AUDIT: Avoid log pollution by untrusted strings.
We log strings from userspace, such as arguments to open(). These could
be formatted to contain \n followed by fake audit log entries. Provide
a function for logging such strings, which gives a hex dump when the
string contains anything but basic printable ASCII characters. Use it
for logging filenames.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 3628f7c..9b77992 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -174,11 +174,15 @@
const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf,2,3)));
extern void audit_log_end(struct audit_buffer *ab);
+extern void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+extern void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab,
+ const char *string);
extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *prefix,
struct dentry *dentry,
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt);
-
/* Private API (for auditsc.c only) */
extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
int done, int multi,
@@ -190,6 +194,8 @@
#define audit_log_vformat(b,f,a) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_format(b,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_end(b) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_log_hex(a,b,l) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_log_untrustedstring(a,s) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_d_path(b,p,d,v) do { ; } while (0)
#endif
#endif