net: sctp: remove unused multiple cookie keys
Vlad says: The whole multiple cookie keys code is completely unused
and has been all this time. Noone uses anything other then the
secret_key[0] since there is no changeover support anywhere.
Thus, for now clean up its left-over fragments.
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index 1a9c5fb..73aad3d 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -151,9 +151,7 @@
ep->rcvbuf_policy = net->sctp.rcvbuf_policy;
/* Initialize the secret key used with cookie. */
- get_random_bytes(&ep->secret_key[0], SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
- ep->last_key = ep->current_key = 0;
- ep->key_changed_at = jiffies;
+ get_random_bytes(ep->secret_key, sizeof(ep->secret_key));
/* SCTP-AUTH extensions*/
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->endpoint_shared_keys);
@@ -249,8 +247,6 @@
/* Final destructor for endpoint. */
static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
- int i;
-
SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);
/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -273,8 +269,7 @@
sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);
- for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
- memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
+ memset(ep->secret_key, 0, sizeof(ep->secret_key));
/* Remove and free the port */
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index e1c5fc2..a193f3b 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1589,8 +1589,6 @@
struct sctp_signed_cookie *cookie;
struct scatterlist sg;
int headersize, bodysize;
- unsigned int keylen;
- char *key;
/* Header size is static data prior to the actual cookie, including
* any padding.
@@ -1650,12 +1648,11 @@
/* Sign the message. */
sg_init_one(&sg, &cookie->c, bodysize);
- keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE;
- key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key];
desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
desc.flags = 0;
- if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) ||
+ if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, ep->secret_key,
+ sizeof(ep->secret_key)) ||
crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, cookie->signature))
goto free_cookie;
}
@@ -1682,8 +1679,7 @@
int headersize, bodysize, fixed_size;
__u8 *digest = ep->digest;
struct scatterlist sg;
- unsigned int keylen, len;
- char *key;
+ unsigned int len;
sctp_scope_t scope;
struct sk_buff *skb = chunk->skb;
struct timeval tv;
@@ -1718,34 +1714,21 @@
goto no_hmac;
/* Check the signature. */
- keylen = SCTP_SECRET_SIZE;
sg_init_one(&sg, bear_cookie, bodysize);
- key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->current_key];
desc.tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
desc.flags = 0;
memset(digest, 0x00, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) ||
+ if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, ep->secret_key,
+ sizeof(ep->secret_key)) ||
crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) {
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
goto fail;
}
if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
- /* Try the previous key. */
- key = (char *)ep->secret_key[ep->last_key];
- memset(digest, 0x00, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
- if (crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, key, keylen) ||
- crypto_hash_digest(&desc, &sg, bodysize, digest)) {
- *error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (memcmp(digest, cookie->signature, SCTP_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
- /* Yikes! Still bad signature! */
- *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG;
- goto fail;
- }
+ *error = -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG;
+ goto fail;
}
no_hmac: