support::coseSignEcDsa(readerKey, {}, // content
encodedReaderAuthenticationBytes, // detached content
readerCertificate.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(readerSignature);
// Generate the key that will be used to sign AuthenticatedData.
vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> signingPubKey =
support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
EXPECT_TRUE(signingPubKey);
test_utils::verifyAuthKeyCertificate(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
// Since we're using a test-credential we know storageKey meaning we can get the
// private key. Do this, derive the public key from it, and check this matches what
// is in the certificate...
const vector<uint8_t> exDocTypeVec(exDocType.begin(), exDocType.end());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> exSigningPrivKey =
support::decryptAes128Gcm(exStorageKey, signingKeyBlob, exDocTypeVec);
ASSERT_TRUE(exSigningPrivKey);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> exSigningKeyPair =
support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(exSigningPrivKey.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(exSigningKeyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> exSigningPubKey =
support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(exSigningKeyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(exSigningPubKey);
ASSERT_EQ(exSigningPubKey.value(), signingPubKey.value());
vector<RequestNamespace> requestedNamespaces = test_utils::buildRequestNamespaces(testEntries);
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
credential->setRequestedNamespaces(requestedNamespaces);
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
credential->setVerificationToken(verificationToken);
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->startRetrieval(secureProfiles.value(), authToken, itemsRequestBytes,
signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptEncoded,
readerSignature.value(), testEntriesEntryCounts)
.isOk());
for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->startRetrieveEntryValue(entry.nameSpace, entry.name,
entry.valueCbor.size(), entry.profileIds)
.isOk());
auto it = encryptedBlobs.find(&entry);
ASSERT_NE(it, encryptedBlobs.end());
const vector<vector<uint8_t>>& encryptedChunks = it->second;
vector<uint8_t> content;
for (const auto& encryptedChunk : encryptedChunks) {
vector<uint8_t> chunk;
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->retrieveEntryValue(encryptedChunk, &chunk).isOk());
content.insert(content.end(), chunk.begin(), chunk.end());
}
EXPECT_EQ(content, entry.valueCbor);
// TODO: also use |exStorageKey| to decrypt data and check it's the same as whatt
// the HAL returns...
}
vector<uint8_t> mac;
vector<uint8_t> ecdsaSignature;
vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpacesEncoded;
// API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
&ecdsaSignature)
.isOk());
ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
}
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
ASSERT_EQ(
"{\n"
" 'PersonalData' : {\n"
" 'Last name' : 'Turing',\n"
" 'Birth date' : '19120623',\n"
" 'First name' : 'Alan',\n"
" 'Home address' : 'Maida Vale, London, England',\n"
" },\n"
" 'Image' : {\n"
" 'Portrait image' : <bstr size=262134 "
"sha1=941e372f654d86c32d88fae9e41b706afbfd02bb>,\n"
" },\n"
"}",
cborPretty);
string docType = "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl";
optional<vector<uint8_t>> readerEphemeralPrivateKey =
support::ecKeyPairGetPrivateKey(readerEphemeralKeyPair.value());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> eMacKey =
support::calcEMacKey(readerEphemeralPrivateKey.value(), // Private Key
signingPubKey.value(), // Public Key
cppbor::SemanticTag(24, sessionTranscript.encode())
.encode()); // SessionTranscriptBytes
optional<vector<uint8_t>> calculatedMac =
support::calcMac(sessionTranscript.encode(), // SessionTranscript
docType, // DocType
deviceNameSpacesEncoded, // DeviceNamespaces
eMacKey.value()); // EMacKey
ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
cppbor::Array()
.add("DeviceAuthentication")
.add(sessionTranscript.clone())
.add(docType)
.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
.encode();
vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
deviceAuthenticationBytes, // Detached content
signingPubKey.value()));
}
// Also perform an additional empty request. This is what mDL applications
// are envisioned to do - one call to get the data elements, another to get
// an empty DeviceSignedItems and corresponding MAC.
//
credential->setRequestedNamespaces({}); // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->startRetrieval(
secureProfiles.value(), authToken, {}, // itemsRequestBytes
signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptEncoded, {}, // readerSignature,
testEntriesEntryCounts)
.isOk());
// API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
&ecdsaSignature)
.isOk());
ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
}
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
ASSERT_EQ("{}", cborPretty);
// Calculate DeviceAuthentication and MAC (MACing key hasn't changed)
calculatedMac = support::calcMac(sessionTranscript.encode(), // SessionTranscript
docType, // DocType
deviceNameSpacesEncoded, // DeviceNamespaces
eMacKey.value()); // EMacKey
ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
cppbor::Array()
.add("DeviceAuthentication")
.add(sessionTranscript.clone())
.add(docType)
.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
.encode();
vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
deviceAuthenticationBytes, // Detached content
signingPubKey.value()));
}
// Some mDL apps might send a request but with a single empty
// namespace. Check that too.
RequestNamespace emptyRequestNS;
emptyRequestNS.namespaceName = "PersonalData";
credential->setRequestedNamespaces({emptyRequestNS}); // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->startRetrieval(
secureProfiles.value(), authToken, {}, // itemsRequestBytes
signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptEncoded, {}, // readerSignature,
testEntriesEntryCounts)
.isOk());
// API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
&ecdsaSignature)
.isOk());
ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
}
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
ASSERT_EQ("{}", cborPretty);
// Calculate DeviceAuthentication and MAC (MACing key hasn't changed)
calculatedMac = support::calcMac(sessionTranscript.encode(), // SessionTranscript
docType, // DocType
deviceNameSpacesEncoded, // DeviceNamespaces
eMacKey.value()); // EMacKey
ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
cppbor::Array()
.add("DeviceAuthentication")
.add(sessionTranscript.clone())
.add(docType)
.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
.encode();
vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
deviceAuthenticationBytes, // Detached content
signingPubKey.value()));
}
}
TEST_P(EndToEndTests, noSessionEncryption) {
if (halApiVersion_ < 5) {
GTEST_SKIP() << "Need HAL API version 5, have " << halApiVersion_;
}
const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {// Profile 0 (no authentication)
{0, {}, false, 0}};
HardwareAuthToken authToken;
VerificationToken verificationToken;
authToken.challenge = 0;
authToken.userId = 0;
authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
authToken.mac.clear();
verificationToken.challenge = 0;
verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
verificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
verificationToken.mac.clear();
// Here's the actual test data:
const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries = {
{"PersonalData", "Last name", string("Turing"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
{"PersonalData", "Birth date", string("19120623"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
{"PersonalData", "First name", string("Alan"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
};
const vector<int32_t> testEntriesEntryCounts = {3};
HardwareInformation hwInfo;
ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
string cborPretty;
sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_,
true /* testCredential */));
string challenge = "attestationChallenge";
test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge,
{1} /* atteestationApplicationId */);
ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
<< attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
// This is kinda of a hack but we need to give the size of
// ProofOfProvisioning that we'll expect to receive.
const int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize = 230;
// OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
ASSERT_TRUE(
writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), testEntriesEntryCounts)
.isOk());
optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
// Uses TestEntryData* pointer as key and values are the encrypted blobs. This
// is a little hacky but it works well enough.
map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
encryptedBlobs, true));
}
vector<uint8_t> credentialData;
vector<uint8_t> proofOfProvisioningSignature;
ASSERT_TRUE(
writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature)
.isOk());
// Validate the proofOfProvisioning which was returned
optional<vector<uint8_t>> proofOfProvisioning =
support::coseSignGetPayload(proofOfProvisioningSignature);
ASSERT_TRUE(proofOfProvisioning);
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(proofOfProvisioning.value(), 32, {"readerCertificate"});
EXPECT_EQ(
"[\n"
" 'ProofOfProvisioning',\n"
" 'org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl',\n"
" [\n"
" {\n"
" 'id' : 0,\n"
" },\n"
" ],\n"
" {\n"
" 'PersonalData' : [\n"
" {\n"
" 'name' : 'Last name',\n"
" 'value' : 'Turing',\n"
" 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
" },\n"
" {\n"
" 'name' : 'Birth date',\n"
" 'value' : '19120623',\n"
" 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
" },\n"
" {\n"
" 'name' : 'First name',\n"
" 'value' : 'Alan',\n"
" 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
" },\n"
" ],\n"
" },\n"
" true,\n"
"]",
cborPretty);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> credentialPubKey = support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(
attData.attestationCertificate[0].encodedCertificate);
ASSERT_TRUE(credentialPubKey);
EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(proofOfProvisioningSignature,
{}, // Additional data
credentialPubKey.value()));
writableCredential = nullptr;
// Extract doctype, storage key, and credentialPrivKey from credentialData... this works
// only because we asked for a test-credential meaning that the HBK is all zeroes.
auto [exSuccess, exDocType, exStorageKey, exCredentialPrivKey, exSha256Pop] =
extractFromTestCredentialData(credentialData);
ASSERT_TRUE(exSuccess);
ASSERT_EQ(exDocType, "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl");
// ... check that the public key derived from the private key matches what was
// in the certificate.
optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialKeyPair =
support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(exCredentialPrivKey);
ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialKeyPair);
optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialPubKey =
support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(exCredentialKeyPair.value());
ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialPubKey);
ASSERT_EQ(exCredentialPubKey.value(), credentialPubKey.value());
sp<IIdentityCredential> credential;
ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_
->getCredential(
CipherSuite::CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256,
credentialData, &credential)
.isOk());
ASSERT_NE(credential, nullptr);
// Calculate sessionTranscript, make something that resembles what you'd use for
// an over-the-Internet presentation not using mdoc session encryption.
cppbor::Array sessionTranscript =
cppbor::Array()
.add(cppbor::Null()) // DeviceEngagementBytes isn't used.
.add(cppbor::Null()) // EReaderKeyBytes isn't used.
.add(cppbor::Array() // Proprietary handover structure follows.
.add(cppbor::Tstr("TestHandover"))
.add(cppbor::Bstr(vector<uint8_t>{1, 2, 3}))
.add(cppbor::Bstr(vector<uint8_t>{9, 8, 7, 6})));
vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptEncoded = sessionTranscript.encode();
// Generate the key that will be used to sign AuthenticatedData.
vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
optional<vector<uint8_t>> signingPubKey =
support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
EXPECT_TRUE(signingPubKey);
test_utils::verifyAuthKeyCertificate(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
vector<RequestNamespace> requestedNamespaces = test_utils::buildRequestNamespaces(testEntries);
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->setRequestedNamespaces(requestedNamespaces).isOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->setVerificationToken(verificationToken).isOk());
Status status = credential->startRetrieval(
secureProfiles.value(), authToken, {} /* itemsRequestBytes*/, signingKeyBlob,
sessionTranscriptEncoded, {} /* readerSignature */, testEntriesEntryCounts);
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.exceptionCode() << ": " << status.exceptionMessage();
for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
ASSERT_TRUE(credential
->startRetrieveEntryValue(entry.nameSpace, entry.name,
entry.valueCbor.size(), entry.profileIds)
.isOk());
auto it = encryptedBlobs.find(&entry);
ASSERT_NE(it, encryptedBlobs.end());
const vector<vector<uint8_t>>& encryptedChunks = it->second;
vector<uint8_t> content;
for (const auto& encryptedChunk : encryptedChunks) {
vector<uint8_t> chunk;
ASSERT_TRUE(credential->retrieveEntryValue(encryptedChunk, &chunk).isOk());
content.insert(content.end(), chunk.begin(), chunk.end());
}
EXPECT_EQ(content, entry.valueCbor);
}
vector<uint8_t> mac;
vector<uint8_t> ecdsaSignature;
vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpacesEncoded;
status = credential->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
&ecdsaSignature);
ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.exceptionCode() << ": " << status.exceptionMessage();
// MACing should NOT work since we're not using session encryption
ASSERT_EQ(0, mac.size());
// ECDSA signatures should work, however. Check this.
ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
ASSERT_EQ(
"{\n"
" 'PersonalData' : {\n"
" 'Last name' : 'Turing',\n"
" 'Birth date' : '19120623',\n"
" 'First name' : 'Alan',\n"
" },\n"
"}",
cborPretty);
string docType = "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl";
vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
cppbor::Array()
.add("DeviceAuthentication")
.add(sessionTranscript.clone())
.add(docType)
.add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
.encode();
vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
deviceAuthenticationBytes, // Detached content
signingPubKey.value()));
}
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(EndToEndTests);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
Identity, EndToEndTests,
testing::ValuesIn(android::getAidlHalInstanceNames(IIdentityCredentialStore::descriptor)),
android::PrintInstanceNameToString);
} // namespace android::hardware::identity
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
::android::ProcessState::self()->setThreadPoolMaxThreadCount(1);
::android::ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}