sctp: Free cookie before we memdup a new one
[ Upstream commit ce950f1050cece5e406a5cde723c69bba60e1b26 ]
Based on comments from Xin, even after fixes for our recent syzbot
report of cookie memory leaks, its possible to get a resend of an INIT
chunk which would lead to us leaking cookie memory.
To ensure that we don't leak cookie memory, free any previously
allocated cookie first.
Change notes
v1->v2
update subsystem tag in subject (davem)
repeat kfree check for peer_random and peer_hmacs (xin)
v2->v3
net->sctp
also free peer_chunks
v3->v4
fix subject tags
v4->v5
remove cut line
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+f7e9153b037eac9b1df8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
CC: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 4edb4f5..f67df16 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -2586,6 +2586,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
asoc->peer.cookie_len =
ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
+ if (asoc->peer.cookie)
+ kfree(asoc->peer.cookie);
asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(param.cookie->body, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.cookie)
retval = 0;
@@ -2650,6 +2652,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's random parameter */
+ if (asoc->peer.peer_random)
+ kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
@@ -2663,6 +2667,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's HMAC list */
+ if (asoc->peer.peer_hmacs)
+ kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
@@ -2678,6 +2684,8 @@ static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
+ if (asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
+ kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)