| /* Userspace key control operations |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. |
| * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or |
| * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License |
| * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version |
| * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/module.h> |
| #include <linux/init.h> |
| #include <linux/sched.h> |
| #include <linux/slab.h> |
| #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
| #include <linux/key.h> |
| #include <linux/keyctl.h> |
| #include <linux/fs.h> |
| #include <linux/capability.h> |
| #include <linux/string.h> |
| #include <linux/err.h> |
| #include <linux/vmalloc.h> |
| #include <linux/security.h> |
| #include <linux/uio.h> |
| #include <asm/uaccess.h> |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| #define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096 |
| |
| static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type, |
| const char __user *_type, |
| unsigned len) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, len); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| if (ret == 0 || ret >= len) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (type[0] == '.') |
| return -EPERM; |
| type[len - 1] = '\0'; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a |
| * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring. |
| * |
| * If the description is NULL or an empty string, the key type is asked to |
| * generate one from the payload. |
| * |
| * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it. |
| * |
| * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error |
| * code is returned. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type, |
| const char __user *, _description, |
| const void __user *, _payload, |
| size_t, plen, |
| key_serial_t, ringid) |
| { |
| key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref; |
| char type[32], *description; |
| void *payload; |
| long ret; |
| |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* draw all the data into kernel space */ |
| ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type)); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| description = NULL; |
| if (_description) { |
| description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE); |
| if (IS_ERR(description)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(description); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| if (!*description) { |
| kfree(description); |
| description = NULL; |
| } else if ((description[0] == '.') && |
| (strncmp(type, "keyring", 7) == 0)) { |
| ret = -EPERM; |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ |
| payload = NULL; |
| |
| if (_payload) { |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); |
| if (!payload) { |
| if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE) |
| goto error2; |
| payload = vmalloc(plen); |
| if (!payload) |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0) |
| goto error3; |
| } |
| |
| /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */ |
| keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref); |
| goto error3; |
| } |
| |
| /* create or update the requested key and add it to the target |
| * keyring */ |
| key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description, |
| payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF, |
| KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA); |
| if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial; |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| } |
| else { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| } |
| |
| key_ref_put(keyring_ref); |
| error3: |
| kvfree(payload); |
| error2: |
| kfree(description); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Search the process keyrings and keyring trees linked from those for a |
| * matching key. Keyrings must have appropriate Search permission to be |
| * searched. |
| * |
| * If a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if there's |
| * one specified and the serial number of the key will be returned. |
| * |
| * If no key is found, /sbin/request-key will be invoked if _callout_info is |
| * non-NULL in an attempt to create a key. The _callout_info string will be |
| * passed to /sbin/request-key to aid with completing the request. If the |
| * _callout_info string is "" then it will be changed to "-". |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type, |
| const char __user *, _description, |
| const char __user *, _callout_info, |
| key_serial_t, destringid) |
| { |
| struct key_type *ktype; |
| struct key *key; |
| key_ref_t dest_ref; |
| size_t callout_len; |
| char type[32], *description, *callout_info; |
| long ret; |
| |
| /* pull the type into kernel space */ |
| ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type)); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* pull the description into kernel space */ |
| description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE); |
| if (IS_ERR(description)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(description); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* pull the callout info into kernel space */ |
| callout_info = NULL; |
| callout_len = 0; |
| if (_callout_info) { |
| callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE); |
| if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info); |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| callout_len = strlen(callout_info); |
| } |
| |
| /* get the destination keyring if specified */ |
| dest_ref = NULL; |
| if (destringid) { |
| dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, |
| KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref); |
| goto error3; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* find the key type */ |
| ktype = key_type_lookup(type); |
| if (IS_ERR(ktype)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(ktype); |
| goto error4; |
| } |
| |
| /* do the search */ |
| key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, callout_info, |
| callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), |
| KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA); |
| if (IS_ERR(key)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key); |
| goto error5; |
| } |
| |
| /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */ |
| ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error6; |
| |
| ret = key->serial; |
| |
| error6: |
| key_put(key); |
| error5: |
| key_type_put(ktype); |
| error4: |
| key_ref_put(dest_ref); |
| error3: |
| kfree(callout_info); |
| error2: |
| kfree(description); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Get the ID of the specified process keyring. |
| * |
| * The requested keyring must have search permission to be found. |
| * |
| * If successful, the ID of the requested keyring will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create) |
| { |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| unsigned long lflags; |
| long ret; |
| |
| lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0; |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial; |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Join a (named) session keyring. |
| * |
| * Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session |
| * keyring, creating it if necessary. A named session keyring must have Search |
| * permission for it to be joined. Session keyrings without this permit will |
| * be skipped over. It is not permitted for userspace to create or join |
| * keyrings whose name begin with a dot. |
| * |
| * If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name) |
| { |
| char *name; |
| long ret; |
| |
| /* fetch the name from userspace */ |
| name = NULL; |
| if (_name) { |
| name = strndup_user(_name, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE); |
| if (IS_ERR(name)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(name); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| ret = -EPERM; |
| if (name[0] == '.') |
| goto error_name; |
| } |
| |
| /* join the session */ |
| ret = join_session_keyring(name); |
| error_name: |
| kfree(name); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Update a key's data payload from the given data. |
| * |
| * The key must grant the caller Write permission and the key type must support |
| * updating for this to work. A negative key can be positively instantiated |
| * with this call. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. If the key type does not support |
| * updating, then -EOPNOTSUPP will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id, |
| const void __user *_payload, |
| size_t plen) |
| { |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| void *payload; |
| long ret; |
| |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| if (plen > PAGE_SIZE) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ |
| payload = NULL; |
| if (_payload) { |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!payload) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0) |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| |
| /* find the target key (which must be writable) */ |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| |
| /* update the key */ |
| ret = key_update(key_ref, payload, plen); |
| |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| error2: |
| kfree(payload); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Revoke a key. |
| * |
| * The key must be grant the caller Write or Setattr permission for this to |
| * work. The key type should give up its quota claim when revoked. The key |
| * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a |
| * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay). |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 is returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id) |
| { |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| long ret; |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| if (ret != -EACCES) |
| goto error; |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)); |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Invalidate a key. |
| * |
| * The key must be grant the caller Invalidate permission for this to work. |
| * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected |
| * immediately. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 is returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id) |
| { |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| long ret; |
| |
| kenter("%d", id); |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| |
| /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keys */ |
| if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
| goto error; |
| if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL, |
| &key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->flags)) |
| goto invalidate; |
| goto error_put; |
| } |
| |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| invalidate: |
| key_invalidate(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)); |
| ret = 0; |
| error_put: |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| error: |
| kleave(" = %ld", ret); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the |
| * special keyring IDs is used. |
| * |
| * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work. If |
| * successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid) |
| { |
| key_ref_t keyring_ref; |
| long ret; |
| |
| keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref); |
| |
| /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */ |
| if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
| keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) |
| goto error; |
| if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR, |
| &key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)->flags)) |
| goto clear; |
| goto error_put; |
| } |
| |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| clear: |
| ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)); |
| error_put: |
| key_ref_put(keyring_ref); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Create a link from a keyring to a key if there's no matching key in the |
| * keyring, otherwise replace the link to the matching key with a link to the |
| * new key. |
| * |
| * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the the keyring must grant |
| * the caller Write permission. Furthermore, if an additional link is created, |
| * the keyring's quota will be extended. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid) |
| { |
| key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref; |
| long ret; |
| |
| keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| |
| ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)); |
| |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| error2: |
| key_ref_put(keyring_ref); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Unlink a key from a keyring. |
| * |
| * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work; the key |
| * itself need not grant the caller anything. If the last link to a key is |
| * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid) |
| { |
| key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref; |
| long ret; |
| |
| keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| |
| ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)); |
| |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| error2: |
| key_ref_put(keyring_ref); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Return a description of a key to userspace. |
| * |
| * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work. |
| * |
| * If there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it formatted |
| * in the following way: |
| * |
| * type;uid;gid;perm;description<NUL> |
| * |
| * If successful, we return the amount of description available, irrespective |
| * of how much we may have copied into the buffer. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid, |
| char __user *buffer, |
| size_t buflen) |
| { |
| struct key *key, *instkey; |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| char *infobuf; |
| long ret; |
| int desclen, infolen; |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the |
| * authorisation token handy */ |
| if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) { |
| instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid); |
| if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) { |
| key_put(instkey); |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, |
| KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, |
| 0); |
| if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
| goto okay; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| okay: |
| key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
| desclen = strlen(key->description); |
| |
| /* calculate how much information we're going to return */ |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| infobuf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, |
| "%s;%d;%d;%08x;", |
| key->type->name, |
| from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->uid), |
| from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), key->gid), |
| key->perm); |
| if (!infobuf) |
| goto error2; |
| infolen = strlen(infobuf); |
| ret = infolen + desclen + 1; |
| |
| /* consider returning the data */ |
| if (buffer && buflen >= ret) { |
| if (copy_to_user(buffer, infobuf, infolen) != 0 || |
| copy_to_user(buffer + infolen, key->description, |
| desclen + 1) != 0) |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| kfree(infobuf); |
| error2: |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Search the specified keyring and any keyrings it links to for a matching |
| * key. Only keyrings that grant the caller Search permission will be searched |
| * (this includes the starting keyring). Only keys with Search permission can |
| * be found. |
| * |
| * If successful, the found key will be linked to the destination keyring if |
| * supplied and the key has Link permission, and the found key ID will be |
| * returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid, |
| const char __user *_type, |
| const char __user *_description, |
| key_serial_t destringid) |
| { |
| struct key_type *ktype; |
| key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref, dest_ref; |
| char type[32], *description; |
| long ret; |
| |
| /* pull the type and description into kernel space */ |
| ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type)); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| description = strndup_user(_description, KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE); |
| if (IS_ERR(description)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(description); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */ |
| keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH); |
| if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref); |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| |
| /* get the destination keyring if specified */ |
| dest_ref = NULL; |
| if (destringid) { |
| dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, |
| KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref); |
| goto error3; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* find the key type */ |
| ktype = key_type_lookup(type); |
| if (IS_ERR(ktype)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(ktype); |
| goto error4; |
| } |
| |
| /* do the search */ |
| key_ref = keyring_search(keyring_ref, ktype, description); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| |
| /* treat lack or presence of a negative key the same */ |
| if (ret == -EAGAIN) |
| ret = -ENOKEY; |
| goto error5; |
| } |
| |
| /* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */ |
| if (dest_ref) { |
| ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error6; |
| |
| ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error6; |
| } |
| |
| ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial; |
| |
| error6: |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| error5: |
| key_type_put(ktype); |
| error4: |
| key_ref_put(dest_ref); |
| error3: |
| key_ref_put(keyring_ref); |
| error2: |
| kfree(description); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Read a key's payload. |
| * |
| * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the |
| * caller Search permission when searched for from the process keyrings. |
| * |
| * If successful, we place up to buflen bytes of data into the buffer, if one |
| * is provided, and return the amount of data that is available in the key, |
| * irrespective of how much we copied into the buffer. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) |
| { |
| struct key *key; |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| long ret; |
| |
| /* find the key first */ |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = -ENOKEY; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
| |
| /* see if we can read it directly */ |
| ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ); |
| if (ret == 0) |
| goto can_read_key; |
| if (ret != -EACCES) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings |
| * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be |
| * dangling off an instantiation key |
| */ |
| if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) { |
| ret = -EACCES; |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| |
| /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */ |
| can_read_key: |
| ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| if (key->type->read) { |
| /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep) |
| * to protect against the key being updated or revoked. |
| */ |
| down_read(&key->sem); |
| ret = key_validate(key); |
| if (ret == 0) |
| ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen); |
| up_read(&key->sem); |
| } |
| |
| error2: |
| key_put(key); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Change the ownership of a key |
| * |
| * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though |
| * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. For the UID to be changed, or |
| * for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the |
| * caller must have sysadmin capability. If either uid or gid is -1 then that |
| * attribute is not changed. |
| * |
| * If the UID is to be changed, the new user must have sufficient quota to |
| * accept the key. The quota deduction will be removed from the old user to |
| * the new user should the attribute be changed. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group) |
| { |
| struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL; |
| struct key *key; |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| long ret; |
| kuid_t uid; |
| kgid_t gid; |
| |
| uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), user); |
| gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), group); |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| if ((user != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(uid)) |
| goto error; |
| if ((group != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(gid)) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| if (user == (uid_t) -1 && group == (gid_t) -1) |
| goto error; |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, |
| KEY_NEED_SETATTR); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
| |
| /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */ |
| ret = -EACCES; |
| down_write(&key->sem); |
| |
| if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
| /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */ |
| if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(key->uid, uid)) |
| goto error_put; |
| |
| /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other |
| * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */ |
| if (group != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(gid, key->gid) && !in_group_p(gid)) |
| goto error_put; |
| } |
| |
| /* change the UID */ |
| if (user != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(uid, key->uid)) { |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| newowner = key_user_lookup(uid); |
| if (!newowner) |
| goto error_put; |
| |
| /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */ |
| if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) { |
| unsigned maxkeys = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? |
| key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys; |
| unsigned maxbytes = uid_eq(uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) ? |
| key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes; |
| |
| spin_lock(&newowner->lock); |
| if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys || |
| newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes || |
| newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen < |
| newowner->qnbytes) |
| goto quota_overrun; |
| |
| newowner->qnkeys++; |
| newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen; |
| spin_unlock(&newowner->lock); |
| |
| spin_lock(&key->user->lock); |
| key->user->qnkeys--; |
| key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen; |
| spin_unlock(&key->user->lock); |
| } |
| |
| atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); |
| atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys); |
| |
| if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { |
| atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); |
| atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys); |
| } |
| |
| zapowner = key->user; |
| key->user = newowner; |
| key->uid = uid; |
| } |
| |
| /* change the GID */ |
| if (group != (gid_t) -1) |
| key->gid = gid; |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| error_put: |
| up_write(&key->sem); |
| key_put(key); |
| if (zapowner) |
| key_user_put(zapowner); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| |
| quota_overrun: |
| spin_unlock(&newowner->lock); |
| zapowner = newowner; |
| ret = -EDQUOT; |
| goto error_put; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Change the permission mask on a key. |
| * |
| * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though |
| * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. If the caller does not have |
| * sysadmin capability, it may only change the permission on keys that it owns. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm) |
| { |
| struct key *key; |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| long ret; |
| |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL)) |
| goto error; |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, |
| KEY_NEED_SETATTR); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
| |
| /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */ |
| ret = -EACCES; |
| down_write(&key->sem); |
| |
| /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */ |
| if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || uid_eq(key->uid, current_fsuid())) { |
| key->perm = perm; |
| ret = 0; |
| } |
| |
| up_write(&key->sem); |
| key_put(key); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Get the destination keyring for instantiation and check that the caller has |
| * Write permission on it. |
| */ |
| static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid, |
| struct request_key_auth *rka, |
| struct key **_dest_keyring) |
| { |
| key_ref_t dkref; |
| |
| *_dest_keyring = NULL; |
| |
| /* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */ |
| if (ringid == 0) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */ |
| if (ringid > 0) { |
| dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE); |
| if (IS_ERR(dkref)) |
| return PTR_ERR(dkref); |
| *_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (ringid == KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| /* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the |
| * authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */ |
| if (ringid >= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING) { |
| *_dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -ENOKEY; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Change the request_key authorisation key on the current process. |
| */ |
| static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key) |
| { |
| struct cred *new; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| key_put(new->request_key_auth); |
| new->request_key_auth = key_get(key); |
| |
| return commit_creds(new); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the |
| * destination keyring if one is given. |
| * |
| * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to |
| * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id, |
| struct iov_iter *from, |
| key_serial_t ringid) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| struct request_key_auth *rka; |
| struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring; |
| size_t plen = from ? iov_iter_count(from) : 0; |
| void *payload; |
| long ret; |
| |
| kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid); |
| |
| if (!plen) |
| from = NULL; |
| |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been |
| * assumed before calling this */ |
| ret = -EPERM; |
| instkey = cred->request_key_auth; |
| if (!instkey) |
| goto error; |
| |
| rka = instkey->payload.data[0]; |
| if (rka->target_key->serial != id) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */ |
| payload = NULL; |
| |
| if (from) { |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!payload) { |
| if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE) |
| goto error; |
| payload = vmalloc(plen); |
| if (!payload) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| if (copy_from_iter(payload, plen, from) != plen) |
| goto error2; |
| } |
| |
| /* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the |
| * requesting task */ |
| ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error2; |
| |
| /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */ |
| ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen, |
| dest_keyring, instkey); |
| |
| key_put(dest_keyring); |
| |
| /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by |
| * instantiation of the key */ |
| if (ret == 0) |
| keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL); |
| |
| error2: |
| kvfree(payload); |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the |
| * destination keyring if one is given. |
| * |
| * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to |
| * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id, |
| const void __user *_payload, |
| size_t plen, |
| key_serial_t ringid) |
| { |
| if (_payload && plen) { |
| struct iovec iov; |
| struct iov_iter from; |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = import_single_range(WRITE, (void __user *)_payload, plen, |
| &iov, &from); |
| if (unlikely(ret)) |
| return ret; |
| |
| return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, &from, ringid); |
| } |
| |
| return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, ringid); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into |
| * the destination keyring if one is given. |
| * |
| * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to |
| * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id, |
| const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov, |
| unsigned ioc, |
| key_serial_t ringid) |
| { |
| struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack; |
| struct iov_iter from; |
| long ret; |
| |
| if (!_payload_iov) |
| ioc = 0; |
| |
| ret = import_iovec(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, |
| ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), &iov, &from); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| return ret; |
| ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, &from, ringid); |
| kfree(iov); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link |
| * the key into the destination keyring if one is given. |
| * |
| * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to |
| * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. |
| * |
| * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected |
| * after the timeout expires. |
| * |
| * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing |
| * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid) |
| { |
| return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error |
| * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given. |
| * |
| * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to |
| * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required. |
| * |
| * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected |
| * after the timeout expires. |
| * |
| * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing |
| * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error, |
| key_serial_t ringid) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| struct request_key_auth *rka; |
| struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring; |
| long ret; |
| |
| kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid); |
| |
| /* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */ |
| if (error <= 0 || |
| error >= MAX_ERRNO || |
| error == ERESTARTSYS || |
| error == ERESTARTNOINTR || |
| error == ERESTARTNOHAND || |
| error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been |
| * assumed before calling this */ |
| ret = -EPERM; |
| instkey = cred->request_key_auth; |
| if (!instkey) |
| goto error; |
| |
| rka = instkey->payload.data[0]; |
| if (rka->target_key->serial != id) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be |
| * writable) */ |
| ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */ |
| ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error, |
| dest_keyring, instkey); |
| |
| key_put(dest_keyring); |
| |
| /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by |
| * instantiation of the key */ |
| if (ret == 0) |
| keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL); |
| |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and |
| * return the old setting. |
| * |
| * If a thread or process keyring is specified then it will be created if it |
| * doesn't yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl) |
| { |
| struct cred *new; |
| int ret, old_setting; |
| |
| old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring); |
| |
| if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE) |
| return old_setting; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| switch (reqkey_defl) { |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING: |
| ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error; |
| goto set; |
| |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING: |
| ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error; |
| goto set; |
| |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT: |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING: |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING: |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING: |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING: |
| goto set; |
| |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE: |
| case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING: |
| default: |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| set: |
| new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl; |
| commit_creds(new); |
| return old_setting; |
| error: |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set or clear the timeout on a key. |
| * |
| * Either the key must grant the caller Setattr permission or else the caller |
| * must hold an instantiation authorisation token for the key. |
| * |
| * The timeout is either 0 to clear the timeout, or a number of seconds from |
| * the current time. The key and any links to the key will be automatically |
| * garbage collected after the timeout expires. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 is returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout) |
| { |
| struct key *key, *instkey; |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| long ret; |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, |
| KEY_NEED_SETATTR); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| /* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted |
| * if we have the authorisation token handy */ |
| if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) { |
| instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id); |
| if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) { |
| key_put(instkey); |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, |
| KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, |
| 0); |
| if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
| goto okay; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| okay: |
| key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
| key_set_timeout(key, timeout); |
| key_put(key); |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Assume (or clear) the authority to instantiate the specified key. |
| * |
| * This sets the authoritative token currently in force for key instantiation. |
| * This must be done for a key to be instantiated. It has the effect of making |
| * available all the keys from the caller of the request_key() that created a |
| * key to request_key() calls made by the caller of this function. |
| * |
| * The caller must have the instantiation key in their process keyrings with a |
| * Search permission grant available to the caller. |
| * |
| * If the ID given is 0, then the setting will be cleared and 0 returned. |
| * |
| * If the ID given has a matching an authorisation key, then that key will be |
| * set and its ID will be returned. The authorisation key can be read to get |
| * the callout information passed to request_key(). |
| */ |
| long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id) |
| { |
| struct key *authkey; |
| long ret; |
| |
| /* special key IDs aren't permitted */ |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| if (id < 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */ |
| if (id == 0) { |
| ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we |
| * instantiate the specified key |
| * - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings |
| * somewhere |
| */ |
| authkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id); |
| if (IS_ERR(authkey)) { |
| ret = PTR_ERR(authkey); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto error; |
| key_put(authkey); |
| |
| ret = authkey->serial; |
| error: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Get a key's the LSM security label. |
| * |
| * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work. |
| * |
| * If there's a buffer, then up to buflen bytes of data will be placed into it. |
| * |
| * If successful, the amount of information available will be returned, |
| * irrespective of how much was copied (including the terminal NUL). |
| */ |
| long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, |
| char __user *buffer, |
| size_t buflen) |
| { |
| struct key *key, *instkey; |
| key_ref_t key_ref; |
| char *context; |
| long ret; |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { |
| if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES) |
| return PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| |
| /* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we |
| * have the authorisation token handy */ |
| instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid); |
| if (IS_ERR(instkey)) |
| return PTR_ERR(instkey); |
| key_put(instkey); |
| |
| key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0); |
| if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) |
| return PTR_ERR(key_ref); |
| } |
| |
| key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
| ret = security_key_getsecurity(key, &context); |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| /* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty |
| * string */ |
| ret = 1; |
| if (buffer && buflen > 0 && |
| copy_to_user(buffer, "", 1) != 0) |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| } else if (ret > 0) { |
| /* return as much data as there's room for */ |
| if (buffer && buflen > 0) { |
| if (buflen > ret) |
| buflen = ret; |
| |
| if (copy_to_user(buffer, context, buflen) != 0) |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| kfree(context); |
| } |
| |
| key_ref_put(key_ref); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's |
| * parent process. |
| * |
| * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the |
| * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective |
| * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID. |
| * |
| * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace. |
| * |
| * If successful, 0 will be returned. |
| */ |
| long keyctl_session_to_parent(void) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *me, *parent; |
| const struct cred *mycred, *pcred; |
| struct callback_head *newwork, *oldwork; |
| key_ref_t keyring_r; |
| struct cred *cred; |
| int ret; |
| |
| keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK); |
| if (IS_ERR(keyring_r)) |
| return PTR_ERR(keyring_r); |
| |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| |
| /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct |
| * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in |
| * our parent */ |
| cred = cred_alloc_blank(); |
| if (!cred) |
| goto error_keyring; |
| newwork = &cred->rcu; |
| |
| cred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r); |
| keyring_r = NULL; |
| init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring); |
| |
| me = current; |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| |
| ret = -EPERM; |
| oldwork = NULL; |
| parent = me->real_parent; |
| |
| /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */ |
| if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm) |
| goto unlock; |
| |
| /* the parent must be single threaded */ |
| if (!thread_group_empty(parent)) |
| goto unlock; |
| |
| /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or |
| * there's no point */ |
| mycred = current_cred(); |
| pcred = __task_cred(parent); |
| if (mycred == pcred || |
| mycred->session_keyring == pcred->session_keyring) { |
| ret = 0; |
| goto unlock; |
| } |
| |
| /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be |
| * SUID/SGID */ |
| if (!uid_eq(pcred->uid, mycred->euid) || |
| !uid_eq(pcred->euid, mycred->euid) || |
| !uid_eq(pcred->suid, mycred->euid) || |
| !gid_eq(pcred->gid, mycred->egid) || |
| !gid_eq(pcred->egid, mycred->egid) || |
| !gid_eq(pcred->sgid, mycred->egid)) |
| goto unlock; |
| |
| /* the keyrings must have the same UID */ |
| if ((pcred->session_keyring && |
| !uid_eq(pcred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) || |
| !uid_eq(mycred->session_keyring->uid, mycred->euid)) |
| goto unlock; |
| |
| /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */ |
| oldwork = task_work_cancel(parent, key_change_session_keyring); |
| |
| /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace |
| * restarting */ |
| ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, true); |
| if (!ret) |
| newwork = NULL; |
| unlock: |
| write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| if (oldwork) |
| put_cred(container_of(oldwork, struct cred, rcu)); |
| if (newwork) |
| put_cred(cred); |
| return ret; |
| |
| error_keyring: |
| key_ref_put(keyring_r); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The key control system call |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, |
| unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
| { |
| switch (option) { |
| case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID: |
| return keyctl_get_keyring_ID((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (int) arg3); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING: |
| return keyctl_join_session_keyring((const char __user *) arg2); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_UPDATE: |
| return keyctl_update_key((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (const void __user *) arg3, |
| (size_t) arg4); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_REVOKE: |
| return keyctl_revoke_key((key_serial_t) arg2); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE: |
| return keyctl_describe_key((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (char __user *) arg3, |
| (unsigned) arg4); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_CLEAR: |
| return keyctl_keyring_clear((key_serial_t) arg2); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_LINK: |
| return keyctl_keyring_link((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (key_serial_t) arg3); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_UNLINK: |
| return keyctl_keyring_unlink((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (key_serial_t) arg3); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_SEARCH: |
| return keyctl_keyring_search((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (const char __user *) arg3, |
| (const char __user *) arg4, |
| (key_serial_t) arg5); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_READ: |
| return keyctl_read_key((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (char __user *) arg3, |
| (size_t) arg4); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_CHOWN: |
| return keyctl_chown_key((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (uid_t) arg3, |
| (gid_t) arg4); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_SETPERM: |
| return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (key_perm_t) arg3); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE: |
| return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (const void __user *) arg3, |
| (size_t) arg4, |
| (key_serial_t) arg5); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_NEGATE: |
| return keyctl_negate_key((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (unsigned) arg3, |
| (key_serial_t) arg4); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING: |
| return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT: |
| return keyctl_set_timeout((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (unsigned) arg3); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY: |
| return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t) arg2); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY: |
| return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (char __user *) arg3, |
| (size_t) arg4); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT: |
| return keyctl_session_to_parent(); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_REJECT: |
| return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (unsigned) arg3, |
| (unsigned) arg4, |
| (key_serial_t) arg5); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV: |
| return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( |
| (key_serial_t) arg2, |
| (const struct iovec __user *) arg3, |
| (unsigned) arg4, |
| (key_serial_t) arg5); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_INVALIDATE: |
| return keyctl_invalidate_key((key_serial_t) arg2); |
| |
| case KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT: |
| return keyctl_get_persistent((uid_t)arg2, (key_serial_t)arg3); |
| |
| default: |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| } |
| } |