| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 |
| /* |
| * fs/verity/signature.c: verification of builtin signatures |
| * |
| * Copyright 2019 Google LLC |
| */ |
| |
| #include "fsverity_private.h" |
| |
| #include <linux/cred.h> |
| #include <linux/key.h> |
| #include <linux/slab.h> |
| #include <linux/verification.h> |
| |
| /* |
| * /proc/sys/fs/verity/require_signatures |
| * If 1, all verity files must have a valid builtin signature. |
| */ |
| static int fsverity_require_signatures; |
| |
| /* |
| * Keyring that contains the trusted X.509 certificates. |
| * |
| * Only root (kuid=0) can modify this. Also, root may use |
| * keyctl_restrict_keyring() to prevent any more additions. |
| */ |
| static struct key *fsverity_keyring; |
| |
| /** |
| * fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature |
| * @vi: the file's fsverity_info |
| * @desc: the file's fsverity_descriptor |
| * @desc_size: size of @desc |
| * |
| * If the file's fs-verity descriptor includes a signature of the file |
| * measurement, verify it against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. |
| * |
| * Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure |
| */ |
| int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi, |
| const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, |
| size_t desc_size) |
| { |
| const struct inode *inode = vi->inode; |
| const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg; |
| const u32 sig_size = le32_to_cpu(desc->sig_size); |
| struct fsverity_signed_digest *d; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (sig_size == 0) { |
| if (fsverity_require_signatures) { |
| fsverity_err(inode, |
| "require_signatures=1, rejecting unsigned file!"); |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (sig_size > desc_size - sizeof(*desc)) { |
| fsverity_err(inode, "Signature overflows verity descriptor"); |
| return -EBADMSG; |
| } |
| |
| if (fsverity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree == 0) { |
| /* |
| * The ".fs-verity" keyring is empty, due to builtin signatures |
| * being supported by the kernel but not actually being used. |
| * In this case, verify_pkcs7_signature() would always return an |
| * error, usually ENOKEY. It could also be EBADMSG if the |
| * PKCS#7 is malformed, but that isn't very important to |
| * distinguish. So, just skip to ENOKEY to avoid the attack |
| * surface of the PKCS#7 parser, which would otherwise be |
| * reachable by any task able to execute FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. |
| */ |
| fsverity_err(inode, |
| "fs-verity keyring is empty, rejecting signed file!"); |
| return -ENOKEY; |
| } |
| |
| d = kzalloc(sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); |
| if (!d) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| memcpy(d->magic, "FSVerity", 8); |
| d->digest_algorithm = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg - fsverity_hash_algs); |
| d->digest_size = cpu_to_le16(hash_alg->digest_size); |
| memcpy(d->digest, vi->measurement, hash_alg->digest_size); |
| |
| err = verify_pkcs7_signature(d, sizeof(*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, |
| desc->signature, sig_size, |
| fsverity_keyring, |
| VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, |
| NULL, NULL); |
| kfree(d); |
| |
| if (err) { |
| if (err == -ENOKEY) |
| fsverity_err(inode, |
| "File's signing cert isn't in the fs-verity keyring"); |
| else if (err == -EKEYREJECTED) |
| fsverity_err(inode, "Incorrect file signature"); |
| else if (err == -EBADMSG) |
| fsverity_err(inode, "Malformed file signature"); |
| else |
| fsverity_err(inode, "Error %d verifying file signature", |
| err); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| pr_debug("Valid signature for file measurement %s:%*phN\n", |
| hash_alg->name, hash_alg->digest_size, vi->measurement); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL |
| static struct ctl_table_header *fsverity_sysctl_header; |
| |
| static const struct ctl_path fsverity_sysctl_path[] = { |
| { .procname = "fs", }, |
| { .procname = "verity", }, |
| { } |
| }; |
| |
| /* shared constants to be used in various sysctls */ |
| static int sysctl_vals[] = { 0, 1, INT_MAX }; |
| |
| #define SYSCTL_ZERO ((void *)&sysctl_vals[0]) |
| #define SYSCTL_ONE ((void *)&sysctl_vals[1]) |
| #define SYSCTL_INT_MAX ((void *)&sysctl_vals[2]) |
| |
| static struct ctl_table fsverity_sysctl_table[] = { |
| { |
| .procname = "require_signatures", |
| .data = &fsverity_require_signatures, |
| .maxlen = sizeof(int), |
| .mode = 0644, |
| .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, |
| .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, |
| .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, |
| }, |
| { } |
| }; |
| |
| static int __init fsverity_sysctl_init(void) |
| { |
| fsverity_sysctl_header = register_sysctl_paths(fsverity_sysctl_path, |
| fsverity_sysctl_table); |
| if (!fsverity_sysctl_header) { |
| pr_err("sysctl registration failed!\n"); |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #else /* !CONFIG_SYSCTL */ |
| static inline int __init fsverity_sysctl_init(void) |
| { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* !CONFIG_SYSCTL */ |
| |
| int __init fsverity_init_signature(void) |
| { |
| struct key *ring; |
| int err; |
| |
| ring = keyring_alloc(".fs-verity", KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), |
| current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH | |
| KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | |
| KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SETATTR, |
| KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); |
| if (IS_ERR(ring)) |
| return PTR_ERR(ring); |
| |
| err = fsverity_sysctl_init(); |
| if (err) |
| goto err_put_ring; |
| |
| fsverity_keyring = ring; |
| return 0; |
| |
| err_put_ring: |
| key_put(ring); |
| return err; |
| } |