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85c87212005-04-29 16:23:29 +01001/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
3 *
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00005 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05006 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07007 * All Rights Reserved.
8 *
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
13 *
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
18 *
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
22 *
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
24 *
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
27 *
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
31 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -050032 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
33 * 2006.
34 *
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +000035 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
37 *
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +000038 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +000040 *
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070043 */
44
45#include <linux/init.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070046#include <asm/types.h>
Alan Cox715b49e2006-01-18 17:44:07 -080047#include <asm/atomic.h>
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +000048#include <linux/fs.h>
49#include <linux/namei.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070050#include <linux/mm.h>
51#include <linux/module.h>
Stephen Smalley01116102005-05-21 00:15:52 +010052#include <linux/mount.h>
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +010053#include <linux/socket.h>
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -050054#include <linux/mqueue.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070055#include <linux/audit.h>
56#include <linux/personality.h>
57#include <linux/time.h>
David Woodhouse5bb289b2005-06-24 14:14:05 +010058#include <linux/netlink.h>
David Woodhousef5561962005-07-13 22:47:07 +010059#include <linux/compiler.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070060#include <asm/unistd.h>
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +000061#include <linux/security.h>
David Woodhousefe7752b2005-12-15 18:33:52 +000062#include <linux/list.h>
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -050063#include <linux/tty.h>
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -040064#include <linux/binfmts.h>
Al Viroa1f8e7f72006-10-19 16:08:53 -040065#include <linux/highmem.h>
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -040066#include <linux/syscalls.h>
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -040067#include <linux/inotify.h>
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +110068#include <linux/capability.h>
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070069
David Woodhousefe7752b2005-12-15 18:33:52 +000070#include "audit.h"
71
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070072/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
73 * for saving names from getname(). */
74#define AUDIT_NAMES 20
75
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -040076/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
77#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
78
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -050079/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
81
Al Viro471a5c72006-07-10 08:29:24 -040082/* number of audit rules */
83int audit_n_rules;
84
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -040085/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
86int audit_signals;
87
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +110088struct audit_cap_data {
89 kernel_cap_t permitted;
90 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
91 union {
92 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
93 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
94 };
95};
96
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -070097/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
98 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
99 * pointers at syscall exit time).
100 *
101 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
102struct audit_names {
103 const char *name;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400104 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
105 unsigned name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700106 unsigned long ino;
107 dev_t dev;
108 umode_t mode;
109 uid_t uid;
110 gid_t gid;
111 dev_t rdev;
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -0400112 u32 osid;
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +1100113 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
114 unsigned int fcap_ver;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700115};
116
117struct audit_aux_data {
118 struct audit_aux_data *next;
119 int type;
120};
121
122#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
123
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400124/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
125#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
126
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -0400127struct audit_aux_data_execve {
128 struct audit_aux_data d;
129 int argc;
130 int envc;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -0700131 struct mm_struct *mm;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -0400132};
133
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400134struct audit_aux_data_pids {
135 struct audit_aux_data d;
136 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500137 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
138 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500139 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400140 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500141 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400142 int pid_count;
143};
144
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +1100145struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
146 struct audit_aux_data d;
147 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
148 unsigned int fcap_ver;
149 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
150 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
151};
152
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +1100153struct audit_aux_data_capset {
154 struct audit_aux_data d;
155 pid_t pid;
156 struct audit_cap_data cap;
157};
158
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400159struct audit_tree_refs {
160 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
161 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
162};
163
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700164/* The per-task audit context. */
165struct audit_context {
Al Virod51374a2006-08-03 10:59:26 -0400166 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700167 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500168 enum audit_state state, current_state;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700169 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
170 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700171 int major; /* syscall number */
172 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
173 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100174 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500175 u64 prio;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700176 int name_count;
177 struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES];
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400178 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800179 struct path pwd;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700180 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
181 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400182 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -0500183 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
184 size_t sockaddr_len;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700185 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -0400186 pid_t pid, ppid;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700187 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
188 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
189 unsigned long personality;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100190 int arch;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700191
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400192 pid_t target_pid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500193 uid_t target_auid;
194 uid_t target_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500195 unsigned int target_sessionid;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400196 u32 target_sid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500197 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -0400198
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400199 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
200 int tree_count;
201
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500202 int type;
203 union {
204 struct {
205 int nargs;
206 long args[6];
207 } socketcall;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500208 struct {
209 uid_t uid;
210 gid_t gid;
211 mode_t mode;
212 u32 osid;
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -0500213 int has_perm;
214 uid_t perm_uid;
215 gid_t perm_gid;
216 mode_t perm_mode;
217 unsigned long qbytes;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500218 } ipc;
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -0500219 struct {
220 mqd_t mqdes;
221 struct mq_attr mqstat;
222 } mq_getsetattr;
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -0500223 struct {
224 mqd_t mqdes;
225 int sigev_signo;
226 } mq_notify;
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -0500227 struct {
228 mqd_t mqdes;
229 size_t msg_len;
230 unsigned int msg_prio;
231 struct timespec abs_timeout;
232 } mq_sendrecv;
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -0500233 struct {
234 int oflag;
235 mode_t mode;
236 struct mq_attr attr;
237 } mq_open;
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -0500238 struct {
239 pid_t pid;
240 struct audit_cap_data cap;
241 } capset;
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500242 };
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -0500243 int fds[2];
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -0500244
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700245#if AUDIT_DEBUG
246 int put_count;
247 int ino_count;
248#endif
249};
250
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400251#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\004\002\006\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
252static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
253{
254 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
255 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
256 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
257 return n & mask;
258}
259
260static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
261{
Cordeliac4bacef2008-08-18 09:45:51 -0700262 unsigned n;
zhangxiliang1a61c882008-08-02 10:56:37 +0800263 if (unlikely(!ctx))
264 return 0;
Cordeliac4bacef2008-08-18 09:45:51 -0700265 n = ctx->major;
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +0100266
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400267 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
268 case 0: /* native */
269 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
270 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
271 return 1;
272 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
273 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
274 return 1;
275 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
276 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
277 return 1;
278 return 0;
279 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
280 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
281 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
282 return 1;
283 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
284 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
285 return 1;
286 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
287 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
288 return 1;
289 return 0;
290 case 2: /* open */
291 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
292 case 3: /* openat */
293 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
294 case 4: /* socketcall */
295 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
296 case 5: /* execve */
297 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
298 default:
299 return 0;
300 }
301}
302
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400303static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int which)
304{
305 unsigned index = which & ~S_IFMT;
306 mode_t mode = which & S_IFMT;
zhangxiliang1a61c882008-08-02 10:56:37 +0800307
308 if (unlikely(!ctx))
309 return 0;
310
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400311 if (index >= ctx->name_count)
312 return 0;
313 if (ctx->names[index].ino == -1)
314 return 0;
315 if ((ctx->names[index].mode ^ mode) & S_IFMT)
316 return 0;
317 return 1;
318}
319
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400320/*
321 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
322 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
323 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
324 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
325 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
326 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
327 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
328 */
329
330#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
331static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
332{
333 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
334 int left = ctx->tree_count;
335 if (likely(left)) {
336 p->c[--left] = chunk;
337 ctx->tree_count = left;
338 return 1;
339 }
340 if (!p)
341 return 0;
342 p = p->next;
343 if (p) {
344 p->c[30] = chunk;
345 ctx->trees = p;
346 ctx->tree_count = 30;
347 return 1;
348 }
349 return 0;
350}
351
352static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
353{
354 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
355 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
356 if (!ctx->trees) {
357 ctx->trees = p;
358 return 0;
359 }
360 if (p)
361 p->next = ctx->trees;
362 else
363 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
364 ctx->tree_count = 31;
365 return 1;
366}
367#endif
368
369static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
370 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
371{
372#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
373 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
374 int n;
375 if (!p) {
376 /* we started with empty chain */
377 p = ctx->first_trees;
378 count = 31;
379 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
380 if (!p)
381 return;
382 }
383 n = count;
384 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
385 while (n--) {
386 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
387 q->c[n] = NULL;
388 }
389 }
390 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
391 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
392 q->c[n] = NULL;
393 }
394 ctx->trees = p;
395 ctx->tree_count = count;
396#endif
397}
398
399static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
400{
401 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
402 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
403 q = p->next;
404 kfree(p);
405 }
406}
407
408static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
409{
410#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
411 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
412 int n;
413 if (!tree)
414 return 0;
415 /* full ones */
416 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
417 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
418 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
419 return 1;
420 }
421 /* partial */
422 if (p) {
423 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
424 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
425 return 1;
426 }
427#endif
428 return 0;
429}
430
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400431/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700432/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
433 * otherwise. */
434static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500435 struct audit_krule *rule,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700436 struct audit_context *ctx,
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400437 struct audit_names *name,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700438 enum audit_state *state)
439{
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100440 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400441 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600442 u32 sid;
443
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700444 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500445 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700446 int result = 0;
447
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500448 switch (f->type) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700449 case AUDIT_PID:
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500450 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700451 break;
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400452 case AUDIT_PPID:
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -0400453 if (ctx) {
454 if (!ctx->ppid)
455 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400456 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -0400457 }
Al Viro3c662512006-05-06 08:26:27 -0400458 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700459 case AUDIT_UID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100460 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700461 break;
462 case AUDIT_EUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100463 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700464 break;
465 case AUDIT_SUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100466 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700467 break;
468 case AUDIT_FSUID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100469 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700470 break;
471 case AUDIT_GID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100472 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700473 break;
474 case AUDIT_EGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100475 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700476 break;
477 case AUDIT_SGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100478 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700479 break;
480 case AUDIT_FSGID:
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +1100481 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700482 break;
483 case AUDIT_PERS:
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500484 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700485 break;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100486 case AUDIT_ARCH:
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -0700487 if (ctx)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500488 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +0100489 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700490
491 case AUDIT_EXIT:
492 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500493 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700494 break;
495 case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100496 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500497 if (f->val)
498 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100499 else
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500500 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
David Woodhouseb01f2cc2005-08-27 10:25:43 +0100501 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700502 break;
503 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400504 if (name)
505 result = audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev),
506 f->op, f->val);
507 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700508 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500509 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700510 ++result;
511 break;
512 }
513 }
514 }
515 break;
516 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400517 if (name)
518 result = audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev),
519 f->op, f->val);
520 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700521 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500522 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700523 ++result;
524 break;
525 }
526 }
527 }
528 break;
529 case AUDIT_INODE:
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400530 if (name)
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400531 result = (name->ino == f->val);
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400532 else if (ctx) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700533 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400534 if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val)) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700535 ++result;
536 break;
537 }
538 }
539 }
540 break;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400541 case AUDIT_WATCH:
542 if (name && rule->watch->ino != (unsigned long)-1)
543 result = (name->dev == rule->watch->dev &&
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400544 name->ino == rule->watch->ino);
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400545 break;
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400546 case AUDIT_DIR:
547 if (ctx)
548 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
549 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700550 case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
551 result = 0;
552 if (ctx)
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -0500553 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700554 break;
Darrel Goeddel3a6b9f82006-06-29 16:56:39 -0500555 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
556 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
557 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
558 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
559 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600560 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
561 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
562 match for now to avoid losing information that
563 may be wanted. An error message will also be
564 logged upon error */
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000565 if (f->lsm_rule) {
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400566 if (need_sid) {
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200567 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400568 need_sid = 0;
569 }
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200570 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600571 f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000572 f->lsm_rule,
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600573 ctx);
Steve Grubb2ad312d2006-04-11 08:50:56 -0400574 }
Darrel Goeddel3dc7e312006-03-10 18:14:06 -0600575 break;
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500576 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
577 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
578 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
579 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
580 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
581 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
582 also applies here */
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000583 if (f->lsm_rule) {
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500584 /* Find files that match */
585 if (name) {
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200586 result = security_audit_rule_match(
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500587 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000588 f->lsm_rule, ctx);
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500589 } else if (ctx) {
590 for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
Ahmed S. Darwishd7a96f32008-03-01 22:01:11 +0200591 if (security_audit_rule_match(
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500592 ctx->names[j].osid,
593 f->type, f->op,
Ahmed S. Darwish04305e42008-04-19 09:59:43 +1000594 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500595 ++result;
596 break;
597 }
598 }
599 }
600 /* Find ipc objects that match */
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -0500601 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
602 break;
603 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
604 f->type, f->op,
605 f->lsm_rule, ctx))
606 ++result;
Darrel Goeddel6e5a2d12006-06-29 16:57:08 -0500607 }
608 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700609 case AUDIT_ARG0:
610 case AUDIT_ARG1:
611 case AUDIT_ARG2:
612 case AUDIT_ARG3:
613 if (ctx)
Amy Griffis93315ed2006-02-07 12:05:27 -0500614 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700615 break;
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400616 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
617 /* ignore this field for filtering */
618 result = 1;
619 break;
Al Viro55669bf2006-08-31 19:26:40 -0400620 case AUDIT_PERM:
621 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
622 break;
Al Viro8b67dca2008-04-28 04:15:49 -0400623 case AUDIT_FILETYPE:
624 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
625 break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700626 }
627
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100628 if (!result) {
629 put_cred(cred);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700630 return 0;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100631 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700632 }
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500633
634 if (ctx) {
635 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
636 return 0;
637 if (rule->filterkey) {
638 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
639 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
640 }
641 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
642 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700643 switch (rule->action) {
644 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700645 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
646 }
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +1100647 put_cred(cred);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700648 return 1;
649}
650
651/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
652 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
653 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
654 */
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500655static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700656{
657 struct audit_entry *e;
658 enum audit_state state;
659
660 rcu_read_lock();
David Woodhouse0f45aa12005-06-19 19:35:50 +0100661 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400662 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) {
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500663 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
664 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700665 rcu_read_unlock();
666 return state;
667 }
668 }
669 rcu_read_unlock();
670 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
671}
672
673/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
674 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
Steve Grubb23f32d12005-05-13 18:35:15 +0100675 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700676 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700677 */
678static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
679 struct audit_context *ctx,
680 struct list_head *list)
681{
682 struct audit_entry *e;
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100683 enum audit_state state;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700684
David Woodhouse351bb722005-07-14 14:40:06 +0100685 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
David Woodhousef7056d62005-06-20 16:07:33 +0100686 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
687
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700688 rcu_read_lock();
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100689 if (!list_empty(list)) {
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000690 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
691 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
David Woodhousec3896492005-08-17 14:49:57 +0100692
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000693 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400694 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
695 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
696 &state)) {
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000697 rcu_read_unlock();
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500698 ctx->current_state = state;
Dustin Kirklandb63862f2005-11-03 15:41:46 +0000699 return state;
700 }
701 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700702 }
703 rcu_read_unlock();
704 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
705}
706
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400707/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names[] have been
708 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
709 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names[].
710 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
711 */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500712void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400713{
714 int i;
715 struct audit_entry *e;
716 enum audit_state state;
717
718 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500719 return;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400720
721 rcu_read_lock();
722 for (i = 0; i < ctx->name_count; i++) {
723 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
724 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
725 struct audit_names *n = &ctx->names[i];
726 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
727 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
728
729 if (list_empty(list))
730 continue;
731
732 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
733 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
734 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) {
735 rcu_read_unlock();
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500736 ctx->current_state = state;
737 return;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400738 }
739 }
740 }
741 rcu_read_unlock();
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400742}
743
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500744static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400745{
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500746 if (!ctx->prio) {
747 ctx->prio = 1;
748 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
749 }
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -0400750}
751
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700752static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
753 int return_valid,
754 int return_code)
755{
756 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
757
758 if (likely(!context))
759 return NULL;
760 context->return_valid = return_valid;
Eric Parisf701b752008-01-07 13:34:51 -0500761
762 /*
763 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
764 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
765 * signal handlers
766 *
767 * This is actually a test for:
768 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
769 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
770 *
771 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
772 */
773 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
774 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
775 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
776 context->return_code = -EINTR;
777 else
778 context->return_code = return_code;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700779
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500780 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
781 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
782 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700783 }
784
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700785 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
786 return context;
787}
788
789static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
790{
791 int i;
792
793#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500794 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000795 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700796 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
797 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000798 __FILE__, __LINE__,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700799 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
800 context->name_count, context->put_count,
801 context->ino_count);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000802 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700803 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
804 context->names[i].name,
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +0000805 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000806 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700807 dump_stack();
808 return;
809 }
810#endif
811#if AUDIT_DEBUG
812 context->put_count = 0;
813 context->ino_count = 0;
814#endif
815
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000816 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -0400817 if (context->names[i].name && context->names[i].name_put)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700818 __putname(context->names[i].name);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000819 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700820 context->name_count = 0;
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800821 path_put(&context->pwd);
822 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
823 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700824}
825
826static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
827{
828 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
829
830 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
831 context->aux = aux->next;
832 kfree(aux);
833 }
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400834 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
835 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
836 kfree(aux);
837 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700838}
839
840static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
841 enum audit_state state)
842{
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700843 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
844 context->state = state;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -0500845 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700846}
847
848static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
849{
850 struct audit_context *context;
851
852 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
853 return NULL;
854 audit_zero_context(context, state);
855 return context;
856}
857
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700858/**
859 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
860 * @tsk: task
861 *
862 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700863 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
864 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -0700865 * needed.
866 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700867int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
868{
869 struct audit_context *context;
870 enum audit_state state;
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500871 char *key = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700872
Eric Parisb593d382008-01-08 17:38:31 -0500873 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700874 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
875
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500876 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700877 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
878 return 0;
879
880 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500881 kfree(key);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700882 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
883 return -ENOMEM;
884 }
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -0500885 context->filterkey = key;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700886
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700887 tsk->audit_context = context;
888 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
889 return 0;
890}
891
892static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
893{
894 struct audit_context *previous;
895 int count = 0;
896
897 do {
898 previous = context->previous;
899 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
900 ++count;
901 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
902 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
903 context->serial, context->major,
904 context->name_count, count);
905 }
906 audit_free_names(context);
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -0400907 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
908 free_tree_refs(context);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700909 audit_free_aux(context);
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -0400910 kfree(context->filterkey);
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -0500911 kfree(context->sockaddr);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -0700912 kfree(context);
913 context = previous;
914 } while (context);
915 if (count >= 10)
916 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
917}
918
Joy Latten161a09e2006-11-27 13:11:54 -0600919void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000920{
921 char *ctx = NULL;
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000922 unsigned len;
923 int error;
924 u32 sid;
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000925
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200926 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000927 if (!sid)
928 return;
929
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200930 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
Al Viroc4823bc2007-03-12 16:17:42 +0000931 if (error) {
932 if (error != -EINVAL)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000933 goto error_path;
934 return;
935 }
936
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000937 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200938 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
Dustin Kirkland7306a0b2005-11-16 15:53:13 +0000939 return;
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000940
941error_path:
Dustin Kirkland7306a0b2005-11-16 15:53:13 +0000942 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +0000943 return;
944}
945
Joy Latten161a09e2006-11-27 13:11:54 -0600946EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
947
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500948static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700949{
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -0500950 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
951 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700952 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
953
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500954 /* tsk == current */
955
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -0500956 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
David Woodhouse99e45ee2005-05-23 21:57:41 +0100957 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
958 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700959
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500960 if (mm) {
961 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
962 vma = mm->mmap;
963 while (vma) {
964 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
965 vma->vm_file) {
966 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -0800967 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500968 break;
969 }
970 vma = vma->vm_next;
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700971 }
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500972 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700973 }
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -0500974 audit_log_task_context(ab);
Stephen Smalley219f0812005-04-18 10:47:35 -0700975}
976
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400977static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500978 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
979 u32 sid, char *comm)
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400980{
981 struct audit_buffer *ab;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200982 char *ctx = NULL;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400983 u32 len;
984 int rc = 0;
985
986 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
987 if (!ab)
Eric Paris6246cca2008-01-07 14:01:18 -0500988 return rc;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400989
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -0500990 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
991 uid, sessionid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200992 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500993 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -0400994 rc = 1;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +0200995 } else {
996 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
997 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
998 }
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -0500999 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1000 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001001 audit_log_end(ab);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001002
1003 return rc;
1004}
1005
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001006/*
1007 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1008 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1009 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundry)
1010 *
1011 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1012 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1013 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1014 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1015 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1016 */
1017static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1018 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1019 int arg_num,
1020 size_t *len_sent,
1021 const char __user *p,
1022 char *buf)
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001023{
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001024 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1025 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1026 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 3 is the length of a=\n */
1027 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 3;
1028 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1029 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1030 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1031 int ret;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001032
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001033 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1034 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001035
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001036 /*
1037 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1038 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1039 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1040 * any.
1041 */
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001042 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001043 WARN_ON(1);
1044 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001045 return -1;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001046 }
Peter Zijlstra040b3a22007-07-28 00:55:18 +02001047
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001048 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1049 do {
1050 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1051 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1052 else
1053 to_send = len_left;
1054 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001055 /*
1056 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1057 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1058 * space yet.
1059 */
Peter Zijlstra040b3a22007-07-28 00:55:18 +02001060 if (ret) {
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001061 WARN_ON(1);
1062 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001063 return -1;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001064 }
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001065 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1066 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1067 if (has_cntl) {
1068 /*
1069 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1070 * send half as much in each message
1071 */
1072 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1073 break;
1074 }
1075 len_left -= to_send;
1076 tmp_p += to_send;
1077 } while (len_left > 0);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001078
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001079 len_left = len;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001080
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001081 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1082 too_long = 1;
1083
1084 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1085 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1086 int room_left;
1087
1088 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1089 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1090 else
1091 to_send = len_left;
1092
1093 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1094 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1095 if (has_cntl)
1096 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1097 else
1098 room_left -= to_send;
1099 if (room_left < 0) {
1100 *len_sent = 0;
1101 audit_log_end(*ab);
1102 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1103 if (!*ab)
1104 return 0;
1105 }
1106
1107 /*
1108 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1109 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1110 */
1111 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
Paul Moore422b03c2008-02-27 10:39:22 -05001112 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d_len=%zu ", arg_num,
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001113 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1114
1115 /*
1116 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1117 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1118 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1119 */
1120 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1121 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1122 else
1123 ret = 0;
1124 if (ret) {
1125 WARN_ON(1);
1126 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
Eric Parisb0abcfc2008-02-18 18:23:16 -05001127 return -1;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001128 }
1129 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1130
1131 /* actually log it */
1132 audit_log_format(*ab, "a%d", arg_num);
1133 if (too_long)
1134 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1135 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1136 if (has_cntl)
Eric Parisb556f8a2008-04-18 10:12:59 -04001137 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001138 else
1139 audit_log_format(*ab, "\"%s\"", buf);
1140 audit_log_format(*ab, "\n");
1141
1142 p += to_send;
1143 len_left -= to_send;
1144 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1145 if (has_cntl)
1146 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1147 else
1148 *len_sent += to_send;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001149 }
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001150 /* include the null we didn't log */
1151 return len + 1;
1152}
1153
1154static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1155 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1156 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1157{
1158 int i;
1159 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1160 const char __user *p;
1161 char *buf;
1162
1163 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1164 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1165
1166 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1167
1168 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d ", axi->argc);
1169
1170 /*
1171 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1172 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1173 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1174 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1175 */
1176 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1177 if (!buf) {
1178 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1179 return;
1180 }
1181
1182 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1183 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1184 &len_sent, p, buf);
1185 if (len <= 0)
1186 break;
1187 p += len;
1188 }
1189 kfree(buf);
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07001190}
1191
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001192static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1193{
1194 int i;
1195
1196 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1197 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1198 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1199 }
1200}
1201
1202static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1203{
1204 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1205 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1206 int log = 0;
1207
1208 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1209 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1210 log = 1;
1211 }
1212 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1213 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1214 log = 1;
1215 }
1216
1217 if (log)
1218 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1219}
1220
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001221static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001222{
1223 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1224 int i;
1225
1226 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1227 if (!ab)
1228 return;
1229
1230 switch (context->type) {
1231 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1232 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1233 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1234 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1235 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1236 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1237 break; }
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001238 case AUDIT_IPC: {
1239 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1240
1241 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1242 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1243 if (osid) {
1244 char *ctx = NULL;
1245 u32 len;
1246 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1247 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1248 *call_panic = 1;
1249 } else {
1250 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1251 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1252 }
1253 }
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05001254 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1255 audit_log_end(ab);
1256 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1257 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1258 audit_log_format(ab,
1259 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o",
1260 context->ipc.qbytes,
1261 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1262 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1263 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1264 if (!ab)
1265 return;
1266 }
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001267 break; }
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05001268 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1269 audit_log_format(ab,
1270 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#o mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1271 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1272 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1273 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1274 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1275 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1276 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1277 break; }
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05001278 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1279 audit_log_format(ab,
1280 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1281 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1282 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1283 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1284 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1285 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1286 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1287 break; }
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05001288 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1289 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1290 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1291 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1292 break; }
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05001293 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1294 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1295 audit_log_format(ab,
1296 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1297 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ",
1298 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1299 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1300 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1301 break; }
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05001302 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1303 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1304 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1305 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1306 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1307 break; }
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001308 }
1309 audit_log_end(ab);
1310}
1311
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001312static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001313{
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001314 const struct cred *cred;
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001315 int i, call_panic = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001316 struct audit_buffer *ab;
David Woodhouse7551ced2005-05-26 12:04:57 +01001317 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -05001318 const char *tty;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001319
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001320 /* tsk == current */
Al Viro3f2792f2006-07-16 06:43:48 -04001321 context->pid = tsk->pid;
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -04001322 if (!context->ppid)
1323 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001324 cred = current_cred();
1325 context->uid = cred->uid;
1326 context->gid = cred->gid;
1327 context->euid = cred->euid;
1328 context->suid = cred->suid;
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11001329 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11001330 context->egid = cred->egid;
1331 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
David Howellsb6dff3e2008-11-14 10:39:16 +11001332 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
Al Viro3f2792f2006-07-16 06:43:48 -04001333 context->personality = tsk->personality;
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001334
1335 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001336 if (!ab)
1337 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
David Woodhousebccf6ae2005-05-23 21:35:28 +01001338 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1339 context->arch, context->major);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001340 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1341 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1342 if (context->return_valid)
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001343 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001344 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1345 context->return_code);
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001346
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +01001347 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
Al Viro45d9bb02006-03-29 20:02:55 -05001348 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1349 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
Steve Grubba6c043a2006-01-01 14:07:00 -05001350 else
1351 tty = "(none)";
Alan Coxdbda4c02008-10-13 10:40:53 +01001352 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1353
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001354 audit_log_format(ab,
1355 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -04001356 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
Steve Grubb326e9c82005-05-21 00:22:31 +01001357 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001358 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001359 context->argv[0],
1360 context->argv[1],
1361 context->argv[2],
1362 context->argv[3],
1363 context->name_count,
Al Virof46038f2006-05-06 08:22:52 -04001364 context->ppid,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001365 context->pid,
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05001366 tsk->loginuid,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001367 context->uid,
1368 context->gid,
1369 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001370 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1371 tsk->sessionid);
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001372
Alan Coxeb84a202006-09-29 02:01:41 -07001373
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001374 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
Amy Griffis5adc8a62006-06-14 18:45:21 -04001375 if (context->filterkey) {
1376 audit_log_format(ab, " key=");
1377 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->filterkey);
1378 } else
1379 audit_log_format(ab, " key=(null)");
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001380 audit_log_end(ab);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001381
David Woodhouse7551ced2005-05-26 12:04:57 +01001382 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01001383
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001384 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001385 if (!ab)
1386 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1387
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001388 switch (aux->type) {
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05001389
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04001390 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1391 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
Eric Parisde6bbd12008-01-07 14:31:58 -05001392 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04001393 break; }
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04001394
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11001395 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1396 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1397 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1398 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1399 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1400 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1401 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1402 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1404 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1405 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1406 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1407 break; }
1408
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001409 }
1410 audit_log_end(ab);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001411 }
1412
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001413 if (context->type)
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05001414 show_special(context, &call_panic);
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001415
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05001416 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1417 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1418 if (ab) {
1419 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1420 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1421 audit_log_end(ab);
1422 }
1423 }
1424
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05001425 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1426 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1427 if (ab) {
1428 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1429 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1430 context->sockaddr_len);
1431 audit_log_end(ab);
1432 }
1433 }
1434
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001435 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1436 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001437
1438 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1439 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001440 axs->target_auid[i],
1441 axs->target_uid[i],
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001442 axs->target_sessionid[i],
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001443 axs->target_sid[i],
1444 axs->target_comm[i]))
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001445 call_panic = 1;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04001446 }
1447
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001448 if (context->target_pid &&
1449 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001450 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05001451 context->target_sessionid,
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05001452 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001453 call_panic = 1;
1454
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001455 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001456 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001457 if (ab) {
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001458 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001459 audit_log_end(ab);
1460 }
1461 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001462 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001463 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[i];
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001464
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001465 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001466 if (!ab)
1467 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001468
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001469 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001470
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001471 if (n->name) {
1472 switch(n->name_len) {
1473 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1474 /* log the full path */
1475 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1476 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1477 break;
1478 case 0:
1479 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1480 * directory component is the cwd */
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001481 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001482 break;
1483 default:
1484 /* log the name's directory component */
1485 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
Eric Parisb556f8a2008-04-18 10:12:59 -04001486 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1487 n->name_len);
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001488 }
1489 } else
1490 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001491
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001492 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1493 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1494 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
1495 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1496 n->ino,
1497 MAJOR(n->dev),
1498 MINOR(n->dev),
1499 n->mode,
1500 n->uid,
1501 n->gid,
1502 MAJOR(n->rdev),
1503 MINOR(n->rdev));
1504 }
1505 if (n->osid != 0) {
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -04001506 char *ctx = NULL;
1507 u32 len;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001508 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001509 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1510 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001511 call_panic = 2;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001512 } else {
Steve Grubb1b50eed2006-04-03 14:06:13 -04001513 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001514 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1515 }
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001516 }
1517
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001518 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1519
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001520 audit_log_end(ab);
1521 }
Eric Parisc0641f22008-01-07 13:49:15 -05001522
1523 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1524 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1525 if (ab)
1526 audit_log_end(ab);
Steve Grubb9c7aa6a2006-03-31 15:22:49 -05001527 if (call_panic)
1528 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001529}
1530
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001531/**
1532 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1533 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1534 *
Al Virofa84cb92006-03-29 20:30:19 -05001535 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001536 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001537void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1538{
1539 struct audit_context *context;
1540
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001541 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001542 if (likely(!context))
1543 return;
1544
1545 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001546 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1547 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
David Woodhousef5561962005-07-13 22:47:07 +01001548 * in the context of the idle thread */
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001549 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001550 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001551 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001552
1553 audit_free_context(context);
1554}
1555
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001556/**
1557 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001558 * @arch: architecture type
1559 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1560 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1561 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1562 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1563 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1564 *
1565 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001566 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1567 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1568 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1569 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1570 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001571 * be written).
1572 */
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001573void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001574 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1575 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1576{
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001577 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001578 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1579 enum audit_state state;
1580
Roland McGrath86a1c342008-06-23 15:37:04 -07001581 if (unlikely(!context))
1582 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001583
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001584 /*
1585 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001586 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1587 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1588 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1589 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1590 *
1591 * i386 no
1592 * x86_64 no
Jon Mason2ef94812006-01-23 10:58:20 -06001593 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001594 *
1595 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1596 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1597 */
1598 if (context->in_syscall) {
1599 struct audit_context *newctx;
1600
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001601#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1602 printk(KERN_ERR
1603 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1604 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1605 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1606#endif
1607 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1608 if (newctx) {
1609 newctx->previous = context;
1610 context = newctx;
1611 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1612 } else {
1613 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1614 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1615 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1616 * to abandon auditing. */
1617 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1618 }
1619 }
1620 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1621
1622 if (!audit_enabled)
1623 return;
1624
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001625 context->arch = arch;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001626 context->major = major;
1627 context->argv[0] = a1;
1628 context->argv[1] = a2;
1629 context->argv[2] = a3;
1630 context->argv[3] = a4;
1631
1632 state = context->state;
Al Virod51374a2006-08-03 10:59:26 -04001633 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001634 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1635 context->prio = 0;
David Woodhouse0f45aa12005-06-19 19:35:50 +01001636 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001637 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001638 if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
1639 return;
1640
David Woodhousece625a82005-07-18 14:24:46 -04001641 context->serial = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001642 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1643 context->in_syscall = 1;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001644 context->current_state = state;
Alexander Viro419c58f2006-09-29 00:08:50 -04001645 context->ppid = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001646}
1647
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001648void audit_finish_fork(struct task_struct *child)
1649{
1650 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
1651 struct audit_context *p = child->audit_context;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001652 if (!p || !ctx)
1653 return;
1654 if (!ctx->in_syscall || ctx->current_state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001655 return;
1656 p->arch = ctx->arch;
1657 p->major = ctx->major;
1658 memcpy(p->argv, ctx->argv, sizeof(ctx->argv));
1659 p->ctime = ctx->ctime;
1660 p->dummy = ctx->dummy;
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001661 p->in_syscall = ctx->in_syscall;
1662 p->filterkey = kstrdup(ctx->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL);
1663 p->ppid = current->pid;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001664 p->prio = ctx->prio;
1665 p->current_state = ctx->current_state;
Al Viroa64e6492008-11-12 18:37:41 -05001666}
1667
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001668/**
1669 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001670 * @valid: success/failure flag
1671 * @return_code: syscall return value
1672 *
1673 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001674 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1675 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1676 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001677 * free the names stored from getname().
1678 */
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001679void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001680{
Al Viro5411be52006-03-29 20:23:36 -05001681 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001682 struct audit_context *context;
1683
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001684 context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001685
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001686 if (likely(!context))
Al Viro97e94c42006-03-29 20:26:24 -05001687 return;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001688
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001689 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
Al Viroe4951492006-03-29 20:17:10 -05001690 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001691
1692 context->in_syscall = 0;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05001693 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
2fd6f582005-04-29 16:08:28 +01001694
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001695 if (context->previous) {
1696 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1697 context->previous = NULL;
1698 audit_free_context(context);
1699 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1700 } else {
1701 audit_free_names(context);
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001702 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001703 audit_free_aux(context);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001704 context->aux = NULL;
1705 context->aux_pids = NULL;
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04001706 context->target_pid = 0;
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04001707 context->target_sid = 0;
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05001708 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05001709 context->type = 0;
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05001710 context->fds[0] = -1;
Al Viroe048e022008-12-16 03:51:22 -05001711 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1712 kfree(context->filterkey);
1713 context->filterkey = NULL;
1714 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001715 tsk->audit_context = context;
1716 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001717}
1718
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001719static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1720{
1721#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1722 struct audit_context *context;
1723 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1724 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1725 int count;
1726 if (likely(list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches)))
1727 return;
1728 context = current->audit_context;
1729 p = context->trees;
1730 count = context->tree_count;
1731 rcu_read_lock();
1732 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1733 rcu_read_unlock();
1734 if (!chunk)
1735 return;
1736 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1737 return;
1738 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001739 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001740 audit_set_auditable(context);
1741 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1742 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1743 return;
1744 }
1745 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1746#endif
1747}
1748
1749static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1750{
1751#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1752 struct audit_context *context;
1753 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1754 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1755 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1756 unsigned long seq;
1757 int count;
1758
1759 context = current->audit_context;
1760 p = context->trees;
1761 count = context->tree_count;
1762retry:
1763 drop = NULL;
1764 d = dentry;
1765 rcu_read_lock();
1766 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1767 for(;;) {
1768 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1769 if (inode && unlikely(!list_empty(&inode->inotify_watches))) {
1770 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1771 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1772 if (chunk) {
1773 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1774 drop = chunk;
1775 break;
1776 }
1777 }
1778 }
1779 parent = d->d_parent;
1780 if (parent == d)
1781 break;
1782 d = parent;
1783 }
1784 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1785 rcu_read_unlock();
1786 if (!drop) {
1787 /* just a race with rename */
1788 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1789 goto retry;
1790 }
1791 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1792 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1793 /* OK, got more space */
1794 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1795 goto retry;
1796 }
1797 /* too bad */
1798 printk(KERN_WARNING
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001799 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001800 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1801 audit_set_auditable(context);
1802 return;
1803 }
1804 rcu_read_unlock();
1805#endif
1806}
1807
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001808/**
1809 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1810 * @name: name to add
1811 *
1812 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1813 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1814 */
Al Virod8945bb52006-05-18 16:01:30 -04001815void __audit_getname(const char *name)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001816{
1817 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1818
Al Virod8945bb52006-05-18 16:01:30 -04001819 if (IS_ERR(name) || !name)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001820 return;
1821
1822 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1823#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1824 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1825 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1826 dump_stack();
1827#endif
1828 return;
1829 }
1830 BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
1831 context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04001832 context->names[context->name_count].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1833 context->names[context->name_count].name_put = 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001834 context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
Amy Griffise41e8bd2007-02-13 14:14:09 -05001835 context->names[context->name_count].osid = 0;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001836 ++context->name_count;
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001837 if (!context->pwd.dentry) {
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001838 read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
Jan Blunck44707fd2008-02-14 19:38:33 -08001839 context->pwd = current->fs->pwd;
1840 path_get(&current->fs->pwd);
David Woodhouse8f37d472005-05-27 12:17:28 +01001841 read_unlock(&current->fs->lock);
1842 }
Daniel Walker9f8dbe92007-10-18 03:06:09 -07001843
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001844}
1845
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001846/* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1847 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1848 *
1849 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1850 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1851 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1852 */
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001853void audit_putname(const char *name)
1854{
1855 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1856
1857 BUG_ON(!context);
1858 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1859#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1860 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1861 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1862 if (context->name_count) {
1863 int i;
1864 for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
1865 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1866 context->names[i].name,
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001867 context->names[i].name ?: "(null)");
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001868 }
1869#endif
1870 __putname(name);
1871 }
1872#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1873 else {
1874 ++context->put_count;
1875 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1876 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1877 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1878 " put_count=%d\n",
1879 __FILE__, __LINE__,
1880 context->serial, context->major,
1881 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
1882 context->put_count);
1883 dump_stack();
1884 }
1885 }
1886#endif
1887}
1888
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001889static int audit_inc_name_count(struct audit_context *context,
1890 const struct inode *inode)
1891{
1892 if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES) {
1893 if (inode)
1894 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data: "
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001895 "dev=%02x:%02x, inode=%lu\n",
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001896 MAJOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1897 MINOR(inode->i_sb->s_dev),
1898 inode->i_ino);
1899
1900 else
Eric Paris436c4052008-04-18 10:01:04 -04001901 printk(KERN_DEBUG "name_count maxed, losing inode data\n");
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001902 return 1;
1903 }
1904 context->name_count++;
1905#if AUDIT_DEBUG
1906 context->ino_count++;
1907#endif
1908 return 0;
1909}
1910
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001911
1912static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
1913{
1914 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
1915 int rc;
1916
1917 memset(&name->fcap.permitted, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1918 memset(&name->fcap.inheritable, 0, sizeof(kernel_cap_t));
1919 name->fcap.fE = 0;
1920 name->fcap_ver = 0;
1921
1922 if (!dentry)
1923 return 0;
1924
1925 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
1926 if (rc)
1927 return rc;
1928
1929 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
1930 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
1931 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
1932 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
1933
1934 return 0;
1935}
1936
1937
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04001938/* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001939static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1940 const struct inode *inode)
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001941{
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04001942 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
1943 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
1944 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
1945 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
1946 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
1947 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02001948 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001949 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
Dustin Kirkland8c8570f2005-11-03 17:15:16 +00001950}
1951
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001952/**
1953 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1954 * @name: name being audited
Randy Dunlap481968f2007-10-21 20:59:53 -07001955 * @dentry: dentry being audited
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07001956 *
1957 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
1958 */
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04001959void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001960{
1961 int idx;
1962 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001963 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001964
1965 if (!context->in_syscall)
1966 return;
1967 if (context->name_count
1968 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
1969 && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
1970 idx = context->name_count - 1;
1971 else if (context->name_count > 1
1972 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
1973 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
1974 idx = context->name_count - 2;
1975 else {
1976 /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
1977 * associated name? */
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001978 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001979 return;
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05001980 idx = context->name_count - 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001981 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001982 }
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04001983 handle_path(dentry);
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11001984 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], dentry, inode);
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07001985}
1986
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001987/**
1988 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1989 * @dname: inode's dentry name
Randy Dunlap481968f2007-10-21 20:59:53 -07001990 * @dentry: dentry being audited
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04001991 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00001992 *
1993 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1994 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1995 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1996 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1997 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1998 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1999 * unsuccessful attempts.
2000 */
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04002001void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct dentry *dentry,
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002002 const struct inode *parent)
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002003{
2004 int idx;
2005 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002006 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
Al Viro5a190ae2007-06-07 12:19:32 -04002007 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
Amy Griffis9c937dc2006-06-08 23:19:31 -04002008 int dirlen = 0;
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002009
2010 if (!context->in_syscall)
2011 return;
2012
Al Viro74c3cbe2007-07-22 08:04:18 -04002013 if (inode)
2014 handle_one(inode);
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002015 /* determine matching parent */
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -04002016 if (!dname)
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002017 goto add_names;
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002018
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002019 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2020 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2021 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002022
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002023 if (!n->name)
2024 continue;
2025
2026 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2027 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2028 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2029 found_parent = n->name;
2030 goto add_names;
Amy Griffisf368c07d2006-04-07 16:55:56 -04002031 }
Steve Grubbac9910c2006-09-28 14:31:32 -04002032 }
Amy Griffis73241cc2005-11-03 16:00:25 +00002033
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002034 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2035 for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) {
2036 struct audit_names *n = &context->names[idx];
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002037
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002038 if (!n->name)
2039 continue;
2040
2041 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2042 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2043 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2044 if (inode)
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002045 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002046 else
2047 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2048 found_child = n->name;
2049 goto add_names;
Steve Grubbac9910c2006-09-28 14:31:32 -04002050 }
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002051 }
2052
2053add_names:
2054 if (!found_parent) {
2055 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, parent))
2056 return;
2057 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2058 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002059 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, parent);
Amy Griffis73d3ec52006-07-13 13:16:39 -04002060 }
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002061
2062 if (!found_child) {
2063 if (audit_inc_name_count(context, inode))
2064 return;
2065 idx = context->name_count - 1;
2066
2067 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2068 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2069 * audit_free_names() */
2070 if (found_parent) {
2071 context->names[idx].name = found_parent;
2072 context->names[idx].name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2073 /* don't call __putname() */
2074 context->names[idx].name_put = 0;
2075 } else {
2076 context->names[idx].name = NULL;
2077 }
2078
2079 if (inode)
Eric Paris851f7ff2008-11-11 21:48:14 +11002080 audit_copy_inode(&context->names[idx], NULL, inode);
Amy Griffis5712e882007-02-13 14:15:22 -05002081 else
2082 context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2083 }
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04002084}
Trond Myklebust50e437d2007-06-07 22:44:34 -04002085EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
Amy Griffis3e2efce2006-07-13 13:16:02 -04002086
2087/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002088 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2089 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2090 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2091 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2092 *
2093 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2094 */
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002095int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
David Woodhousebfb44962005-05-21 21:08:09 +01002096 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002097{
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002098 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2099 return 0;
David Woodhousece625a82005-07-18 14:24:46 -04002100 if (!ctx->serial)
2101 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
David Woodhousebfb44962005-05-21 21:08:09 +01002102 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2103 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2104 *serial = ctx->serial;
Al Viro0590b932008-12-14 23:45:27 -05002105 if (!ctx->prio) {
2106 ctx->prio = 1;
2107 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2108 }
Al Viro48887e62008-12-06 01:05:50 -05002109 return 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002110}
2111
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002112/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2113static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2114
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002115/**
2116 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2117 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2118 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2119 *
2120 * Returns 0.
2121 *
2122 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2123 */
Steve Grubb456be6c2005-04-29 17:30:07 +01002124int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002125{
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002126 unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
Steve Grubb41757102006-06-12 07:48:28 -04002127 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01002128
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002129 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2130 struct audit_buffer *ab;
Steve Grubb41757102006-06-12 07:48:28 -04002131
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002132 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2133 if (ab) {
2134 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002135 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2136 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002137 task->pid, task_uid(task),
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002138 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2139 task->sessionid, sessionid);
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002140 audit_log_end(ab);
Steve Grubbc0404992005-05-13 18:17:42 +01002141 }
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002142 }
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002143 task->sessionid = sessionid;
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002144 task->loginuid = loginuid;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002145 return 0;
2146}
2147
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002148/**
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002149 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2150 * @oflag: open flag
2151 * @mode: mode bits
2152 * @u_attr: queue attributes
2153 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002154 */
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002155void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, mode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002156{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002157 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2158
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002159 if (attr)
2160 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2161 else
2162 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002163
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002164 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2165 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002166
Al Viro564f6992008-12-14 04:02:26 -05002167 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002168}
2169
2170/**
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002171 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002172 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2173 * @msg_len: Message length
2174 * @msg_prio: Message priority
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002175 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002176 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002177 */
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002178void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2179 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002180{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002181 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002182 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002183
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002184 if (abs_timeout)
2185 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2186 else
2187 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002188
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002189 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2190 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2191 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002192
Al Viroc32c8af2008-12-14 03:46:48 -05002193 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002194}
2195
2196/**
2197 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2198 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2199 * @u_notification: Notification event
2200 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002201 */
2202
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002203void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002204{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002205 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2206
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002207 if (notification)
2208 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2209 else
2210 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002211
Al Viro20114f72008-12-10 07:16:12 -05002212 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2213 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002214}
2215
2216/**
2217 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2218 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2219 * @mqstat: MQ flags
2220 *
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002221 */
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05002222void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002223{
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002224 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro73929062008-12-10 06:58:59 -05002225 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2226 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2227 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
George C. Wilson20ca73b2006-05-24 16:09:55 -05002228}
2229
2230/**
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002231 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2232 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2233 *
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002234 */
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002235void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002236{
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002237 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002238 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2239 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2240 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002241 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
Al Viroa33e6752008-12-10 03:40:06 -05002242 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2243 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
Steve Grubb073115d2006-04-02 17:07:33 -04002244}
2245
2246/**
2247 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002248 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2249 * @uid: msgq user id
2250 * @gid: msgq group id
2251 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2252 *
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002253 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002254 */
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002255void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002256{
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002257 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2258
Al Viroe816f372008-12-10 03:47:15 -05002259 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2260 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2261 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2262 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2263 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
Linus Torvalds1da177e2005-04-16 15:20:36 -07002264}
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002265
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002266int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2267{
2268 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2269 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002270
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002271 if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy))
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002272 return 0;
2273
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07002274 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002275 if (!ax)
2276 return -ENOMEM;
2277
2278 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2279 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
Peter Zijlstrabdf4c482007-07-19 01:48:15 -07002280 ax->mm = bprm->mm;
Al Viro473ae302006-04-26 14:04:08 -04002281 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2282 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2283 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2284 return 0;
2285}
2286
2287
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002288/**
2289 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2290 * @nargs: number of args
2291 * @args: args array
2292 *
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002293 */
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002294void audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002295{
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002296 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2297
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002298 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002299 return;
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002300
Al Virof3298dc2008-12-10 03:16:51 -05002301 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2302 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2303 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002304}
2305
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002306/**
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002307 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2308 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2309 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2310 *
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002311 */
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05002312void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002313{
2314 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro157cf642008-12-14 04:57:47 -05002315 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2316 context->fds[1] = fd2;
Al Virodb349502007-02-07 01:48:00 -05002317}
2318
2319/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002320 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2321 * @len: data length in user space
2322 * @a: data address in kernel space
2323 *
2324 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2325 */
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002326int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2327{
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002328 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2329
Al Viro5ac3a9c2006-07-16 06:38:45 -04002330 if (likely(!context || context->dummy))
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002331 return 0;
2332
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05002333 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2334 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2335 if (!p)
2336 return -ENOMEM;
2337 context->sockaddr = p;
2338 }
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002339
Al Viro4f6b4342008-12-09 19:50:34 -05002340 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2341 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
David Woodhouse3ec3b2f2005-05-17 12:08:48 +01002342 return 0;
2343}
2344
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04002345void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2346{
2347 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2348
2349 context->target_pid = t->pid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002350 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002351 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002352 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002353 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002354 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Al Viroa5cb0132007-03-20 13:58:35 -04002355}
2356
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002357/**
Randy Dunlapb0dd25a2005-09-13 12:47:11 -07002358 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2359 * @sig: signal value
2360 * @t: task being signaled
2361 *
2362 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2363 * and uid that is doing that.
2364 */
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002365int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002366{
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002367 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2368 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2369 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002370 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002371
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002372 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
Eric Parisee1d3152008-07-07 10:49:45 -04002373 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002374 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
Al Virobfef93a2008-01-10 04:53:18 -05002375 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2376 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002377 else
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002378 audit_sig_uid = uid;
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002379 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
Al Viro175fc482007-08-08 00:01:46 +01002380 }
2381 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2382 return 0;
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002383 }
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002384
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002385 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2386 * in audit_context */
2387 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2388 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002389 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002390 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002391 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002392 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002393 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002394 return 0;
2395 }
2396
2397 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2398 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2399 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2400 if (!axp)
2401 return -ENOMEM;
2402
2403 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2404 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2405 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2406 }
Adrian Bunk88ae7042007-08-22 14:01:05 -07002407 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002408
2409 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002410 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
David Howellsc69e8d92008-11-14 10:39:19 +11002411 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002412 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002413 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
Eric Parisc2a77802008-01-07 13:40:17 -05002414 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
Amy Griffise54dc242007-03-29 18:01:04 -04002415 axp->pid_count++;
2416
2417 return 0;
Steve Grubbc2f0c7c2005-05-06 12:38:39 +01002418}
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002419
2420/**
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002421 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002422 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2423 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2424 * @old: the old credentials
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002425 *
2426 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2427 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2428 *
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002429 * -Eric
2430 */
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002431int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2432 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002433{
2434 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2435 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2436 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2437 struct dentry *dentry;
2438
2439 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2440 if (!ax)
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002441 return -ENOMEM;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002442
2443 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2444 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2445 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2446
2447 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2448 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2449 dput(dentry);
2450
2451 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2452 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2453 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2454 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2455
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002456 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2457 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2458 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002459
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002460 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2461 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2462 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2463 return 0;
Eric Paris3fc689e2008-11-11 21:48:18 +11002464}
2465
2466/**
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002467 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002468 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2469 * @new: the new credentials
2470 * @old: the old (current) credentials
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002471 *
2472 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2473 * audit system if applicable
2474 */
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05002475void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
David Howellsd84f4f92008-11-14 10:39:23 +11002476 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002477{
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002478 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
Al Viro57f71a02009-01-04 14:52:57 -05002479 context->capset.pid = pid;
2480 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2481 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2482 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2483 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
Eric Parise68b75a02008-11-11 21:48:22 +11002484}
2485
2486/**
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002487 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
Henrik Kretzschmar6d9525b2007-07-15 23:41:10 -07002488 * @signr: signal value
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002489 *
2490 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2491 * should record the event for investigation.
2492 */
2493void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2494{
2495 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2496 u32 sid;
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002497 uid_t auid = audit_get_loginuid(current), uid;
2498 gid_t gid;
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002499 unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002500
2501 if (!audit_enabled)
2502 return;
2503
2504 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2505 return;
2506
2507 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002508 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
Eric Paris4746ec52008-01-08 10:06:53 -05002509 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
David Howells76aac0e2008-11-14 10:39:12 +11002510 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002511 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002512 if (sid) {
2513 char *ctx = NULL;
2514 u32 len;
2515
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002516 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002517 audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002518 else {
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002519 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
Ahmed S. Darwish2a862b32008-03-01 21:54:38 +02002520 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
2521 }
Steve Grubb0a4ff8c2007-04-19 10:28:21 -04002522 }
2523 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2524 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2525 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2526 audit_log_end(ab);
2527}