tree 898470778475e6da9b55906e4ee740da494a19e7
parent d12a874b09dbcb4964660e0718078fa49b9587b8
author Danny Lin <danny@kdrag0n.dev> 1687070591 +0530
committer SamarV-121 <samar@samarv121.dev> 1711267409 +0530
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base: Add Safetynet/Play Integrity hax

Author: Danny Lin <danny@kdrag0n.dev>
Date:   Mon Oct 11 19:59:51 2021 -0700

    Alter model name to avoid SafetyNet HW attestation enforcement

    As of September 2, Google is enforcing SafetyNet's previously
    opportunistic hardware-backed attestation based on device information.
    Append a space to the device model name in order to avoid such
    enforcement.

    Also contains:
            Spoof build fingerprint for Google Play Services

            SafetyNet's CTS profile attestation checks whether Build.FINGERPRINT
            matches that of the device's stock OS, which has passed CTS testing.
            Spoof the fingerprint for Google Play Services to help pass SafetyNet.

            We used to set the real system build fingerprint to the stock one, but
            Android relies on each build having a unique fingerprint in order to
            clear the correct caches and update persistent state for system changes.
            On devices that no longer receive updates from the OEM, the build
            fingerprint never changes and Android doesn't account for updates
            correctly, which causes issues when updating without wiping data.
            Only spoofing the fingerprint for Google Play Services fixes this issue.

            Corresponding vendor commit:
            "Only use stock build fingerprint for Google Play Services"

            NB: This code is under the gmscompat package, but it does not depend on
            any code from gmscompat.

            Change-Id: I26a2498eb2e2163933303b03f6d516e5fb30fe51

    * We don't need to spoof the fingerprint here since we do it globally, but we
      use the Build field spoofing code it added for model

    Change-Id: Ib7779e0aae40cab3730a56785e9231896917ab0a

Author: Danny Lin <danny@kdrag0n.dev>
Date:   Mon Oct 11 20:00:44 2021 -0700

    keystore: Block key attestation for SafetyNet

    SafetyNet (part of Google Play Services) opportunistically uses
    hardware-backed key attestation via KeyStore as a strong integrity
    check. This causes SafetyNet to fail on custom ROMs because the verified
    boot key and bootloader unlock state can be detected from attestation
    certificates.

    As a workaround, we can take advantage of the fact that SafetyNet's
    usage of key attestation is opportunistic (i.e. falls back to basic
    integrity checks if it fails) and prevent it from getting the
    attestation certificate chain from KeyStore. This is done by checking
    the stack for DroidGuard, which is the codename for SafetyNet, and
    pretending that the device doesn't support key attestation.

    Key attestation has only been blocked for SafetyNet specifically, as
    Google Play Services and other apps have many valid reasons to use it.
    For example, it appears to be involved in Google's mobile security key
    ferature.

    Change-Id: I5146439d47f42dc6231cb45c4dab9f61540056f6

Author: Tim Zimmermann <tim@linux4.de>
Date:   Fri Jun 3 17:20:55 2022 +0200

    core: Spoof build properties for SafetyNet

    * Unfortunately system side security patch can't be spoofed
      so we'll need to update the fingerprint every month

    Change-Id: I3c6c17c43d297d18e7f19fa74b3d6c17b9961378

Author: Tim Zimmermann <tim@linux4.de>
Date:   Sat Jun 4 18:38:07 2022 +0200

    core: Also spoof properties for samsung apps

    * Especially galaxy wearable apps don't work
      on samsung devices running AOSP

    Change-Id: I3663df8761c52ab8a1259c17e3a663ebf2b0ddbd

Author: SamarV-121 <samarvispute121@pm.me>
Date:   Tue Nov 29 08:41:15 2022 +0000

    gmscompat: Spoof Nexus 6P build fingerprint for GMS

    * Helps to pass DEVICE_INTEGRITY, tested using https://github.com/1nikolas/play-integrity-checker-app
    REF: https://github.com/kdrag0n/safetynet-fix/pull/207

    Change-Id: Id5f98f2f95f775ebba0a484caccb0e3beb75849b

Author: SamarV-121 <samarvispute121@pm.me>
Date:   Wed Nov 30 06:37:02 2022 +0000

    gmscompat: Stop spoofing vendor properties

    Change-Id: If1ba11a211efdbb4e0e752073b28a785eebc0132

Author: Danny Lin <danny@kdrag0n.dev>
Date:   Mon Nov 1 20:06:48 2021 -0700

    Limit SafetyNet workarounds to unstable GMS process

    The unstable process is where SafetyNet attestation actually runs, so
    we only need to spoof the model in that process. Leaving other processes
    fixes various issues caused by model detection and flag provisioning,
    including screen-off Voice Match in Google Assistant, broken At a Glance
    weather and settings on Android 12, and more.

    Change-Id: Idcf663907a6c3d0408dbd45b1ac53c9eb4200df8

Author: SamarV-121 <samarvispute121@pm.me>
Date:   Sat Dec 24 12:10:55 2022 +0000

    AttestationHooks: Cleanup and refactor a bit

    Change-Id: I957a06e97ec1deb949eb659474658df8fb791924

Author: Anirudh Gupta <anirudhgupta109@aosip.dev>
Date:   Wed Jan 4 18:20:56 2023 +0000

    gmscompat: Set shipping level to 32 for devices >=33

    If ro.product.first_api_level is 33, its forced to use HW attestation even though the safteynet checker app shows BASIC
    setting it to 32 allows for software attestation and passing CTS

    Change-Id: Ie7326eaac48424cdea3d9633ebe13c65053ef6c1
    Signed-off-by: Dyneteve <dyneteve@hentaios.com>

Author: Dyneteve <dyneteve@hentaios.com>
Date:   Wed Feb 8 15:21:01 2023 +0000

    gmscompat: Make CTS/Play Integrity pass again

    The logic behind CTS and Play Integrity has been updated today it now
    checks the product and model names against the fingerprint and if
    they do not match the CTS profile will fail.

    Also while we are at it use a newer FP from Pixel XL and add logging
    for key attestation blocking for debugging.

    Test: Boot, check for CTS and Play Integrity

    Change-Id: I089d5ef935bba40338e10c795ea7d181103ffd15
    Signed-off-by: Dyneteve <dyneteve@hentaios.com>

Author: Tim Josten <timjosten@gmail.com>
Date:   Tue Oct 24 21:55:02 2023 +0700

    gmscompat: Fix GMS drain triggered by an outdated ROM build date

    If the build date exceeds a month, GMS, thinking the device is Pixel, attempts a system update, which unexpectedly fails. This goes into an endless cycle which drains battery very quickly and generates a lot of heat. Let's fix it by spoofing the build date to something always fresh.

    Change-Id: Ib38883026d2a957e0d0a570e164c415dac154bb1

Change-Id: I774a8ffc98e329f5ccd79f07b0189b2ed19a6780