diff --git a/public/charger.te b/public/charger.te
index 9c48ddd..4577cbc 100644
--- a/public/charger.te
+++ b/public/charger.te
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@
 r_dir_file(charger, rootfs)
 r_dir_file(charger, cgroup)
 
-allow charger self:capability { sys_tty_config };
-allow charger self:capability sys_boot;
+allow charger self:global_capability_class_set { sys_tty_config };
+allow charger self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
 
 wakelock_use(charger)
 
diff --git a/public/clatd.te b/public/clatd.te
index 212b76e..ee44abf 100644
--- a/public/clatd.te
+++ b/public/clatd.te
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 allow clatd netd:unix_stream_socket { read write };
 allow clatd netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
 
-allow clatd self:capability { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid };
+allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid };
 
 # clatd calls mmap(MAP_LOCKED) with a 1M buffer. MAP_LOCKED first checks
 # capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK), and then checks to see the requested amount is
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 # so we permit any requests we see from clatd asking for this capability.
 # See https://android-review.googlesource.com/127940 and
 # https://b.corp.google.com/issues/21736319
-allow clatd self:capability ipc_lock;
+allow clatd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
 
 allow clatd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
 allow clatd self:{ packet_socket rawip_socket tun_socket } create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
diff --git a/public/crash_dump.te b/public/crash_dump.te
index c101b34..d70b150 100644
--- a/public/crash_dump.te
+++ b/public/crash_dump.te
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
 
 # crash_dump might inherit CAP_SYS_PTRACE from a privileged process,
 # which will result in an audit log even when it's allowed to trace.
-dontaudit crash_dump self:capability { sys_ptrace };
+dontaudit crash_dump self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace };
 
 userdebug_or_eng(`
   allow crash_dump logd:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
diff --git a/public/dhcp.te b/public/dhcp.te
index 2b54b7f..1f1ef2b 100644
--- a/public/dhcp.te
+++ b/public/dhcp.te
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 net_domain(dhcp)
 
 allow dhcp cgroup:dir { create write add_name };
-allow dhcp self:capability { setgid setuid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
+allow dhcp self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service };
 allow dhcp self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow dhcp self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
 allow dhcp shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/dnsmasq.te b/public/dnsmasq.te
index ccac69a..3aaefd3 100644
--- a/public/dnsmasq.te
+++ b/public/dnsmasq.te
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
 allowxperm dnsmasq self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
 
 # TODO:  Run with dhcp group to avoid need for dac_override.
-allow dnsmasq self:capability dac_override;
+allow dnsmasq self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
 
-allow dnsmasq self:capability { net_admin net_raw net_bind_service setgid setuid };
+allow dnsmasq self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw net_bind_service setgid setuid };
 
 allow dnsmasq dhcp_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
 allow dnsmasq dhcp_data_file:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 7c53d0c..f4d5c68 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
   -init
   -ueventd
   -vold
-} self:capability mknod;
+} self:global_capability_class_set mknod;
 
 # Limit raw I/O to these whitelisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
 neverallow {
@@ -261,16 +261,16 @@
   -healthd
   -uncrypt
   -tee
-} self:capability sys_rawio;
+} self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
 
 # No process can map low memory (< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR).
 neverallow * self:memprotect mmap_zero;
 
 # No domain needs mac_override as it is unused by SELinux.
-neverallow * self:capability2 mac_override;
+neverallow * self:global_capability2_class_set mac_override;
 
 # Only recovery needs mac_admin to set contexts not defined in current policy.
-neverallow { domain -recovery } self:capability2 mac_admin;
+neverallow { domain -recovery } self:global_capability2_class_set mac_admin;
 
 # Once the policy has been loaded there shall be none to modify the policy.
 # It is sealed.
@@ -1096,7 +1096,7 @@
 neverallow {
   domain
   -recovery
-} self:capability setfcap;
+} self:global_capability_class_set setfcap;
 
 # Enforce AT_SECURE for executing crash_dump.
 neverallow domain crash_dump:process noatsecure;
diff --git a/public/dumpstate.te b/public/dumpstate.te
index 772b63d..6f1fa69 100644
--- a/public/dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -8,12 +8,12 @@
 
 # Allow setting process priority, protect from OOM killer, and dropping
 # privileges by switching UID / GID
-allow dumpstate self:capability { setuid setgid sys_resource };
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid sys_resource };
 
 # Allow dumpstate to scan through /proc/pid for all processes
 r_dir_file(dumpstate, domain)
 
-allow dumpstate self:capability {
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set {
     # Send signals to processes
     kill
     # Run iptables
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
 allow dumpstate system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # Create and write into /data/anr/
-allow dumpstate self:capability { dac_override chown fowner fsetid };
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override chown fowner fsetid };
 allow dumpstate anr_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow dumpstate anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 allow dumpstate system_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Read dmesg
-allow dumpstate self:capability2 syslog;
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
 allow dumpstate kernel:system syslog_read;
 
 # Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
 allow dumpstate sysfs_vibrator:file { rw_file_perms getattr };
 
 # Reading /proc/PID/maps of other processes
-allow dumpstate self:capability sys_ptrace;
+allow dumpstate self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
 
 # Allow the bugreport service to create a file in
 # /data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport
diff --git a/public/global_macros b/public/global_macros
index bcfb686..5dab5ab 100644
--- a/public/global_macros
+++ b/public/global_macros
@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 #####################################
 # Common groupings of object classes.
 #
-define(`capability_class_set', `{ capability capability2 }')
+define(`capability_class_set', `{ capability capability2 cap_userns cap2_userns }')
+define(`global_capability_class_set', `{ capability cap_userns }')
+define(`global_capability2_class_set', `{ capability2 cap2_userns }')
 
 define(`devfile_class_set', `{ chr_file blk_file }')
 define(`notdevfile_class_set', `{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }')
diff --git a/public/hal_bluetooth.te b/public/hal_bluetooth.te
index 2394e2e..461523b 100644
--- a/public/hal_bluetooth.te
+++ b/public/hal_bluetooth.te
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 wakelock_use(hal_bluetooth);
 
 # The HAL toggles rfkill to power the chip off/on.
-allow hal_bluetooth self:capability net_admin;
+allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
 
 # bluetooth factory file accesses.
 r_dir_file(hal_bluetooth, bluetooth_efs_file)
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 # sysfs access.
 r_dir_file(hal_bluetooth, sysfs_type)
 allow hal_bluetooth sysfs_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
-allow hal_bluetooth self:capability2 wake_alarm;
+allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability2_class_set wake_alarm;
 
 # Allow write access to bluetooth-specific properties
 set_prop(hal_bluetooth, bluetooth_prop)
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@
 allow hal_bluetooth proc_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
-allow hal_bluetooth self:capability sys_nice;
+allow hal_bluetooth self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te b/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
index f56e8f6..e2b04ae 100644
--- a/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
+++ b/public/hal_graphics_allocator.te
@@ -10,4 +10,4 @@
 allow hal_graphics_allocator ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 
 # allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
-allow hal_graphics_allocator self:capability sys_nice;
+allow hal_graphics_allocator self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/hal_graphics_composer.te b/public/hal_graphics_composer.te
index 287037c..2df4612 100644
--- a/public/hal_graphics_composer.te
+++ b/public/hal_graphics_composer.te
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@
 allow hal_graphics_composer appdomain:fd use;
 
 # allow self to set SCHED_FIFO
-allow hal_graphics_composer self:capability sys_nice;
+allow hal_graphics_composer self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/hal_neverallows.te b/public/hal_neverallows.te
index 036e1d2..c866bae 100644
--- a/public/hal_neverallows.te
+++ b/public/hal_neverallows.te
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
   -hal_wifi_server
   -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
   -rild
-} self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
+} self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
 
 # Unless a HAL's job is to communicate over the network, or control network
 # hardware, it should not be using network sockets.
diff --git a/public/hal_sensors.te b/public/hal_sensors.te
index 068c93b..9d7cbe9 100644
--- a/public/hal_sensors.te
+++ b/public/hal_sensors.te
@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@
 allow hal_sensors hal_allocator:fd use;
 
 # allow to run with real-time scheduling policy
-allow hal_sensors self:capability sys_nice;
+allow hal_sensors self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
diff --git a/public/hal_wifi.te b/public/hal_wifi.te
index e267731..ac8a0d9 100644
--- a/public/hal_wifi.te
+++ b/public/hal_wifi.te
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 allow hal_wifi self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
 allowxperm hal_wifi self:udp_socket ioctl { SIOCSIFFLAGS };
 
-allow hal_wifi self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
+allow hal_wifi self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
 # allow hal_wifi to speak to nl80211 in the kernel
 allow hal_wifi self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 # newer kernels (e.g. 4.4 but not 4.1) have a new class for sockets
@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@
 # hal_wifi writes firmware paths to this file.
 allow hal_wifi sysfs_wlan_fwpath:file { w_file_perms };
 # allow hal_wifi to access /proc/modules to check if Wi-Fi driver is loaded
-allow hal_wifi proc_modules:file { getattr open read };
\ No newline at end of file
+allow hal_wifi proc_modules:file { getattr open read };
diff --git a/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te b/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
index 10db826..6bf0d32 100644
--- a/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
+++ b/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 r_dir_file(hal_wifi_supplicant, proc_net)
 
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant kernel:system module_request;
-allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:capability { setuid net_admin setgid net_raw };
+allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:global_capability_class_set { setuid net_admin setgid net_raw };
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
 allow hal_wifi_supplicant self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
diff --git a/public/healthd.te b/public/healthd.te
index e7c92c4..856a4b1 100644
--- a/public/healthd.te
+++ b/public/healthd.te
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
 # /{system,vendor,odm}/lib[64]/hw/
 r_dir_file(healthd, system_file)
 
-allow healthd self:capability { sys_tty_config };
-allow healthd self:capability sys_boot;
+allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_tty_config };
+allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
 
 allow healthd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index deeb887..9792522 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
 allow init misc_block_device:{ blk_file lnk_file } relabelto;
 
 # setrlimit
-allow init self:capability sys_resource;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
 
 # Remove /dev/.booting, created before initial policy load or restorecon /dev.
 allow init tmpfs:file unlink;
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@
 allow init tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Call mount(2).
-allow init self:capability sys_admin;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
 
 # Create and mount on directories in /.
 allow init rootfs:dir create_dir_perms;
@@ -92,12 +92,12 @@
 allow init tmpfs:dir relabelfrom;
 
 # Create directories under /dev/cpuctl after chowning it to system.
-allow init self:capability dac_override;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
 
 # Set system clock.
-allow init self:capability sys_time;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_time;
 
-allow init self:capability { sys_rawio mknod };
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set { sys_rawio mknod };
 
 # Mounting filesystems from block devices.
 allow init dev_type:blk_file r_file_perms;
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
 # system/core/init.rc requires at least cache_file and data_file_type.
 # init.<board>.rc files often include device-specific types, so
 # we just allow all file types except /system files here.
-allow init self:capability { chown fowner fsetid };
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set { chown fowner fsetid };
 
 allow init {
   file_type
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@
 # Any operation that can modify the kernel ring buffer, e.g. clear
 # or a read that consumes the messages that were read.
 allow init kernel:system syslog_mod;
-allow init self:capability2 syslog;
+allow init self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
 
 # init access to /proc.
 r_dir_file(init, proc_net)
@@ -295,10 +295,10 @@
 # Set usermodehelpers.
 allow init { usermodehelper sysfs_usermodehelper }:file rw_file_perms;
 
-allow init self:capability net_admin;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
 
 # Reboot.
-allow init self:capability sys_boot;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
 
 # Write to sysfs nodes.
 allow init sysfs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@
 allow init misc_logd_file:file { open create getattr setattr write };
 
 # Support "adb shell stop"
-allow init self:capability kill;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set kill;
 allow init domain:process { getpgid sigkill signal };
 
 # Init creates keystore's directory on boot, and walks through
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@
 allow init shell_data_file:file { getattr };
 
 # Set UID, GID, and adjust capability bounding set for services.
-allow init self:capability { setuid setgid setpcap };
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid setpcap };
 
 # For bootchart to read the /proc/$pid/cmdline file of each process,
 # we need to have following line to allow init to have access
@@ -369,13 +369,13 @@
 # so it can be picked up and processed by logd. These denials are
 # generated when an attempt to set a property is denied by policy.
 allow init self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_relay };
-allow init self:capability audit_write;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set audit_write;
 
 # Run "ifup lo" to bring up the localhost interface
 allow init self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
 # in addition to unpriv ioctls granted to all domains, init also needs:
 allowxperm init self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCSIFFLAGS;
-allow init self:capability net_raw;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set net_raw;
 
 # This line seems suspect, as it should not really need to
 # set scheduling parameters for a kernel domain task.
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
 allow init device:file create_file_perms;
 
 # keychord configuration
-allow init self:capability sys_tty_config;
+allow init self:global_capability_class_set sys_tty_config;
 allow init keychord_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Access device mapper for setting up dm-verity
diff --git a/public/install_recovery.te b/public/install_recovery.te
index 2115663..ab68838 100644
--- a/public/install_recovery.te
+++ b/public/install_recovery.te
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type install_recovery, domain;
 type install_recovery_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
-allow install_recovery self:capability dac_override;
+allow install_recovery self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
 
 # /system/bin/install-recovery.sh is a shell script.
 # Needs to execute /system/bin/sh
diff --git a/public/installd.te b/public/installd.te
index d02a86a..fad4562 100644
--- a/public/installd.te
+++ b/public/installd.te
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type installd, domain;
 type installd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 typeattribute installd mlstrustedsubject;
-allow installd self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid sys_admin };
+allow installd self:global_capability_class_set { chown dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid sys_admin };
 
 # Allow labeling of files under /data/app/com.example/oat/
 allow installd dalvikcache_data_file:dir relabelto;
diff --git a/public/kernel.te b/public/kernel.te
index 74c77a9..ba1dec9 100644
--- a/public/kernel.te
+++ b/public/kernel.te
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # Life begins with the kernel.
 type kernel, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 
-allow kernel self:capability sys_nice;
+allow kernel self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
 
 # Root fs.
 r_dir_file(kernel, rootfs)
@@ -33,14 +33,14 @@
 dontaudit kernel self:security setenforce;
 
 # Write to /proc/1/oom_adj prior to switching to init domain.
-allow kernel self:capability sys_resource;
+allow kernel self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
 
 # Init reboot before switching selinux domains under certain error
 # conditions. Allow it.
 # As part of rebooting, init writes "u" to /proc/sysrq-trigger to
 # remount filesystems read-only. /data is not mounted at this point,
 # so we could ignore this. For now, we allow it.
-allow kernel self:capability sys_boot;
+allow kernel self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
 allow kernel proc_sysrq:file w_file_perms;
 
 # Allow writing to /dev/kmsg which was created prior to loading policy.
@@ -101,4 +101,4 @@
 # the kernel should not be accessing files owned by other users.
 # Instead of adding dac_{read_search,override}, fix the unix permissions
 # on files being accessed.
-neverallow kernel self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search };
+neverallow kernel self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
diff --git a/public/lmkd.te b/public/lmkd.te
index 0ff9518..f43e42a 100644
--- a/public/lmkd.te
+++ b/public/lmkd.te
@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@
 type lmkd, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 type lmkd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
-allow lmkd self:capability { dac_override sys_resource kill };
+allow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override sys_resource kill };
 
 # lmkd locks itself in memory, to prevent it from being
 # swapped out and unable to kill other memory hogs.
 # system/core commit b28ff9131363f7b4a698990da5748b2a88c3ed35
 # b/16236289
-allow lmkd self:capability ipc_lock;
+allow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
 
 ## Open and write to /proc/PID/oom_score_adj
 ## TODO: maybe scope this down?
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 allow lmkd cgroup:file r_file_perms;
 
 # Set self to SCHED_FIFO
-allow lmkd self:capability sys_nice;
+allow lmkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
 
 allow lmkd proc_zoneinfo:file r_file_perms;
 
diff --git a/public/logd.te b/public/logd.te
index c47bfd7..817a705 100644
--- a/public/logd.te
+++ b/public/logd.te
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
 r_dir_file(logd, proc_meminfo)
 r_dir_file(logd, proc_net)
 
-allow logd self:capability { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
-allow logd self:capability2 syslog;
+allow logd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid setpcap sys_nice audit_control };
+allow logd self:global_capability2_class_set syslog;
 allow logd self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write };
 allow logd kernel:system syslog_read;
 allow logd kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/modprobe.te b/public/modprobe.te
index 3ed320e..7d9e05d 100644
--- a/public/modprobe.te
+++ b/public/modprobe.te
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 type modprobe, domain;
 
 allow modprobe proc_modules:file r_file_perms;
-allow modprobe self:capability sys_module;
+allow modprobe self:global_capability_class_set sys_module;
 allow modprobe kernel:key search;
 recovery_only(`
   allow modprobe rootfs:system module_load;
diff --git a/public/mtp.te b/public/mtp.te
index a776240..7256bcf 100644
--- a/public/mtp.te
+++ b/public/mtp.te
@@ -6,6 +6,6 @@
 
 # pptp policy
 allow mtp self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
-allow mtp self:capability net_raw;
+allow mtp self:global_capability_class_set net_raw;
 allow mtp ppp:process signal;
 allow mtp vpn_data_file:dir search;
diff --git a/public/netd.te b/public/netd.te
index ab01fd8..fa03dbd 100644
--- a/public/netd.te
+++ b/public/netd.te
@@ -9,14 +9,14 @@
 r_dir_file(netd, cgroup)
 allow netd system_server:fd use;
 
-allow netd self:capability { net_admin net_raw kill };
+allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw kill };
 # Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are
 # triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other
 # than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if
 # the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid
 # bit was even set.  We do not appear to truly need this capability
 # for netd to operate.
-dontaudit netd self:capability fsetid;
+dontaudit netd self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
 
 allow netd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow netd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
@@ -60,12 +60,12 @@
 # TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related
 #       work.  However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them.
 #       Why?
-allow netd self:capability { dac_override chown };
+allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override chown };
 
 # Needed to update /data/misc/net/rt_tables
 allow netd net_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow netd net_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow netd self:capability fowner;
+allow netd self:global_capability_class_set fowner;
 
 # Needed to lock the iptables lock.
 allow netd system_file:file lock;
diff --git a/public/otapreopt_chroot.te b/public/otapreopt_chroot.te
index c071f44..894363a 100644
--- a/public/otapreopt_chroot.te
+++ b/public/otapreopt_chroot.te
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # Chroot preparation and execution.
 # We need to create an unshared mount namespace, and then mount /data.
 allow otapreopt_chroot postinstall_file:dir { search mounton };
-allow otapreopt_chroot self:capability { sys_admin sys_chroot };
+allow otapreopt_chroot self:global_capability_class_set { sys_admin sys_chroot };
 
 # This is required to mount /vendor.
 allow otapreopt_chroot block_device:dir search;
diff --git a/public/performanced.te b/public/performanced.te
index 9bf813e..5f23088 100644
--- a/public/performanced.te
+++ b/public/performanced.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 pdx_server(performanced, performance_client)
 
 # TODO: use file caps to obtain sys_nice instead of setuid / setgid.
-allow performanced self:capability { setuid setgid sys_nice };
+allow performanced self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid sys_nice };
 
 # Access /proc to validate we're only affecting threads in the same thread group.
 # Performanced also shields unbound kernel threads.  It scans every task in the
diff --git a/public/perfprofd.te b/public/perfprofd.te
index bfb8693..578391c 100644
--- a/public/perfprofd.te
+++ b/public/perfprofd.te
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
   # perfprofd reads a config file from /data/data/com.google.android.gms/files
   allow perfprofd app_data_file:file r_file_perms;
   allow perfprofd app_data_file:dir search;
-  allow perfprofd self:capability { dac_override };
+  allow perfprofd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override };
 
   # perfprofd opens a file for writing in /data/misc/perfprofd
   allow perfprofd perfprofd_data_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -34,13 +34,13 @@
   wakelock_use(perfprofd);
 
   # simpleperf uses ioctl() to turn on kernel perf events measurements
-  allow perfprofd self:capability sys_admin;
+  allow perfprofd self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
 
   # simpleperf needs to examine /proc to collect task/thread info
   r_dir_file(perfprofd, domain)
 
   # simpleperf needs to access /proc/<pid>/exec
-  allow perfprofd self:capability { sys_resource sys_ptrace };
+  allow perfprofd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_resource sys_ptrace };
   neverallow perfprofd domain:process ptrace;
 
   # simpleperf needs open/read any file that turns up in a profile
@@ -54,6 +54,6 @@
   allow perfprofd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
   # needed for simpleperf on some kernels
-  allow perfprofd self:capability ipc_lock;
+  allow perfprofd self:global_capability_class_set ipc_lock;
 
 ')
diff --git a/public/postinstall_dexopt.te b/public/postinstall_dexopt.te
index d6c2060..8881f44 100644
--- a/public/postinstall_dexopt.te
+++ b/public/postinstall_dexopt.te
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 
 type postinstall_dexopt, domain;
 
-allow postinstall_dexopt self:capability { chown dac_override fowner setgid setuid };
+allow postinstall_dexopt self:global_capability_class_set { chown dac_override fowner setgid setuid };
 
 allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_file:filesystem getattr;
 allow postinstall_dexopt postinstall_file:dir { getattr search };
diff --git a/public/ppp.te b/public/ppp.te
index 04e17f5..9340dee 100644
--- a/public/ppp.te
+++ b/public/ppp.te
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 allow ppp mtp:unix_dgram_socket rw_socket_perms;
 allow ppp ppp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow ppp self:capability net_admin;
+allow ppp self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
 allow ppp system_file:file rx_file_perms;
 not_full_treble(`allow ppp vendor_file:file rx_file_perms;')
 allow ppp vpn_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/racoon.te b/public/racoon.te
index 00744d8..c759217 100644
--- a/public/racoon.te
+++ b/public/racoon.te
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 allow racoon self:key_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow racoon self:tun_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
-allow racoon self:capability { net_admin net_bind_service net_raw };
+allow racoon self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_bind_service net_raw };
 
 # XXX: should we give ip-up-vpn its own label (currently racoon domain)
 allow racoon system_file:file rx_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/recovery.te b/public/recovery.te
index fb61dbd..3e3c28e 100644
--- a/public/recovery.te
+++ b/public/recovery.te
@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@
   # Recovery can only use HALs in passthrough mode
   passthrough_hal_client_domain(recovery, hal_bootctl)
 
-  allow recovery self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid setfcap setuid setgid sys_admin sys_tty_config };
+  allow recovery self:global_capability_class_set { chown dac_override fowner fsetid setfcap setuid setgid sys_admin sys_tty_config };
 
   # Set security contexts on files that are not known to the loaded policy.
-  allow recovery self:capability2 mac_admin;
+  allow recovery self:global_capability2_class_set mac_admin;
 
   # Run helpers from / or /system without changing domain.
   r_dir_file(recovery, rootfs)
diff --git a/public/rild.te b/public/rild.te
index 4244ff3..5bcde72 100644
--- a/public/rild.te
+++ b/public/rild.te
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 allow rild self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;
 allow rild kernel:system module_request;
-allow rild self:capability { setpcap setgid setuid net_admin net_raw };
+allow rild self:global_capability_class_set { setpcap setgid setuid net_admin net_raw };
 allow rild alarm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow rild cgroup:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow rild cgroup:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/runas.te b/public/runas.te
index ca6f4f6..053a87f 100644
--- a/public/runas.te
+++ b/public/runas.te
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 allow runas system_data_file:lnk_file read;
 
 # run-as checks and changes to the app data dir.
-dontaudit runas self:capability dac_override;
+dontaudit runas self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
 allow runas app_data_file:dir { getattr search };
 
 # run-as switches to the app UID/GID.
-allow runas self:capability { setuid setgid };
+allow runas self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid };
 
 # run-as switches to the app security context.
 selinux_check_context(runas) # validate context
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@
 ###
 
 # run-as cannot have capabilities other than CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID
-neverallow runas self:capability ~{ setuid setgid };
-neverallow runas self:capability2 *;
+neverallow runas self:global_capability_class_set ~{ setuid setgid };
+neverallow runas self:global_capability2_class_set *;
diff --git a/public/sdcardd.te b/public/sdcardd.te
index 2af6410..4a88f54 100644
--- a/public/sdcardd.te
+++ b/public/sdcardd.te
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 allow sdcardd storage_file:dir search;
 allow sdcardd storage_stub_file:dir { search mounton };
 allow sdcardd sdcard_type:filesystem { mount unmount };
-allow sdcardd self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override sys_admin sys_resource };
+allow sdcardd self:global_capability_class_set { setuid setgid dac_override sys_admin sys_resource };
 
 allow sdcardd sdcard_type:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow sdcardd sdcard_type:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/sgdisk.te b/public/sgdisk.te
index 3007398..ca3096c 100644
--- a/public/sgdisk.te
+++ b/public/sgdisk.te
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 allow sgdisk vold:fifo_file { read write getattr };
 
 # Used to probe kernel to reload partition tables
-allow sgdisk self:capability sys_admin;
+allow sgdisk self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
 
 # Only allow entry from vold
 neverallow { domain -vold } sgdisk:process transition;
diff --git a/public/slideshow.te b/public/slideshow.te
index 86d4bff..10fbbb8 100644
--- a/public/slideshow.te
+++ b/public/slideshow.te
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 allow slideshow kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 wakelock_use(slideshow)
 allow slideshow device:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow slideshow self:capability sys_tty_config;
+allow slideshow self:global_capability_class_set sys_tty_config;
 allow slideshow graphics_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow slideshow graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow slideshow input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index f3aa583..aad2949 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@
 # Access /sys/power/wake_lock and /sys/power/wake_unlock
 allow $1 sysfs_wake_lock:file rw_file_perms;
 # Accessing these files requires CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND
-allow $1 self:capability2 block_suspend;
+allow $1 self:global_capability2_class_set block_suspend;
 ')
 
 #####################################
diff --git a/public/ueventd.te b/public/ueventd.te
index 7e1f3fd..b4a2497 100644
--- a/public/ueventd.te
+++ b/public/ueventd.te
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 # Write to /dev/kmsg.
 allow ueventd kmsg_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
-allow ueventd self:capability { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override fowner };
+allow ueventd self:global_capability_class_set { chown mknod net_admin setgid fsetid sys_rawio dac_override fowner };
 allow ueventd device:file create_file_perms;
 
 r_dir_file(ueventd, rootfs)
diff --git a/public/uncrypt.te b/public/uncrypt.te
index dd2d7dd..1e48b83 100644
--- a/public/uncrypt.te
+++ b/public/uncrypt.te
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 type uncrypt, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 type uncrypt_exec, exec_type, file_type;
 
-allow uncrypt self:capability dac_override;
+allow uncrypt self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
 
 # Read OTA zip file from /data/data/com.google.android.gsf/app_download
 r_dir_file(uncrypt, app_data_file)
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 set_prop(uncrypt, powerctl_prop)
 
 # Raw writes to block device
-allow uncrypt self:capability sys_rawio;
+allow uncrypt self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
 allow uncrypt misc_block_device:blk_file w_file_perms;
 allow uncrypt block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 
diff --git a/public/update_engine.te b/public/update_engine.te
index fef5dec..6e97aa9 100644
--- a/public/update_engine.te
+++ b/public/update_engine.te
@@ -11,12 +11,12 @@
 
 # Following permissions are needed for update_engine.
 allow update_engine self:process { setsched };
-allow update_engine self:capability { fowner sys_admin };
+allow update_engine self:global_capability_class_set { fowner sys_admin };
 # Note: fsetid checks are triggered when creating a file in a directory with
 # the setgid bit set to determine if the file should inherit setgid. In this
 # case, setgid on the file is undesirable so we should just suppress the
 # denial.
-dontaudit update_engine self:capability fsetid;
+dontaudit update_engine self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
 
 allow update_engine kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
 allow update_engine update_engine_exec:file rx_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/vendor_init.te b/public/vendor_init.te
index 16d283f..5b9d09f 100644
--- a/public/vendor_init.te
+++ b/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -22,14 +22,14 @@
 allow vendor_init configfs:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
 
 # Create directories under /dev/cpuctl after chowning it to system.
-allow vendor_init self:capability dac_override;
+allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
 
 # mkdir, symlink, write, rm/rmdir, chown/chmod, restorecon/restorecon_recursive from init.rc files.
 # chown/chmod require open+read+setattr required for open()+fchown/fchmod().
 # system/core/init.rc requires at least cache_file and data_file_type.
 # init.<board>.rc files often include device-specific types, so
 # we just allow all file types except /system files here.
-allow vendor_init self:capability { chown fowner fsetid };
+allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set { chown fowner fsetid };
 
 allow vendor_init {
   file_type
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@
 # Write to /proc/sys/net/ping_group_range and other /proc/sys/net files.
 r_dir_file(vendor_init, proc_net)
 allow vendor_init proc_net:file w_file_perms;
-allow vendor_init self:capability net_admin;
+allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set net_admin;
 
 # Write to /proc/sys/vm/page-cluster
 allow vendor_init proc_page_cluster:file w_file_perms;
@@ -207,4 +207,4 @@
 allow vendor_init serialno_prop:file { getattr open read };
 
 # Vendor init can perform operations on trusted and security Extended Attributes
-allow vendor_init self:capability sys_admin;
+allow vendor_init self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
diff --git a/public/vold.te b/public/vold.te
index 148f4b5..b446915 100644
--- a/public/vold.te
+++ b/public/vold.te
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
 allow vold tmpfs:filesystem { mount unmount };
 allow vold tmpfs:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow vold tmpfs:dir mounton;
-allow vold self:capability { net_admin dac_override mknod sys_admin chown fowner fsetid };
+allow vold self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin dac_override mknod sys_admin chown fowner fsetid };
 allow vold self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 allow vold app_data_file:dir search;
 allow vold app_data_file:file rw_file_perms;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
 allow vold domain:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow vold domain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
 allow vold domain:process { signal sigkill };
-allow vold self:capability { sys_ptrace kill };
+allow vold self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace kill };
 
 # XXX Label sysfs files with a specific type?
 allow vold sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@
 allow vold vold:key { write search setattr };
 
 # vold temporarily changes its priority when running benchmarks
-allow vold self:capability sys_nice;
+allow vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_nice;
 
 # vold needs to chroot into app namespaces to remount when runtime permissions change
-allow vold self:capability sys_chroot;
+allow vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_chroot;
 allow vold storage_file:dir mounton;
 
 # For AppFuse.
diff --git a/public/wificond.te b/public/wificond.te
index c91053e..8eeb8c8 100644
--- a/public/wificond.te
+++ b/public/wificond.te
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 allow wificond self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
 # setting interface state up/down is a privileged ioctl
 allowxperm wificond self:udp_socket ioctl { SIOCSIFFLAGS };
-allow wificond self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
+allow wificond self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
 # allow wificond to speak to nl80211 in the kernel
 allow wificond self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 # newer kernels (e.g. 4.4 but not 4.1) have a new class for sockets
diff --git a/public/wpantund.te b/public/wpantund.te
index a97481e..b317236 100644
--- a/public/wpantund.te
+++ b/public/wpantund.te
@@ -25,5 +25,5 @@
 
 # Allow us to bring up a TUN network interface.
 allow wpantund tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow wpantund self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
+allow wpantund self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
 allow wpantund self:tun_socket create;