| /* |
| * Simultaneous authentication of equals |
| * Copyright (c) 2012-2016, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> |
| * |
| * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license. |
| * See README for more details. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| |
| #include "common.h" |
| #include "common/defs.h" |
| #include "common/wpa_common.h" |
| #include "utils/const_time.h" |
| #include "crypto/crypto.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha256.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha384.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha512.h" |
| #include "crypto/random.h" |
| #include "crypto/dh_groups.h" |
| #include "ieee802_11_defs.h" |
| #include "dragonfly.h" |
| #include "sae.h" |
| |
| |
| int sae_set_group(struct sae_data *sae, int group) |
| { |
| struct sae_temporary_data *tmp; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS |
| /* Allow all groups for testing purposes in non-production builds. */ |
| #else /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */ |
| if (!dragonfly_suitable_group(group, 0)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Reject unsuitable group %d", group); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */ |
| |
| sae_clear_data(sae); |
| tmp = sae->tmp = os_zalloc(sizeof(*tmp)); |
| if (tmp == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* First, check if this is an ECC group */ |
| tmp->ec = crypto_ec_init(group); |
| if (tmp->ec) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Selecting supported ECC group %d", |
| group); |
| sae->group = group; |
| tmp->prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(tmp->ec); |
| tmp->prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(tmp->ec); |
| tmp->order_len = crypto_ec_order_len(tmp->ec); |
| tmp->order = crypto_ec_get_order(tmp->ec); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Not an ECC group, check FFC */ |
| tmp->dh = dh_groups_get(group); |
| if (tmp->dh) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Selecting supported FFC group %d", |
| group); |
| sae->group = group; |
| tmp->prime_len = tmp->dh->prime_len; |
| if (tmp->prime_len > SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN) { |
| sae_clear_data(sae); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| tmp->prime_buf = crypto_bignum_init_set(tmp->dh->prime, |
| tmp->prime_len); |
| if (tmp->prime_buf == NULL) { |
| sae_clear_data(sae); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| tmp->prime = tmp->prime_buf; |
| |
| tmp->order_len = tmp->dh->order_len; |
| tmp->order_buf = crypto_bignum_init_set(tmp->dh->order, |
| tmp->dh->order_len); |
| if (tmp->order_buf == NULL) { |
| sae_clear_data(sae); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| tmp->order = tmp->order_buf; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Unsupported group */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: Group %d not supported by the crypto library", group); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void sae_clear_temp_data(struct sae_data *sae) |
| { |
| struct sae_temporary_data *tmp; |
| if (sae == NULL || sae->tmp == NULL) |
| return; |
| tmp = sae->tmp; |
| crypto_ec_deinit(tmp->ec); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp->prime_buf, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp->order_buf, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp->sae_rand, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp->pwe_ffc, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp->own_commit_scalar, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp->own_commit_element_ffc, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc, 0); |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(tmp->pwe_ecc, 1); |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(tmp->own_commit_element_ecc, 0); |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc, 0); |
| wpabuf_free(tmp->anti_clogging_token); |
| wpabuf_free(tmp->own_rejected_groups); |
| wpabuf_free(tmp->peer_rejected_groups); |
| os_free(tmp->pw_id); |
| bin_clear_free(tmp, sizeof(*tmp)); |
| sae->tmp = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void sae_clear_data(struct sae_data *sae) |
| { |
| if (sae == NULL) |
| return; |
| sae_clear_temp_data(sae); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->peer_commit_scalar, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->peer_commit_scalar_accepted, 0); |
| os_memset(sae, 0, sizeof(*sae)); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void sae_pwd_seed_key(const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, u8 *key) |
| { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE derivation - addr1=" MACSTR |
| " addr2=" MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr1), MAC2STR(addr2)); |
| if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) > 0) { |
| os_memcpy(key, addr1, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(key + ETH_ALEN, addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
| } else { |
| os_memcpy(key, addr2, ETH_ALEN); |
| os_memcpy(key + ETH_ALEN, addr1, ETH_ALEN); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed, |
| const u8 *prime, const u8 *qr, const u8 *qnr, |
| u8 *pwd_value) |
| { |
| struct crypto_bignum *y_sqr, *x_cand; |
| int res; |
| size_t bits; |
| int cmp_prime; |
| unsigned int in_range; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN); |
| |
| /* pwd-value = KDF-z(pwd-seed, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", p) */ |
| bits = crypto_ec_prime_len_bits(sae->tmp->ec); |
| if (sha256_prf_bits(pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", |
| prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, pwd_value, bits) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| if (bits % 8) |
| buf_shift_right(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len, 8 - bits % 8); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", |
| pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| |
| cmp_prime = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| /* Create a const_time mask for selection based on prf result |
| * being smaller than prime. */ |
| in_range = const_time_fill_msb((unsigned int) cmp_prime); |
| /* The algorithm description would skip the next steps if |
| * cmp_prime >= 0 (return 0 here), but go through them regardless to |
| * minimize externally observable differences in behavior. */ |
| |
| x_cand = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| if (!x_cand) |
| return -1; |
| y_sqr = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(sae->tmp->ec, x_cand); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(x_cand, 1); |
| if (!y_sqr) |
| return -1; |
| |
| res = dragonfly_is_quadratic_residue_blind(sae->tmp->ec, qr, qnr, |
| y_sqr); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(y_sqr, 1); |
| if (res < 0) |
| return res; |
| return const_time_select_int(in_range, res, 0); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* Returns -1 on fatal failure, 0 if PWE cannot be derived from the provided |
| * pwd-seed, or 1 if a valid PWE was derived from pwd-seed. */ |
| static int sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *pwd_seed, |
| struct crypto_bignum *pwe) |
| { |
| u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN]; |
| size_t bits = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8; |
| u8 exp[1]; |
| struct crypto_bignum *a, *b = NULL; |
| int res, is_val; |
| u8 pwd_value_valid; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN); |
| |
| /* pwd-value = KDF-z(pwd-seed, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", p) */ |
| if (sha256_prf_bits(pwd_seed, SHA256_MAC_LEN, "SAE Hunting and Pecking", |
| sae->tmp->dh->prime, sae->tmp->prime_len, pwd_value, |
| bits) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", pwd_value, |
| sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| |
| /* Check whether pwd-value < p */ |
| res = const_time_memcmp(pwd_value, sae->tmp->dh->prime, |
| sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| /* pwd-value >= p is invalid, so res is < 0 for the valid cases and |
| * the negative sign can be used to fill the mask for constant time |
| * selection */ |
| pwd_value_valid = const_time_fill_msb(res); |
| |
| /* If pwd-value >= p, force pwd-value to be < p and perform the |
| * calculations anyway to hide timing difference. The derived PWE will |
| * be ignored in that case. */ |
| pwd_value[0] = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, pwd_value[0], 0); |
| |
| /* PWE = pwd-value^((p-1)/r) modulo p */ |
| |
| res = -1; |
| a = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| if (!a) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* This is an optimization based on the used group that does not depend |
| * on the password in any way, so it is fine to use separate branches |
| * for this step without constant time operations. */ |
| if (sae->tmp->dh->safe_prime) { |
| /* |
| * r = (p-1)/2 for the group used here, so this becomes: |
| * PWE = pwd-value^2 modulo p |
| */ |
| exp[0] = 2; |
| b = crypto_bignum_init_set(exp, sizeof(exp)); |
| } else { |
| /* Calculate exponent: (p-1)/r */ |
| exp[0] = 1; |
| b = crypto_bignum_init_set(exp, sizeof(exp)); |
| if (b == NULL || |
| crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, b, b) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_div(b, sae->tmp->order, b) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| if (!b) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| res = crypto_bignum_exptmod(a, b, sae->tmp->prime, pwe); |
| if (res < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* There were no fatal errors in calculations, so determine the return |
| * value using constant time operations. We get here for number of |
| * invalid cases which are cleared here after having performed all the |
| * computation. PWE is valid if pwd-value was less than prime and |
| * PWE > 1. Start with pwd-value check first and then use constant time |
| * operations to clear res to 0 if PWE is 0 or 1. |
| */ |
| res = const_time_select_u8(pwd_value_valid, 1, 0); |
| is_val = crypto_bignum_is_zero(pwe); |
| res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0); |
| is_val = crypto_bignum_is_one(pwe); |
| res = const_time_select_u8(const_time_is_zero(is_val), res, 0); |
| |
| fail: |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(a, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(b, 1); |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_derive_pwe_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1, |
| const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password, |
| size_t password_len) |
| { |
| u8 counter, k; |
| u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN]; |
| const u8 *addr[2]; |
| size_t len[2]; |
| u8 *stub_password, *tmp_password; |
| int pwd_seed_odd = 0; |
| u8 prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| size_t prime_len; |
| struct crypto_bignum *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *qr = NULL, *qnr = NULL; |
| u8 x_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 x_cand_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 qr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 qnr_bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 x_y[2 * SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| int res = -1; |
| u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_* |
| * mask */ |
| unsigned int is_eq; |
| |
| os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin)); |
| |
| stub_password = os_malloc(password_len); |
| tmp_password = os_malloc(password_len); |
| if (!stub_password || !tmp_password || |
| random_get_bytes(stub_password, password_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len; |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->prime, prime, sizeof(prime), |
| prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* |
| * Create a random quadratic residue (qr) and quadratic non-residue |
| * (qnr) modulo p for blinding purposes during the loop. |
| */ |
| if (dragonfly_get_random_qr_qnr(sae->tmp->prime, &qr, &qnr) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(qr, qr_bin, sizeof(qr_bin), prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(qnr, qnr_bin, sizeof(qnr_bin), prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password", |
| password, password_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * H(salt, ikm) = HMAC-SHA256(salt, ikm) |
| * base = password |
| * pwd-seed = H(MAX(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC) || MIN(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC), |
| * base || counter) |
| */ |
| sae_pwd_seed_key(addr1, addr2, addrs); |
| |
| addr[0] = tmp_password; |
| len[0] = password_len; |
| addr[1] = &counter; |
| len[1] = sizeof(counter); |
| |
| /* |
| * Continue for at least k iterations to protect against side-channel |
| * attacks that attempt to determine the number of iterations required |
| * in the loop. |
| */ |
| k = dragonfly_min_pwe_loop_iter(sae->group); |
| |
| for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) { |
| u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| if (counter > 200) { |
| /* This should not happen in practice */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to derive PWE"); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %03u", counter); |
| const_time_select_bin(found, stub_password, password, |
| password_len, tmp_password); |
| if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), 2, |
| addr, len, pwd_seed) < 0) |
| break; |
| |
| res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ecc(sae, pwd_seed, |
| prime, qr_bin, qnr_bin, x_cand_bin); |
| const_time_select_bin(found, x_bin, x_cand_bin, prime_len, |
| x_bin); |
| pwd_seed_odd = const_time_select_u8( |
| found, pwd_seed_odd, |
| pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN - 1] & 0x01); |
| os_memset(pwd_seed, 0, sizeof(pwd_seed)); |
| if (res < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| /* Need to minimize differences in handling res == 0 and 1 here |
| * to avoid differences in timing and instruction cache access, |
| * so use const_time_select_*() to make local copies of the |
| * values based on whether this loop iteration was the one that |
| * found the pwd-seed/x. */ |
| |
| /* found is 0 or 0xff here and res is 0 or 1. Bitwise OR of them |
| * (with res converted to 0/0xff) handles this in constant time. |
| */ |
| found |= res * 0xff; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed result %d found=0x%02x", |
| res, found); |
| } |
| |
| if (!found) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE"); |
| res = -1; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| x = crypto_bignum_init_set(x_bin, prime_len); |
| if (!x) { |
| res = -1; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| /* y = sqrt(x^3 + ax + b) mod p |
| * if LSB(save) == LSB(y): PWE = (x, y) |
| * else: PWE = (x, p - y) |
| * |
| * Calculate y and the two possible values for PWE and after that, |
| * use constant time selection to copy the correct alternative. |
| */ |
| y = crypto_ec_point_compute_y_sqr(sae->tmp->ec, x); |
| if (!y || |
| dragonfly_sqrt(sae->tmp->ec, y, y) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y, SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, |
| prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, y, y) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, x_y + SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, |
| SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, prime_len) < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not solve y"); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| is_eq = const_time_eq(pwd_seed_odd, x_y[prime_len - 1] & 0x01); |
| const_time_select_bin(is_eq, x_y, x_y + SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN, |
| prime_len, x_y + prime_len); |
| os_memcpy(x_y, x_bin, prime_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE", x_y, 2 * prime_len); |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, 1); |
| sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(sae->tmp->ec, x_y); |
| if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not generate PWE"); |
| res = -1; |
| } |
| |
| fail: |
| forced_memzero(x_y, sizeof(x_y)); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(qr, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(qnr, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(y, 1); |
| os_free(stub_password); |
| bin_clear_free(tmp_password, password_len); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(x, 1); |
| os_memset(x_bin, 0, sizeof(x_bin)); |
| os_memset(x_cand_bin, 0, sizeof(x_cand_bin)); |
| |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_derive_pwe_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *addr1, |
| const u8 *addr2, const u8 *password, |
| size_t password_len) |
| { |
| u8 counter, k, sel_counter = 0; |
| u8 addrs[2 * ETH_ALEN]; |
| const u8 *addr[2]; |
| size_t len[2]; |
| u8 found = 0; /* 0 (false) or 0xff (true) to be used as const_time_* |
| * mask */ |
| u8 mask; |
| struct crypto_bignum *pwe; |
| size_t prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len * 8; |
| u8 *pwe_buf; |
| |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, 1); |
| sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = NULL; |
| |
| /* Allocate a buffer to maintain selected and candidate PWE for constant |
| * time selection. */ |
| pwe_buf = os_zalloc(prime_len * 2); |
| pwe = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!pwe_buf || !pwe) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password", |
| password, password_len); |
| |
| /* |
| * H(salt, ikm) = HMAC-SHA256(salt, ikm) |
| * pwd-seed = H(MAX(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC) || MIN(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC), |
| * password || counter) |
| */ |
| sae_pwd_seed_key(addr1, addr2, addrs); |
| |
| addr[0] = password; |
| len[0] = password_len; |
| addr[1] = &counter; |
| len[1] = sizeof(counter); |
| |
| k = dragonfly_min_pwe_loop_iter(sae->group); |
| |
| for (counter = 1; counter <= k || !found; counter++) { |
| u8 pwd_seed[SHA256_MAC_LEN]; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (counter > 200) { |
| /* This should not happen in practice */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to derive PWE"); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: counter = %02u", counter); |
| if (hmac_sha256_vector(addrs, sizeof(addrs), 2, |
| addr, len, pwd_seed) < 0) |
| break; |
| res = sae_test_pwd_seed_ffc(sae, pwd_seed, pwe); |
| /* res is -1 for fatal failure, 0 if a valid PWE was not found, |
| * or 1 if a valid PWE was found. */ |
| if (res < 0) |
| break; |
| /* Store the candidate PWE into the second half of pwe_buf and |
| * the selected PWE in the beginning of pwe_buf using constant |
| * time selection. */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(pwe, pwe_buf + prime_len, prime_len, |
| prime_len) < 0) |
| break; |
| const_time_select_bin(found, pwe_buf, pwe_buf + prime_len, |
| prime_len, pwe_buf); |
| sel_counter = const_time_select_u8(found, sel_counter, counter); |
| mask = const_time_eq_u8(res, 1); |
| found = const_time_select_u8(found, found, mask); |
| } |
| |
| if (!found) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Use PWE from counter = %02u", sel_counter); |
| sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwe_buf, prime_len); |
| fail: |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1); |
| bin_clear_free(pwe_buf, prime_len * 2); |
| return sae->tmp->pwe_ffc ? 0 : -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int hkdf_extract(size_t hash_len, const u8 *salt, size_t salt_len, |
| size_t num_elem, const u8 *addr[], const size_t len[], |
| u8 *prk) |
| { |
| if (hash_len == 32) |
| return hmac_sha256_vector(salt, salt_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| prk); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (hash_len == 48) |
| return hmac_sha384_vector(salt, salt_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| prk); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (hash_len == 64) |
| return hmac_sha512_vector(salt, salt_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| prk); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int hkdf_expand(size_t hash_len, const u8 *prk, size_t prk_len, |
| const char *info, u8 *okm, size_t okm_len) |
| { |
| size_t info_len = os_strlen(info); |
| |
| if (hash_len == 32) |
| return hmac_sha256_kdf(prk, prk_len, NULL, |
| (const u8 *) info, info_len, |
| okm, okm_len); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (hash_len == 48) |
| return hmac_sha384_kdf(prk, prk_len, NULL, |
| (const u8 *) info, info_len, |
| okm, okm_len); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (hash_len == 64) |
| return hmac_sha512_kdf(prk, prk_len, NULL, |
| (const u8 *) info, info_len, |
| okm, okm_len); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sswu_curve_param(int group, int *z) |
| { |
| switch (group) { |
| case 19: |
| *z = -10; |
| return 0; |
| case 20: |
| *z = -12; |
| return 0; |
| case 21: |
| *z = -4; |
| return 0; |
| case 25: |
| case 29: |
| *z = -5; |
| return 0; |
| case 26: |
| *z = 31; |
| return 0; |
| case 28: |
| *z = -2; |
| return 0; |
| case 30: |
| *z = 7; |
| return 0; |
| default: |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void debug_print_bignum(const char *title, const struct crypto_bignum *a, |
| size_t prime_len) |
| { |
| u8 *bin; |
| |
| bin = os_malloc(prime_len); |
| if (bin && crypto_bignum_to_bin(a, bin, prime_len, prime_len) >= 0) |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, title, bin, prime_len); |
| else |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Could not print bignum (%s)", title); |
| bin_clear_free(bin, prime_len); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct crypto_ec_point * sswu(struct crypto_ec *ec, int group, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *u) |
| { |
| int z_int; |
| const struct crypto_bignum *a, *b, *prime; |
| struct crypto_bignum *u2, *t1, *t2, *z, *t, *zero, *one, *two, *three, |
| *x1a, *x1b, *y = NULL; |
| struct crypto_bignum *x1 = NULL, *x2, *gx1, *gx2, *v = NULL; |
| unsigned int m_is_zero, is_qr, is_eq; |
| size_t prime_len; |
| u8 bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 bin1[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 bin2[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 x_y[2 * SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| struct crypto_ec_point *p = NULL; |
| |
| if (sswu_curve_param(group, &z_int) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(ec); |
| prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(ec); |
| a = crypto_ec_get_a(ec); |
| b = crypto_ec_get_b(ec); |
| |
| u2 = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| t1 = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| t2 = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| z = crypto_bignum_init_uint(abs(z_int)); |
| t = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| zero = crypto_bignum_init_uint(0); |
| one = crypto_bignum_init_uint(1); |
| two = crypto_bignum_init_uint(2); |
| three = crypto_bignum_init_uint(3); |
| x1a = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| x1b = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| x2 = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| gx1 = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| gx2 = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!u2 || !t1 || !t2 || !z || !t || !zero || !one || !two || !three || |
| !x1a || !x1b || !x2 || !gx1 || !gx2) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| if (z_int < 0 && crypto_bignum_sub(prime, z, z) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* m = z^2 * u^4 + z * u^2 */ |
| /* --> tmp = z * u^2, m = tmp^2 + tmp */ |
| |
| /* u2 = u^2 |
| * t1 = z * u2 |
| * t2 = t1^2 |
| * m = t1 = t1 + t2 */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_sqrmod(u, prime, u2) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mulmod(z, u2, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_sqrmod(t1, prime, t2) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_addmod(t1, t2, prime, t1) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: m", t1, prime_len); |
| |
| /* l = CEQ(m, 0) |
| * t = CSEL(l, 0, inverse(m); where inverse(x) is calculated as |
| * x^(p-2) modulo p which will handle m == 0 case correctly */ |
| /* TODO: Make sure crypto_bignum_is_zero() is constant time */ |
| m_is_zero = const_time_eq(crypto_bignum_is_zero(t1), 1); |
| /* t = m^(p-2) modulo p */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_sub(prime, two, t2) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_exptmod(t1, t2, prime, t) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: t", t, prime_len); |
| |
| /* b / (z * a) */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(z, a, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_inverse(t1, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mulmod(b, t1, prime, x1a) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: x1a = b / (z * a)", x1a, prime_len); |
| |
| /* (-b/a) * (1 + t) */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_sub(prime, b, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_inverse(a, prime, t2) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mulmod(t1, t2, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_addmod(one, t, prime, t2) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mulmod(t1, t2, prime, x1b) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: x1b = (-b/a) * (1 + t)", x1b, prime_len); |
| |
| /* x1 = CSEL(CEQ(m, 0), x1a, x1b) */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(x1a, bin1, sizeof(bin1), prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(x1b, bin2, sizeof(bin2), prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| const_time_select_bin(m_is_zero, bin1, bin2, prime_len, bin); |
| x1 = crypto_bignum_init_set(bin, prime_len); |
| if (!x1) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: x1 = CSEL(l, x1a, x1b)", x1, prime_len); |
| |
| /* gx1 = x1^3 + a * x1 + b */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_exptmod(x1, three, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mulmod(a, x1, prime, t2) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_addmod(t1, t2, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_addmod(t1, b, prime, gx1) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: gx1 = x1^3 + a * x1 + b", gx1, prime_len); |
| |
| /* x2 = z * u^2 * x1 */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_mulmod(z, u2, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mulmod(t1, x1, prime, x2) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: x2 = z * u^2 * x1", x2, prime_len); |
| |
| /* gx2 = x2^3 + a * x2 + b */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_exptmod(x2, three, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mulmod(a, x2, prime, t2) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_addmod(t1, t2, prime, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_addmod(t1, b, prime, gx2) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: gx2 = x2^3 + a * x2 + b", gx2, prime_len); |
| |
| /* l = gx1 is a quadratic residue modulo p |
| * --> gx1^((p-1)/2) modulo p is zero or one */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_sub(prime, one, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_rshift(t1, 1, t1) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_exptmod(gx1, t1, prime, t1) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: gx1^((p-1)/2) modulo p", t1, prime_len); |
| is_qr = const_time_eq(crypto_bignum_is_zero(t1) | |
| crypto_bignum_is_one(t1), 1); |
| |
| /* v = CSEL(l, gx1, gx2) */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(gx1, bin1, sizeof(bin1), prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(gx2, bin2, sizeof(bin2), prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| const_time_select_bin(is_qr, bin1, bin2, prime_len, bin); |
| v = crypto_bignum_init_set(bin, prime_len); |
| if (!v) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: v = CSEL(l, gx1, gx2)", v, prime_len); |
| |
| /* x = CSEL(l, x1, x2) */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(x1, bin1, sizeof(bin1), prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(x2, bin2, sizeof(bin2), prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| const_time_select_bin(is_qr, bin1, bin2, prime_len, x_y); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SSWU: x = CSEL(l, x1, x2)", x_y, prime_len); |
| |
| /* y = sqrt(v) */ |
| y = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!y || dragonfly_sqrt(ec, v, y) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: y = sqrt(v)", y, prime_len); |
| |
| /* l = CEQ(LSB(u), LSB(y)) */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(u, bin1, sizeof(bin1), prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, bin2, sizeof(bin2), prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| is_eq = const_time_eq(bin1[prime_len - 1] & 0x01, |
| bin2[prime_len - 1] & 0x01); |
| |
| /* P = CSEL(l, (x,y), (x, p-y)) */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_sub(prime, y, t1) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SSWU: p - y", t1, prime_len); |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(y, bin1, sizeof(bin1), prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(t1, bin2, sizeof(bin2), prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| const_time_select_bin(is_eq, bin1, bin2, prime_len, &x_y[prime_len]); |
| |
| /* output P */ |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SSWU: P.x", x_y, prime_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SSWU: P.y", &x_y[prime_len], prime_len); |
| p = crypto_ec_point_from_bin(ec, x_y); |
| |
| fail: |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(u2, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(t1, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(t2, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(z, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(t, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(x1a, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(x1b, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(x1, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(x2, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(gx1, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(gx2, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(y, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(v, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(zero, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(two, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(three, 0); |
| forced_memzero(bin, sizeof(bin)); |
| forced_memzero(bin1, sizeof(bin1)); |
| forced_memzero(bin2, sizeof(bin2)); |
| forced_memzero(x_y, sizeof(x_y)); |
| return p; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_pwd_seed(size_t hash_len, const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len, |
| const u8 *password, size_t password_len, |
| const char *identifier, u8 *pwd_seed) |
| { |
| const u8 *addr[2]; |
| size_t len[2]; |
| size_t num_elem; |
| |
| /* pwd-seed = HKDF-Extract(ssid, password [ || identifier ]) */ |
| addr[0] = password; |
| len[0] = password_len; |
| num_elem = 1; |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: SSID", ssid, ssid_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password", |
| password, password_len); |
| if (identifier) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: password identifier: %s", |
| identifier); |
| addr[num_elem] = (const u8 *) identifier; |
| len[num_elem] = os_strlen(identifier); |
| num_elem++; |
| } |
| if (hkdf_extract(hash_len, ssid, ssid_len, num_elem, addr, len, |
| pwd_seed) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-seed", pwd_seed, hash_len); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| size_t sae_ecc_prime_len_2_hash_len(size_t prime_len) |
| { |
| if (prime_len <= 256 / 8) |
| return 32; |
| if (prime_len <= 384 / 8) |
| return 48; |
| return 64; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct crypto_ec_point * |
| sae_derive_pt_ecc(struct crypto_ec *ec, int group, |
| const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len, |
| const u8 *password, size_t password_len, |
| const char *identifier) |
| { |
| u8 pwd_seed[64]; |
| u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN * 2]; |
| size_t pwd_value_len, hash_len, prime_len; |
| const struct crypto_bignum *prime; |
| struct crypto_bignum *bn = NULL; |
| struct crypto_ec_point *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *pt = NULL; |
| |
| prime = crypto_ec_get_prime(ec); |
| prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(ec); |
| if (prime_len > SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN) |
| goto fail; |
| hash_len = sae_ecc_prime_len_2_hash_len(prime_len); |
| |
| /* len = olen(p) + ceil(olen(p)/2) */ |
| pwd_value_len = prime_len + (prime_len + 1) / 2; |
| |
| if (sae_pwd_seed(hash_len, ssid, ssid_len, password, password_len, |
| identifier, pwd_seed) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* pwd-value = HKDF-Expand(pwd-seed, "SAE Hash to Element u1 P1", len) |
| */ |
| if (hkdf_expand(hash_len, pwd_seed, hash_len, |
| "SAE Hash to Element u1 P1", pwd_value, pwd_value_len) < |
| 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value (u1 P1)", |
| pwd_value, pwd_value_len); |
| |
| /* u1 = pwd-value modulo p */ |
| bn = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, pwd_value_len); |
| if (!bn || crypto_bignum_mod(bn, prime, bn) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(bn, pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), |
| prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: u1", pwd_value, prime_len); |
| |
| /* P1 = SSWU(u1) */ |
| p1 = sswu(ec, group, bn); |
| if (!p1) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* pwd-value = HKDF-Expand(pwd-seed, "SAE Hash to Element u2 P2", len) |
| */ |
| if (hkdf_expand(hash_len, pwd_seed, hash_len, |
| "SAE Hash to Element u2 P2", pwd_value, |
| pwd_value_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value (u2 P2)", |
| pwd_value, pwd_value_len); |
| |
| /* u2 = pwd-value modulo p */ |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(bn, 1); |
| bn = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, pwd_value_len); |
| if (!bn || crypto_bignum_mod(bn, prime, bn) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(bn, pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), |
| prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: u2", pwd_value, prime_len); |
| |
| /* P2 = SSWU(u2) */ |
| p2 = sswu(ec, group, bn); |
| if (!p2) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* PT = elem-op(P1, P2) */ |
| pt = crypto_ec_point_init(ec); |
| if (!pt) |
| goto fail; |
| if (crypto_ec_point_add(ec, p1, p2, pt) < 0) { |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(pt, 1); |
| pt = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| fail: |
| forced_memzero(pwd_seed, sizeof(pwd_seed)); |
| forced_memzero(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value)); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(bn, 1); |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(p1, 1); |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(p2, 1); |
| return pt; |
| } |
| |
| |
| size_t sae_ffc_prime_len_2_hash_len(size_t prime_len) |
| { |
| if (prime_len <= 2048 / 8) |
| return 32; |
| if (prime_len <= 3072 / 8) |
| return 48; |
| return 64; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct crypto_bignum * |
| sae_derive_pt_ffc(const struct dh_group *dh, int group, |
| const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len, |
| const u8 *password, size_t password_len, |
| const char *identifier) |
| { |
| size_t hash_len, prime_len, pwd_value_len; |
| struct crypto_bignum *prime, *order; |
| struct crypto_bignum *one = NULL, *two = NULL, *bn = NULL, *tmp = NULL, |
| *pt = NULL; |
| u8 pwd_seed[64]; |
| u8 pwd_value[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN + SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN / 2]; |
| |
| prime = crypto_bignum_init_set(dh->prime, dh->prime_len); |
| order = crypto_bignum_init_set(dh->order, dh->order_len); |
| if (!prime || !order) |
| goto fail; |
| prime_len = dh->prime_len; |
| if (prime_len > SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN) |
| goto fail; |
| hash_len = sae_ffc_prime_len_2_hash_len(prime_len); |
| |
| /* len = olen(p) + ceil(olen(p)/2) */ |
| pwd_value_len = prime_len + (prime_len + 1) / 2; |
| if (pwd_value_len > sizeof(pwd_value)) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| if (sae_pwd_seed(hash_len, ssid, ssid_len, password, password_len, |
| identifier, pwd_seed) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* pwd-value = HKDF-Expand(pwd-seed, "SAE Hash to Element", len) */ |
| if (hkdf_expand(hash_len, pwd_seed, hash_len, |
| "SAE Hash to Element", pwd_value, pwd_value_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value", |
| pwd_value, pwd_value_len); |
| |
| /* pwd-value = (pwd-value modulo (p-2)) + 2 */ |
| bn = crypto_bignum_init_set(pwd_value, pwd_value_len); |
| one = crypto_bignum_init_uint(1); |
| two = crypto_bignum_init_uint(2); |
| tmp = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!bn || !one || !two || !tmp || |
| crypto_bignum_sub(prime, two, tmp) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mod(bn, tmp, bn) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_add(bn, two, bn) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(bn, pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value), |
| prime_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: pwd-value(reduced)", |
| pwd_value, prime_len); |
| |
| /* PT = pwd-value^((p-1)/q) modulo p */ |
| pt = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!pt || |
| crypto_bignum_sub(prime, one, tmp) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_div(tmp, order, tmp) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_exptmod(bn, tmp, prime, pt) < 0) { |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(pt, 1); |
| pt = NULL; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| debug_print_bignum("SAE: PT", pt, prime_len); |
| |
| fail: |
| forced_memzero(pwd_seed, sizeof(pwd_seed)); |
| forced_memzero(pwd_value, sizeof(pwd_value)); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(bn, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(two, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(prime, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(order, 0); |
| return pt; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static struct sae_pt * |
| sae_derive_pt_group(int group, const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len, |
| const u8 *password, size_t password_len, |
| const char *identifier) |
| { |
| struct sae_pt *pt; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Derive PT - group %d", group); |
| |
| if (ssid_len > 32) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| pt = os_zalloc(sizeof(*pt)); |
| if (!pt) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE_PK |
| os_memcpy(pt->ssid, ssid, ssid_len); |
| pt->ssid_len = ssid_len; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE_PK */ |
| pt->group = group; |
| pt->ec = crypto_ec_init(group); |
| if (pt->ec) { |
| pt->ecc_pt = sae_derive_pt_ecc(pt->ec, group, ssid, ssid_len, |
| password, password_len, |
| identifier); |
| if (!pt->ecc_pt) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to derive PT"); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| return pt; |
| } |
| |
| pt->dh = dh_groups_get(group); |
| if (!pt->dh) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Unsupported group %d", group); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| pt->ffc_pt = sae_derive_pt_ffc(pt->dh, group, ssid, ssid_len, |
| password, password_len, identifier); |
| if (!pt->ffc_pt) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to derive PT"); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| return pt; |
| fail: |
| sae_deinit_pt(pt); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| |
| struct sae_pt * sae_derive_pt(int *groups, const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len, |
| const u8 *password, size_t password_len, |
| const char *identifier) |
| { |
| struct sae_pt *pt = NULL, *last = NULL, *tmp; |
| int default_groups[] = { 19, 0 }; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!groups) |
| groups = default_groups; |
| for (i = 0; groups[i] > 0; i++) { |
| tmp = sae_derive_pt_group(groups[i], ssid, ssid_len, password, |
| password_len, identifier); |
| if (!tmp) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (last) |
| last->next = tmp; |
| else |
| pt = tmp; |
| last = tmp; |
| } |
| |
| return pt; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void sae_max_min_addr(const u8 *addr[], size_t len[], |
| const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2) |
| { |
| len[0] = ETH_ALEN; |
| len[1] = ETH_ALEN; |
| if (os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) > 0) { |
| addr[0] = addr1; |
| addr[1] = addr2; |
| } else { |
| addr[0] = addr2; |
| addr[1] = addr1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| struct crypto_ec_point * |
| sae_derive_pwe_from_pt_ecc(const struct sae_pt *pt, |
| const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2) |
| { |
| u8 bin[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN * 2]; |
| size_t prime_len; |
| const u8 *addr[2]; |
| size_t len[2]; |
| u8 salt[64], hash[64]; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| const struct crypto_bignum *order; |
| struct crypto_bignum *tmp = NULL, *val = NULL, *one = NULL; |
| struct crypto_ec_point *pwe = NULL; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Derive PWE from PT"); |
| prime_len = crypto_ec_prime_len(pt->ec); |
| if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(pt->ec, pt->ecc_pt, |
| bin, bin + prime_len) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PT.x", bin, prime_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PT.y", bin + prime_len, prime_len); |
| |
| sae_max_min_addr(addr, len, addr1, addr2); |
| |
| /* val = H(0^n, |
| * MAX(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC) || MIN(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC)) */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: val = H(0^n, MAX(addrs) || MIN(addrs))"); |
| hash_len = sae_ecc_prime_len_2_hash_len(prime_len); |
| os_memset(salt, 0, hash_len); |
| if (hkdf_extract(hash_len, salt, hash_len, 2, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: val", hash, hash_len); |
| |
| /* val = val modulo (q - 1) + 1 */ |
| order = crypto_ec_get_order(pt->ec); |
| tmp = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| val = crypto_bignum_init_set(hash, hash_len); |
| one = crypto_bignum_init_uint(1); |
| if (!tmp || !val || !one || |
| crypto_bignum_sub(order, one, tmp) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mod(val, tmp, val) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_add(val, one, val) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SAE: val(reduced to 1..q-1)", val, prime_len); |
| |
| /* PWE = scalar-op(val, PT) */ |
| pwe = crypto_ec_point_init(pt->ec); |
| if (!pwe || |
| crypto_ec_point_mul(pt->ec, pt->ecc_pt, val, pwe) < 0 || |
| crypto_ec_point_to_bin(pt->ec, pwe, bin, bin + prime_len) < 0) { |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(pwe, 1); |
| pwe = NULL; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE.x", bin, prime_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PWE.y", bin + prime_len, prime_len); |
| |
| fail: |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(val, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0); |
| return pwe; |
| } |
| |
| |
| struct crypto_bignum * |
| sae_derive_pwe_from_pt_ffc(const struct sae_pt *pt, |
| const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2) |
| { |
| size_t prime_len; |
| const u8 *addr[2]; |
| size_t len[2]; |
| u8 salt[64], hash[64]; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| struct crypto_bignum *tmp = NULL, *val = NULL, *one = NULL; |
| struct crypto_bignum *pwe = NULL, *order = NULL, *prime = NULL; |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Derive PWE from PT"); |
| prime = crypto_bignum_init_set(pt->dh->prime, pt->dh->prime_len); |
| order = crypto_bignum_init_set(pt->dh->order, pt->dh->order_len); |
| if (!prime || !order) |
| goto fail; |
| prime_len = pt->dh->prime_len; |
| |
| sae_max_min_addr(addr, len, addr1, addr2); |
| |
| /* val = H(0^n, |
| * MAX(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC) || MIN(STA-A-MAC, STA-B-MAC)) */ |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: val = H(0^n, MAX(addrs) || MIN(addrs))"); |
| hash_len = sae_ffc_prime_len_2_hash_len(prime_len); |
| os_memset(salt, 0, hash_len); |
| if (hkdf_extract(hash_len, salt, hash_len, 2, addr, len, hash) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: val", hash, hash_len); |
| |
| /* val = val modulo (q - 1) + 1 */ |
| tmp = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| val = crypto_bignum_init_set(hash, hash_len); |
| one = crypto_bignum_init_uint(1); |
| if (!tmp || !val || !one || |
| crypto_bignum_sub(order, one, tmp) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mod(val, tmp, val) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_add(val, one, val) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| debug_print_bignum("SAE: val(reduced to 1..q-1)", val, prime_len); |
| |
| /* PWE = scalar-op(val, PT) */ |
| pwe = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!pwe || crypto_bignum_exptmod(pt->ffc_pt, val, prime, pwe) < 0) { |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(pwe, 1); |
| pwe = NULL; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| debug_print_bignum("SAE: PWE", pwe, prime_len); |
| |
| fail: |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(val, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(prime, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(order, 0); |
| return pwe; |
| } |
| |
| |
| void sae_deinit_pt(struct sae_pt *pt) |
| { |
| struct sae_pt *prev; |
| |
| while (pt) { |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(pt->ecc_pt, 1); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(pt->ffc_pt, 1); |
| crypto_ec_deinit(pt->ec); |
| prev = pt; |
| pt = pt->next; |
| os_free(prev); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_derive_commit_element_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, |
| struct crypto_bignum *mask) |
| { |
| /* COMMIT-ELEMENT = inverse(scalar-op(mask, PWE)) */ |
| if (!sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc) { |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc = |
| crypto_ec_point_init(sae->tmp->ec); |
| if (!sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->tmp->ec, sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, mask, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc) < 0 || |
| crypto_ec_point_invert(sae->tmp->ec, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc) < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not compute commit-element"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_derive_commit_element_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, |
| struct crypto_bignum *mask) |
| { |
| /* COMMIT-ELEMENT = inverse(scalar-op(mask, PWE)) */ |
| if (!sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc) { |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (crypto_bignum_exptmod(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, mask, sae->tmp->prime, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_inverse(sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc, |
| sae->tmp->prime, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc) < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Could not compute commit-element"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_derive_commit(struct sae_data *sae) |
| { |
| struct crypto_bignum *mask; |
| int ret; |
| |
| mask = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!sae->tmp->sae_rand) |
| sae->tmp->sae_rand = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (!sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar) |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| ret = !mask || !sae->tmp->sae_rand || !sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar || |
| dragonfly_generate_scalar(sae->tmp->order, sae->tmp->sae_rand, |
| mask, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar) < 0 || |
| (sae->tmp->ec && |
| sae_derive_commit_element_ecc(sae, mask) < 0) || |
| (sae->tmp->dh && |
| sae_derive_commit_element_ffc(sae, mask) < 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(mask, 1); |
| return ret ? -1 : 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int sae_prepare_commit(const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, |
| const u8 *password, size_t password_len, |
| struct sae_data *sae) |
| { |
| if (sae->tmp == NULL || |
| (sae->tmp->ec && sae_derive_pwe_ecc(sae, addr1, addr2, password, |
| password_len) < 0) || |
| (sae->tmp->dh && sae_derive_pwe_ffc(sae, addr1, addr2, password, |
| password_len) < 0)) |
| return -1; |
| |
| sae->h2e = 0; |
| sae->pk = 0; |
| return sae_derive_commit(sae); |
| } |
| |
| |
| int sae_prepare_commit_pt(struct sae_data *sae, const struct sae_pt *pt, |
| const u8 *addr1, const u8 *addr2, |
| int *rejected_groups, const struct sae_pk *pk) |
| { |
| if (!sae->tmp) |
| return -1; |
| |
| while (pt) { |
| if (pt->group == sae->group) |
| break; |
| pt = pt->next; |
| } |
| if (!pt) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "SAE: Could not find PT for group %u", |
| sae->group); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE_PK |
| os_memcpy(sae->tmp->ssid, pt->ssid, pt->ssid_len); |
| sae->tmp->ssid_len = pt->ssid_len; |
| sae->tmp->ap_pk = pk; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE_PK */ |
| sae->tmp->own_addr_higher = os_memcmp(addr1, addr2, ETH_ALEN) > 0; |
| wpabuf_free(sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups); |
| sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups = NULL; |
| if (rejected_groups) { |
| int count, i; |
| struct wpabuf *groups; |
| |
| count = int_array_len(rejected_groups); |
| groups = wpabuf_alloc(count * 2); |
| if (!groups) |
| return -1; |
| for (i = 0; i < count; i++) |
| wpabuf_put_le16(groups, rejected_groups[i]); |
| sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups = groups; |
| } |
| |
| if (pt->ec) { |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, 1); |
| sae->tmp->pwe_ecc = sae_derive_pwe_from_pt_ecc(pt, addr1, |
| addr2); |
| if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ecc) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (pt->dh) { |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, 1); |
| sae->tmp->pwe_ffc = sae_derive_pwe_from_pt_ffc(pt, addr1, |
| addr2); |
| if (!sae->tmp->pwe_ffc) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| sae->h2e = 1; |
| return sae_derive_commit(sae); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_derive_k_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, u8 *k) |
| { |
| struct crypto_ec_point *K; |
| int ret = -1; |
| |
| K = crypto_ec_point_init(sae->tmp->ec); |
| if (K == NULL) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* |
| * K = scalar-op(rand, (elem-op(scalar-op(peer-commit-scalar, PWE), |
| * PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT))) |
| * If K is identity element (point-at-infinity), reject |
| * k = F(K) (= x coordinate) |
| */ |
| |
| if (crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->tmp->ec, sae->tmp->pwe_ecc, |
| sae->peer_commit_scalar, K) < 0 || |
| crypto_ec_point_add(sae->tmp->ec, K, |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc, K) < 0 || |
| crypto_ec_point_mul(sae->tmp->ec, K, sae->tmp->sae_rand, K) < 0 || |
| crypto_ec_point_is_at_infinity(sae->tmp->ec, K) || |
| crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->tmp->ec, K, k, NULL) < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to calculate K and k"); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: k", k, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| fail: |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(K, 1); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_derive_k_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, u8 *k) |
| { |
| struct crypto_bignum *K; |
| int ret = -1; |
| |
| K = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (K == NULL) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* |
| * K = scalar-op(rand, (elem-op(scalar-op(peer-commit-scalar, PWE), |
| * PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT))) |
| * If K is identity element (one), reject. |
| * k = F(K) (= x coordinate) |
| */ |
| |
| if (crypto_bignum_exptmod(sae->tmp->pwe_ffc, sae->peer_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->prime, K) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mulmod(K, sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc, |
| sae->tmp->prime, K) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_exptmod(K, sae->tmp->sae_rand, sae->tmp->prime, K) < 0 |
| || |
| crypto_bignum_is_one(K) || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(K, k, SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN, sae->tmp->prime_len) < |
| 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Failed to calculate K and k"); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: k", k, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| fail: |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(K, 1); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_kdf_hash(size_t hash_len, const u8 *k, const char *label, |
| const u8 *context, size_t context_len, |
| u8 *out, size_t out_len) |
| { |
| if (hash_len == 32) |
| return sha256_prf(k, hash_len, label, |
| context, context_len, out, out_len); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA384 |
| if (hash_len == 48) |
| return sha384_prf(k, hash_len, label, |
| context, context_len, out, out_len); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA384 */ |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SHA512 |
| if (hash_len == 64) |
| return sha512_prf(k, hash_len, label, |
| context, context_len, out, out_len); |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SHA512 */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_derive_keys(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *k) |
| { |
| u8 zero[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN], val[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN]; |
| const u8 *salt; |
| struct wpabuf *rejected_groups = NULL; |
| u8 keyseed[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN]; |
| u8 keys[2 * SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN + SAE_PMK_LEN_MAX]; |
| struct crypto_bignum *tmp; |
| int ret = -1; |
| size_t hash_len, salt_len, prime_len = sae->tmp->prime_len; |
| size_t pmk_len; |
| const u8 *addr[1]; |
| size_t len[1]; |
| |
| tmp = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| if (tmp == NULL) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| /* keyseed = H(salt, k) |
| * KCK || PMK = KDF-Hash-Length(keyseed, "SAE KCK and PMK", |
| * (commit-scalar + peer-commit-scalar) modulo r) |
| * PMKID = L((commit-scalar + peer-commit-scalar) modulo r, 0, 128) |
| * |
| * When SAE-PK is used, |
| * KCK || PMK || KEK = KDF-Hash-Length(keyseed, "SAE-PK keys", context) |
| */ |
| if (!sae->h2e) |
| hash_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN; |
| else if (sae->tmp->dh) |
| hash_len = sae_ffc_prime_len_2_hash_len(prime_len); |
| else |
| hash_len = sae_ecc_prime_len_2_hash_len(prime_len); |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae_ext_key(sae->akmp)) |
| pmk_len = hash_len; |
| else |
| pmk_len = SAE_PMK_LEN; |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Derive keys - H2E=%d AKMP=0x%x = %08x (%s)", |
| sae->h2e, sae->akmp, |
| wpa_akm_to_suite(sae->akmp), |
| wpa_key_mgmt_txt(sae->akmp, WPA_PROTO_RSN)); |
| if (sae->h2e && (sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups || |
| sae->tmp->peer_rejected_groups)) { |
| struct wpabuf *own, *peer; |
| |
| own = sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups; |
| peer = sae->tmp->peer_rejected_groups; |
| salt_len = 0; |
| if (own) |
| salt_len += wpabuf_len(own); |
| if (peer) |
| salt_len += wpabuf_len(peer); |
| rejected_groups = wpabuf_alloc(salt_len); |
| if (!rejected_groups) |
| goto fail; |
| if (sae->tmp->own_addr_higher) { |
| if (own) |
| wpabuf_put_buf(rejected_groups, own); |
| if (peer) |
| wpabuf_put_buf(rejected_groups, peer); |
| } else { |
| if (peer) |
| wpabuf_put_buf(rejected_groups, peer); |
| if (own) |
| wpabuf_put_buf(rejected_groups, own); |
| } |
| salt = wpabuf_head(rejected_groups); |
| salt_len = wpabuf_len(rejected_groups); |
| } else { |
| os_memset(zero, 0, hash_len); |
| salt = zero; |
| salt_len = hash_len; |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: salt for keyseed derivation", |
| salt, salt_len); |
| addr[0] = k; |
| len[0] = prime_len; |
| if (hkdf_extract(hash_len, salt, salt_len, 1, addr, len, keyseed) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: keyseed", keyseed, hash_len); |
| |
| if (crypto_bignum_add(sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar, |
| sae->peer_commit_scalar, tmp) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_mod(tmp, sae->tmp->order, tmp) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| /* IEEE Std 802.11-2016 is not exactly clear on the encoding of the bit |
| * string that is needed for KCK, PMK, and PMKID derivation, but it |
| * seems to make most sense to encode the |
| * (commit-scalar + peer-commit-scalar) mod r part as a bit string by |
| * zero padding it from left to the length of the order (in full |
| * octets). */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(tmp, val, sizeof(val), |
| sae->tmp->order_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PMKID", val, SAE_PMKID_LEN); |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE_PK |
| if (sae->pk) { |
| if (sae_kdf_hash(hash_len, keyseed, "SAE-PK keys", |
| val, sae->tmp->order_len, |
| keys, 2 * hash_len + pmk_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| } else { |
| if (sae_kdf_hash(hash_len, keyseed, "SAE KCK and PMK", |
| val, sae->tmp->order_len, |
| keys, hash_len + pmk_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| #else /* CONFIG_SAE_PK */ |
| if (sae_kdf_hash(hash_len, keyseed, "SAE KCK and PMK", |
| val, sae->tmp->order_len, |
| keys, hash_len + pmk_len) < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| #endif /* !CONFIG_SAE_PK */ |
| |
| forced_memzero(keyseed, sizeof(keyseed)); |
| os_memcpy(sae->tmp->kck, keys, hash_len); |
| sae->tmp->kck_len = hash_len; |
| os_memcpy(sae->pmk, keys + hash_len, pmk_len); |
| sae->pmk_len = pmk_len; |
| os_memcpy(sae->pmkid, val, SAE_PMKID_LEN); |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE_PK |
| if (sae->pk) { |
| os_memcpy(sae->tmp->kek, keys + hash_len + SAE_PMK_LEN, |
| hash_len); |
| sae->tmp->kek_len = hash_len; |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: KEK for SAE-PK", |
| sae->tmp->kek, sae->tmp->kek_len); |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE_PK */ |
| forced_memzero(keys, sizeof(keys)); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: KCK", |
| sae->tmp->kck, sae->tmp->kck_len); |
| wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: PMK", sae->pmk, sae->pmk_len); |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| fail: |
| wpabuf_free(rejected_groups); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(tmp, 0); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int sae_process_commit(struct sae_data *sae) |
| { |
| u8 k[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN]; |
| if (sae->tmp == NULL || |
| (sae->tmp->ec && sae_derive_k_ecc(sae, k) < 0) || |
| (sae->tmp->dh && sae_derive_k_ffc(sae, k) < 0) || |
| sae_derive_keys(sae, k) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int sae_write_commit(struct sae_data *sae, struct wpabuf *buf, |
| const struct wpabuf *token, const char *identifier) |
| { |
| u8 *pos; |
| |
| if (sae->tmp == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| wpabuf_put_le16(buf, sae->group); /* Finite Cyclic Group */ |
| if (!sae->h2e && token) { |
| wpabuf_put_buf(buf, token); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Anti-clogging token", |
| wpabuf_head(token), wpabuf_len(token)); |
| } |
| pos = wpabuf_put(buf, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar, pos, |
| sae->tmp->prime_len, sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: own commit-scalar", |
| pos, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| if (sae->tmp->ec) { |
| pos = wpabuf_put(buf, 2 * sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->tmp->ec, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc, |
| pos, pos + sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: own commit-element(x)", |
| pos, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: own commit-element(y)", |
| pos + sae->tmp->prime_len, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| } else { |
| pos = wpabuf_put(buf, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc, pos, |
| sae->tmp->prime_len, |
| sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: own commit-element", |
| pos, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| } |
| |
| if (identifier) { |
| /* Password Identifier element */ |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, 1 + os_strlen(identifier)); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXT_PASSWORD_IDENTIFIER); |
| wpabuf_put_str(buf, identifier); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: own Password Identifier: %s", |
| identifier); |
| } |
| |
| if (sae->h2e && sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups) { |
| wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: own Rejected Groups", |
| sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, |
| 1 + wpabuf_len(sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups)); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXT_REJECTED_GROUPS); |
| wpabuf_put_buf(buf, sae->tmp->own_rejected_groups); |
| } |
| |
| if (sae->h2e && token) { |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, 1 + wpabuf_len(token)); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXT_ANTI_CLOGGING_TOKEN); |
| wpabuf_put_buf(buf, token); |
| wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: Anti-clogging token (in container)", |
| token); |
| } |
| |
| if (wpa_key_mgmt_sae_ext_key(sae->akmp)) { |
| u32 suite = wpa_akm_to_suite(sae->akmp); |
| |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXTENSION); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, 1 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN); |
| wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_EXT_AKM_SUITE_SELECTOR); |
| RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(wpabuf_put(buf, RSN_SELECTOR_LEN), suite); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: AKM Suite Selector: %08x", suite); |
| sae->own_akm_suite_selector = suite; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| u16 sae_group_allowed(struct sae_data *sae, int *allowed_groups, u16 group) |
| { |
| if (allowed_groups) { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; allowed_groups[i] > 0; i++) { |
| if (allowed_groups[i] == group) |
| break; |
| } |
| if (allowed_groups[i] != group) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Proposed group %u not " |
| "enabled in the current configuration", |
| group); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (sae->state == SAE_COMMITTED && group != sae->group) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Do not allow group to be changed"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED; |
| } |
| |
| if (group != sae->group && sae_set_group(sae, group) < 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Unsupported Finite Cyclic Group %u", |
| group); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED; |
| } |
| |
| if (sae->tmp == NULL) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Group information not yet initialized"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| if (sae->tmp->dh && !allowed_groups) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Do not allow FFC group %u without " |
| "explicit configuration enabling it", group); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_FINITE_CYCLIC_GROUP_NOT_SUPPORTED; |
| } |
| |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_is_password_id_elem(const u8 *pos, const u8 *end) |
| { |
| return end - pos >= 3 && |
| pos[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION && |
| pos[1] >= 1 && |
| end - pos - 2 >= pos[1] && |
| pos[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_PASSWORD_IDENTIFIER; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_is_rejected_groups_elem(const u8 *pos, const u8 *end) |
| { |
| return end - pos >= 3 && |
| pos[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION && |
| pos[1] >= 2 && |
| end - pos - 2 >= pos[1] && |
| pos[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_REJECTED_GROUPS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_is_token_container_elem(const u8 *pos, const u8 *end) |
| { |
| return end - pos >= 3 && |
| pos[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION && |
| pos[1] >= 1 && |
| end - pos - 2 >= pos[1] && |
| pos[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_ANTI_CLOGGING_TOKEN; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_is_akm_suite_selector_elem(const u8 *pos, const u8 *end) |
| { |
| return end - pos >= 2 + 1 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN && |
| pos[0] == WLAN_EID_EXTENSION && |
| pos[1] >= 1 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN && |
| end - pos - 2 >= pos[1] && |
| pos[2] == WLAN_EID_EXT_AKM_SUITE_SELECTOR; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void sae_parse_commit_token(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 **pos, |
| const u8 *end, const u8 **token, |
| size_t *token_len, int h2e) |
| { |
| size_t scalar_elem_len, tlen; |
| |
| if (token) |
| *token = NULL; |
| if (token_len) |
| *token_len = 0; |
| |
| if (h2e) |
| return; /* No Anti-Clogging Token field outside container IE */ |
| |
| scalar_elem_len = (sae->tmp->ec ? 3 : 2) * sae->tmp->prime_len; |
| if (scalar_elem_len >= (size_t) (end - *pos)) |
| return; /* No extra data beyond peer scalar and element */ |
| |
| tlen = end - (*pos + scalar_elem_len); |
| |
| if (tlen < SHA256_MAC_LEN) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: Too short optional data (%u octets) to include our Anti-Clogging Token", |
| (unsigned int) tlen); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Anti-Clogging Token", *pos, tlen); |
| if (token) |
| *token = *pos; |
| if (token_len) |
| *token_len = tlen; |
| *pos += tlen; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static void sae_parse_token_container(struct sae_data *sae, |
| const u8 *pos, const u8 *end, |
| const u8 **token, size_t *token_len) |
| { |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Possible elements at the end of the frame", |
| pos, end - pos); |
| if (!sae_is_token_container_elem(pos, end)) |
| return; |
| *token = pos + 3; |
| *token_len = pos[1] - 1; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Anti-Clogging Token (in container)", |
| *token, *token_len); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u16 sae_parse_commit_scalar(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 **pos, |
| const u8 *end) |
| { |
| struct crypto_bignum *peer_scalar; |
| |
| if (sae->tmp->prime_len > end - *pos) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Not enough data for scalar"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| peer_scalar = crypto_bignum_init_set(*pos, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| if (peer_scalar == NULL) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| |
| /* |
| * IEEE Std 802.11-2012, 11.3.8.6.1: If there is a protocol instance for |
| * the peer and it is in Authenticated state, the new Commit Message |
| * shall be dropped if the peer-scalar is identical to the one used in |
| * the existing protocol instance. |
| */ |
| if (sae->state == SAE_ACCEPTED && sae->peer_commit_scalar_accepted && |
| crypto_bignum_cmp(sae->peer_commit_scalar_accepted, |
| peer_scalar) == 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Do not accept re-use of previous " |
| "peer-commit-scalar"); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(peer_scalar, 0); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| /* 1 < scalar < r */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_is_zero(peer_scalar) || |
| crypto_bignum_is_one(peer_scalar) || |
| crypto_bignum_cmp(peer_scalar, sae->tmp->order) >= 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Invalid peer scalar"); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(peer_scalar, 0); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->peer_commit_scalar, 0); |
| sae->peer_commit_scalar = peer_scalar; |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-scalar", |
| *pos, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| *pos += sae->tmp->prime_len; |
| |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u16 sae_parse_commit_element_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 **pos, |
| const u8 *end) |
| { |
| u8 prime[SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| |
| if (2 * sae->tmp->prime_len > end - *pos) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Not enough data for " |
| "commit-element"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(sae->tmp->prime, prime, sizeof(prime), |
| sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| |
| /* element x and y coordinates < p */ |
| if (os_memcmp(*pos, prime, sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0 || |
| os_memcmp(*pos + sae->tmp->prime_len, prime, |
| sae->tmp->prime_len) >= 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Invalid coordinates in peer " |
| "element"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-element(x)", |
| *pos, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-element(y)", |
| *pos + sae->tmp->prime_len, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| |
| crypto_ec_point_deinit(sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc, 0); |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc = |
| crypto_ec_point_from_bin(sae->tmp->ec, *pos); |
| if (!sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer element is not a valid point"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| if (!crypto_ec_point_is_on_curve(sae->tmp->ec, |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer element is not on curve"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| *pos += 2 * sae->tmp->prime_len; |
| |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u16 sae_parse_commit_element_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 **pos, |
| const u8 *end) |
| { |
| struct crypto_bignum *res, *one; |
| const u8 one_bin[1] = { 0x01 }; |
| |
| if (sae->tmp->prime_len > end - *pos) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Not enough data for " |
| "commit-element"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Peer commit-element", *pos, |
| sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc, 0); |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc = |
| crypto_bignum_init_set(*pos, sae->tmp->prime_len); |
| if (sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc == NULL) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| /* 1 < element < p - 1 */ |
| res = crypto_bignum_init(); |
| one = crypto_bignum_init_set(one_bin, sizeof(one_bin)); |
| if (!res || !one || |
| crypto_bignum_sub(sae->tmp->prime, one, res) || |
| crypto_bignum_is_zero(sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc) || |
| crypto_bignum_is_one(sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc) || |
| crypto_bignum_cmp(sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc, res) >= 0) { |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(res, 0); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Invalid peer element"); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(one, 0); |
| |
| /* scalar-op(r, ELEMENT) = 1 modulo p */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_exptmod(sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc, |
| sae->tmp->order, sae->tmp->prime, res) < 0 || |
| !crypto_bignum_is_one(res)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Invalid peer element (scalar-op)"); |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(res, 0); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| crypto_bignum_deinit(res, 0); |
| |
| *pos += sae->tmp->prime_len; |
| |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static u16 sae_parse_commit_element(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 **pos, |
| const u8 *end) |
| { |
| if (sae->tmp->dh) |
| return sae_parse_commit_element_ffc(sae, pos, end); |
| return sae_parse_commit_element_ecc(sae, pos, end); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_parse_password_identifier(struct sae_data *sae, |
| const u8 **pos, const u8 *end) |
| { |
| const u8 *epos; |
| u8 len; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Possible elements at the end of the frame", |
| *pos, end - *pos); |
| if (!sae_is_password_id_elem(*pos, end)) { |
| if (sae->tmp->pw_id) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: No Password Identifier included, but expected one (%s)", |
| sae->tmp->pw_id); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNKNOWN_PASSWORD_IDENTIFIER; |
| } |
| os_free(sae->tmp->pw_id); |
| sae->tmp->pw_id = NULL; |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; /* No Password Identifier */ |
| } |
| |
| epos = *pos; |
| epos++; /* skip IE type */ |
| len = *epos++; /* IE length */ |
| if (len > end - epos || len < 1) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| epos++; /* skip ext ID */ |
| len--; |
| |
| if (sae->tmp->pw_id && |
| (len != os_strlen(sae->tmp->pw_id) || |
| os_memcmp(sae->tmp->pw_id, epos, len) != 0)) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: The included Password Identifier does not match the expected one (%s)", |
| sae->tmp->pw_id); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNKNOWN_PASSWORD_IDENTIFIER; |
| } |
| |
| os_free(sae->tmp->pw_id); |
| sae->tmp->pw_id = os_malloc(len + 1); |
| if (!sae->tmp->pw_id) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| os_memcpy(sae->tmp->pw_id, epos, len); |
| sae->tmp->pw_id[len] = '\0'; |
| wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Received Password Identifier", |
| sae->tmp->pw_id, len); |
| *pos = epos + len; |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_parse_rejected_groups(struct sae_data *sae, |
| const u8 **pos, const u8 *end) |
| { |
| const u8 *epos; |
| u8 len; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Possible elements at the end of the frame", |
| *pos, end - *pos); |
| if (!sae_is_rejected_groups_elem(*pos, end)) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| |
| epos = *pos; |
| epos++; /* skip IE type */ |
| len = *epos++; /* IE length */ |
| if (len > end - epos || len < 1) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| epos++; /* skip ext ID */ |
| len--; |
| |
| wpabuf_free(sae->tmp->peer_rejected_groups); |
| sae->tmp->peer_rejected_groups = wpabuf_alloc(len); |
| if (!sae->tmp->peer_rejected_groups) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| wpabuf_put_data(sae->tmp->peer_rejected_groups, epos, len); |
| wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Received Rejected Groups list", |
| sae->tmp->peer_rejected_groups); |
| *pos = epos + len; |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_parse_akm_suite_selector(struct sae_data *sae, |
| const u8 **pos, const u8 *end) |
| { |
| const u8 *epos; |
| u8 len; |
| |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Possible elements at the end of the frame", |
| *pos, end - *pos); |
| if (!sae_is_akm_suite_selector_elem(*pos, end)) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| |
| epos = *pos; |
| epos++; /* skip IE type */ |
| len = *epos++; /* IE length */ |
| if (len > end - epos || len < 1) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| epos++; /* skip ext ID */ |
| len--; |
| |
| if (len < RSN_SELECTOR_LEN) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| sae->peer_akm_suite_selector = RSN_SELECTOR_GET(epos); |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Received AKM Suite Selector: %08x", |
| sae->peer_akm_suite_selector); |
| *pos = epos + len; |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| |
| u16 sae_parse_commit(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len, |
| const u8 **token, size_t *token_len, int *allowed_groups, |
| int h2e, int *ie_offset) |
| { |
| const u8 *pos = data, *end = data + len; |
| u16 res; |
| |
| /* Check Finite Cyclic Group */ |
| if (end - pos < 2) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| res = sae_group_allowed(sae, allowed_groups, WPA_GET_LE16(pos)); |
| if (res != WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) |
| return res; |
| pos += 2; |
| |
| /* Optional Anti-Clogging Token */ |
| sae_parse_commit_token(sae, &pos, end, token, token_len, h2e); |
| |
| /* commit-scalar */ |
| res = sae_parse_commit_scalar(sae, &pos, end); |
| if (res != WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) |
| return res; |
| |
| /* commit-element */ |
| res = sae_parse_commit_element(sae, &pos, end); |
| if (res != WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) |
| return res; |
| |
| if (ie_offset) |
| *ie_offset = pos - data; |
| |
| /* Optional Password Identifier element */ |
| res = sae_parse_password_identifier(sae, &pos, end); |
| if (res != WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) |
| return res; |
| |
| /* Conditional Rejected Groups element */ |
| if (h2e) { |
| res = sae_parse_rejected_groups(sae, &pos, end); |
| if (res != WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| /* Optional Anti-Clogging Token Container element */ |
| if (h2e) |
| sae_parse_token_container(sae, pos, end, token, token_len); |
| |
| /* Conditional AKM Suite Selector element */ |
| if (h2e) { |
| res = sae_parse_akm_suite_selector(sae, &pos, end); |
| if (res != WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS) |
| return res; |
| } |
| |
| if (sae->own_akm_suite_selector && |
| sae->own_akm_suite_selector != sae->peer_akm_suite_selector) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, |
| "SAE: AKM suite selector mismatch: own=%08x peer=%08x", |
| sae->own_akm_suite_selector, |
| sae->peer_akm_suite_selector); |
| return WLAN_STATUS_UNSPECIFIED_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sae->akmp) { |
| if (sae->peer_akm_suite_selector == |
| RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY) |
| sae->akmp = WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE_EXT_KEY; |
| else if (sae->peer_akm_suite_selector == |
| RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY) |
| sae->akmp = WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE_EXT_KEY; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check whether peer-commit-scalar and PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT are same as |
| * the values we sent which would be evidence of a reflection attack. |
| */ |
| if (!sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar || |
| crypto_bignum_cmp(sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar, |
| sae->peer_commit_scalar) != 0 || |
| (sae->tmp->dh && |
| (!sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc || |
| crypto_bignum_cmp(sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc, |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc) != 0)) || |
| (sae->tmp->ec && |
| (!sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc || |
| crypto_ec_point_cmp(sae->tmp->ec, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc, |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc) != 0))) |
| return WLAN_STATUS_SUCCESS; /* scalars/elements are different */ |
| |
| /* |
| * This is a reflection attack - return special value to trigger caller |
| * to silently discard the frame instead of replying with a specific |
| * status code. |
| */ |
| return SAE_SILENTLY_DISCARD; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_cn_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *sc, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *scalar1, |
| const u8 *element1, size_t element1_len, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *scalar2, |
| const u8 *element2, size_t element2_len, |
| u8 *confirm) |
| { |
| const u8 *addr[5]; |
| size_t len[5]; |
| u8 scalar_b1[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN], scalar_b2[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN]; |
| |
| /* Confirm |
| * CN(key, X, Y, Z, ...) = |
| * HMAC-SHA256(key, D2OS(X) || D2OS(Y) || D2OS(Z) | ...) |
| * confirm = CN(KCK, send-confirm, commit-scalar, COMMIT-ELEMENT, |
| * peer-commit-scalar, PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT) |
| * verifier = CN(KCK, peer-send-confirm, peer-commit-scalar, |
| * PEER-COMMIT-ELEMENT, commit-scalar, COMMIT-ELEMENT) |
| */ |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(scalar1, scalar_b1, sizeof(scalar_b1), |
| sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(scalar2, scalar_b2, sizeof(scalar_b2), |
| sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| addr[0] = sc; |
| len[0] = 2; |
| addr[1] = scalar_b1; |
| len[1] = sae->tmp->prime_len; |
| addr[2] = element1; |
| len[2] = element1_len; |
| addr[3] = scalar_b2; |
| len[3] = sae->tmp->prime_len; |
| addr[4] = element2; |
| len[4] = element2_len; |
| return hkdf_extract(sae->tmp->kck_len, sae->tmp->kck, sae->tmp->kck_len, |
| 5, addr, len, confirm); |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_cn_confirm_ecc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *sc, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *scalar1, |
| const struct crypto_ec_point *element1, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *scalar2, |
| const struct crypto_ec_point *element2, |
| u8 *confirm) |
| { |
| u8 element_b1[2 * SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 element_b2[2 * SAE_MAX_ECC_PRIME_LEN]; |
| |
| if (crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->tmp->ec, element1, element_b1, |
| element_b1 + sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_ec_point_to_bin(sae->tmp->ec, element2, element_b2, |
| element_b2 + sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0 || |
| sae_cn_confirm(sae, sc, scalar1, element_b1, |
| 2 * sae->tmp->prime_len, |
| scalar2, element_b2, 2 * sae->tmp->prime_len, |
| confirm) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| static int sae_cn_confirm_ffc(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *sc, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *scalar1, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *element1, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *scalar2, |
| const struct crypto_bignum *element2, |
| u8 *confirm) |
| { |
| u8 element_b1[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN]; |
| u8 element_b2[SAE_MAX_PRIME_LEN]; |
| |
| if (crypto_bignum_to_bin(element1, element_b1, sizeof(element_b1), |
| sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0 || |
| crypto_bignum_to_bin(element2, element_b2, sizeof(element_b2), |
| sae->tmp->prime_len) < 0 || |
| sae_cn_confirm(sae, sc, scalar1, element_b1, sae->tmp->prime_len, |
| scalar2, element_b2, sae->tmp->prime_len, |
| confirm) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int sae_write_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, struct wpabuf *buf) |
| { |
| const u8 *sc; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| int res; |
| |
| if (sae->tmp == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| |
| hash_len = sae->tmp->kck_len; |
| |
| /* Send-Confirm */ |
| if (sae->send_confirm < 0xffff) |
| sae->send_confirm++; |
| sc = wpabuf_put(buf, 0); |
| wpabuf_put_le16(buf, sae->send_confirm); |
| |
| if (sae->tmp->ec) |
| res = sae_cn_confirm_ecc(sae, sc, sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc, |
| sae->peer_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc, |
| wpabuf_put(buf, hash_len)); |
| else |
| res = sae_cn_confirm_ffc(sae, sc, sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc, |
| sae->peer_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc, |
| wpabuf_put(buf, hash_len)); |
| if (res) |
| return res; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE_PK |
| if (sae_write_confirm_pk(sae, buf) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE_PK */ |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| int sae_check_confirm(struct sae_data *sae, const u8 *data, size_t len, |
| int *ie_offset) |
| { |
| u8 verifier[SAE_MAX_HASH_LEN]; |
| size_t hash_len; |
| |
| if (!sae->tmp) |
| return -1; |
| |
| hash_len = sae->tmp->kck_len; |
| if (len < 2 + hash_len) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Too short confirm message"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: peer-send-confirm %u", WPA_GET_LE16(data)); |
| |
| if (!sae->peer_commit_scalar || !sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Temporary data not yet available"); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (sae->tmp->ec) { |
| if (!sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc || |
| !sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc || |
| sae_cn_confirm_ecc(sae, data, sae->peer_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ecc, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ecc, |
| verifier) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } else { |
| if (!sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc || |
| !sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc || |
| sae_cn_confirm_ffc(sae, data, sae->peer_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->peer_commit_element_ffc, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_scalar, |
| sae->tmp->own_commit_element_ffc, |
| verifier) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (os_memcmp_const(verifier, data + 2, hash_len) != 0) { |
| wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Confirm mismatch"); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Received confirm", |
| data + 2, hash_len); |
| wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "SAE: Calculated verifier", |
| verifier, hash_len); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SAE_PK |
| if (sae_check_confirm_pk(sae, data + 2 + hash_len, |
| len - 2 - hash_len) < 0) |
| return -1; |
| #endif /* CONFIG_SAE_PK */ |
| |
| /* 2 bytes are for send-confirm, then the hash, followed by IEs */ |
| if (ie_offset) |
| *ie_offset = 2 + hash_len; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| |
| const char * sae_state_txt(enum sae_state state) |
| { |
| switch (state) { |
| case SAE_NOTHING: |
| return "Nothing"; |
| case SAE_COMMITTED: |
| return "Committed"; |
| case SAE_CONFIRMED: |
| return "Confirmed"; |
| case SAE_ACCEPTED: |
| return "Accepted"; |
| } |
| return "?"; |
| } |