diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index e3cbebb..482df23 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1197,9 +1197,6 @@
 	ssize_t length;
 	uid_t loginuid;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
-		return -EPERM;
-
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (current != pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID)) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index a075765..5ad8b77 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -372,6 +372,20 @@
 	depends on AUDITSYSCALL
 	select FSNOTIFY
 
+config AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
+	bool "Make audit loginuid immutable"
+	depends on AUDIT
+	help
+	  The config option toggles if a task setting it's loginuid requires
+	  CAP_SYS_AUDITCONTROL or if that task should require no special permissions
+	  but should instead only allow setting its loginuid if it was never
+	  previously set.  On systems which use systemd or a similar central
+	  process to restart login services this should be set to true.  On older
+	  systems in which an admin would typically have to directly stop and
+	  start processes this should be set to false.  Setting this to true allows
+	  one to drop potentially dangerous capabilites from the login tasks,
+	  but may not be backwards compatible with older init systems.
+
 source "kernel/irq/Kconfig"
 
 menu "RCU Subsystem"
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 9d6dd7d..bd084a1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2173,9 +2173,18 @@
 int audit_set_loginuid(uid_t loginuid)
 {
 	struct task_struct *task = current;
-	unsigned int sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
 	struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
+	unsigned int sessionid;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
+	if (task->loginuid != -1)
+		return -EPERM;
+#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
+	if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+		return -EPERM;
+#endif  /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
+
+	sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
 	if (context && context->in_syscall) {
 		struct audit_buffer *ab;