capabilities: implement per-process securebits
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.
Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.
Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.
The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.
With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 7d50ff6..eaab759 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@
* Add any capability from current's capability bounding set
* to the current process' inheritable set
* Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set
+ * Allow modification of the securebits for a process
*/
#define CAP_SETPCAP 8
@@ -490,8 +491,6 @@
int capable(int cap);
int __capable(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
-extern long cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap);
-
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
index 37a6f5b..bf6b8a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/init_task.h
+++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/ipc.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#define INIT_FDTABLE \
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@
.cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET, \
.cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, \
.cap_bset = CAP_INIT_BSET, \
- .keep_capabilities = 0, \
+ .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT, \
.user = INIT_USER, \
.comm = "swapper", \
.thread = INIT_THREAD, \
diff --git a/include/linux/prctl.h b/include/linux/prctl.h
index 5c80b19..5ad7919 100644
--- a/include/linux/prctl.h
+++ b/include/linux/prctl.h
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
# define PR_UNALIGN_NOPRINT 1 /* silently fix up unaligned user accesses */
# define PR_UNALIGN_SIGBUS 2 /* generate SIGBUS on unaligned user access */
-/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from uid 0 */
+/* Get/set whether or not to drop capabilities on setuid() away from
+ * uid 0 (as per security/commoncap.c) */
#define PR_GET_KEEPCAPS 7
#define PR_SET_KEEPCAPS 8
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@
#define PR_GET_SECCOMP 21
#define PR_SET_SECCOMP 22
-/* Get/set the capability bounding set */
+/* Get/set the capability bounding set (as per security/commoncap.c) */
#define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
#define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
@@ -73,4 +74,8 @@
# define PR_TSC_ENABLE 1 /* allow the use of the timestamp counter */
# define PR_TSC_SIGSEGV 2 /* throw a SIGSEGV instead of reading the TSC */
+/* Get/set securebits (as per security/commoncap.c) */
+#define PR_GET_SECUREBITS 27
+#define PR_SET_SECUREBITS 28
+
#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 9a4f3e6..024d72b 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/sem.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
-#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
@@ -1133,7 +1132,7 @@
gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid;
struct group_info *group_info;
kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_bset;
- unsigned keep_capabilities:1;
+ unsigned securebits;
struct user_struct *user;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
struct key *request_key_auth; /* assumed request_key authority */
diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h
index 5b06178..c1f19db 100644
--- a/include/linux/securebits.h
+++ b/include/linux/securebits.h
@@ -3,28 +3,39 @@
#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
-extern unsigned securebits;
-
/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
*of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the inheritable bitmask of the
executable file. */
-#define SECURE_NOROOT 0
+#define SECURE_NOROOT 0
+#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED 1 /* make bit-0 immutable */
/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixes"
to be compatible with old programs relying on set*uid to loose
privileges. When unset, setuid doesn't change privileges. */
-#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2
+#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP 2
+#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED 3 /* make bit-2 immutable */
+
+/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
+ transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
+ bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
+ bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
+ child can use this feature again. */
+#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS 4
+#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED 5 /* make bit-4 immutable */
/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specify
whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
setting is fixed or not. A setting which is fixed cannot be changed
from user-level. */
+#define issecure_mask(X) (1 << (X))
+#define issecure(X) (issecure_mask(X) & current->securebits)
-#define issecure(X) ( (1 << (X+1)) & SECUREBITS_DEFAULT ? \
- (1 << (X)) & SECUREBITS_DEFAULT : \
- (1 << (X)) & securebits )
+#define SECURE_ALL_BITS (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
+ issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
+ issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
#endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 53a3453..e6299e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@
#include <linux/xfrm.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
-extern unsigned securebits;
-
/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
@@ -61,6 +59,8 @@
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
+extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -720,7 +720,9 @@
* @arg3 contains a argument.
* @arg4 contains a argument.
* @arg5 contains a argument.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @rc_p contains a pointer to communicate back the forced return code
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted, and non-zero if the security module
+ * has taken responsibility (setting *rc_p) for the prctl call.
* @task_reparent_to_init:
* Set the security attributes in @p->security for a kernel thread that
* is being reparented to the init task.
@@ -1420,7 +1422,7 @@
int (*task_wait) (struct task_struct * p);
int (*task_prctl) (int option, unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5);
+ unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
void (*task_reparent_to_init) (struct task_struct * p);
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
@@ -1684,7 +1686,7 @@
int sig, u32 secid);
int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p);
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
@@ -2271,9 +2273,9 @@
static inline int security_task_prctl (int option, unsigned long arg2,
unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5)
+ unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p)
{
- return 0;
+ return cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg3, arg5, rc_p);
}
static inline void security_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)