| /* |
| * linux/kernel/sys.c |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds |
| */ |
| |
| #include <linux/export.h> |
| #include <linux/mm.h> |
| #include <linux/utsname.h> |
| #include <linux/mman.h> |
| #include <linux/reboot.h> |
| #include <linux/prctl.h> |
| #include <linux/highuid.h> |
| #include <linux/fs.h> |
| #include <linux/kmod.h> |
| #include <linux/perf_event.h> |
| #include <linux/resource.h> |
| #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| #include <linux/kexec.h> |
| #include <linux/workqueue.h> |
| #include <linux/capability.h> |
| #include <linux/device.h> |
| #include <linux/key.h> |
| #include <linux/times.h> |
| #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
| #include <linux/security.h> |
| #include <linux/dcookies.h> |
| #include <linux/suspend.h> |
| #include <linux/tty.h> |
| #include <linux/signal.h> |
| #include <linux/cn_proc.h> |
| #include <linux/getcpu.h> |
| #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> |
| #include <linux/seccomp.h> |
| #include <linux/cpu.h> |
| #include <linux/personality.h> |
| #include <linux/ptrace.h> |
| #include <linux/fs_struct.h> |
| #include <linux/file.h> |
| #include <linux/mount.h> |
| #include <linux/gfp.h> |
| #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> |
| #include <linux/version.h> |
| #include <linux/ctype.h> |
| |
| #include <linux/compat.h> |
| #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
| #include <linux/kprobes.h> |
| #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
| #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
| |
| #include <linux/sched.h> |
| #include <linux/rcupdate.h> |
| #include <linux/uidgid.h> |
| #include <linux/cred.h> |
| |
| #include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> |
| /* Move somewhere else to avoid recompiling? */ |
| #include <generated/utsrelease.h> |
| |
| #include <asm/uaccess.h> |
| #include <asm/io.h> |
| #include <asm/unistd.h> |
| |
| #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL |
| # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef GET_UNALIGN_CTL |
| # define GET_UNALIGN_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SET_FPEMU_CTL |
| # define SET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef GET_FPEMU_CTL |
| # define GET_FPEMU_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SET_FPEXC_CTL |
| # define SET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef GET_FPEXC_CTL |
| # define GET_FPEXC_CTL(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef GET_ENDIAN |
| # define GET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SET_ENDIAN |
| # define SET_ENDIAN(a,b) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef GET_TSC_CTL |
| # define GET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL |
| # define SET_TSC_CTL(a) (-EINVAL) |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * this is where the system-wide overflow UID and GID are defined, for |
| * architectures that now have 32-bit UID/GID but didn't in the past |
| */ |
| |
| int overflowuid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWUID; |
| int overflowgid = DEFAULT_OVERFLOWGID; |
| |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowuid); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(overflowgid); |
| |
| /* |
| * the same as above, but for filesystems which can only store a 16-bit |
| * UID and GID. as such, this is needed on all architectures |
| */ |
| |
| int fs_overflowuid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
| int fs_overflowgid = DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWUID; |
| |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowuid); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(fs_overflowgid); |
| |
| /* |
| * this indicates whether you can reboot with ctrl-alt-del: the default is yes |
| */ |
| |
| int C_A_D = 1; |
| struct pid *cad_pid; |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(cad_pid); |
| |
| /* |
| * If set, this is used for preparing the system to power off. |
| */ |
| |
| void (*pm_power_off_prepare)(void); |
| |
| /* |
| * Returns true if current's euid is same as p's uid or euid, |
| * or has CAP_SYS_NICE to p's user_ns. |
| * |
| * Called with rcu_read_lock, creds are safe |
| */ |
| static bool set_one_prio_perm(struct task_struct *p) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred = __task_cred(p); |
| |
| if (uid_eq(pcred->uid, cred->euid) || |
| uid_eq(pcred->euid, cred->euid)) |
| return true; |
| if (ns_capable(pcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE)) |
| return true; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * set the priority of a task |
| * - the caller must hold the RCU read lock |
| */ |
| static int set_one_prio(struct task_struct *p, int niceval, int error) |
| { |
| int no_nice; |
| |
| if (!set_one_prio_perm(p)) { |
| error = -EPERM; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (niceval < task_nice(p) && !can_nice(p, niceval)) { |
| error = -EACCES; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| no_nice = security_task_setnice(p, niceval); |
| if (no_nice) { |
| error = no_nice; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (error == -ESRCH) |
| error = 0; |
| set_user_nice(p, niceval); |
| out: |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setpriority, int, which, int, who, int, niceval) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *g, *p; |
| struct user_struct *user; |
| const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| int error = -EINVAL; |
| struct pid *pgrp; |
| kuid_t uid; |
| |
| if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* normalize: avoid signed division (rounding problems) */ |
| error = -ESRCH; |
| if (niceval < -20) |
| niceval = -20; |
| if (niceval > 19) |
| niceval = 19; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
| switch (which) { |
| case PRIO_PROCESS: |
| if (who) |
| p = find_task_by_vpid(who); |
| else |
| p = current; |
| if (p) |
| error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
| break; |
| case PRIO_PGRP: |
| if (who) |
| pgrp = find_vpid(who); |
| else |
| pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
| do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
| error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
| } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
| break; |
| case PRIO_USER: |
| uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); |
| user = cred->user; |
| if (!who) |
| uid = cred->uid; |
| else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) && |
| !(user = find_user(uid))) |
| goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
| |
| do_each_thread(g, p) { |
| if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) |
| error = set_one_prio(p, niceval, error); |
| } while_each_thread(g, p); |
| if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) |
| free_uid(user); /* For find_user() */ |
| break; |
| } |
| out_unlock: |
| read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| out: |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Ugh. To avoid negative return values, "getpriority()" will |
| * not return the normal nice-value, but a negated value that |
| * has been offset by 20 (ie it returns 40..1 instead of -20..19) |
| * to stay compatible. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getpriority, int, which, int, who) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *g, *p; |
| struct user_struct *user; |
| const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| long niceval, retval = -ESRCH; |
| struct pid *pgrp; |
| kuid_t uid; |
| |
| if (which > PRIO_USER || which < PRIO_PROCESS) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
| switch (which) { |
| case PRIO_PROCESS: |
| if (who) |
| p = find_task_by_vpid(who); |
| else |
| p = current; |
| if (p) { |
| niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
| if (niceval > retval) |
| retval = niceval; |
| } |
| break; |
| case PRIO_PGRP: |
| if (who) |
| pgrp = find_vpid(who); |
| else |
| pgrp = task_pgrp(current); |
| do_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p) { |
| niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
| if (niceval > retval) |
| retval = niceval; |
| } while_each_pid_thread(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, p); |
| break; |
| case PRIO_USER: |
| uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, who); |
| user = cred->user; |
| if (!who) |
| uid = cred->uid; |
| else if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) && |
| !(user = find_user(uid))) |
| goto out_unlock; /* No processes for this user */ |
| |
| do_each_thread(g, p) { |
| if (uid_eq(task_uid(p), uid)) { |
| niceval = 20 - task_nice(p); |
| if (niceval > retval) |
| retval = niceval; |
| } |
| } while_each_thread(g, p); |
| if (!uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)) |
| free_uid(user); /* for find_user() */ |
| break; |
| } |
| out_unlock: |
| read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * emergency_restart - reboot the system |
| * |
| * Without shutting down any hardware or taking any locks |
| * reboot the system. This is called when we know we are in |
| * trouble so this is our best effort to reboot. This is |
| * safe to call in interrupt context. |
| */ |
| void emergency_restart(void) |
| { |
| kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_EMERG); |
| machine_emergency_restart(); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(emergency_restart); |
| |
| void kernel_restart_prepare(char *cmd) |
| { |
| blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, SYS_RESTART, cmd); |
| system_state = SYSTEM_RESTART; |
| usermodehelper_disable(); |
| device_shutdown(); |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * register_reboot_notifier - Register function to be called at reboot time |
| * @nb: Info about notifier function to be called |
| * |
| * Registers a function with the list of functions |
| * to be called at reboot time. |
| * |
| * Currently always returns zero, as blocking_notifier_chain_register() |
| * always returns zero. |
| */ |
| int register_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) |
| { |
| return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&reboot_notifier_list, nb); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_reboot_notifier); |
| |
| /** |
| * unregister_reboot_notifier - Unregister previously registered reboot notifier |
| * @nb: Hook to be unregistered |
| * |
| * Unregisters a previously registered reboot |
| * notifier function. |
| * |
| * Returns zero on success, or %-ENOENT on failure. |
| */ |
| int unregister_reboot_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) |
| { |
| return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&reboot_notifier_list, nb); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_reboot_notifier); |
| |
| /** |
| * kernel_restart - reboot the system |
| * @cmd: pointer to buffer containing command to execute for restart |
| * or %NULL |
| * |
| * Shutdown everything and perform a clean reboot. |
| * This is not safe to call in interrupt context. |
| */ |
| void kernel_restart(char *cmd) |
| { |
| kernel_restart_prepare(cmd); |
| disable_nonboot_cpus(); |
| syscore_shutdown(); |
| if (!cmd) |
| printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system.\n"); |
| else |
| printk(KERN_EMERG "Restarting system with command '%s'.\n", cmd); |
| kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_RESTART); |
| machine_restart(cmd); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_restart); |
| |
| static void kernel_shutdown_prepare(enum system_states state) |
| { |
| blocking_notifier_call_chain(&reboot_notifier_list, |
| (state == SYSTEM_HALT)?SYS_HALT:SYS_POWER_OFF, NULL); |
| system_state = state; |
| usermodehelper_disable(); |
| device_shutdown(); |
| } |
| /** |
| * kernel_halt - halt the system |
| * |
| * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system halt. |
| */ |
| void kernel_halt(void) |
| { |
| kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_HALT); |
| disable_nonboot_cpus(); |
| syscore_shutdown(); |
| printk(KERN_EMERG "System halted.\n"); |
| kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_HALT); |
| machine_halt(); |
| } |
| |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_halt); |
| |
| /** |
| * kernel_power_off - power_off the system |
| * |
| * Shutdown everything and perform a clean system power_off. |
| */ |
| void kernel_power_off(void) |
| { |
| kernel_shutdown_prepare(SYSTEM_POWER_OFF); |
| if (pm_power_off_prepare) |
| pm_power_off_prepare(); |
| disable_nonboot_cpus(); |
| syscore_shutdown(); |
| printk(KERN_EMERG "Power down.\n"); |
| kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_POWEROFF); |
| machine_power_off(); |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_power_off); |
| |
| static DEFINE_MUTEX(reboot_mutex); |
| |
| /* |
| * Reboot system call: for obvious reasons only root may call it, |
| * and even root needs to set up some magic numbers in the registers |
| * so that some mistake won't make this reboot the whole machine. |
| * You can also set the meaning of the ctrl-alt-del-key here. |
| * |
| * reboot doesn't sync: do that yourself before calling this. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE4(reboot, int, magic1, int, magic2, unsigned int, cmd, |
| void __user *, arg) |
| { |
| struct pid_namespace *pid_ns = task_active_pid_ns(current); |
| char buffer[256]; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ |
| if (!ns_capable(pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_BOOT)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| /* For safety, we require "magic" arguments. */ |
| if (magic1 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC1 || |
| (magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2 && |
| magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2A && |
| magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2B && |
| magic2 != LINUX_REBOOT_MAGIC2C)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| /* |
| * If pid namespaces are enabled and the current task is in a child |
| * pid_namespace, the command is handled by reboot_pid_ns() which will |
| * call do_exit(). |
| */ |
| ret = reboot_pid_ns(pid_ns, cmd); |
| if (ret) |
| return ret; |
| |
| /* Instead of trying to make the power_off code look like |
| * halt when pm_power_off is not set do it the easy way. |
| */ |
| if ((cmd == LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF) && !pm_power_off) |
| cmd = LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT; |
| |
| mutex_lock(&reboot_mutex); |
| switch (cmd) { |
| case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART: |
| kernel_restart(NULL); |
| break; |
| |
| case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_ON: |
| C_A_D = 1; |
| break; |
| |
| case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_CAD_OFF: |
| C_A_D = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_HALT: |
| kernel_halt(); |
| do_exit(0); |
| panic("cannot halt"); |
| |
| case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_POWER_OFF: |
| kernel_power_off(); |
| do_exit(0); |
| break; |
| |
| case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_RESTART2: |
| if (strncpy_from_user(&buffer[0], arg, sizeof(buffer) - 1) < 0) { |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| break; |
| } |
| buffer[sizeof(buffer) - 1] = '\0'; |
| |
| kernel_restart(buffer); |
| break; |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC |
| case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_KEXEC: |
| ret = kernel_kexec(); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION |
| case LINUX_REBOOT_CMD_SW_SUSPEND: |
| ret = hibernate(); |
| break; |
| #endif |
| |
| default: |
| ret = -EINVAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| mutex_unlock(&reboot_mutex); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static void deferred_cad(struct work_struct *dummy) |
| { |
| kernel_restart(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function gets called by ctrl-alt-del - ie the keyboard interrupt. |
| * As it's called within an interrupt, it may NOT sync: the only choice |
| * is whether to reboot at once, or just ignore the ctrl-alt-del. |
| */ |
| void ctrl_alt_del(void) |
| { |
| static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad); |
| |
| if (C_A_D) |
| schedule_work(&cad_work); |
| else |
| kill_cad_pid(SIGINT, 1); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Unprivileged users may change the real gid to the effective gid |
| * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
| * |
| * If you set the real gid at all, or set the effective gid to a value not |
| * equal to the real gid, then the saved gid is set to the new effective gid. |
| * |
| * This makes it possible for a setgid program to completely drop its |
| * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
| * a security audit over a program. |
| * |
| * The general idea is that a program which uses just setregid() will be |
| * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setgid() will be |
| * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
| * |
| * SMP: There are not races, the GIDs are checked only by filesystem |
| * operations (as far as semantic preservation is concerned). |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setregid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid) |
| { |
| struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| const struct cred *old; |
| struct cred *new; |
| int retval; |
| kgid_t krgid, kegid; |
| |
| krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); |
| kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); |
| |
| if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| old = current_cred(); |
| |
| retval = -EPERM; |
| if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) { |
| if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) || |
| gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) || |
| nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) |
| new->gid = krgid; |
| else |
| goto error; |
| } |
| if (egid != (gid_t) -1) { |
| if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) || |
| gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) || |
| gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) || |
| nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) |
| new->egid = kegid; |
| else |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 || |
| (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid))) |
| new->sgid = new->egid; |
| new->fsgid = new->egid; |
| |
| return commit_creds(new); |
| |
| error: |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * setgid() is implemented like SysV w/ SAVED_IDS |
| * |
| * SMP: Same implicit races as above. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setgid, gid_t, gid) |
| { |
| struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| const struct cred *old; |
| struct cred *new; |
| int retval; |
| kgid_t kgid; |
| |
| kgid = make_kgid(ns, gid); |
| if (!gid_valid(kgid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| old = current_cred(); |
| |
| retval = -EPERM; |
| if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) |
| new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
| else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid)) |
| new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid; |
| else |
| goto error; |
| |
| return commit_creds(new); |
| |
| error: |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * change the user struct in a credentials set to match the new UID |
| */ |
| static int set_user(struct cred *new) |
| { |
| struct user_struct *new_user; |
| |
| new_user = alloc_uid(new->uid); |
| if (!new_user) |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| |
| /* |
| * We don't fail in case of NPROC limit excess here because too many |
| * poorly written programs don't check set*uid() return code, assuming |
| * it never fails if called by root. We may still enforce NPROC limit |
| * for programs doing set*uid()+execve() by harmlessly deferring the |
| * failure to the execve() stage. |
| */ |
| if (atomic_read(&new_user->processes) >= rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) && |
| new_user != INIT_USER) |
| current->flags |= PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
| else |
| current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED; |
| |
| free_uid(new->user); |
| new->user = new_user; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Unprivileged users may change the real uid to the effective uid |
| * or vice versa. (BSD-style) |
| * |
| * If you set the real uid at all, or set the effective uid to a value not |
| * equal to the real uid, then the saved uid is set to the new effective uid. |
| * |
| * This makes it possible for a setuid program to completely drop its |
| * privileges, which is often a useful assertion to make when you are doing |
| * a security audit over a program. |
| * |
| * The general idea is that a program which uses just setreuid() will be |
| * 100% compatible with BSD. A program which uses just setuid() will be |
| * 100% compatible with POSIX with saved IDs. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setreuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid) |
| { |
| struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| const struct cred *old; |
| struct cred *new; |
| int retval; |
| kuid_t kruid, keuid; |
| |
| kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); |
| keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); |
| |
| if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| old = current_cred(); |
| |
| retval = -EPERM; |
| if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
| new->uid = kruid; |
| if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) && |
| !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) && |
| !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| if (euid != (uid_t) -1) { |
| new->euid = keuid; |
| if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) && |
| !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) && |
| !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) && |
| !nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid)) { |
| retval = set_user(new); |
| if (retval < 0) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 || |
| (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid))) |
| new->suid = new->euid; |
| new->fsuid = new->euid; |
| |
| retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE); |
| if (retval < 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| return commit_creds(new); |
| |
| error: |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * setuid() is implemented like SysV with SAVED_IDS |
| * |
| * Note that SAVED_ID's is deficient in that a setuid root program |
| * like sendmail, for example, cannot set its uid to be a normal |
| * user and then switch back, because if you're root, setuid() sets |
| * the saved uid too. If you don't like this, blame the bright people |
| * in the POSIX committee and/or USG. Note that the BSD-style setreuid() |
| * will allow a root program to temporarily drop privileges and be able to |
| * regain them by swapping the real and effective uid. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setuid, uid_t, uid) |
| { |
| struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| const struct cred *old; |
| struct cred *new; |
| int retval; |
| kuid_t kuid; |
| |
| kuid = make_kuid(ns, uid); |
| if (!uid_valid(kuid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| old = current_cred(); |
| |
| retval = -EPERM; |
| if (nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) { |
| new->suid = new->uid = kuid; |
| if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) { |
| retval = set_user(new); |
| if (retval < 0) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } else if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) && !uid_eq(kuid, new->suid)) { |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| new->fsuid = new->euid = kuid; |
| |
| retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID); |
| if (retval < 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| return commit_creds(new); |
| |
| error: |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * This function implements a generic ability to update ruid, euid, |
| * and suid. This allows you to implement the 4.4 compatible seteuid(). |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresuid, uid_t, ruid, uid_t, euid, uid_t, suid) |
| { |
| struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| const struct cred *old; |
| struct cred *new; |
| int retval; |
| kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid; |
| |
| kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid); |
| keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid); |
| ksuid = make_kuid(ns, suid); |
| |
| if ((ruid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(kruid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| if ((euid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(keuid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| old = current_cred(); |
| |
| retval = -EPERM; |
| if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) { |
| if (ruid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) && |
| !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid)) |
| goto error; |
| if (euid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) && |
| !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid)) |
| goto error; |
| if (suid != (uid_t) -1 && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) && |
| !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) { |
| new->uid = kruid; |
| if (!uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) { |
| retval = set_user(new); |
| if (retval < 0) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } |
| if (euid != (uid_t) -1) |
| new->euid = keuid; |
| if (suid != (uid_t) -1) |
| new->suid = ksuid; |
| new->fsuid = new->euid; |
| |
| retval = security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES); |
| if (retval < 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| return commit_creds(new); |
| |
| error: |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| int retval; |
| uid_t ruid, euid, suid; |
| |
| ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid); |
| euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid); |
| suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid); |
| |
| if (!(retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp)) && |
| !(retval = put_user(euid, euidp))) |
| retval = put_user(suid, suidp); |
| |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Same as above, but for rgid, egid, sgid. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE3(setresgid, gid_t, rgid, gid_t, egid, gid_t, sgid) |
| { |
| struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); |
| const struct cred *old; |
| struct cred *new; |
| int retval; |
| kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid; |
| |
| krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid); |
| kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid); |
| ksgid = make_kgid(ns, sgid); |
| |
| if ((rgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(krgid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if ((egid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(kegid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| old = current_cred(); |
| |
| retval = -EPERM; |
| if (!nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) { |
| if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) && |
| !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid)) |
| goto error; |
| if (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) && |
| !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid)) |
| goto error; |
| if (sgid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) && |
| !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) |
| new->gid = krgid; |
| if (egid != (gid_t) -1) |
| new->egid = kegid; |
| if (sgid != (gid_t) -1) |
| new->sgid = ksgid; |
| new->fsgid = new->egid; |
| |
| return commit_creds(new); |
| |
| error: |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresgid, gid_t __user *, rgidp, gid_t __user *, egidp, gid_t __user *, sgidp) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| int retval; |
| gid_t rgid, egid, sgid; |
| |
| rgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->gid); |
| egid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->egid); |
| sgid = from_kgid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->sgid); |
| |
| if (!(retval = put_user(rgid, rgidp)) && |
| !(retval = put_user(egid, egidp))) |
| retval = put_user(sgid, sgidp); |
| |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * "setfsuid()" sets the fsuid - the uid used for filesystem checks. This |
| * is used for "access()" and for the NFS daemon (letting nfsd stay at |
| * whatever uid it wants to). It normally shadows "euid", except when |
| * explicitly set by setfsuid() or for access.. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsuid, uid_t, uid) |
| { |
| const struct cred *old; |
| struct cred *new; |
| uid_t old_fsuid; |
| kuid_t kuid; |
| |
| old = current_cred(); |
| old_fsuid = from_kuid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsuid); |
| |
| kuid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, uid); |
| if (!uid_valid(kuid)) |
| return old_fsuid; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return old_fsuid; |
| |
| if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid) || |
| uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) || |
| nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) { |
| if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) { |
| new->fsuid = kuid; |
| if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0) |
| goto change_okay; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return old_fsuid; |
| |
| change_okay: |
| commit_creds(new); |
| return old_fsuid; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Samma på svenska.. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(setfsgid, gid_t, gid) |
| { |
| const struct cred *old; |
| struct cred *new; |
| gid_t old_fsgid; |
| kgid_t kgid; |
| |
| old = current_cred(); |
| old_fsgid = from_kgid_munged(old->user_ns, old->fsgid); |
| |
| kgid = make_kgid(old->user_ns, gid); |
| if (!gid_valid(kgid)) |
| return old_fsgid; |
| |
| new = prepare_creds(); |
| if (!new) |
| return old_fsgid; |
| |
| if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid) || |
| gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) || |
| nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID)) { |
| if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) { |
| new->fsgid = kgid; |
| goto change_okay; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| abort_creds(new); |
| return old_fsgid; |
| |
| change_okay: |
| commit_creds(new); |
| return old_fsgid; |
| } |
| |
| /** |
| * sys_getpid - return the thread group id of the current process |
| * |
| * Note, despite the name, this returns the tgid not the pid. The tgid and |
| * the pid are identical unless CLONE_THREAD was specified on clone() in |
| * which case the tgid is the same in all threads of the same group. |
| * |
| * This is SMP safe as current->tgid does not change. |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpid) |
| { |
| return task_tgid_vnr(current); |
| } |
| |
| /* Thread ID - the internal kernel "pid" */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(gettid) |
| { |
| return task_pid_vnr(current); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Accessing ->real_parent is not SMP-safe, it could |
| * change from under us. However, we can use a stale |
| * value of ->real_parent under rcu_read_lock(), see |
| * release_task()->call_rcu(delayed_put_task_struct). |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getppid) |
| { |
| int pid; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| pid = task_tgid_vnr(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent)); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| |
| return pid; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getuid) |
| { |
| /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
| return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid()); |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(geteuid) |
| { |
| /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
| return from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_euid()); |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getgid) |
| { |
| /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
| return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_gid()); |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getegid) |
| { |
| /* Only we change this so SMP safe */ |
| return from_kgid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_egid()); |
| } |
| |
| void do_sys_times(struct tms *tms) |
| { |
| cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, cutime, cstime; |
| |
| spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| thread_group_cputime_adjusted(current, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
| cutime = current->signal->cutime; |
| cstime = current->signal->cstime; |
| spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| tms->tms_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgutime); |
| tms->tms_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(tgstime); |
| tms->tms_cutime = cputime_to_clock_t(cutime); |
| tms->tms_cstime = cputime_to_clock_t(cstime); |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(times, struct tms __user *, tbuf) |
| { |
| if (tbuf) { |
| struct tms tmp; |
| |
| do_sys_times(&tmp); |
| if (copy_to_user(tbuf, &tmp, sizeof(struct tms))) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| } |
| force_successful_syscall_return(); |
| return (long) jiffies_64_to_clock_t(get_jiffies_64()); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This needs some heavy checking ... |
| * I just haven't the stomach for it. I also don't fully |
| * understand sessions/pgrp etc. Let somebody who does explain it. |
| * |
| * OK, I think I have the protection semantics right.... this is really |
| * only important on a multi-user system anyway, to make sure one user |
| * can't send a signal to a process owned by another. -TYT, 12/12/91 |
| * |
| * Auch. Had to add the 'did_exec' flag to conform completely to POSIX. |
| * LBT 04.03.94 |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setpgid, pid_t, pid, pid_t, pgid) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *p; |
| struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
| struct pid *pgrp; |
| int err; |
| |
| if (!pid) |
| pid = task_pid_vnr(group_leader); |
| if (!pgid) |
| pgid = pid; |
| if (pgid < 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| |
| /* From this point forward we keep holding onto the tasklist lock |
| * so that our parent does not change from under us. -DaveM |
| */ |
| write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| |
| err = -ESRCH; |
| p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
| if (!p) |
| goto out; |
| |
| err = -EINVAL; |
| if (!thread_group_leader(p)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (same_thread_group(p->real_parent, group_leader)) { |
| err = -EPERM; |
| if (task_session(p) != task_session(group_leader)) |
| goto out; |
| err = -EACCES; |
| if (p->did_exec) |
| goto out; |
| } else { |
| err = -ESRCH; |
| if (p != group_leader) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| err = -EPERM; |
| if (p->signal->leader) |
| goto out; |
| |
| pgrp = task_pid(p); |
| if (pgid != pid) { |
| struct task_struct *g; |
| |
| pgrp = find_vpid(pgid); |
| g = pid_task(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID); |
| if (!g || task_session(g) != task_session(group_leader)) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| err = security_task_setpgid(p, pgid); |
| if (err) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (task_pgrp(p) != pgrp) |
| change_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, pgrp); |
| |
| err = 0; |
| out: |
| /* All paths lead to here, thus we are safe. -DaveM */ |
| write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getpgid, pid_t, pid) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *p; |
| struct pid *grp; |
| int retval; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| if (!pid) |
| grp = task_pgrp(current); |
| else { |
| retval = -ESRCH; |
| p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
| if (!p) |
| goto out; |
| grp = task_pgrp(p); |
| if (!grp) |
| goto out; |
| |
| retval = security_task_getpgid(p); |
| if (retval) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| retval = pid_vnr(grp); |
| out: |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETPGRP |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(getpgrp) |
| { |
| return sys_getpgid(0); |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *p; |
| struct pid *sid; |
| int retval; |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| if (!pid) |
| sid = task_session(current); |
| else { |
| retval = -ESRCH; |
| p = find_task_by_vpid(pid); |
| if (!p) |
| goto out; |
| sid = task_session(p); |
| if (!sid) |
| goto out; |
| |
| retval = security_task_getsid(p); |
| if (retval) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| retval = pid_vnr(sid); |
| out: |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader; |
| struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader); |
| pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid); |
| int err = -EPERM; |
| |
| write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| /* Fail if I am already a session leader */ |
| if (group_leader->signal->leader) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the |
| * proposed session id. |
| */ |
| if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID)) |
| goto out; |
| |
| group_leader->signal->leader = 1; |
| __set_special_pids(sid); |
| |
| proc_clear_tty(group_leader); |
| |
| err = session; |
| out: |
| write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock); |
| if (err > 0) { |
| proc_sid_connector(group_leader); |
| sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader); |
| } |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| DECLARE_RWSEM(uts_sem); |
| |
| #ifdef COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE |
| #define override_architecture(name) \ |
| (personality(current->personality) == PER_LINUX32 && \ |
| copy_to_user(name->machine, COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE, \ |
| sizeof(COMPAT_UTS_MACHINE))) |
| #else |
| #define override_architecture(name) 0 |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0". |
| * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40 |
| */ |
| static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| if (current->personality & UNAME26) { |
| const char *rest = UTS_RELEASE; |
| char buf[65] = { 0 }; |
| int ndots = 0; |
| unsigned v; |
| size_t copy; |
| |
| while (*rest) { |
| if (*rest == '.' && ++ndots >= 3) |
| break; |
| if (!isdigit(*rest) && *rest != '.') |
| break; |
| rest++; |
| } |
| v = ((LINUX_VERSION_CODE >> 8) & 0xff) + 40; |
| copy = clamp_t(size_t, len, 1, sizeof(buf)); |
| copy = scnprintf(buf, copy, "2.6.%u%s", v, rest); |
| ret = copy_to_user(release, buf, copy + 1); |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(newuname, struct new_utsname __user *, name) |
| { |
| int errno = 0; |
| |
| down_read(&uts_sem); |
| if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof *name)) |
| errno = -EFAULT; |
| up_read(&uts_sem); |
| |
| if (!errno && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
| errno = -EFAULT; |
| if (!errno && override_architecture(name)) |
| errno = -EFAULT; |
| return errno; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_UNAME |
| /* |
| * Old cruft |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name) |
| { |
| int error = 0; |
| |
| if (!name) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| |
| down_read(&uts_sem); |
| if (copy_to_user(name, utsname(), sizeof(*name))) |
| error = -EFAULT; |
| up_read(&uts_sem); |
| |
| if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
| error = -EFAULT; |
| if (!error && override_architecture(name)) |
| error = -EFAULT; |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name) |
| { |
| int error; |
| |
| if (!name) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, sizeof(struct oldold_utsname))) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| |
| down_read(&uts_sem); |
| error = __copy_to_user(&name->sysname, &utsname()->sysname, |
| __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __put_user(0, name->sysname + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __copy_to_user(&name->nodename, &utsname()->nodename, |
| __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __put_user(0, name->nodename + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __copy_to_user(&name->release, &utsname()->release, |
| __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __put_user(0, name->release + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __copy_to_user(&name->version, &utsname()->version, |
| __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __put_user(0, name->version + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __copy_to_user(&name->machine, &utsname()->machine, |
| __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| error |= __put_user(0, name->machine + __OLD_UTS_LEN); |
| up_read(&uts_sem); |
| |
| if (!error && override_architecture(name)) |
| error = -EFAULT; |
| if (!error && override_release(name->release, sizeof(name->release))) |
| error = -EFAULT; |
| return error ? -EFAULT : 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
| { |
| int errno; |
| char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
| |
| if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| down_write(&uts_sem); |
| errno = -EFAULT; |
| if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
| struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); |
| |
| memcpy(u->nodename, tmp, len); |
| memset(u->nodename + len, 0, sizeof(u->nodename) - len); |
| errno = 0; |
| uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_HOSTNAME); |
| } |
| up_write(&uts_sem); |
| return errno; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_GETHOSTNAME |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(gethostname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
| { |
| int i, errno; |
| struct new_utsname *u; |
| |
| if (len < 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| down_read(&uts_sem); |
| u = utsname(); |
| i = 1 + strlen(u->nodename); |
| if (i > len) |
| i = len; |
| errno = 0; |
| if (copy_to_user(name, u->nodename, i)) |
| errno = -EFAULT; |
| up_read(&uts_sem); |
| return errno; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Only setdomainname; getdomainname can be implemented by calling |
| * uname() |
| */ |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setdomainname, char __user *, name, int, len) |
| { |
| int errno; |
| char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN]; |
| |
| if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| down_write(&uts_sem); |
| errno = -EFAULT; |
| if (!copy_from_user(tmp, name, len)) { |
| struct new_utsname *u = utsname(); |
| |
| memcpy(u->domainname, tmp, len); |
| memset(u->domainname + len, 0, sizeof(u->domainname) - len); |
| errno = 0; |
| uts_proc_notify(UTS_PROC_DOMAINNAME); |
| } |
| up_write(&uts_sem); |
| return errno; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
| { |
| struct rlimit value; |
| int ret; |
| |
| ret = do_prlimit(current, resource, NULL, &value); |
| if (!ret) |
| ret = copy_to_user(rlim, &value, sizeof(*rlim)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT |
| |
| /* |
| * Back compatibility for getrlimit. Needed for some apps. |
| */ |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(old_getrlimit, unsigned int, resource, |
| struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
| { |
| struct rlimit x; |
| if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| task_lock(current->group_leader); |
| x = current->signal->rlim[resource]; |
| task_unlock(current->group_leader); |
| if (x.rlim_cur > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
| x.rlim_cur = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
| if (x.rlim_max > 0x7FFFFFFF) |
| x.rlim_max = 0x7FFFFFFF; |
| return copy_to_user(rlim, &x, sizeof(x))?-EFAULT:0; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| static inline bool rlim64_is_infinity(__u64 rlim64) |
| { |
| #if BITS_PER_LONG < 64 |
| return rlim64 >= ULONG_MAX; |
| #else |
| return rlim64 == RLIM64_INFINITY; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static void rlim_to_rlim64(const struct rlimit *rlim, struct rlimit64 *rlim64) |
| { |
| if (rlim->rlim_cur == RLIM_INFINITY) |
| rlim64->rlim_cur = RLIM64_INFINITY; |
| else |
| rlim64->rlim_cur = rlim->rlim_cur; |
| if (rlim->rlim_max == RLIM_INFINITY) |
| rlim64->rlim_max = RLIM64_INFINITY; |
| else |
| rlim64->rlim_max = rlim->rlim_max; |
| } |
| |
| static void rlim64_to_rlim(const struct rlimit64 *rlim64, struct rlimit *rlim) |
| { |
| if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_cur)) |
| rlim->rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY; |
| else |
| rlim->rlim_cur = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_cur; |
| if (rlim64_is_infinity(rlim64->rlim_max)) |
| rlim->rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY; |
| else |
| rlim->rlim_max = (unsigned long)rlim64->rlim_max; |
| } |
| |
| /* make sure you are allowed to change @tsk limits before calling this */ |
| int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource, |
| struct rlimit *new_rlim, struct rlimit *old_rlim) |
| { |
| struct rlimit *rlim; |
| int retval = 0; |
| |
| if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (new_rlim) { |
| if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (resource == RLIMIT_NOFILE && |
| new_rlim->rlim_max > sysctl_nr_open) |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| |
| /* protect tsk->signal and tsk->sighand from disappearing */ |
| read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
| if (!tsk->sighand) { |
| retval = -ESRCH; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource; |
| task_lock(tsk->group_leader); |
| if (new_rlim) { |
| /* Keep the capable check against init_user_ns until |
| cgroups can contain all limits */ |
| if (new_rlim->rlim_max > rlim->rlim_max && |
| !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
| retval = -EPERM; |
| if (!retval) |
| retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk->group_leader, |
| resource, new_rlim); |
| if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) { |
| /* |
| * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU |
| * expiry. But we use the zero value to mean "it was |
| * never set". So let's cheat and make it one second |
| * instead |
| */ |
| new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!retval) { |
| if (old_rlim) |
| *old_rlim = *rlim; |
| if (new_rlim) |
| *rlim = *new_rlim; |
| } |
| task_unlock(tsk->group_leader); |
| |
| /* |
| * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Note that the kernel fails to return an error |
| * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU. This is a |
| * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of |
| * applications, so we live with it |
| */ |
| if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU && |
| new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) |
| update_rlimit_cpu(tsk, new_rlim->rlim_cur); |
| out: |
| read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| /* rcu lock must be held */ |
| static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task) |
| { |
| const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred; |
| |
| if (current == task) |
| return 0; |
| |
| tcred = __task_cred(task); |
| if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) && |
| uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) && |
| uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid) && |
| gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) && |
| gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) && |
| gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid)) |
| return 0; |
| if (ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return -EPERM; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource, |
| const struct rlimit64 __user *, new_rlim, |
| struct rlimit64 __user *, old_rlim) |
| { |
| struct rlimit64 old64, new64; |
| struct rlimit old, new; |
| struct task_struct *tsk; |
| int ret; |
| |
| if (new_rlim) { |
| if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64))) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new); |
| } |
| |
| rcu_read_lock(); |
| tsk = pid ? find_task_by_vpid(pid) : current; |
| if (!tsk) { |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return -ESRCH; |
| } |
| ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk); |
| if (ret) { |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| get_task_struct(tsk); |
| rcu_read_unlock(); |
| |
| ret = do_prlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim ? &new : NULL, |
| old_rlim ? &old : NULL); |
| |
| if (!ret && old_rlim) { |
| rlim_to_rlim64(&old, &old64); |
| if (copy_to_user(old_rlim, &old64, sizeof(old64))) |
| ret = -EFAULT; |
| } |
| |
| put_task_struct(tsk); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setrlimit, unsigned int, resource, struct rlimit __user *, rlim) |
| { |
| struct rlimit new_rlim; |
| |
| if (copy_from_user(&new_rlim, rlim, sizeof(*rlim))) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| return do_prlimit(current, resource, &new_rlim, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * It would make sense to put struct rusage in the task_struct, |
| * except that would make the task_struct be *really big*. After |
| * task_struct gets moved into malloc'ed memory, it would |
| * make sense to do this. It will make moving the rest of the information |
| * a lot simpler! (Which we're not doing right now because we're not |
| * measuring them yet). |
| * |
| * When sampling multiple threads for RUSAGE_SELF, under SMP we might have |
| * races with threads incrementing their own counters. But since word |
| * reads are atomic, we either get new values or old values and we don't |
| * care which for the sums. We always take the siglock to protect reading |
| * the c* fields from p->signal from races with exit.c updating those |
| * fields when reaping, so a sample either gets all the additions of a |
| * given child after it's reaped, or none so this sample is before reaping. |
| * |
| * Locking: |
| * We need to take the siglock for CHILDEREN, SELF and BOTH |
| * for the cases current multithreaded, non-current single threaded |
| * non-current multithreaded. Thread traversal is now safe with |
| * the siglock held. |
| * Strictly speaking, we donot need to take the siglock if we are current and |
| * single threaded, as no one else can take our signal_struct away, no one |
| * else can reap the children to update signal->c* counters, and no one else |
| * can race with the signal-> fields. If we do not take any lock, the |
| * signal-> fields could be read out of order while another thread was just |
| * exiting. So we should place a read memory barrier when we avoid the lock. |
| * On the writer side, write memory barrier is implied in __exit_signal |
| * as __exit_signal releases the siglock spinlock after updating the signal-> |
| * fields. But we don't do this yet to keep things simple. |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| static void accumulate_thread_rusage(struct task_struct *t, struct rusage *r) |
| { |
| r->ru_nvcsw += t->nvcsw; |
| r->ru_nivcsw += t->nivcsw; |
| r->ru_minflt += t->min_flt; |
| r->ru_majflt += t->maj_flt; |
| r->ru_inblock += task_io_get_inblock(t); |
| r->ru_oublock += task_io_get_oublock(t); |
| } |
| |
| static void k_getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage *r) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *t; |
| unsigned long flags; |
| cputime_t tgutime, tgstime, utime, stime; |
| unsigned long maxrss = 0; |
| |
| memset((char *) r, 0, sizeof *r); |
| utime = stime = 0; |
| |
| if (who == RUSAGE_THREAD) { |
| task_cputime_adjusted(current, &utime, &stime); |
| accumulate_thread_rusage(p, r); |
| maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (!lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) |
| return; |
| |
| switch (who) { |
| case RUSAGE_BOTH: |
| case RUSAGE_CHILDREN: |
| utime = p->signal->cutime; |
| stime = p->signal->cstime; |
| r->ru_nvcsw = p->signal->cnvcsw; |
| r->ru_nivcsw = p->signal->cnivcsw; |
| r->ru_minflt = p->signal->cmin_flt; |
| r->ru_majflt = p->signal->cmaj_flt; |
| r->ru_inblock = p->signal->cinblock; |
| r->ru_oublock = p->signal->coublock; |
| maxrss = p->signal->cmaxrss; |
| |
| if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN) |
| break; |
| |
| case RUSAGE_SELF: |
| thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime); |
| utime += tgutime; |
| stime += tgstime; |
| r->ru_nvcsw += p->signal->nvcsw; |
| r->ru_nivcsw += p->signal->nivcsw; |
| r->ru_minflt += p->signal->min_flt; |
| r->ru_majflt += p->signal->maj_flt; |
| r->ru_inblock += p->signal->inblock; |
| r->ru_oublock += p->signal->oublock; |
| if (maxrss < p->signal->maxrss) |
| maxrss = p->signal->maxrss; |
| t = p; |
| do { |
| accumulate_thread_rusage(t, r); |
| t = next_thread(t); |
| } while (t != p); |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| BUG(); |
| } |
| unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags); |
| |
| out: |
| cputime_to_timeval(utime, &r->ru_utime); |
| cputime_to_timeval(stime, &r->ru_stime); |
| |
| if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) { |
| struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p); |
| if (mm) { |
| setmax_mm_hiwater_rss(&maxrss, mm); |
| mmput(mm); |
| } |
| } |
| r->ru_maxrss = maxrss * (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* convert pages to KBs */ |
| } |
| |
| int getrusage(struct task_struct *p, int who, struct rusage __user *ru) |
| { |
| struct rusage r; |
| k_getrusage(p, who, &r); |
| return copy_to_user(ru, &r, sizeof(r)) ? -EFAULT : 0; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct rusage __user *, ru) |
| { |
| if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
| who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| return getrusage(current, who, ru); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
| COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(getrusage, int, who, struct compat_rusage __user *, ru) |
| { |
| struct rusage r; |
| |
| if (who != RUSAGE_SELF && who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN && |
| who != RUSAGE_THREAD) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| k_getrusage(current, who, &r); |
| return put_compat_rusage(&r, ru); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask) |
| { |
| mask = xchg(¤t->fs->umask, mask & S_IRWXUGO); |
| return mask; |
| } |
| |
| static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd) |
| { |
| struct fd exe; |
| struct inode *inode; |
| int err; |
| |
| exe = fdget(fd); |
| if (!exe.file) |
| return -EBADF; |
| |
| inode = file_inode(exe.file); |
| |
| /* |
| * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make |
| * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an |
| * overall picture. |
| */ |
| err = -EACCES; |
| if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || |
| exe.file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); |
| if (err) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); |
| |
| /* |
| * Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped. |
| */ |
| err = -EBUSY; |
| if (mm->exe_file) { |
| struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
| |
| for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) |
| if (vma->vm_file && |
| path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path, |
| &mm->exe_file->f_path)) |
| goto exit_unlock; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The symlink can be changed only once, just to disallow arbitrary |
| * transitions malicious software might bring in. This means one |
| * could make a snapshot over all processes running and monitor |
| * /proc/pid/exe changes to notice unusual activity if needed. |
| */ |
| err = -EPERM; |
| if (test_and_set_bit(MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED, &mm->flags)) |
| goto exit_unlock; |
| |
| err = 0; |
| set_mm_exe_file(mm, exe.file); /* this grabs a reference to exe.file */ |
| exit_unlock: |
| up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); |
| |
| exit: |
| fdput(exe); |
| return err; |
| } |
| |
| static int prctl_set_mm(int opt, unsigned long addr, |
| unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
| { |
| unsigned long rlim = rlimit(RLIMIT_DATA); |
| struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; |
| struct vm_area_struct *vma; |
| int error; |
| |
| if (arg5 || (arg4 && opt != PR_SET_MM_AUXV)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)) |
| return -EPERM; |
| |
| if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE) |
| return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr); |
| |
| if (addr >= TASK_SIZE || addr < mmap_min_addr) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| error = -EINVAL; |
| |
| down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
| vma = find_vma(mm, addr); |
| |
| switch (opt) { |
| case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE: |
| mm->start_code = addr; |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_MM_END_CODE: |
| mm->end_code = addr; |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_MM_START_DATA: |
| mm->start_data = addr; |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_MM_END_DATA: |
| mm->end_data = addr; |
| break; |
| |
| case PR_SET_MM_START_BRK: |
| if (addr <= mm->end_data) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && |
| (mm->brk - addr) + |
| (mm->end_data - mm->start_data) > rlim) |
| goto out; |
| |
| mm->start_brk = addr; |
| break; |
| |
| case PR_SET_MM_BRK: |
| if (addr <= mm->end_data) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (rlim < RLIM_INFINITY && |
| (addr - mm->start_brk) + |
| (mm->end_data - mm->start_data) > rlim) |
| goto out; |
| |
| mm->brk = addr; |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * If command line arguments and environment |
| * are placed somewhere else on stack, we can |
| * set them up here, ARG_START/END to setup |
| * command line argumets and ENV_START/END |
| * for environment. |
| */ |
| case PR_SET_MM_START_STACK: |
| case PR_SET_MM_ARG_START: |
| case PR_SET_MM_ARG_END: |
| case PR_SET_MM_ENV_START: |
| case PR_SET_MM_ENV_END: |
| if (!vma) { |
| error = -EFAULT; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (opt == PR_SET_MM_START_STACK) |
| mm->start_stack = addr; |
| else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_START) |
| mm->arg_start = addr; |
| else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ARG_END) |
| mm->arg_end = addr; |
| else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_START) |
| mm->env_start = addr; |
| else if (opt == PR_SET_MM_ENV_END) |
| mm->env_end = addr; |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * This doesn't move auxiliary vector itself |
| * since it's pinned to mm_struct, but allow |
| * to fill vector with new values. It's up |
| * to a caller to provide sane values here |
| * otherwise user space tools which use this |
| * vector might be unhappy. |
| */ |
| case PR_SET_MM_AUXV: { |
| unsigned long user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE]; |
| |
| if (arg4 > sizeof(user_auxv)) |
| goto out; |
| up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
| |
| if (copy_from_user(user_auxv, (const void __user *)addr, arg4)) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| |
| /* Make sure the last entry is always AT_NULL */ |
| user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 2] = 0; |
| user_auxv[AT_VECTOR_SIZE - 1] = 0; |
| |
| BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(user_auxv) != sizeof(mm->saved_auxv)); |
| |
| task_lock(current); |
| memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, arg4); |
| task_unlock(current); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| default: |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| error = 0; |
| out: |
| up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE |
| static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) |
| { |
| return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr); |
| } |
| #else |
| static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr) |
| { |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3, |
| unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5) |
| { |
| struct task_struct *me = current; |
| unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)]; |
| long error; |
| |
| error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
| if (error != -ENOSYS) |
| return error; |
| |
| error = 0; |
| switch (option) { |
| case PR_SET_PDEATHSIG: |
| if (!valid_signal(arg2)) { |
| error = -EINVAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| me->pdeath_signal = arg2; |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_PDEATHSIG: |
| error = put_user(me->pdeath_signal, (int __user *)arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_DUMPABLE: |
| error = get_dumpable(me->mm); |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_DUMPABLE: |
| if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) { |
| error = -EINVAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| set_dumpable(me->mm, arg2); |
| break; |
| |
| case PR_SET_UNALIGN: |
| error = SET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_UNALIGN: |
| error = GET_UNALIGN_CTL(me, arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_FPEMU: |
| error = SET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_FPEMU: |
| error = GET_FPEMU_CTL(me, arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_FPEXC: |
| error = SET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_FPEXC: |
| error = GET_FPEXC_CTL(me, arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_TIMING: |
| error = PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL; |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_TIMING: |
| if (arg2 != PR_TIMING_STATISTICAL) |
| error = -EINVAL; |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_NAME: |
| comm[sizeof(me->comm) - 1] = 0; |
| if (strncpy_from_user(comm, (char __user *)arg2, |
| sizeof(me->comm) - 1) < 0) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| set_task_comm(me, comm); |
| proc_comm_connector(me); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_NAME: |
| get_task_comm(comm, me); |
| if (copy_to_user((char __user *)arg2, comm, sizeof(comm))) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_ENDIAN: |
| error = GET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_ENDIAN: |
| error = SET_ENDIAN(me, arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_SECCOMP: |
| error = prctl_get_seccomp(); |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_SECCOMP: |
| error = prctl_set_seccomp(arg2, (char __user *)arg3); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_TSC: |
| error = GET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_TSC: |
| error = SET_TSC_CTL(arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_DISABLE: |
| error = perf_event_task_disable(); |
| break; |
| case PR_TASK_PERF_EVENTS_ENABLE: |
| error = perf_event_task_enable(); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: |
| error = current->timer_slack_ns; |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: |
| if (arg2 <= 0) |
| current->timer_slack_ns = |
| current->default_timer_slack_ns; |
| else |
| current->timer_slack_ns = arg2; |
| break; |
| case PR_MCE_KILL: |
| if (arg4 | arg5) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| switch (arg2) { |
| case PR_MCE_KILL_CLEAR: |
| if (arg3 != 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
| break; |
| case PR_MCE_KILL_SET: |
| current->flags |= PF_MCE_PROCESS; |
| if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY) |
| current->flags |= PF_MCE_EARLY; |
| else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_LATE) |
| current->flags &= ~PF_MCE_EARLY; |
| else if (arg3 == PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT) |
| current->flags &= |
| ~(PF_MCE_EARLY|PF_MCE_PROCESS); |
| else |
| return -EINVAL; |
| break; |
| default: |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| break; |
| case PR_MCE_KILL_GET: |
| if (arg2 | arg3 | arg4 | arg5) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (current->flags & PF_MCE_PROCESS) |
| error = (current->flags & PF_MCE_EARLY) ? |
| PR_MCE_KILL_EARLY : PR_MCE_KILL_LATE; |
| else |
| error = PR_MCE_KILL_DEFAULT; |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_MM: |
| error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: |
| error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user **)arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: |
| me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2; |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_CHILD_SUBREAPER: |
| error = put_user(me->signal->is_child_subreaper, |
| (int __user *)arg2); |
| break; |
| case PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: |
| if (arg2 != 1 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| current->no_new_privs = 1; |
| break; |
| case PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: |
| if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| return current->no_new_privs ? 1 : 0; |
| default: |
| error = -EINVAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| return error; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getcpu, unsigned __user *, cpup, unsigned __user *, nodep, |
| struct getcpu_cache __user *, unused) |
| { |
| int err = 0; |
| int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); |
| if (cpup) |
| err |= put_user(cpu, cpup); |
| if (nodep) |
| err |= put_user(cpu_to_node(cpu), nodep); |
| return err ? -EFAULT : 0; |
| } |
| |
| char poweroff_cmd[POWEROFF_CMD_PATH_LEN] = "/sbin/poweroff"; |
| |
| static int __orderly_poweroff(bool force) |
| { |
| char **argv; |
| static char *envp[] = { |
| "HOME=/", |
| "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin", |
| NULL |
| }; |
| int ret; |
| |
| argv = argv_split(GFP_KERNEL, poweroff_cmd, NULL); |
| if (argv) { |
| ret = call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_EXEC); |
| argv_free(argv); |
| } else { |
| printk(KERN_WARNING "%s failed to allocate memory for \"%s\"\n", |
| __func__, poweroff_cmd); |
| ret = -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret && force) { |
| printk(KERN_WARNING "Failed to start orderly shutdown: " |
| "forcing the issue\n"); |
| /* |
| * I guess this should try to kick off some daemon to sync and |
| * poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing if we're doing an |
| * emergency shutdown? |
| */ |
| emergency_sync(); |
| kernel_power_off(); |
| } |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static bool poweroff_force; |
| |
| static void poweroff_work_func(struct work_struct *work) |
| { |
| __orderly_poweroff(poweroff_force); |
| } |
| |
| static DECLARE_WORK(poweroff_work, poweroff_work_func); |
| |
| /** |
| * orderly_poweroff - Trigger an orderly system poweroff |
| * @force: force poweroff if command execution fails |
| * |
| * This may be called from any context to trigger a system shutdown. |
| * If the orderly shutdown fails, it will force an immediate shutdown. |
| */ |
| int orderly_poweroff(bool force) |
| { |
| if (force) /* do not override the pending "true" */ |
| poweroff_force = true; |
| schedule_work(&poweroff_work); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(orderly_poweroff); |
| |
| /** |
| * do_sysinfo - fill in sysinfo struct |
| * @info: pointer to buffer to fill |
| */ |
| static int do_sysinfo(struct sysinfo *info) |
| { |
| unsigned long mem_total, sav_total; |
| unsigned int mem_unit, bitcount; |
| struct timespec tp; |
| |
| memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo)); |
| |
| ktime_get_ts(&tp); |
| monotonic_to_bootbased(&tp); |
| info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0); |
| |
| get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT); |
| |
| info->procs = nr_threads; |
| |
| si_meminfo(info); |
| si_swapinfo(info); |
| |
| /* |
| * If the sum of all the available memory (i.e. ram + swap) |
| * is less than can be stored in a 32 bit unsigned long then |
| * we can be binary compatible with 2.2.x kernels. If not, |
| * well, in that case 2.2.x was broken anyways... |
| * |
| * -Erik Andersen <andersee@debian.org> |
| */ |
| |
| mem_total = info->totalram + info->totalswap; |
| if (mem_total < info->totalram || mem_total < info->totalswap) |
| goto out; |
| bitcount = 0; |
| mem_unit = info->mem_unit; |
| while (mem_unit > 1) { |
| bitcount++; |
| mem_unit >>= 1; |
| sav_total = mem_total; |
| mem_total <<= 1; |
| if (mem_total < sav_total) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If mem_total did not overflow, multiply all memory values by |
| * info->mem_unit and set it to 1. This leaves things compatible |
| * with 2.2.x, and also retains compatibility with earlier 2.4.x |
| * kernels... |
| */ |
| |
| info->mem_unit = 1; |
| info->totalram <<= bitcount; |
| info->freeram <<= bitcount; |
| info->sharedram <<= bitcount; |
| info->bufferram <<= bitcount; |
| info->totalswap <<= bitcount; |
| info->freeswap <<= bitcount; |
| info->totalhigh <<= bitcount; |
| info->freehigh <<= bitcount; |
| |
| out: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct sysinfo __user *, info) |
| { |
| struct sysinfo val; |
| |
| do_sysinfo(&val); |
| |
| if (copy_to_user(info, &val, sizeof(struct sysinfo))) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT |
| struct compat_sysinfo { |
| s32 uptime; |
| u32 loads[3]; |
| u32 totalram; |
| u32 freeram; |
| u32 sharedram; |
| u32 bufferram; |
| u32 totalswap; |
| u32 freeswap; |
| u16 procs; |
| u16 pad; |
| u32 totalhigh; |
| u32 freehigh; |
| u32 mem_unit; |
| char _f[20-2*sizeof(u32)-sizeof(int)]; |
| }; |
| |
| COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info) |
| { |
| struct sysinfo s; |
| |
| do_sysinfo(&s); |
| |
| /* Check to see if any memory value is too large for 32-bit and scale |
| * down if needed |
| */ |
| if ((s.totalram >> 32) || (s.totalswap >> 32)) { |
| int bitcount = 0; |
| |
| while (s.mem_unit < PAGE_SIZE) { |
| s.mem_unit <<= 1; |
| bitcount++; |
| } |
| |
| s.totalram >>= bitcount; |
| s.freeram >>= bitcount; |
| s.sharedram >>= bitcount; |
| s.bufferram >>= bitcount; |
| s.totalswap >>= bitcount; |
| s.freeswap >>= bitcount; |
| s.totalhigh >>= bitcount; |
| s.freehigh >>= bitcount; |
| } |
| |
| if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) || |
| __put_user(s.uptime, &info->uptime) || |
| __put_user(s.loads[0], &info->loads[0]) || |
| __put_user(s.loads[1], &info->loads[1]) || |
| __put_user(s.loads[2], &info->loads[2]) || |
| __put_user(s.totalram, &info->totalram) || |
| __put_user(s.freeram, &info->freeram) || |
| __put_user(s.sharedram, &info->sharedram) || |
| __put_user(s.bufferram, &info->bufferram) || |
| __put_user(s.totalswap, &info->totalswap) || |
| __put_user(s.freeswap, &info->freeswap) || |
| __put_user(s.procs, &info->procs) || |
| __put_user(s.totalhigh, &info->totalhigh) || |
| __put_user(s.freehigh, &info->freehigh) || |
| __put_user(s.mem_unit, &info->mem_unit)) |
| return -EFAULT; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ |