| type superuser_device, file_type, mlstrustedobject; |
| |
| ## Perms for the daemon |
| |
| userdebug_or_eng(` |
| domain_trans(init, su_exec, sudaemon) |
| |
| typeattribute sudaemon domain, coredomain, mlstrustedsubject; |
| |
| domain_trans(init, su_exec, sudaemon) |
| |
| type_transition sudaemon socket_device:sock_file superuser_device; |
| # The userspace app uses /dev sockets to control per-app access |
| allow sudaemon superuser_device:dir { create rw_dir_perms setattr unlink }; |
| allow sudaemon superuser_device:sock_file { create setattr unlink write }; |
| |
| # sudaemon is also permissive to permit setenforce. |
| permissive sudaemon; |
| |
| # Add sudaemon to various domains |
| net_domain(sudaemon) |
| app_domain(sudaemon) |
| |
| dontaudit sudaemon self:capability_class_set *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon kernel:security *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon kernel:system *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon self:memprotect *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:process *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:fd *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:dir *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:lnk_file *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:{ fifo_file file } *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:socket_class_set *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:ipc_class_set *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:key *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon fs_type:filesystem *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon node_type:node *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon netif_type:netif *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon port_type:socket_class_set *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon port_type:{ tcp_socket dccp_socket } *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:peer *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon domain:binder *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon property_type:property_service *; |
| dontaudit sudaemon appops_service:service_manager *; |
| ') |
| |
| ## Perms for the app |
| |
| userdebug_or_eng(` |
| # Translate user apps to the shell domain when using su |
| # |
| # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS blocks this :( |
| # we need to find a way to narrow this down to the actual exec. |
| # typealias shell alias suclient; |
| # domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app, su_exec, suclient) |
| |
| allow untrusted_app_all su_exec:file { execute_no_trans getattr open read execute }; |
| allow untrusted_app_all sudaemon:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write setopt ioctl }; |
| allow untrusted_app_all superuser_device:dir { r_dir_perms }; |
| allow untrusted_app_all superuser_device:sock_file { write }; |
| |
| # For Settings control of access |
| allow system_app superuser_device:sock_file { read write create setattr unlink getattr }; |
| allow system_app sudaemon:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write setopt ioctl }; |
| allow system_app superuser_device:dir { create rw_dir_perms setattr unlink }; |
| |
| allow kernel sudaemon:fd { use }; |
| ') |
| |
| neverallow { domain userdebug_or_eng(`-dumpstate -shell -su -untrusted_app_all -init -sudaemon') } su_exec:file no_x_file_perms; |