| /* |
| * WPA/RSN - Shared functions for supplicant and authenticator |
| * Copyright (c) 2002-2018, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
| * |
| * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. |
| * See README for more details. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| #include "crypto/md5.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha1.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha256.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha384.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha512.h" |
| #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h" |
| #include "crypto/crypto.h" |
| #include "ieee802_11_defs.h" |
| #include "defs.h" |
| #include "wpa_common.h" |
| |
| |
| static unsigned int wpa_kck_len(int akmp, size_t pmk_len) |
| { |
| switch (akmp) { |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| return 24; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| return 0; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| return pmk_len / 2; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| return pmk_len / 2; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| return pmk_len / 2; |
| default: |
| return 16; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| static unsigned int wpa_kck2_len(int akmp) |
| { |
| switch (akmp) { |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| return 16; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| return 24; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| |
| static unsigned int wpa_kek_len(int akmp, size_t pmk_len) |
| { |
| switch (akmp) { |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| return 64; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| return 32; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| return pmk_len <= 32 ? 16 : 32; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| return pmk_len <= 32 ? 16 : 32; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| return pmk_len <= 32 ? 16 : 32; |
| default: |
| return 16; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| static unsigned int wpa_kek2_len(int akmp) |
| { |
| switch (akmp) { |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| return 16; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| return 32; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| |
| unsigned int wpa_mic_len(int akmp, size_t pmk_len) |
| { |
| switch (akmp) { |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| return 24; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| return 0; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| return pmk_len / 2; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| return pmk_len / 2; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| return pmk_len / 2; |
| default: |
| return 16; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_use_akm_defined - Is AKM-defined Key Descriptor Version used |
| * @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation |
| * Returns: 1 if AKM-defined Key Descriptor Version is used; 0 otherwise |
| */ |
| int wpa_use_akm_defined(int akmp) |
| { |
| return akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN || |
| akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE || |
| akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP || |
| akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384 || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_sae(akmp) || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(akmp) || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_fils(akmp); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_use_cmac - Is CMAC integrity algorithm used for EAPOL-Key MIC |
| * @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation |
| * Returns: 1 if CMAC is used; 0 otherwise |
| */ |
| int wpa_use_cmac(int akmp) |
| { |
| return akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN || |
| akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE || |
| akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_ft(akmp) || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp) || |
| (wpa_key_mgmt_sae(akmp) && |
| !wpa_key_mgmt_sae_ext_key(akmp)) || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(akmp); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_use_aes_key_wrap - Is AES Keywrap algorithm used for EAPOL-Key Key Data |
| * @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation |
| * Returns: 1 if AES Keywrap is used; 0 otherwise |
| * |
| * Note: AKM 00-0F-AC:1 and 00-0F-AC:2 have special rules for selecting whether |
| * to use AES Keywrap based on the negotiated pairwise cipher. This function |
| * does not cover those special cases. |
| */ |
| int wpa_use_aes_key_wrap(int akmp) |
| { |
| return akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN || |
| akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE || |
| akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_ft(akmp) || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp) || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_sae(akmp) || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_suite_b(akmp); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_eapol_key_mic - Calculate EAPOL-Key MIC |
| * @key: EAPOL-Key Key Confirmation Key (KCK) |
| * @key_len: KCK length in octets |
| * @akmp: WPA_KEY_MGMT_* used in key derivation |
| * @ver: Key descriptor version (WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_*) |
| * @buf: Pointer to the beginning of the EAPOL header (version field) |
| * @len: Length of the EAPOL frame (from EAPOL header to the end of the frame) |
| * @mic: Pointer to the buffer to which the EAPOL-Key MIC is written |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| * |
| * Calculate EAPOL-Key MIC for an EAPOL-Key packet. The EAPOL-Key MIC field has |
| * to be cleared (all zeroes) when calling this function. |
| * |
| * Note: 'IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.2 EAPOL-Key frames' has an error in the |
| * description of the Key MIC calculation. It includes packet data from the |
| * beginning of the EAPOL-Key header, not EAPOL header. This incorrect change |
| * happened during final editing of the standard and the correct behavior is |
| * defined in the last draft (IEEE 802.11i/D10). |
| */ |
| int wpa_eapol_key_mic(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, int akmp, int ver, |
| const u8 *buf, size_t len, u8 *mic) |
| { |
| u8 hash[SHA512_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| if (key_len == 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: KCK not set - cannot calculate MIC"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| switch (ver) { |
| #ifndef CONFIG_FIPS |
| case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-MD5"); |
| return hmac_md5(key, key_len, buf, len, mic); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */ |
| case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA1"); |
| if (hmac_sha1(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, MD5_MAC_LEN); |
| break; |
| case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using AES-CMAC"); |
| return omac1_aes_128(key, buf, len, mic); |
| case WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED: |
| switch (akmp) { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using AES-CMAC (AKM-defined - SAE)"); |
| return omac1_aes_128(key, buf, len, mic); |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA%u (AKM-defined - SAE-EXT-KEY)", |
| (unsigned int) key_len * 8 * 2); |
| if (key_len == 128 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha256(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| } else if (key_len == 192 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| } else if (key_len == 256 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha512(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, |
| "SAE: Unsupported KCK length: %u", |
| (unsigned int) key_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, key_len); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_HS20 |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using AES-CMAC (AKM-defined - OSEN)"); |
| return omac1_aes_128(key, buf, len, mic); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_HS20 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA256 (AKM-defined - Suite B)"); |
| if (hmac_sha256(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, MD5_MAC_LEN); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB192 |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA384 (AKM-defined - Suite B 192-bit)"); |
| if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_OWE |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA%u (AKM-defined - OWE)", |
| (unsigned int) key_len * 8 * 2); |
| if (key_len == 128 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha256(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (key_len == 192 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (key_len == 256 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha512(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, |
| "OWE: Unsupported KCK length: %u", |
| (unsigned int) key_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, key_len); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_OWE */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_DPP |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA%u (AKM-defined - DPP)", |
| (unsigned int) key_len * 8 * 2); |
| if (key_len == 128 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha256(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (key_len == 192 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (key_len == 256 / 8) { |
| if (hmac_sha512(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, |
| "DPP: Unsupported KCK length: %u", |
| (unsigned int) key_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, key_len); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */ |
| #if defined(CONFIG_IEEE80211R) && defined(CONFIG_SHA384) |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC using HMAC-SHA384 (AKM-defined - FT 802.1X SHA384)"); |
| if (hmac_sha384(key, key_len, buf, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R && CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| default: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC algorithm not known (AKM-defined - akmp=0x%x)", |
| akmp); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| break; |
| default: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key MIC algorithm not known (ver=%d)", |
| ver); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_pmk_to_ptk - Calculate PTK from PMK, addresses, and nonces |
| * @pmk: Pairwise master key |
| * @pmk_len: Length of PMK |
| * @label: Label to use in derivation |
| * @addr1: AA or SA |
| * @addr2: SA or AA |
| * @nonce1: ANonce or SNonce |
| * @nonce2: SNonce or ANonce |
| * @ptk: Buffer for pairwise transient key |
| * @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| * @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| * @kdk_len: The length in octets that should be derived for KDK |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| * |
| * IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 - 8.5.1.2 Pairwise key hierarchy |
| * PTK = PRF-X(PMK, "Pairwise key expansion", |
| * Min(AA, SA) || Max(AA, SA) || |
| * Min(ANonce, SNonce) || Max(ANonce, SNonce) |
| * [ || Z.x ]) |
| * |
| * The optional Z.x component is used only with DPP and that part is not defined |
| * in IEEE 802.11. |
| */ |
| int wpa_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const char *label, |
| const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, |
| const u8 *nonce1, const u8 *nonce2, |
| struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int akmp, int cipher, |
| const u8 *z, size_t z_len, size_t kdk_len) |
| { |
| #define MAX_Z_LEN 66 /* with NIST P-521 */ |
| u8 data[2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN + MAX_Z_LEN]; |
| size_t data_len = 2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN + |
| WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN]; |
| size_t ptk_len; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_OWE |
| int owe_ptk_workaround = 0; |
| |
| if (akmp == (WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE | WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256)) { |
| owe_ptk_workaround = 1; |
| akmp = WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_OWE */ |
| |
| if (pmk_len == 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: No PMK set for PTK derivation"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (z_len > MAX_Z_LEN) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) < 0) { |
| os_memcpy(data, addr1, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
| } else { |
| os_memcpy(data, addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, addr1, ETH_ALEN); |
| } |
| |
| if (os_memcmp(nonce1, nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) { |
| os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, nonce1, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN, nonce2, |
| WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| } else { |
| os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN, nonce1, |
| WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| if (z && z_len) { |
| os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN, z, z_len); |
| data_len += z_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (kdk_len > WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "WPA: KDK len=%zu exceeds max supported len", |
| kdk_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| ptk->kck_len = wpa_kck_len(akmp, pmk_len); |
| ptk->kek_len = wpa_kek_len(akmp, pmk_len); |
| ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher); |
| ptk->kdk_len = kdk_len; |
| if (ptk->tk_len == 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "WPA: Unsupported cipher (0x%x) used in PTK derivation", |
| cipher); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| ptk_len = ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len + ptk->tk_len + ptk->kdk_len; |
| |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) { |
| #if defined(CONFIG_SUITEB192) || defined(CONFIG_FILS) |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| #else /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 || CONFIG_FILS */ |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 || CONFIG_FILS */ |
| } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_OWE |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && (pmk_len == 32 || |
| owe_ptk_workaround)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && pmk_len == 48) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE && pmk_len == 64) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA512)"); |
| if (sha512_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "OWE: Unknown PMK length %u", |
| (unsigned int) pmk_len); |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_OWE */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_DPP |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && pmk_len == 32) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && pmk_len == 48) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP && pmk_len == 64) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA512)"); |
| if (sha512_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "DPP: Unknown PMK length %u", |
| (unsigned int) pmk_len); |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae_ext_key(akmp)) { |
| if (pmk_len == 32) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| } else if (pmk_len == 48) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| } else if (pmk_len == 64) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA512)"); |
| if (sha512_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE: Unknown PMK length %u", |
| (unsigned int) pmk_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA1)"); |
| if (sha1_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, tmp, |
| ptk_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK derivation - A1=" MACSTR " A2=" MACSTR, |
| MAC2STR(addr1), MAC2STR(addr2)); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Nonce1", nonce1, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Nonce2", nonce2, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| if (z && z_len) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Z.x", z, z_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK", pmk, pmk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PTK", tmp, ptk_len); |
| |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kck, tmp, ptk->kck_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KCK", ptk->kck, ptk->kck_len); |
| |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kek, tmp + ptk->kck_len, ptk->kek_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KEK", ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len); |
| |
| os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len, ptk->tk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: TK", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len); |
| |
| if (kdk_len) { |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kdk, tmp + ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len + |
| ptk->tk_len, ptk->kdk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KDK", ptk->kdk, ptk->kdk_len); |
| } |
| |
| ptk->kek2_len = 0; |
| ptk->kck2_len = 0; |
| |
| os_memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); |
| os_memset(data, 0, data_len); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_FILS |
| |
| int fils_rmsk_to_pmk(int akmp, const u8 *rmsk, size_t rmsk_len, |
| const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce, const u8 *dh_ss, |
| size_t dh_ss_len, u8 *pmk, size_t *pmk_len) |
| { |
| u8 nonces[2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN]; |
| const u8 *addr[2]; |
| size_t len[2]; |
| size_t num_elem; |
| int res; |
| |
| /* PMK = HMAC-Hash(SNonce || ANonce, rMSK [ || DHss ]) */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: rMSK to PMK derivation"); |
| |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| *pmk_len = SHA384_MAC_LEN; |
| else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) |
| *pmk_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| else |
| return -1; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: rMSK", rmsk, rmsk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: SNonce", snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ANonce", anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: DHss", dh_ss, dh_ss_len); |
| |
| os_memcpy(nonces, snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| os_memcpy(&nonces[FILS_NONCE_LEN], anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| addr[0] = rmsk; |
| len[0] = rmsk_len; |
| num_elem = 1; |
| if (dh_ss) { |
| addr[1] = dh_ss; |
| len[1] = dh_ss_len; |
| num_elem++; |
| } |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| res = hmac_sha384_vector(nonces, 2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN, num_elem, |
| addr, len, pmk); |
| else |
| res = hmac_sha256_vector(nonces, 2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN, num_elem, |
| addr, len, pmk); |
| if (res == 0) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PMK", pmk, *pmk_len); |
| else |
| *pmk_len = 0; |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int fils_pmkid_erp(int akmp, const u8 *reauth, size_t reauth_len, |
| u8 *pmkid) |
| { |
| const u8 *addr[1]; |
| size_t len[1]; |
| u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| int res; |
| |
| /* PMKID = Truncate-128(Hash(EAP-Initiate/Reauth)) */ |
| addr[0] = reauth; |
| len[0] = reauth_len; |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| res = sha384_vector(1, addr, len, hash); |
| else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) |
| res = sha256_vector(1, addr, len, hash); |
| else |
| return -1; |
| if (res) |
| return res; |
| os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PMKID", pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int fils_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *spa, const u8 *aa, |
| const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce, const u8 *dhss, |
| size_t dhss_len, struct wpa_ptk *ptk, |
| u8 *ick, size_t *ick_len, int akmp, int cipher, |
| u8 *fils_ft, size_t *fils_ft_len, size_t kdk_len) |
| { |
| u8 *data, *pos; |
| size_t data_len; |
| u8 tmp[FILS_ICK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN + |
| FILS_FT_MAX_LEN + WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN]; |
| size_t key_data_len; |
| const char *label = "FILS PTK Derivation"; |
| int ret = -1; |
| size_t offset; |
| |
| /* |
| * FILS-Key-Data = PRF-X(PMK, "FILS PTK Derivation", |
| * SPA || AA || SNonce || ANonce [ || DHss ]) |
| * ICK = L(FILS-Key-Data, 0, ICK_bits) |
| * KEK = L(FILS-Key-Data, ICK_bits, KEK_bits) |
| * TK = L(FILS-Key-Data, ICK_bits + KEK_bits, TK_bits) |
| * If doing FT initial mobility domain association: |
| * FILS-FT = L(FILS-Key-Data, ICK_bits + KEK_bits + TK_bits, |
| * FILS-FT_bits) |
| * When a KDK is derived: |
| * KDK = L(FILS-Key-Data, ICK_bits + KEK_bits + TK_bits + FILS-FT_bits, |
| * KDK_bits) |
| */ |
| data_len = 2 * ETH_ALEN + 2 * FILS_NONCE_LEN + dhss_len; |
| data = os_malloc(data_len); |
| if (!data) |
| goto err; |
| pos = data; |
| os_memcpy(pos, spa, ETH_ALEN); |
| pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| os_memcpy(pos, aa, ETH_ALEN); |
| pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| os_memcpy(pos, snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| pos += FILS_NONCE_LEN; |
| os_memcpy(pos, anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| pos += FILS_NONCE_LEN; |
| if (dhss) |
| os_memcpy(pos, dhss, dhss_len); |
| |
| ptk->kck_len = 0; |
| ptk->kek_len = wpa_kek_len(akmp, pmk_len); |
| ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher); |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| *ick_len = 48; |
| else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) |
| *ick_len = 32; |
| else |
| goto err; |
| key_data_len = *ick_len + ptk->kek_len + ptk->tk_len; |
| |
| if (kdk_len) { |
| if (kdk_len > WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FILS: KDK len=%zu too big", |
| kdk_len); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ptk->kdk_len = kdk_len; |
| key_data_len += kdk_len; |
| } else { |
| ptk->kdk_len = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (fils_ft && fils_ft_len) { |
| if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256) { |
| *fils_ft_len = 32; |
| } else if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384) { |
| *fils_ft_len = 48; |
| } else { |
| *fils_ft_len = 0; |
| fils_ft = NULL; |
| } |
| key_data_len += *fils_ft_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA384)"); |
| if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, key_data_len) < 0) |
| goto err; |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PTK derivation using PRF(SHA256)"); |
| if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, |
| tmp, key_data_len) < 0) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PTK derivation - SPA=" MACSTR |
| " AA=" MACSTR, MAC2STR(spa), MAC2STR(aa)); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: SNonce", snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ANonce", anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| if (dhss) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: DHss", dhss, dhss_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: PMK", pmk, pmk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: FILS-Key-Data", tmp, key_data_len); |
| |
| os_memcpy(ick, tmp, *ick_len); |
| offset = *ick_len; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ICK", ick, *ick_len); |
| |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kek, tmp + offset, ptk->kek_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: KEK", ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len); |
| offset += ptk->kek_len; |
| |
| os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + offset, ptk->tk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: TK", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len); |
| offset += ptk->tk_len; |
| |
| if (fils_ft && fils_ft_len) { |
| os_memcpy(fils_ft, tmp + offset, *fils_ft_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: FILS-FT", |
| fils_ft, *fils_ft_len); |
| offset += *fils_ft_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (ptk->kdk_len) { |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kdk, tmp + offset, ptk->kdk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: KDK", ptk->kdk, ptk->kdk_len); |
| } |
| |
| ptk->kek2_len = 0; |
| ptk->kck2_len = 0; |
| |
| os_memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); |
| ret = 0; |
| err: |
| bin_clear_free(data, data_len); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int fils_key_auth_sk(const u8 *ick, size_t ick_len, const u8 *snonce, |
| const u8 *anonce, const u8 *sta_addr, const u8 *bssid, |
| const u8 *g_sta, size_t g_sta_len, |
| const u8 *g_ap, size_t g_ap_len, |
| int akmp, u8 *key_auth_sta, u8 *key_auth_ap, |
| size_t *key_auth_len) |
| { |
| const u8 *addr[6]; |
| size_t len[6]; |
| size_t num_elem = 4; |
| int res; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key-Auth derivation: STA-MAC=" MACSTR |
| " AP-BSSID=" MACSTR, MAC2STR(sta_addr), MAC2STR(bssid)); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ICK", ick, ick_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: SNonce", snonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: ANonce", anonce, FILS_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: gSTA", g_sta, g_sta_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: gAP", g_ap, g_ap_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * For (Re)Association Request frame (STA->AP): |
| * Key-Auth = HMAC-Hash(ICK, SNonce || ANonce || STA-MAC || AP-BSSID |
| * [ || gSTA || gAP ]) |
| */ |
| addr[0] = snonce; |
| len[0] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; |
| addr[1] = anonce; |
| len[1] = FILS_NONCE_LEN; |
| addr[2] = sta_addr; |
| len[2] = ETH_ALEN; |
| addr[3] = bssid; |
| len[3] = ETH_ALEN; |
| if (g_sta && g_sta_len && g_ap && g_ap_len) { |
| addr[4] = g_sta; |
| len[4] = g_sta_len; |
| addr[5] = g_ap; |
| len[5] = g_ap_len; |
| num_elem = 6; |
| } |
| |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) { |
| *key_auth_len = 48; |
| res = hmac_sha384_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| key_auth_sta); |
| } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) { |
| *key_auth_len = 32; |
| res = hmac_sha256_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| key_auth_sta); |
| } else { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (res < 0) |
| return res; |
| |
| /* |
| * For (Re)Association Response frame (AP->STA): |
| * Key-Auth = HMAC-Hash(ICK, ANonce || SNonce || AP-BSSID || STA-MAC |
| * [ || gAP || gSTA ]) |
| */ |
| addr[0] = anonce; |
| addr[1] = snonce; |
| addr[2] = bssid; |
| addr[3] = sta_addr; |
| if (g_sta && g_sta_len && g_ap && g_ap_len) { |
| addr[4] = g_ap; |
| len[4] = g_ap_len; |
| addr[5] = g_sta; |
| len[5] = g_sta_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| res = hmac_sha384_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| key_auth_ap); |
| else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) |
| res = hmac_sha256_vector(ick, ick_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| key_auth_ap); |
| if (res < 0) |
| return res; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key-Auth (STA)", |
| key_auth_sta, *key_auth_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FILS: Key-Auth (AP)", |
| key_auth_ap, *key_auth_len); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| int wpa_ft_mic(int key_mgmt, const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *sta_addr, |
| const u8 *ap_addr, u8 transaction_seqnum, |
| const u8 *mdie, size_t mdie_len, |
| const u8 *ftie, size_t ftie_len, |
| const u8 *rsnie, size_t rsnie_len, |
| const u8 *ric, size_t ric_len, |
| const u8 *rsnxe, size_t rsnxe_len, |
| u8 *mic) |
| { |
| const u8 *addr[10]; |
| size_t len[10]; |
| size_t i, num_elem = 0; |
| u8 zero_mic[32]; |
| size_t mic_len, fte_fixed_len; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (kck_len == 16) { |
| mic_len = 16; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| } else if (kck_len == 24) { |
| mic_len = 24; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| } else if (kck_len == 32) { |
| mic_len = 32; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "FT: Unsupported KCK length %u", |
| (unsigned int) kck_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| fte_fixed_len = sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) - 16 + mic_len; |
| |
| addr[num_elem] = sta_addr; |
| len[num_elem] = ETH_ALEN; |
| num_elem++; |
| |
| addr[num_elem] = ap_addr; |
| len[num_elem] = ETH_ALEN; |
| num_elem++; |
| |
| addr[num_elem] = &transaction_seqnum; |
| len[num_elem] = 1; |
| num_elem++; |
| |
| if (rsnie) { |
| addr[num_elem] = rsnie; |
| len[num_elem] = rsnie_len; |
| num_elem++; |
| } |
| if (mdie) { |
| addr[num_elem] = mdie; |
| len[num_elem] = mdie_len; |
| num_elem++; |
| } |
| if (ftie) { |
| if (ftie_len < 2 + fte_fixed_len) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* IE hdr and mic_control */ |
| addr[num_elem] = ftie; |
| len[num_elem] = 2 + 2; |
| num_elem++; |
| |
| /* MIC field with all zeros */ |
| os_memset(zero_mic, 0, mic_len); |
| addr[num_elem] = zero_mic; |
| len[num_elem] = mic_len; |
| num_elem++; |
| |
| /* Rest of FTIE */ |
| addr[num_elem] = ftie + 2 + 2 + mic_len; |
| len[num_elem] = ftie_len - (2 + 2 + mic_len); |
| num_elem++; |
| } |
| if (ric) { |
| addr[num_elem] = ric; |
| len[num_elem] = ric_len; |
| num_elem++; |
| } |
| |
| if (rsnxe) { |
| addr[num_elem] = rsnxe; |
| len[num_elem] = rsnxe_len; |
| num_elem++; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < num_elem; i++) |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "FT: MIC data", addr[i], len[i]); |
| res = -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (kck_len == 32) { |
| u8 hash[SHA512_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| if (hmac_sha512_vector(kck, kck_len, num_elem, addr, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, 32); |
| res = 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (kck_len == 24) { |
| u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| if (hmac_sha384_vector(kck, kck_len, num_elem, addr, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24); |
| res = 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| if (kck_len == 16 && key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY) { |
| u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| if (hmac_sha256_vector(kck, kck_len, num_elem, addr, len, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, 16); |
| res = 0; |
| } |
| if (kck_len == 16 && key_mgmt != WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY && |
| omac1_aes_128_vector(kck, num_elem, addr, len, mic) == 0) |
| res = 0; |
| |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_ft_parse_ftie(const u8 *ie, size_t ie_len, |
| struct wpa_ft_ies *parse, const u8 *opt) |
| { |
| const u8 *end, *pos; |
| |
| parse->ftie = ie; |
| parse->ftie_len = ie_len; |
| |
| pos = opt; |
| end = ie + ie_len; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Parse FTE subelements", pos, end - pos); |
| |
| while (end - pos >= 2) { |
| u8 id, len; |
| |
| id = *pos++; |
| len = *pos++; |
| if (len > end - pos) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Truncated subelement"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| switch (id) { |
| case FTIE_SUBELEM_R1KH_ID: |
| if (len != FT_R1KH_ID_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "FT: Invalid R1KH-ID length in FTIE: %d", |
| len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| parse->r1kh_id = pos; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: R1KH-ID", |
| parse->r1kh_id, FT_R1KH_ID_LEN); |
| break; |
| case FTIE_SUBELEM_GTK: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: GTK"); |
| parse->gtk = pos; |
| parse->gtk_len = len; |
| break; |
| case FTIE_SUBELEM_R0KH_ID: |
| if (len < 1 || len > FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "FT: Invalid R0KH-ID length in FTIE: %d", |
| len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| parse->r0kh_id = pos; |
| parse->r0kh_id_len = len; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: R0KH-ID", |
| parse->r0kh_id, parse->r0kh_id_len); |
| break; |
| case FTIE_SUBELEM_IGTK: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: IGTK"); |
| parse->igtk = pos; |
| parse->igtk_len = len; |
| break; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_OCV |
| case FTIE_SUBELEM_OCI: |
| parse->oci = pos; |
| parse->oci_len = len; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: OCI", |
| parse->oci, parse->oci_len); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_OCV */ |
| case FTIE_SUBELEM_BIGTK: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: BIGTK"); |
| parse->bigtk = pos; |
| parse->bigtk_len = len; |
| break; |
| default: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Unknown subelem id %u", id); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| pos += len; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_ft_parse_fte(int key_mgmt, const u8 *ie, size_t len, |
| struct wpa_ft_ies *parse) |
| { |
| size_t mic_len; |
| u8 mic_len_info; |
| const u8 *pos = ie; |
| const u8 *end = pos + len; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-MIC Control", pos, 2); |
| parse->fte_rsnxe_used = pos[0] & FTE_MIC_CTRL_RSNXE_USED; |
| mic_len_info = (pos[0] & FTE_MIC_CTRL_MIC_LEN_MASK) >> |
| FTE_MIC_CTRL_MIC_LEN_SHIFT; |
| parse->fte_elem_count = pos[1]; |
| pos += 2; |
| |
| if (key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY) { |
| switch (mic_len_info) { |
| case FTE_MIC_LEN_16: |
| mic_len = 16; |
| break; |
| case FTE_MIC_LEN_24: |
| mic_len = 24; |
| break; |
| case FTE_MIC_LEN_32: |
| mic_len = 32; |
| break; |
| default: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "FT: Unknown MIC Length subfield value %u", |
| mic_len_info); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| mic_len = wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(key_mgmt) ? 24 : 16; |
| } |
| if (mic_len > (size_t) (end - pos)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No room for %zu octet MIC in FTE", |
| mic_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-MIC", pos, mic_len); |
| parse->fte_mic = pos; |
| parse->fte_mic_len = mic_len; |
| pos += mic_len; |
| |
| if (2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN > end - pos) |
| return -1; |
| parse->fte_anonce = pos; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-ANonce", |
| parse->fte_anonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| pos += WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| parse->fte_snonce = pos; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE-SNonce", |
| parse->fte_snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| pos += WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| |
| return wpa_ft_parse_ftie(ie, len, parse, pos); |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_ft_parse_ies(const u8 *ies, size_t ies_len, struct wpa_ft_ies *parse, |
| int key_mgmt) |
| { |
| const u8 *end, *pos; |
| struct wpa_ie_data data; |
| int ret; |
| int prot_ie_count = 0; |
| |
| os_memset(parse, 0, sizeof(*parse)); |
| if (ies == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| |
| pos = ies; |
| end = ies + ies_len; |
| while (end - pos >= 2) { |
| u8 id, len; |
| |
| id = *pos++; |
| len = *pos++; |
| if (len > end - pos) |
| break; |
| |
| switch (id) { |
| case WLAN_EID_RSN: |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RSNE", pos, len); |
| parse->rsn = pos; |
| parse->rsn_len = len; |
| ret = wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(parse->rsn - 2, |
| parse->rsn_len + 2, |
| &data); |
| if (ret < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse " |
| "RSN IE: %d", ret); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| parse->rsn_capab = data.capabilities; |
| if (data.num_pmkid == 1 && data.pmkid) |
| parse->rsn_pmkid = data.pmkid; |
| parse->key_mgmt = data.key_mgmt; |
| parse->pairwise_cipher = data.pairwise_cipher; |
| if (!key_mgmt) |
| key_mgmt = parse->key_mgmt; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_EID_RSNX: |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RSNXE", pos, len); |
| if (len < 1) |
| break; |
| parse->rsnxe = pos; |
| parse->rsnxe_len = len; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN: |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDE", pos, len); |
| if (len < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie)) |
| return -1; |
| parse->mdie = pos; |
| parse->mdie_len = len; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_EID_FAST_BSS_TRANSITION: |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTE", pos, len); |
| /* The first two octets (MIC Control field) is in the |
| * same offset for all cases, but the second field (MIC) |
| * has variable length with three different values. |
| * In particular the FT-SAE-EXT-KEY is inconvinient to |
| * parse, so try to handle this in pieces instead of |
| * using the struct rsn_ftie* definitions. */ |
| |
| if (len < 2) |
| return -1; |
| prot_ie_count = pos[1]; /* Element Count field in |
| * MIC Control */ |
| |
| if (wpa_ft_parse_fte(key_mgmt, pos, len, parse) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL: |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Timeout Interval", |
| pos, len); |
| if (len != 5) |
| break; |
| parse->tie = pos; |
| parse->tie_len = len; |
| break; |
| case WLAN_EID_RIC_DATA: |
| if (parse->ric == NULL) |
| parse->ric = pos - 2; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| pos += len; |
| } |
| |
| if (prot_ie_count == 0) |
| return 0; /* no MIC */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Check that the protected IE count matches with IEs included in the |
| * frame. |
| */ |
| if (parse->rsn) |
| prot_ie_count--; |
| if (parse->mdie) |
| prot_ie_count--; |
| if (parse->ftie) |
| prot_ie_count--; |
| if (parse->rsnxe) |
| prot_ie_count--; |
| if (prot_ie_count < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Some required IEs not included in " |
| "the protected IE count"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (prot_ie_count == 0 && parse->ric) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: RIC IE(s) in the frame, but not " |
| "included in protected IE count"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Determine the end of the RIC IE(s) */ |
| if (parse->ric) { |
| pos = parse->ric; |
| while (end - pos >= 2 && 2 + pos[1] <= end - pos && |
| prot_ie_count) { |
| prot_ie_count--; |
| pos += 2 + pos[1]; |
| } |
| parse->ric_len = pos - parse->ric; |
| } |
| if (prot_ie_count) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: %d protected IEs missing from " |
| "frame", (int) prot_ie_count); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PASN |
| |
| /* |
| * pasn_use_sha384 - Should SHA384 be used or SHA256 |
| * |
| * @akmp: Authentication and key management protocol |
| * @cipher: The cipher suite |
| * |
| * According to IEEE P802.11az/D2.7, 12.12.7, the hash algorithm to use is the |
| * hash algorithm defined for the Base AKM (see Table 9-151 (AKM suite |
| * selectors)). When there is no Base AKM, the hash algorithm is selected based |
| * on the pairwise cipher suite provided in the RSNE by the AP in the second |
| * PASN frame. SHA-256 is used as the hash algorithm, except for the ciphers |
| * 00-0F-AC:9 and 00-0F-AC:10 for which SHA-384 is used. |
| */ |
| bool pasn_use_sha384(int akmp, int cipher) |
| { |
| return (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN && (cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256)) || |
| wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * pasn_pmk_to_ptk - Calculate PASN PTK from PMK, addresses, etc. |
| * @pmk: Pairwise master key |
| * @pmk_len: Length of PMK |
| * @spa: Suppplicant address |
| * @bssid: AP BSSID |
| * @dhss: Is the shared secret (DHss) derived from the PASN ephemeral key |
| * exchange encoded as an octet string |
| * @dhss_len: The length of dhss in octets |
| * @ptk: Buffer for pairwise transient key |
| * @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| * @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| * @kdk_len: the length in octets that should be derived for HTLK. Can be zero. |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| */ |
| int pasn_pmk_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, |
| const u8 *spa, const u8 *bssid, |
| const u8 *dhss, size_t dhss_len, |
| struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int akmp, int cipher, |
| size_t kdk_len) |
| { |
| u8 tmp[WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN + WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN]; |
| u8 *data; |
| size_t data_len, ptk_len; |
| int ret = -1; |
| const char *label = "PASN PTK Derivation"; |
| |
| if (!pmk || !pmk_len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: No PMK set for PTK derivation"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!dhss || !dhss_len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: No DHss set for PTK derivation"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * PASN-PTK = KDF(PMK, “PASN PTK Derivation”, SPA || BSSID || DHss) |
| * |
| * KCK = L(PASN-PTK, 0, 256) |
| * TK = L(PASN-PTK, 256, TK_bits) |
| * KDK = L(PASN-PTK, 256 + TK_bits, kdk_len * 8) |
| */ |
| data_len = 2 * ETH_ALEN + dhss_len; |
| data = os_zalloc(data_len); |
| if (!data) |
| return -1; |
| |
| os_memcpy(data, spa, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, bssid, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(data + 2 * ETH_ALEN, dhss, dhss_len); |
| |
| ptk->kck_len = WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN; |
| ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher); |
| ptk->kdk_len = kdk_len; |
| ptk->kek_len = 0; |
| ptk->kek2_len = 0; |
| ptk->kck2_len = 0; |
| |
| if (ptk->tk_len == 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "PASN: Unsupported cipher (0x%x) used in PTK derivation", |
| cipher); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ptk_len = ptk->kck_len + ptk->tk_len + ptk->kdk_len; |
| if (ptk_len > sizeof(tmp)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: PTK derivation using SHA384"); |
| |
| if (sha384_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, tmp, |
| ptk_len) < 0) |
| goto err; |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: PTK derivation using SHA256"); |
| |
| if (sha256_prf(pmk, pmk_len, label, data, data_len, tmp, |
| ptk_len) < 0) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "PASN: PTK derivation: SPA=" MACSTR " BSSID=" MACSTR, |
| MAC2STR(spa), MAC2STR(bssid)); |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: DHss", dhss, dhss_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: PMK", pmk, pmk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: PASN-PTK", tmp, ptk_len); |
| |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kck, tmp, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: KCK:", ptk->kck, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN); |
| |
| os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN, ptk->tk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: TK:", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len); |
| |
| if (kdk_len) { |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kdk, tmp + WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN + ptk->tk_len, |
| ptk->kdk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: KDK:", |
| ptk->kdk, ptk->kdk_len); |
| } |
| |
| forced_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); |
| ret = 0; |
| err: |
| bin_clear_free(data, data_len); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * pasn_mic_len - Returns the MIC length for PASN authentication |
| */ |
| u8 pasn_mic_len(int akmp, int cipher) |
| { |
| if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) |
| return 24; |
| |
| return 16; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_ltf_keyseed - Compute LTF keyseed from KDK |
| * @ptk: Buffer that holds pairwise transient key |
| * @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| * @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| */ |
| int wpa_ltf_keyseed(struct wpa_ptk *ptk, int akmp, int cipher) |
| { |
| u8 *buf; |
| size_t buf_len; |
| u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| const u8 *kdk = ptk->kdk; |
| size_t kdk_len = ptk->kdk_len; |
| const char *label = "Secure LTF key seed"; |
| |
| if (!kdk || !kdk_len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: No KDK for LTF keyseed generation"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| buf = (u8 *)label; |
| buf_len = os_strlen(label); |
| |
| if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: Secure LTF keyseed using HMAC-SHA384"); |
| |
| if (hmac_sha384(kdk, kdk_len, buf, buf_len, hash)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "WPA: HMAC-SHA384 compute failed"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(ptk->ltf_keyseed, hash, SHA384_MAC_LEN); |
| ptk->ltf_keyseed_len = SHA384_MAC_LEN; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Secure LTF keyseed: ", |
| ptk->ltf_keyseed, ptk->ltf_keyseed_len); |
| |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: LTF keyseed using HMAC-SHA256"); |
| |
| if (hmac_sha256(kdk, kdk_len, buf, buf_len, hash)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "WPA: HMAC-SHA256 compute failed"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(ptk->ltf_keyseed, hash, SHA256_MAC_LEN); |
| ptk->ltf_keyseed_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Secure LTF keyseed: ", |
| ptk->ltf_keyseed, ptk->ltf_keyseed_len); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * pasn_mic - Calculate PASN MIC |
| * @kck: The key confirmation key for the PASN PTKSA |
| * @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| * @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| * @addr1: For the 2nd PASN frame supplicant address; for the 3rd frame the |
| * BSSID |
| * @addr2: For the 2nd PASN frame the BSSID; for the 3rd frame the supplicant |
| * address |
| * @data: For calculating the MIC for the 2nd PASN frame, this should hold the |
| * Beacon frame RSNE + RSNXE. For calculating the MIC for the 3rd PASN |
| * frame, this should hold the hash of the body of the PASN 1st frame. |
| * @data_len: The length of data |
| * @frame: The body of the PASN frame including the MIC element with the octets |
| * in the MIC field of the MIC element set to 0. |
| * @frame_len: The length of frame |
| * @mic: Buffer to hold the MIC on success. Should be big enough to handle the |
| * maximal MIC length |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| */ |
| int pasn_mic(const u8 *kck, int akmp, int cipher, |
| const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, |
| const u8 *data, size_t data_len, |
| const u8 *frame, size_t frame_len, u8 *mic) |
| { |
| u8 *buf; |
| u8 hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| size_t buf_len = 2 * ETH_ALEN + data_len + frame_len; |
| int ret = -1; |
| |
| if (!kck) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: No KCK for MIC calculation"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!data || !data_len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: invalid data for MIC calculation"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!frame || !frame_len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: invalid data for MIC calculation"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| buf = os_zalloc(buf_len); |
| if (!buf) |
| return -1; |
| |
| os_memcpy(buf, addr1, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: data", data, data_len); |
| os_memcpy(buf + 2 * ETH_ALEN, data, data_len); |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: frame", frame, frame_len); |
| os_memcpy(buf + 2 * ETH_ALEN + data_len, frame, frame_len); |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: KCK", kck, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: buf", buf, buf_len); |
| |
| if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC using HMAC-SHA384"); |
| |
| if (hmac_sha384(kck, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN, buf, buf_len, hash)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, 24); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: mic: ", mic, 24); |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC using HMAC-SHA256"); |
| |
| if (hmac_sha256(kck, WPA_PASN_KCK_LEN, buf, buf_len, hash)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| os_memcpy(mic, hash, 16); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: MIC: mic: ", mic, 16); |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| err: |
| bin_clear_free(buf, buf_len); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * pasn_auth_frame_hash - Computes a hash of an Authentication frame body |
| * @akmp: Negotiated AKM |
| * @cipher: Negotiated pairwise cipher |
| * @data: Pointer to the Authentication frame body |
| * @len: Length of the Authentication frame body |
| * @hash: On return would hold the computed hash. Should be big enough to handle |
| * SHA384. |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| */ |
| int pasn_auth_frame_hash(int akmp, int cipher, const u8 *data, size_t len, |
| u8 *hash) |
| { |
| if (pasn_use_sha384(akmp, cipher)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Frame hash using SHA-384"); |
| return sha384_vector(1, &data, &len, hash); |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Frame hash using SHA-256"); |
| return sha256_vector(1, &data, &len, hash); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* CONFIG_PASN */ |
| |
| |
| static int rsn_selector_to_bitfield(const u8 *s) |
| { |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_NONE; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_128_CMAC) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int rsn_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(const u8 *s) |
| { |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X_SHA384) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SHA256) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B_192) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_OWE |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OWE) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_OWE */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_DPP |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_DPP) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_DPP */ |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PASN |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PASN) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_PASN */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_cipher_valid_group(int cipher) |
| { |
| return wpa_cipher_valid_pairwise(cipher) || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_cipher_valid_mgmt_group(int cipher) |
| { |
| return cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128 || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256 || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn - Parse RSN IE |
| * @rsn_ie: Buffer containing RSN IE |
| * @rsn_ie_len: RSN IE buffer length (including IE number and length octets) |
| * @data: Pointer to structure that will be filled in with parsed data |
| * Returns: 0 on success, <0 on failure |
| */ |
| int wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(const u8 *rsn_ie, size_t rsn_ie_len, |
| struct wpa_ie_data *data) |
| { |
| const u8 *pos; |
| int left; |
| int i, count; |
| |
| os_memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); |
| data->proto = WPA_PROTO_RSN; |
| data->pairwise_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X; |
| data->capabilities = 0; |
| data->pmkid = NULL; |
| data->num_pmkid = 0; |
| data->mgmt_group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC; |
| |
| if (rsn_ie_len == 0) { |
| /* No RSN IE - fail silently */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (rsn_ie_len < sizeof(struct rsn_ie_hdr)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie len too short %lu", |
| __func__, (unsigned long) rsn_ie_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (rsn_ie_len >= 6 && rsn_ie[1] >= 4 && |
| rsn_ie[1] == rsn_ie_len - 2 && |
| WPA_GET_BE32(&rsn_ie[2]) == OSEN_IE_VENDOR_TYPE) { |
| pos = rsn_ie + 6; |
| left = rsn_ie_len - 6; |
| |
| data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| data->has_group = 1; |
| data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN; |
| data->proto = WPA_PROTO_OSEN; |
| } else { |
| const struct rsn_ie_hdr *hdr; |
| |
| hdr = (const struct rsn_ie_hdr *) rsn_ie; |
| |
| if (hdr->elem_id != WLAN_EID_RSN || |
| hdr->len != rsn_ie_len - 2 || |
| WPA_GET_LE16(hdr->version) != RSN_VERSION) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: malformed ie or unknown version", |
| __func__); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| pos = (const u8 *) (hdr + 1); |
| left = rsn_ie_len - sizeof(*hdr); |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| data->group_cipher = rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| data->has_group = 1; |
| if (!wpa_cipher_valid_group(data->group_cipher)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "%s: invalid group cipher 0x%x (%08x)", |
| __func__, data->group_cipher, |
| WPA_GET_BE32(pos)); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NO_TKIP |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(pos) == RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "%s: TKIP as group cipher not supported in CONFIG_NO_TKIP=y build", |
| __func__); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_NO_TKIP */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } else if (left > 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie length mismatch, %u too much", |
| __func__, left); |
| return -3; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2) { |
| data->pairwise_cipher = 0; |
| count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| left -= 2; |
| if (count == 0 || count > left / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (pairwise), " |
| "count %u left %u", __func__, count, left); |
| return -4; |
| } |
| if (count) |
| data->has_pairwise = 1; |
| for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { |
| data->pairwise_cipher |= rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| if (data->pairwise_cipher & WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: AES-128-CMAC used as " |
| "pairwise cipher", __func__); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else if (left == 1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for key mgmt)", |
| __func__); |
| return -5; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2) { |
| data->key_mgmt = 0; |
| count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| left -= 2; |
| if (count == 0 || count > left / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (key mgmt), " |
| "count %u left %u", __func__, count, left); |
| return -6; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { |
| data->key_mgmt |= rsn_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(pos); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| } else if (left == 1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for capabilities)", |
| __func__); |
| return -7; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2) { |
| data->capabilities = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| left -= 2; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2) { |
| u16 num_pmkid = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| left -= 2; |
| if (num_pmkid > (unsigned int) left / PMKID_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: PMKID underflow " |
| "(num_pmkid=%u left=%d)", |
| __func__, num_pmkid, left); |
| data->num_pmkid = 0; |
| return -9; |
| } else { |
| data->num_pmkid = num_pmkid; |
| data->pmkid = pos; |
| pos += data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| left -= data->num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 4) { |
| data->mgmt_group_cipher = rsn_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| if (!wpa_cipher_valid_mgmt_group(data->mgmt_group_cipher)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "%s: Unsupported management group cipher 0x%x (%08x)", |
| __func__, data->mgmt_group_cipher, |
| WPA_GET_BE32(pos)); |
| return -10; |
| } |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| left -= RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| |
| if (left > 0) { |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn: ignore trailing bytes", |
| pos, left); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_selector_to_bitfield(const u8 *s) |
| { |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_NONE; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int wpa_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(const u8 *s) |
| { |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK; |
| if (RSN_SELECTOR_GET(s) == WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_NONE) |
| return WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPA_NONE; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_parse_wpa_ie_wpa(const u8 *wpa_ie, size_t wpa_ie_len, |
| struct wpa_ie_data *data) |
| { |
| const struct wpa_ie_hdr *hdr; |
| const u8 *pos; |
| int left; |
| int i, count; |
| |
| os_memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); |
| data->proto = WPA_PROTO_WPA; |
| data->pairwise_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| data->group_cipher = WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| data->key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X; |
| data->capabilities = 0; |
| data->pmkid = NULL; |
| data->num_pmkid = 0; |
| data->mgmt_group_cipher = 0; |
| |
| if (wpa_ie_len < sizeof(struct wpa_ie_hdr)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie len too short %lu", |
| __func__, (unsigned long) wpa_ie_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| hdr = (const struct wpa_ie_hdr *) wpa_ie; |
| |
| if (hdr->elem_id != WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC || |
| hdr->len != wpa_ie_len - 2 || |
| RSN_SELECTOR_GET(hdr->oui) != WPA_OUI_TYPE || |
| WPA_GET_LE16(hdr->version) != WPA_VERSION) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: malformed ie or unknown version", |
| __func__); |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| pos = (const u8 *) (hdr + 1); |
| left = wpa_ie_len - sizeof(*hdr); |
| |
| if (left >= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| data->group_cipher = wpa_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } else if (left > 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie length mismatch, %u too much", |
| __func__, left); |
| return -3; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2) { |
| data->pairwise_cipher = 0; |
| count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| left -= 2; |
| if (count == 0 || count > left / WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (pairwise), " |
| "count %u left %u", __func__, count, left); |
| return -4; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { |
| data->pairwise_cipher |= wpa_selector_to_bitfield(pos); |
| pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| } else if (left == 1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for key mgmt)", |
| __func__); |
| return -5; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2) { |
| data->key_mgmt = 0; |
| count = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| left -= 2; |
| if (count == 0 || count > left / WPA_SELECTOR_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie count botch (key mgmt), " |
| "count %u left %u", __func__, count, left); |
| return -6; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { |
| data->key_mgmt |= wpa_key_mgmt_to_bitfield(pos); |
| pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| left -= WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| } else if (left == 1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: ie too short (for capabilities)", |
| __func__); |
| return -7; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2) { |
| data->capabilities = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| left -= 2; |
| } |
| |
| if (left > 0) { |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "wpa_parse_wpa_ie_wpa: ignore trailing bytes", |
| pos, left); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_default_rsn_cipher(int freq) |
| { |
| if (freq > 56160) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; /* DMG */ |
| |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_derive_pmk_r0 - Derive PMK-R0 and PMKR0Name |
| * |
| * IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.3 |
| */ |
| int wpa_derive_pmk_r0(const u8 *xxkey, size_t xxkey_len, |
| const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len, |
| const u8 *mdid, const u8 *r0kh_id, size_t r0kh_id_len, |
| const u8 *s0kh_id, u8 *pmk_r0, u8 *pmk_r0_name, |
| int key_mgmt) |
| { |
| u8 buf[1 + SSID_MAX_LEN + MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN + 1 + |
| FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN + ETH_ALEN]; |
| u8 *pos, r0_key_data[64 + 16], hash[64]; |
| const u8 *addr[2]; |
| size_t len[2]; |
| size_t q, r0_key_data_len; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY && |
| (xxkey_len == SHA256_MAC_LEN || xxkey_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN || |
| xxkey_len == SHA512_MAC_LEN)) |
| q = xxkey_len; |
| else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(key_mgmt)) |
| q = SHA384_MAC_LEN; |
| else |
| q = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| r0_key_data_len = q + 16; |
| |
| /* |
| * R0-Key-Data = KDF-Hash-Length(XXKey, "FT-R0", |
| * SSIDlength || SSID || MDID || R0KHlength || |
| * R0KH-ID || S0KH-ID) |
| * XXKey is either the second 256 bits of MSK or PSK; or the first |
| * 384 bits of MSK for FT-EAP-SHA384; or PMK from SAE. |
| * PMK-R0 = L(R0-Key-Data, 0, Q) |
| * PMK-R0Name-Salt = L(R0-Key-Data, Q, 128) |
| * Q = 384 for FT-EAP-SHA384; the length of the digest generated by H() |
| * for FT-SAE-EXT-KEY; or otherwise, 256 |
| */ |
| if (ssid_len > SSID_MAX_LEN || r0kh_id_len > FT_R0KH_ID_MAX_LEN) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derive PMK-R0 using KDF-SHA%zu", q * 8); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: XXKey", xxkey, xxkey_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: SSID", ssid, ssid_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDID", mdid, MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: R0KH-ID", r0kh_id, r0kh_id_len); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: S0KH-ID: " MACSTR, MAC2STR(s0kh_id)); |
| pos = buf; |
| *pos++ = ssid_len; |
| os_memcpy(pos, ssid, ssid_len); |
| pos += ssid_len; |
| os_memcpy(pos, mdid, MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN); |
| pos += MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN; |
| *pos++ = r0kh_id_len; |
| os_memcpy(pos, r0kh_id, r0kh_id_len); |
| pos += r0kh_id_len; |
| os_memcpy(pos, s0kh_id, ETH_ALEN); |
| pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| |
| res = -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (q == SHA512_MAC_LEN) { |
| if (xxkey_len != SHA512_MAC_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "FT: Unexpected XXKey length %d (expected %d)", |
| (int) xxkey_len, SHA512_MAC_LEN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| res = sha512_prf(xxkey, xxkey_len, "FT-R0", buf, pos - buf, |
| r0_key_data, r0_key_data_len); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (q == SHA384_MAC_LEN) { |
| if (xxkey_len != SHA384_MAC_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "FT: Unexpected XXKey length %d (expected %d)", |
| (int) xxkey_len, SHA384_MAC_LEN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| res = sha384_prf(xxkey, xxkey_len, "FT-R0", buf, pos - buf, |
| r0_key_data, r0_key_data_len); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| if (q == SHA256_MAC_LEN) { |
| if (xxkey_len != PMK_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "FT: Unexpected XXKey length %d (expected %d)", |
| (int) xxkey_len, PMK_LEN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| res = sha256_prf(xxkey, xxkey_len, "FT-R0", buf, pos - buf, |
| r0_key_data, r0_key_data_len); |
| } |
| if (res < 0) |
| return res; |
| os_memcpy(pmk_r0, r0_key_data, q); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R0", pmk_r0, q); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R0Name-Salt", &r0_key_data[q], 16); |
| |
| /* |
| * PMKR0Name = Truncate-128(Hash("FT-R0N" || PMK-R0Name-Salt) |
| */ |
| addr[0] = (const u8 *) "FT-R0N"; |
| len[0] = 6; |
| addr[1] = &r0_key_data[q]; |
| len[1] = 16; |
| |
| res = -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (q == SHA512_MAC_LEN) |
| res = sha512_vector(2, addr, len, hash); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (q == SHA384_MAC_LEN) |
| res = sha384_vector(2, addr, len, hash); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| if (q == SHA256_MAC_LEN) |
| res = sha256_vector(2, addr, len, hash); |
| if (res < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "FT: Failed to derive PMKR0Name (PMK-R0 len %zu)", |
| q); |
| return res; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(pmk_r0_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR0Name", pmk_r0_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| forced_memzero(r0_key_data, sizeof(r0_key_data)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name - Derive PMKR1Name |
| * |
| * IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.4 |
| */ |
| int wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(const u8 *pmk_r0_name, const u8 *r1kh_id, |
| const u8 *s1kh_id, u8 *pmk_r1_name, |
| size_t pmk_r1_len) |
| { |
| u8 hash[64]; |
| const u8 *addr[4]; |
| size_t len[4]; |
| int res; |
| const char *title; |
| |
| /* |
| * PMKR1Name = Truncate-128(Hash("FT-R1N" || PMKR0Name || |
| * R1KH-ID || S1KH-ID)) |
| */ |
| addr[0] = (const u8 *) "FT-R1N"; |
| len[0] = 6; |
| addr[1] = pmk_r0_name; |
| len[1] = WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN; |
| addr[2] = r1kh_id; |
| len[2] = FT_R1KH_ID_LEN; |
| addr[3] = s1kh_id; |
| len[3] = ETH_ALEN; |
| |
| res = -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (pmk_r1_len == SHA512_MAC_LEN) { |
| title = "FT: PMKR1Name (using SHA512)"; |
| res = sha512_vector(4, addr, len, hash); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (pmk_r1_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN) { |
| title = "FT: PMKR1Name (using SHA384)"; |
| res = sha384_vector(4, addr, len, hash); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| if (pmk_r1_len == SHA256_MAC_LEN) { |
| title = "FT: PMKR1Name (using SHA256)"; |
| res = sha256_vector(4, addr, len, hash); |
| } |
| if (res < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "FT: Failed to derive PMKR1Name (PMK-R1 len %zu)", |
| pmk_r1_len); |
| return res; |
| } |
| os_memcpy(pmk_r1_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, title, pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_derive_pmk_r1 - Derive PMK-R1 and PMKR1Name from PMK-R0 |
| * |
| * IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.4 |
| */ |
| int wpa_derive_pmk_r1(const u8 *pmk_r0, size_t pmk_r0_len, |
| const u8 *pmk_r0_name, |
| const u8 *r1kh_id, const u8 *s1kh_id, |
| u8 *pmk_r1, u8 *pmk_r1_name) |
| { |
| u8 buf[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN + ETH_ALEN]; |
| u8 *pos; |
| int res; |
| |
| /* PMK-R1 = KDF-Hash(PMK-R0, "FT-R1", R1KH-ID || S1KH-ID) */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derive PMK-R1 using KDF-SHA%zu", |
| pmk_r0_len * 8); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R0", pmk_r0, pmk_r0_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: R1KH-ID", r1kh_id, FT_R1KH_ID_LEN); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: S1KH-ID: " MACSTR, MAC2STR(s1kh_id)); |
| pos = buf; |
| os_memcpy(pos, r1kh_id, FT_R1KH_ID_LEN); |
| pos += FT_R1KH_ID_LEN; |
| os_memcpy(pos, s1kh_id, ETH_ALEN); |
| pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| |
| res = -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (pmk_r0_len == SHA512_MAC_LEN) |
| res = sha512_prf(pmk_r0, pmk_r0_len, "FT-R1", |
| buf, pos - buf, pmk_r1, pmk_r0_len); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (pmk_r0_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN) |
| res = sha384_prf(pmk_r0, pmk_r0_len, "FT-R1", |
| buf, pos - buf, pmk_r1, pmk_r0_len); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| if (pmk_r0_len == SHA256_MAC_LEN) |
| res = sha256_prf(pmk_r0, pmk_r0_len, "FT-R1", |
| buf, pos - buf, pmk_r1, pmk_r0_len); |
| if (res < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to derive PMK-R1"); |
| return res; |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R1", pmk_r1, pmk_r0_len); |
| |
| return wpa_derive_pmk_r1_name(pmk_r0_name, r1kh_id, s1kh_id, |
| pmk_r1_name, pmk_r0_len); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk - Derive PTK and PTKName from PMK-R1 |
| * |
| * IEEE Std 802.11r-2008 - 8.5.1.5.5 |
| */ |
| int wpa_pmk_r1_to_ptk(const u8 *pmk_r1, size_t pmk_r1_len, |
| const u8 *snonce, const u8 *anonce, |
| const u8 *sta_addr, const u8 *bssid, |
| const u8 *pmk_r1_name, |
| struct wpa_ptk *ptk, u8 *ptk_name, int akmp, int cipher, |
| size_t kdk_len) |
| { |
| u8 buf[2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN]; |
| u8 *pos, hash[32]; |
| const u8 *addr[6]; |
| size_t len[6]; |
| u8 tmp[2 * WPA_KCK_MAX_LEN + 2 * WPA_KEK_MAX_LEN + WPA_TK_MAX_LEN + |
| WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN]; |
| size_t ptk_len, offset; |
| size_t key_len; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (kdk_len > WPA_KDK_MAX_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "FT: KDK len=%zu exceeds max supported len", |
| kdk_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (akmp == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY && |
| (pmk_r1_len == SHA256_MAC_LEN || pmk_r1_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN || |
| pmk_r1_len == SHA512_MAC_LEN)) |
| key_len = pmk_r1_len; |
| else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) |
| key_len = SHA384_MAC_LEN; |
| else |
| key_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| |
| /* |
| * PTK = KDF-PTKLen(PMK-R1, "FT-PTK", SNonce || ANonce || |
| * BSSID || STA-ADDR) |
| */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derive PTK using KDF-SHA%zu", key_len * 8); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMK-R1", pmk_r1, pmk_r1_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: SNonce", snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: ANonce", anonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: BSSID=" MACSTR " STA-ADDR=" MACSTR, |
| MAC2STR(bssid), MAC2STR(sta_addr)); |
| pos = buf; |
| os_memcpy(pos, snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| pos += WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| os_memcpy(pos, anonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN); |
| pos += WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| os_memcpy(pos, bssid, ETH_ALEN); |
| pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| os_memcpy(pos, sta_addr, ETH_ALEN); |
| pos += ETH_ALEN; |
| |
| ptk->kck_len = wpa_kck_len(akmp, key_len); |
| ptk->kck2_len = wpa_kck2_len(akmp); |
| ptk->kek_len = wpa_kek_len(akmp, key_len); |
| ptk->kek2_len = wpa_kek2_len(akmp); |
| ptk->tk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(cipher); |
| ptk->kdk_len = kdk_len; |
| ptk_len = ptk->kck_len + ptk->kek_len + ptk->tk_len + |
| ptk->kck2_len + ptk->kek2_len + ptk->kdk_len; |
| |
| res = -1; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (key_len == SHA512_MAC_LEN) { |
| if (pmk_r1_len != SHA512_MAC_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "FT: Unexpected PMK-R1 length %d (expected %d)", |
| (int) pmk_r1_len, SHA512_MAC_LEN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| res = sha512_prf(pmk_r1, pmk_r1_len, "FT-PTK", |
| buf, pos - buf, tmp, ptk_len); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (key_len == SHA384_MAC_LEN) { |
| if (pmk_r1_len != SHA384_MAC_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "FT: Unexpected PMK-R1 length %d (expected %d)", |
| (int) pmk_r1_len, SHA384_MAC_LEN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| res = sha384_prf(pmk_r1, pmk_r1_len, "FT-PTK", |
| buf, pos - buf, tmp, ptk_len); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| if (key_len == SHA256_MAC_LEN) { |
| if (pmk_r1_len != PMK_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "FT: Unexpected PMK-R1 length %d (expected %d)", |
| (int) pmk_r1_len, PMK_LEN); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| res = sha256_prf(pmk_r1, pmk_r1_len, "FT-PTK", |
| buf, pos - buf, tmp, ptk_len); |
| } |
| if (res < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PTK", tmp, ptk_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * PTKName = Truncate-128(SHA-256(PMKR1Name || "FT-PTKN" || SNonce || |
| * ANonce || BSSID || STA-ADDR)) |
| */ |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name", pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| addr[0] = pmk_r1_name; |
| len[0] = WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN; |
| addr[1] = (const u8 *) "FT-PTKN"; |
| len[1] = 7; |
| addr[2] = snonce; |
| len[2] = WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| addr[3] = anonce; |
| len[3] = WPA_NONCE_LEN; |
| addr[4] = bssid; |
| len[4] = ETH_ALEN; |
| addr[5] = sta_addr; |
| len[5] = ETH_ALEN; |
| |
| if (sha256_vector(6, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(ptk_name, hash, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kck, tmp, ptk->kck_len); |
| offset = ptk->kck_len; |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kek, tmp + offset, ptk->kek_len); |
| offset += ptk->kek_len; |
| os_memcpy(ptk->tk, tmp + offset, ptk->tk_len); |
| offset += ptk->tk_len; |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kck2, tmp + offset, ptk->kck2_len); |
| offset += ptk->kck2_len; |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kek2, tmp + offset, ptk->kek2_len); |
| offset += ptk->kek2_len; |
| os_memcpy(ptk->kdk, tmp + offset, ptk->kdk_len); |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KCK", ptk->kck, ptk->kck_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KEK", ptk->kek, ptk->kek_len); |
| if (ptk->kck2_len) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KCK2", |
| ptk->kck2, ptk->kck2_len); |
| if (ptk->kek2_len) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KEK2", |
| ptk->kek2, ptk->kek2_len); |
| if (ptk->kdk_len) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: KDK", ptk->kdk, ptk->kdk_len); |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: TK", ptk->tk, ptk->tk_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PTKName", ptk_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN); |
| |
| forced_memzero(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * rsn_pmkid - Calculate PMK identifier |
| * @pmk: Pairwise master key |
| * @pmk_len: Length of pmk in bytes |
| * @aa: Authenticator address |
| * @spa: Supplicant address |
| * @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID |
| * @akmp: Negotiated key management protocol |
| * |
| * IEEE Std 802.11-2016 - 12.7.1.3 Pairwise key hierarchy |
| * AKM: 00-0F-AC:3, 00-0F-AC:5, 00-0F-AC:6, 00-0F-AC:14, 00-0F-AC:16 |
| * PMKID = Truncate-128(HMAC-SHA-256(PMK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| * AKM: 00-0F-AC:11 |
| * See rsn_pmkid_suite_b() |
| * AKM: 00-0F-AC:12 |
| * See rsn_pmkid_suite_b_192() |
| * AKM: 00-0F-AC:13, 00-0F-AC:15, 00-0F-AC:17 |
| * PMKID = Truncate-128(HMAC-SHA-384(PMK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| * Otherwise: |
| * PMKID = Truncate-128(HMAC-SHA-1(PMK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| */ |
| void rsn_pmkid(const u8 *pmk, size_t pmk_len, const u8 *aa, const u8 *spa, |
| u8 *pmkid, int akmp) |
| { |
| char *title = "PMK Name"; |
| const u8 *addr[3]; |
| const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN }; |
| unsigned char hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| addr[0] = (u8 *) title; |
| addr[1] = aa; |
| addr[2] = spa; |
| |
| if (0) { |
| #if defined(CONFIG_FILS) || defined(CONFIG_SHA384) |
| } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha384(akmp)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Derive PMKID using HMAC-SHA-384"); |
| hmac_sha384_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_FILS || CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| } else if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(akmp)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Derive PMKID using HMAC-SHA-256"); |
| hmac_sha256_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash); |
| } else { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Derive PMKID using HMAC-SHA-1"); |
| hmac_sha1_vector(pmk, pmk_len, 3, addr, len, hash); |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: Derived PMKID", hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB |
| /** |
| * rsn_pmkid_suite_b - Calculate PMK identifier for Suite B AKM |
| * @kck: Key confirmation key |
| * @kck_len: Length of kck in bytes |
| * @aa: Authenticator address |
| * @spa: Supplicant address |
| * @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| * |
| * IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 - 11.6.1.3 Pairwise key hierarchy |
| * PMKID = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-256(KCK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| */ |
| int rsn_pmkid_suite_b(const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *aa, |
| const u8 *spa, u8 *pmkid) |
| { |
| char *title = "PMK Name"; |
| const u8 *addr[3]; |
| const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN }; |
| unsigned char hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| addr[0] = (u8 *) title; |
| addr[1] = aa; |
| addr[2] = spa; |
| |
| if (hmac_sha256_vector(kck, kck_len, 3, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB */ |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SUITEB192 |
| /** |
| * rsn_pmkid_suite_b_192 - Calculate PMK identifier for Suite B AKM |
| * @kck: Key confirmation key |
| * @kck_len: Length of kck in bytes |
| * @aa: Authenticator address |
| * @spa: Supplicant address |
| * @pmkid: Buffer for PMKID |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| * |
| * IEEE Std 802.11ac-2013 - 11.6.1.3 Pairwise key hierarchy |
| * PMKID = Truncate(HMAC-SHA-384(KCK, "PMK Name" || AA || SPA)) |
| */ |
| int rsn_pmkid_suite_b_192(const u8 *kck, size_t kck_len, const u8 *aa, |
| const u8 *spa, u8 *pmkid) |
| { |
| char *title = "PMK Name"; |
| const u8 *addr[3]; |
| const size_t len[3] = { 8, ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN }; |
| unsigned char hash[SHA384_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| addr[0] = (u8 *) title; |
| addr[1] = aa; |
| addr[2] = spa; |
| |
| if (hmac_sha384_vector(kck, kck_len, 3, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(pmkid, hash, PMKID_LEN); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SUITEB192 */ |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_cipher_txt - Convert cipher suite to a text string |
| * @cipher: Cipher suite (WPA_CIPHER_* enum) |
| * Returns: Pointer to a text string of the cipher suite name |
| */ |
| const char * wpa_cipher_txt(int cipher) |
| { |
| switch (cipher) { |
| case WPA_CIPHER_NONE: |
| return "NONE"; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_WEP |
| case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40: |
| return "WEP-40"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104: |
| return "WEP-104"; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_WEP */ |
| case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| return "TKIP"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP: |
| return "CCMP"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| return "CCMP+TKIP"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP: |
| return "GCMP"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256: |
| return "GCMP-256"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256: |
| return "CCMP-256"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC: |
| return "BIP"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128: |
| return "BIP-GMAC-128"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256: |
| return "BIP-GMAC-256"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256: |
| return "BIP-CMAC-256"; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED: |
| return "GTK_NOT_USED"; |
| default: |
| return "UNKNOWN"; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_key_mgmt_txt - Convert key management suite to a text string |
| * @key_mgmt: Key management suite (WPA_KEY_MGMT_* enum) |
| * @proto: WPA/WPA2 version (WPA_PROTO_*) |
| * Returns: Pointer to a text string of the key management suite name |
| */ |
| const char * wpa_key_mgmt_txt(int key_mgmt, int proto) |
| { |
| switch (key_mgmt) { |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X: |
| if (proto == (WPA_PROTO_RSN | WPA_PROTO_WPA)) |
| return "WPA2+WPA/IEEE 802.1X/EAP"; |
| return proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| "WPA2/IEEE 802.1X/EAP" : "WPA/IEEE 802.1X/EAP"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK: |
| if (proto == (WPA_PROTO_RSN | WPA_PROTO_WPA)) |
| return "WPA2-PSK+WPA-PSK"; |
| return proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| "WPA2-PSK" : "WPA-PSK"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_NONE: |
| return "NONE"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPA_NONE: |
| return "WPA-NONE"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_NO_WPA: |
| return "IEEE 802.1X (no WPA)"; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X: |
| return "FT-EAP"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| return "FT-EAP-SHA384"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK: |
| return "FT-PSK"; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256: |
| return "WPA2-EAP-SHA256"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256: |
| return "WPA2-PSK-SHA256"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_WPS: |
| return "WPS"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE: |
| return "SAE"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| return "SAE-EXT-KEY"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE: |
| return "FT-SAE"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| return "FT-SAE-EXT-KEY"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN: |
| return "OSEN"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B: |
| return "WPA2-EAP-SUITE-B"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192: |
| return "WPA2-EAP-SUITE-B-192"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| return "FILS-SHA256"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| return "FILS-SHA384"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256: |
| return "FT-FILS-SHA256"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384: |
| return "FT-FILS-SHA384"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE: |
| return "OWE"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP: |
| return "DPP"; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN: |
| return "PASN"; |
| default: |
| return "UNKNOWN"; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| u32 wpa_akm_to_suite(int akm) |
| { |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X_SHA384; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SHA256) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SHA256; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_UNSPEC_802_1X; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_SHA256; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_PSK) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PSK_OVER_802_1X; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_CCKM) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_CCKM; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OSEN; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X_SUITE_B_192) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_802_1X_SUITE_B_192; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA256; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_FILS_SHA384; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_OWE) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_OWE; |
| if (akm & WPA_KEY_MGMT_DPP) |
| return RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_DPP; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_compare_rsn_ie(int ft_initial_assoc, |
| const u8 *ie1, size_t ie1len, |
| const u8 *ie2, size_t ie2len) |
| { |
| if (ie1 == NULL || ie2 == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if (ie1len == ie2len && os_memcmp(ie1, ie2, ie1len) == 0) |
| return 0; /* identical IEs */ |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| if (ft_initial_assoc) { |
| struct wpa_ie_data ie1d, ie2d; |
| /* |
| * The PMKID-List in RSN IE is different between Beacon/Probe |
| * Response/(Re)Association Request frames and EAPOL-Key |
| * messages in FT initial mobility domain association. Allow |
| * for this, but verify that other parts of the RSN IEs are |
| * identical. |
| */ |
| if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(ie1, ie1len, &ie1d) < 0 || |
| wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(ie2, ie2len, &ie2d) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| if (ie1d.proto == ie2d.proto && |
| ie1d.pairwise_cipher == ie2d.pairwise_cipher && |
| ie1d.group_cipher == ie2d.group_cipher && |
| ie1d.key_mgmt == ie2d.key_mgmt && |
| ie1d.capabilities == ie2d.capabilities && |
| ie1d.mgmt_group_cipher == ie2d.mgmt_group_cipher) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_insert_pmkid(u8 *ies, size_t *ies_len, const u8 *pmkid) |
| { |
| u8 *start, *end, *rpos, *rend; |
| int added = 0; |
| |
| start = ies; |
| end = ies + *ies_len; |
| |
| while (start < end) { |
| if (*start == WLAN_EID_RSN) |
| break; |
| start += 2 + start[1]; |
| } |
| if (start >= end) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "RSN: Could not find RSNE in IEs data"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: RSNE before modification", |
| start, 2 + start[1]); |
| |
| /* Find start of PMKID-Count */ |
| rpos = start + 2; |
| rend = rpos + start[1]; |
| |
| /* Skip Version and Group Data Cipher Suite */ |
| rpos += 2 + 4; |
| /* Skip Pairwise Cipher Suite Count and List */ |
| rpos += 2 + WPA_GET_LE16(rpos) * RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| /* Skip AKM Suite Count and List */ |
| rpos += 2 + WPA_GET_LE16(rpos) * RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| |
| if (rpos == rend) { |
| /* Add RSN Capabilities */ |
| os_memmove(rpos + 2, rpos, end - rpos); |
| *rpos++ = 0; |
| *rpos++ = 0; |
| added += 2; |
| start[1] += 2; |
| rend = rpos; |
| } else { |
| /* Skip RSN Capabilities */ |
| rpos += 2; |
| if (rpos > rend) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, |
| "RSN: Could not parse RSNE in IEs data"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (rpos == rend) { |
| /* No PMKID-Count field included; add it */ |
| os_memmove(rpos + 2 + PMKID_LEN, rpos, end + added - rpos); |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(rpos, 1); |
| rpos += 2; |
| os_memcpy(rpos, pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| added += 2 + PMKID_LEN; |
| start[1] += 2 + PMKID_LEN; |
| } else { |
| u16 num_pmkid; |
| |
| if (rend - rpos < 2) |
| return -1; |
| num_pmkid = WPA_GET_LE16(rpos); |
| /* PMKID-Count was included; use it */ |
| if (num_pmkid != 0) { |
| u8 *after; |
| |
| if (num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN > rend - rpos - 2) |
| return -1; |
| /* |
| * PMKID may have been included in RSN IE in |
| * (Re)Association Request frame, so remove the old |
| * PMKID(s) first before adding the new one. |
| */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "RSN: Remove %u old PMKID(s) from RSNE", |
| num_pmkid); |
| after = rpos + 2 + num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| os_memmove(rpos + 2, after, end - after); |
| start[1] -= num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| added -= num_pmkid * PMKID_LEN; |
| } |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(rpos, 1); |
| rpos += 2; |
| os_memmove(rpos + PMKID_LEN, rpos, end + added - rpos); |
| os_memcpy(rpos, pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| added += PMKID_LEN; |
| start[1] += PMKID_LEN; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: RSNE after modification (PMKID inserted)", |
| start, 2 + start[1]); |
| |
| *ies_len += added; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_cipher_key_len(int cipher) |
| { |
| switch (cipher) { |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256: |
| return 32; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128: |
| return 16; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| return 32; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_cipher_rsc_len(int cipher) |
| { |
| switch (cipher) { |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP: |
| case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| return 6; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| enum wpa_alg wpa_cipher_to_alg(int cipher) |
| { |
| switch (cipher) { |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256: |
| return WPA_ALG_CCMP_256; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256: |
| return WPA_ALG_GCMP_256; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP: |
| return WPA_ALG_CCMP; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_GCMP: |
| return WPA_ALG_GCMP; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP: |
| return WPA_ALG_TKIP; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC: |
| return WPA_ALG_BIP_CMAC_128; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128: |
| return WPA_ALG_BIP_GMAC_128; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256: |
| return WPA_ALG_BIP_GMAC_256; |
| case WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256: |
| return WPA_ALG_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| default: |
| return WPA_ALG_NONE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_cipher_valid_pairwise(int cipher) |
| { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_NO_TKIP |
| return cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| #else /* CONFIG_NO_TKIP */ |
| return cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP || |
| cipher == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_NO_TKIP */ |
| } |
| |
| |
| u32 wpa_cipher_to_suite(int proto, int cipher) |
| { |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) |
| return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256; |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) |
| return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256; |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) |
| return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP); |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) |
| return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP; |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP); |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) |
| return (proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN ? |
| RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE : WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE); |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED) |
| return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED; |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC) |
| return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_128_CMAC; |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128) |
| return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128; |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256) |
| return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256; |
| if (cipher & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256) |
| return RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int rsn_cipher_put_suites(u8 *start, int ciphers) |
| { |
| u8 *pos = start; |
| |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| |
| return (pos - start) / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_cipher_put_suites(u8 *start, int ciphers) |
| { |
| u8 *pos = start; |
| |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP); |
| pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP); |
| pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) { |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE); |
| pos += WPA_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| |
| return (pos - start) / RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_pick_pairwise_cipher(int ciphers, int none_allowed) |
| { |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| if (none_allowed && (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE)) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_NONE; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_pick_group_cipher(int ciphers) |
| { |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_parse_cipher(const char *value) |
| { |
| int val = 0, last; |
| char *start, *end, *buf; |
| |
| buf = os_strdup(value); |
| if (buf == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| start = buf; |
| |
| while (*start != '\0') { |
| while (*start == ' ' || *start == '\t') |
| start++; |
| if (*start == '\0') |
| break; |
| end = start; |
| while (*end != ' ' && *end != '\t' && *end != '\0') |
| end++; |
| last = *end == '\0'; |
| *end = '\0'; |
| if (os_strcmp(start, "CCMP-256") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "GCMP-256") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "CCMP") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "GCMP") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| #ifndef CONFIG_NO_TKIP |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "TKIP") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_NO_TKIP */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_WEP |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "WEP104") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_WEP104; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "WEP40") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_WEP40; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_WEP */ |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "NONE") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_NONE; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "GTK_NOT_USED") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "AES-128-CMAC") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "BIP-GMAC-128") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "BIP-GMAC-256") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256; |
| else if (os_strcmp(start, "BIP-CMAC-256") == 0) |
| val |= WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256; |
| else { |
| os_free(buf); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (last) |
| break; |
| start = end + 1; |
| } |
| os_free(buf); |
| |
| return val; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_write_ciphers(char *start, char *end, int ciphers, const char *delim) |
| { |
| char *pos = start; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sCCMP-256", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sGCMP-256", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sCCMP", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sGCMP", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sTKIP", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_AES_128_CMAC) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sAES-128-CMAC", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_128) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sBIP-GMAC-128", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_GMAC_256) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sBIP-GMAC-256", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_BIP_CMAC_256) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sBIP-CMAC-256", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| if (ciphers & WPA_CIPHER_NONE) { |
| ret = os_snprintf(pos, end - pos, "%sNONE", |
| pos == start ? "" : delim); |
| if (os_snprintf_error(end - pos, ret)) |
| return -1; |
| pos += ret; |
| } |
| |
| return pos - start; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int wpa_select_ap_group_cipher(int wpa, int wpa_pairwise, int rsn_pairwise) |
| { |
| int pairwise = 0; |
| |
| /* Select group cipher based on the enabled pairwise cipher suites */ |
| if (wpa & 1) |
| pairwise |= wpa_pairwise; |
| if (wpa & 2) |
| pairwise |= rsn_pairwise; |
| |
| if (pairwise & WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_TKIP; |
| if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP; |
| if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256 | WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | |
| WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_GCMP_256; |
| if ((pairwise & (WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256 | WPA_CIPHER_CCMP | |
| WPA_CIPHER_GCMP)) == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256) |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP_256; |
| return WPA_CIPHER_CCMP; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_FILS |
| int fils_domain_name_hash(const char *domain, u8 *hash) |
| { |
| char buf[255], *wpos = buf; |
| const char *pos = domain; |
| size_t len; |
| const u8 *addr[1]; |
| u8 mac[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| for (len = 0; len < sizeof(buf) && *pos; len++) { |
| if (isalpha(*pos) && isupper(*pos)) |
| *wpos++ = tolower(*pos); |
| else |
| *wpos++ = *pos; |
| pos++; |
| } |
| |
| addr[0] = (const u8 *) buf; |
| if (sha256_vector(1, addr, &len, mac) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| os_memcpy(hash, mac, 2); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_parse_vendor_specific - Parse Vendor Specific IEs |
| * @pos: Pointer to the IE header |
| * @end: Pointer to the end of the Key Data buffer |
| * @ie: Pointer to parsed IE data |
| */ |
| static void wpa_parse_vendor_specific(const u8 *pos, const u8 *end, |
| struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) |
| { |
| unsigned int oui; |
| |
| if (pos[1] < 4) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_MSGDUMP, |
| "Too short vendor specific IE ignored (len=%u)", |
| pos[1]); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| oui = WPA_GET_BE24(&pos[2]); |
| if (oui == OUI_MICROSOFT && pos[5] == WMM_OUI_TYPE && pos[1] > 4) { |
| if (pos[6] == WMM_OUI_SUBTYPE_INFORMATION_ELEMENT) { |
| ie->wmm = &pos[2]; |
| ie->wmm_len = pos[1]; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: WMM IE", |
| ie->wmm, ie->wmm_len); |
| } else if (pos[6] == WMM_OUI_SUBTYPE_PARAMETER_ELEMENT) { |
| ie->wmm = &pos[2]; |
| ie->wmm_len = pos[1]; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: WMM Parameter Element", |
| ie->wmm, ie->wmm_len); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_parse_generic - Parse EAPOL-Key Key Data Generic IEs |
| * @pos: Pointer to the IE header |
| * @ie: Pointer to parsed IE data |
| * Returns: 0 on success, 1 if end mark is found, 2 if KDE is not recognized |
| */ |
| static int wpa_parse_generic(const u8 *pos, struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) |
| { |
| u8 len = pos[1]; |
| size_t dlen = 2 + len; |
| u32 selector; |
| const u8 *p; |
| size_t left; |
| u8 link_id; |
| char title[50]; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (len == 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (len < RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) |
| return 2; |
| |
| p = pos + 2; |
| selector = RSN_SELECTOR_GET(p); |
| p += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| left = len - RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| |
| if (left >= 2 && selector == WPA_OUI_TYPE && p[0] == 1 && p[1] == 0) { |
| ie->wpa_ie = pos; |
| ie->wpa_ie_len = dlen; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: WPA IE in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->wpa_ie, ie->wpa_ie_len); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (selector == OSEN_IE_VENDOR_TYPE) { |
| ie->osen = pos; |
| ie->osen_len = dlen; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= PMKID_LEN && selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID) { |
| ie->pmkid = p; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMKID in EAPOL-Key", pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2 && selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_KEYID) { |
| ie->key_id = p; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KeyID in EAPOL-Key", pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left > 2 && selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY) { |
| ie->gtk = p; |
| ie->gtk_len = left; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: GTK in EAPOL-Key", pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= ETH_ALEN && selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_MAC_ADDR) { |
| ie->mac_addr = p; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: MAC Address in EAPOL-Key: " MACSTR, |
| MAC2STR(ie->mac_addr)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left > 2 && selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK) { |
| ie->igtk = p; |
| ie->igtk_len = left; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK in EAPOL-Key", |
| pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left > 2 && selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_BIGTK) { |
| ie->bigtk = p; |
| ie->bigtk_len = left; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: BIGTK in EAPOL-Key", |
| pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 1 && selector == WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_REQ) { |
| ie->ip_addr_req = p; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IP Address Request in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->ip_addr_req, left); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 3 * 4 && selector == WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC) { |
| ie->ip_addr_alloc = p; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: IP Address Allocation in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->ip_addr_alloc, left); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left > 2 && selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_OCI) { |
| ie->oci = p; |
| ie->oci_len = left; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: OCI KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 1 && selector == WFA_KEY_DATA_TRANSITION_DISABLE) { |
| ie->transition_disable = p; |
| ie->transition_disable_len = left; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: Transition Disable KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= 2 && selector == WFA_KEY_DATA_DPP) { |
| ie->dpp_kde = p; |
| ie->dpp_kde_len = left; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: DPP KDE in EAPOL-Key", pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= RSN_MLO_GTK_KDE_PREFIX_LENGTH && |
| selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_MLO_GTK) { |
| link_id = (p[0] & RSN_MLO_GTK_KDE_PREFIX0_LINK_ID_MASK) >> |
| RSN_MLO_GTK_KDE_PREFIX0_LINK_ID_SHIFT; |
| if (link_id >= MAX_NUM_MLO_LINKS) |
| return 2; |
| |
| ie->valid_mlo_gtks |= BIT(link_id); |
| ie->mlo_gtk[link_id] = p; |
| ie->mlo_gtk_len[link_id] = left; |
| ret = os_snprintf(title, sizeof(title), |
| "RSN: Link ID %u - MLO GTK KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| link_id); |
| if (!os_snprintf_error(sizeof(title), ret)) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, title, pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= RSN_MLO_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LENGTH && |
| selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_MLO_IGTK) { |
| link_id = (p[8] & RSN_MLO_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX8_LINK_ID_MASK) >> |
| RSN_MLO_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX8_LINK_ID_SHIFT; |
| if (link_id >= MAX_NUM_MLO_LINKS) |
| return 2; |
| |
| ie->valid_mlo_igtks |= BIT(link_id); |
| ie->mlo_igtk[link_id] = p; |
| ie->mlo_igtk_len[link_id] = left; |
| ret = os_snprintf(title, sizeof(title), |
| "RSN: Link ID %u - MLO IGTK KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| link_id); |
| if (!os_snprintf_error(sizeof(title), ret)) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, title, pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= RSN_MLO_BIGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LENGTH && |
| selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_MLO_BIGTK) { |
| link_id = (p[8] & RSN_MLO_BIGTK_KDE_PREFIX8_LINK_ID_MASK) >> |
| RSN_MLO_BIGTK_KDE_PREFIX8_LINK_ID_SHIFT; |
| if (link_id >= MAX_NUM_MLO_LINKS) |
| return 2; |
| |
| ie->valid_mlo_bigtks |= BIT(link_id); |
| ie->mlo_bigtk[link_id] = p; |
| ie->mlo_bigtk_len[link_id] = left; |
| ret = os_snprintf(title, sizeof(title), |
| "RSN: Link ID %u - MLO BIGTK KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| link_id); |
| if (!os_snprintf_error(sizeof(title), ret)) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, title, pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (left >= RSN_MLO_LINK_KDE_FIXED_LENGTH && |
| selector == RSN_KEY_DATA_MLO_LINK) { |
| link_id = (p[0] & RSN_MLO_LINK_KDE_LI_LINK_ID_MASK) >> |
| RSN_MLO_LINK_KDE_LI_LINK_ID_SHIFT; |
| if (link_id >= MAX_NUM_MLO_LINKS) |
| return 2; |
| |
| ie->valid_mlo_links |= BIT(link_id); |
| ie->mlo_link[link_id] = p; |
| ie->mlo_link_len[link_id] = left; |
| ret = os_snprintf(title, sizeof(title), |
| "RSN: Link ID %u - MLO Link KDE in EAPOL-Key", |
| link_id); |
| if (!os_snprintf_error(sizeof(title), ret)) |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, title, pos, dlen); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 2; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /** |
| * wpa_parse_kde_ies - Parse EAPOL-Key Key Data IEs |
| * @buf: Pointer to the Key Data buffer |
| * @len: Key Data Length |
| * @ie: Pointer to parsed IE data |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| */ |
| int wpa_parse_kde_ies(const u8 *buf, size_t len, struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie) |
| { |
| const u8 *pos, *end; |
| int ret = 0; |
| size_t dlen = 0; |
| |
| os_memset(ie, 0, sizeof(*ie)); |
| for (pos = buf, end = pos + len; end - pos > 1; pos += dlen) { |
| if (pos[0] == 0xdd && |
| ((pos == buf + len - 1) || pos[1] == 0)) { |
| /* Ignore padding */ |
| break; |
| } |
| dlen = 2 + pos[1]; |
| if ((int) dlen > end - pos) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: EAPOL-Key Key Data underflow (ie=%d len=%d pos=%d)", |
| pos[0], pos[1], (int) (pos - buf)); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Key Data", buf, len); |
| ret = -1; |
| break; |
| } |
| if (*pos == WLAN_EID_RSN) { |
| ie->rsn_ie = pos; |
| ie->rsn_ie_len = dlen; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: RSN IE in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->rsn_ie, ie->rsn_ie_len); |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_RSNX) { |
| ie->rsnxe = pos; |
| ie->rsnxe_len = dlen; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: RSNXE in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->rsnxe, ie->rsnxe_len); |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_MOBILITY_DOMAIN) { |
| ie->mdie = pos; |
| ie->mdie_len = dlen; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: MDIE in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->mdie, ie->mdie_len); |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_FAST_BSS_TRANSITION) { |
| ie->ftie = pos; |
| ie->ftie_len = dlen; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: FTIE in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->ftie, ie->ftie_len); |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL && pos[1] >= 5) { |
| if (pos[2] == WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE) { |
| ie->reassoc_deadline = pos; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Reassoc Deadline " |
| "in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->reassoc_deadline, dlen); |
| } else if (pos[2] == WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME) { |
| ie->key_lifetime = pos; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: KeyLifetime " |
| "in EAPOL-Key", |
| ie->key_lifetime, dlen); |
| } else { |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Unrecognized " |
| "EAPOL-Key Key Data IE", |
| pos, dlen); |
| } |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_LINK_ID) { |
| if (pos[1] >= 18) { |
| ie->lnkid = pos; |
| ie->lnkid_len = dlen; |
| } |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_EXT_CAPAB) { |
| ie->ext_capab = pos; |
| ie->ext_capab_len = dlen; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES) { |
| ie->supp_rates = pos; |
| ie->supp_rates_len = dlen; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES) { |
| ie->ext_supp_rates = pos; |
| ie->ext_supp_rates_len = dlen; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_HT_CAP && |
| pos[1] >= sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_capabilities)) { |
| ie->ht_capabilities = pos + 2; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_AID) { |
| if (pos[1] >= 2) |
| ie->aid = WPA_GET_LE16(pos + 2) & 0x3fff; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_VHT_CAP && |
| pos[1] >= sizeof(struct ieee80211_vht_capabilities)) |
| { |
| ie->vht_capabilities = pos + 2; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION && |
| pos[1] >= 1 + IEEE80211_HE_CAPAB_MIN_LEN && |
| pos[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_CAPABILITIES) { |
| ie->he_capabilities = pos + 3; |
| ie->he_capab_len = pos[1] - 1; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION && |
| pos[1] >= 1 + |
| sizeof(struct ieee80211_he_6ghz_band_cap) && |
| pos[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_HE_6GHZ_BAND_CAP) { |
| ie->he_6ghz_capabilities = pos + 3; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_QOS && pos[1] >= 1) { |
| ie->qosinfo = pos[2]; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_SUPPORTED_CHANNELS) { |
| ie->supp_channels = pos + 2; |
| ie->supp_channels_len = pos[1]; |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_SUPPORTED_OPERATING_CLASSES) { |
| /* |
| * The value of the Length field of the Supported |
| * Operating Classes element is between 2 and 253. |
| * Silently skip invalid elements to avoid interop |
| * issues when trying to use the value. |
| */ |
| if (pos[1] >= 2 && pos[1] <= 253) { |
| ie->supp_oper_classes = pos + 2; |
| ie->supp_oper_classes_len = pos[1]; |
| } |
| } else if (*pos == WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) { |
| ret = wpa_parse_generic(pos, ie); |
| if (ret == 1) { |
| /* end mark found */ |
| ret = 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret == 2) { |
| /* not a known KDE */ |
| wpa_parse_vendor_specific(pos, end, ie); |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| } else { |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "WPA: Unrecognized EAPOL-Key Key Data IE", |
| pos, dlen); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_PASN |
| |
| /* |
| * wpa_pasn_build_auth_header - Add the MAC header and initialize Authentication |
| * frame for PASN |
| * |
| * @buf: Buffer in which the header will be added |
| * @bssid: The BSSID of the AP |
| * @src: Source address |
| * @dst: Destination address |
| * @trans_seq: Authentication transaction sequence number |
| * @status: Authentication status |
| */ |
| void wpa_pasn_build_auth_header(struct wpabuf *buf, const u8 *bssid, |
| const u8 *src, const u8 *dst, |
| u8 trans_seq, u16 status) |
| { |
| struct ieee80211_mgmt *auth; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Add authentication header. trans_seq=%u", |
| trans_seq); |
| |
| auth = wpabuf_put(buf, offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, |
| u.auth.variable)); |
| |
| auth->frame_control = host_to_le16((WLAN_FC_TYPE_MGMT << 2) | |
| (WLAN_FC_STYPE_AUTH << 4)); |
| |
| os_memcpy(auth->da, dst, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(auth->sa, src, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(auth->bssid, bssid, ETH_ALEN); |
| auth->seq_ctrl = 0; |
| |
| auth->u.auth.auth_alg = host_to_le16(WLAN_AUTH_PASN); |
| auth->u.auth.auth_transaction = host_to_le16(trans_seq); |
| auth->u.auth.status_code = host_to_le16(status); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * wpa_pasn_add_rsne - Add an RSNE for PASN authentication |
| * @buf: Buffer in which the IE will be added |
| * @pmkid: Optional PMKID. Can be NULL. |
| * @akmp: Authentication and key management protocol |
| * @cipher: The cipher suite |
| */ |
| int wpa_pasn_add_rsne(struct wpabuf *buf, const u8 *pmkid, int akmp, int cipher) |
| { |
| struct rsn_ie_hdr *hdr; |
| u32 suite; |
| u16 capab; |
| u8 *pos; |
| u8 rsne_len; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Add RSNE"); |
| |
| rsne_len = sizeof(*hdr) + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + |
| 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + |
| 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + (pmkid ? PMKID_LEN : 0); |
| |
| if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < rsne_len) |
| return -1; |
| hdr = wpabuf_put(buf, rsne_len); |
| hdr->elem_id = WLAN_EID_RSN; |
| hdr->len = rsne_len - 2; |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(hdr->version, RSN_VERSION); |
| pos = (u8 *) (hdr + 1); |
| |
| /* Group addressed data is not allowed */ |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| |
| /* Add the pairwise cipher */ |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, 1); |
| pos += 2; |
| suite = wpa_cipher_to_suite(WPA_PROTO_RSN, cipher); |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, suite); |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| |
| /* Add the AKM suite */ |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, 1); |
| pos += 2; |
| |
| switch (akmp) { |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN: |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_PASN); |
| break; |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE: |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE); |
| break; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_FILS |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256); |
| break; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK: |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK); |
| break; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X: |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X); |
| break; |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_802_1X_SHA384); |
| break; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| default: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: Invalid AKMP=0x%x", akmp); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| pos += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN; |
| |
| /* RSN Capabilities: PASN mandates both MFP capable and required */ |
| capab = WPA_CAPABILITY_MFPC | WPA_CAPABILITY_MFPR; |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, capab); |
| pos += 2; |
| |
| if (pmkid) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Adding PMKID"); |
| |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, 1); |
| pos += 2; |
| os_memcpy(pos, pmkid, PMKID_LEN); |
| pos += PMKID_LEN; |
| } else { |
| WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, 0); |
| pos += 2; |
| } |
| |
| /* Group addressed management is not allowed */ |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(pos, RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NO_GROUP_ADDRESSED); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * wpa_pasn_add_parameter_ie - Add PASN Parameters IE for PASN authentication |
| * @buf: Buffer in which the IE will be added |
| * @pasn_group: Finite Cyclic Group ID for PASN authentication |
| * @wrapped_data_format: Format of the data in the Wrapped Data IE |
| * @pubkey: A buffer holding the local public key. Can be NULL |
| * @compressed: In case pubkey is included, indicates if the public key is |
| * compressed (only x coordinate is included) or not (both x and y |
| * coordinates are included) |
| * @comeback: A buffer holding the comeback token. Can be NULL |
| * @after: If comeback is set, defined the comeback time in seconds. -1 to not |
| * include the Comeback After field (frames from non-AP STA). |
| */ |
| void wpa_pasn_add_parameter_ie(struct wpabuf *buf, u16 pasn_group, |
| u8 wrapped_data_format, |
| const struct wpabuf *pubkey, bool compressed, |
| const struct wpabuf *comeback, int after) |
| { |
| struct pasn_parameter_ie *params; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Add PASN Parameters element"); |
| |
| params = wpabuf_put(buf, sizeof(*params)); |
| |
| params->id = WLAN_EID_EXTENSION; |
| params->len = sizeof(*params) - 2; |
| params->id_ext = WLAN_EID_EXT_PASN_PARAMS; |
| params->control = 0; |
| params->wrapped_data_format = wrapped_data_format; |
| |
| if (comeback) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Adding comeback data"); |
| |
| /* |
| * 2 octets for the 'after' field + 1 octet for the length + |
| * actual cookie data |
| */ |
| if (after >= 0) |
| params->len += 2; |
| params->len += 1 + wpabuf_len(comeback); |
| params->control |= WPA_PASN_CTRL_COMEBACK_INFO_PRESENT; |
| |
| if (after >= 0) |
| wpabuf_put_le16(buf, after); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, wpabuf_len(comeback)); |
| wpabuf_put_buf(buf, comeback); |
| } |
| |
| if (pubkey) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "PASN: Adding public key and group ID %u", |
| pasn_group); |
| |
| /* |
| * 2 octets for the finite cyclic group + 2 octets public key |
| * length + 1 octet for the compressed/uncompressed indication + |
| * the actual key. |
| */ |
| params->len += 2 + 1 + 1 + wpabuf_len(pubkey); |
| params->control |= WPA_PASN_CTRL_GROUP_AND_KEY_PRESENT; |
| |
| wpabuf_put_le16(buf, pasn_group); |
| |
| /* |
| * The first octet indicates whether the public key is |
| * compressed, as defined in RFC 5480 section 2.2. |
| */ |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, wpabuf_len(pubkey) + 1); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, compressed ? WPA_PASN_PUBKEY_COMPRESSED_0 : |
| WPA_PASN_PUBKEY_UNCOMPRESSED); |
| |
| wpabuf_put_buf(buf, pubkey); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * wpa_pasn_add_wrapped_data - Add a Wrapped Data IE to PASN Authentication |
| * frame. If needed, the Wrapped Data IE would be fragmented. |
| * |
| * @buf: Buffer in which the IE will be added |
| * @wrapped_data_buf: Buffer holding the wrapped data |
| */ |
| int wpa_pasn_add_wrapped_data(struct wpabuf *buf, |
| struct wpabuf *wrapped_data_buf) |
| { |
| const u8 *data; |
| size_t data_len; |
| u8 len; |
| |
| if (!wrapped_data_buf) |
| return 0; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Add wrapped data"); |
| |
| data = wpabuf_head_u8(wrapped_data_buf); |
| data_len = wpabuf_len(wrapped_data_buf); |
| |
| /* nothing to add */ |
| if (!data_len) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (data_len <= 254) |
| len = 1 + data_len; |
| else |
| len = 255; |
| |
| if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < 3 + data_len) |
| return -1; |
| |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, len); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXT_WRAPPED_DATA); |
| wpabuf_put_data(buf, data, len - 1); |
| |
| data += len - 1; |
| data_len -= len - 1; |
| |
| while (data_len) { |
| if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < 1 + data_len) |
| return -1; |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_FRAGMENT); |
| len = data_len > 255 ? 255 : data_len; |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, len); |
| wpabuf_put_data(buf, data, len); |
| data += len; |
| data_len -= len; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * wpa_pasn_validate_rsne - Validate PSAN specific data of RSNE |
| * @data: Parsed representation of an RSNE |
| * Returns -1 for invalid data; otherwise 0 |
| */ |
| int wpa_pasn_validate_rsne(const struct wpa_ie_data *data) |
| { |
| u16 capab = WPA_CAPABILITY_MFPC | WPA_CAPABILITY_MFPR; |
| |
| if (data->proto != WPA_PROTO_RSN) |
| return -1; |
| |
| if ((data->capabilities & capab) != capab) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid RSNE capabilities"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!data->has_group || data->group_cipher != WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid group data cipher"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!data->has_pairwise || !data->pairwise_cipher || |
| (data->pairwise_cipher & (data->pairwise_cipher - 1))) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: No valid pairwise suite"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| switch (data->key_mgmt) { |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY: |
| /* fall through */ |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_FILS |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA256: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FILS_SHA384: |
| /* fall through */ |
| #endif /* CONFIG_FILS */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_PSK: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X: |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_IEEE8021X_SHA384: |
| /* fall through */ |
| #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */ |
| case WPA_KEY_MGMT_PASN: |
| break; |
| default: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PASN: invalid key_mgmt: 0x%0x", |
| data->key_mgmt); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (data->mgmt_group_cipher != WPA_CIPHER_GTK_NOT_USED) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid group mgmt cipher"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (data->num_pmkid > 1) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid number of PMKIDs"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * wpa_pasn_parse_parameter_ie - Validates PASN Parameters IE |
| * @data: Pointer to the PASN Parameters IE (starting with the EID). |
| * @len: Length of the data in the PASN Parameters IE |
| * @from_ap: Whether this was received from an AP |
| * @pasn_params: On successful return would hold the parsed PASN parameters. |
| * Returns: -1 for invalid data; otherwise 0 |
| * |
| * Note: On successful return, the pointers in &pasn_params point to the data in |
| * the IE and are not locally allocated (so they should not be freed etc.). |
| */ |
| int wpa_pasn_parse_parameter_ie(const u8 *data, u8 len, bool from_ap, |
| struct wpa_pasn_params_data *pasn_params) |
| { |
| struct pasn_parameter_ie *params = (struct pasn_parameter_ie *) data; |
| const u8 *pos = (const u8 *) (params + 1); |
| |
| if (!pasn_params) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid params"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (!params || ((size_t) (params->len + 2) < sizeof(*params)) || |
| len < sizeof(*params) || params->len + 2 != len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "PASN: Invalid parameters IE. len=(%u, %u)", |
| params ? params->len : 0, len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| os_memset(pasn_params, 0, sizeof(*pasn_params)); |
| |
| switch (params->wrapped_data_format) { |
| case WPA_PASN_WRAPPED_DATA_NO: |
| case WPA_PASN_WRAPPED_DATA_SAE: |
| case WPA_PASN_WRAPPED_DATA_FILS_SK: |
| case WPA_PASN_WRAPPED_DATA_FT: |
| break; |
| default: |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "PASN: Invalid wrapped data format"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| pasn_params->wrapped_data_format = params->wrapped_data_format; |
| |
| len -= sizeof(*params); |
| |
| if (params->control & WPA_PASN_CTRL_COMEBACK_INFO_PRESENT) { |
| if (from_ap) { |
| if (len < 2) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "PASN: Invalid Parameters IE: Truncated Comeback After"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| pasn_params->after = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| len -= 2; |
| } |
| |
| if (len < 1 || len < 1 + *pos) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "PASN: Invalid Parameters IE: comeback len"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| pasn_params->comeback_len = *pos++; |
| len--; |
| pasn_params->comeback = pos; |
| len -= pasn_params->comeback_len; |
| pos += pasn_params->comeback_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (params->control & WPA_PASN_CTRL_GROUP_AND_KEY_PRESENT) { |
| if (len < 3 || len < 3 + pos[2]) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "PASN: Invalid Parameters IE: group and key"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| pasn_params->group = WPA_GET_LE16(pos); |
| pos += 2; |
| len -= 2; |
| pasn_params->pubkey_len = *pos++; |
| len--; |
| pasn_params->pubkey = pos; |
| len -= pasn_params->pubkey_len; |
| pos += pasn_params->pubkey_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "PASN: Invalid Parameters IE. Bytes left=%u", len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void wpa_pasn_add_rsnxe(struct wpabuf *buf, u16 capab) |
| { |
| size_t flen; |
| |
| flen = (capab & 0xff00) ? 2 : 1; |
| if (!capab) |
| return; /* no supported extended RSN capabilities */ |
| if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < 2 + flen) |
| return; |
| capab |= flen - 1; /* bit 0-3 = Field length (n - 1) */ |
| |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_RSNX); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, flen); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, capab & 0x00ff); |
| capab >>= 8; |
| if (capab) |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, capab); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * wpa_pasn_add_extra_ies - Add protocol specific IEs in Authentication |
| * frame for PASN. |
| * |
| * @buf: Buffer in which the elements will be added |
| * @extra_ies: Protocol specific elements to add |
| * @len: Length of the elements |
| * Returns: 0 on success, -1 on failure |
| */ |
| |
| int wpa_pasn_add_extra_ies(struct wpabuf *buf, const u8 *extra_ies, size_t len) |
| { |
| if (!len || !extra_ies || !buf) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (wpabuf_tailroom(buf) < sizeof(len)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| wpabuf_put_data(buf, extra_ies, len); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* CONFIG_PASN */ |