diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c45485
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1015 @@
+/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support -*- linux-c -*-
+ * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
+ * All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
+ *
+ * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
+ * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
+ *
+ * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
+ * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
+ * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <asm/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/types.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+
+/* 0 = no checking
+   1 = put_count checking
+   2 = verbose put_count checking
+*/
+#define AUDIT_DEBUG 0
+
+/* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */
+extern int audit_enabled;
+
+/* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
+ * for saving names from getname(). */
+#define AUDIT_NAMES    20
+
+/* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the
+ * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from
+ * path_lookup. */
+#define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7
+
+/* At task start time, the audit_state is set in the audit_context using
+   a per-task filter.  At syscall entry, the audit_state is augmented by
+   the syscall filter. */
+enum audit_state {
+	AUDIT_DISABLED,		/* Do not create per-task audit_context.
+				 * No syscall-specific audit records can
+				 * be generated. */
+	AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
+				 * but don't necessarily fill it in at
+				 * syscall entry time (i.e., filter
+				 * instead). */
+	AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT,	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
+				 * and always fill it in at syscall
+				 * entry time.  This makes a full
+				 * syscall record available if some
+				 * other part of the kernel decides it
+				 * should be recorded. */
+	AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT	/* Create the per-task audit_context,
+				 * always fill it in at syscall entry
+				 * time, and always write out the audit
+				 * record at syscall exit time.  */
+};
+
+/* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
+ * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
+ * pointers at syscall exit time).
+ *
+ * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
+struct audit_names {
+	const char	*name;
+	unsigned long	ino;
+	dev_t		dev;
+	umode_t		mode;
+	uid_t		uid;
+	gid_t		gid;
+	dev_t		rdev;
+};
+
+struct audit_aux_data {
+	struct audit_aux_data	*next;
+	int			type;
+};
+
+#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM	0
+
+struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
+	struct audit_aux_data	d;
+	struct ipc_perm		p;
+	unsigned long		qbytes;
+	uid_t			uid;
+	gid_t			gid;
+	mode_t			mode;
+};
+
+
+/* The per-task audit context. */
+struct audit_context {
+	int		    in_syscall;	/* 1 if task is in a syscall */
+	enum audit_state    state;
+	unsigned int	    serial;     /* serial number for record */
+	struct timespec	    ctime;      /* time of syscall entry */
+	uid_t		    loginuid;   /* login uid (identity) */
+	int		    major;      /* syscall number */
+	unsigned long	    argv[4];    /* syscall arguments */
+	int		    return_valid; /* return code is valid */
+	int		    return_code;/* syscall return code */
+	int		    auditable;  /* 1 if record should be written */
+	int		    name_count;
+	struct audit_names  names[AUDIT_NAMES];
+	struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
+	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+
+				/* Save things to print about task_struct */
+	pid_t		    pid;
+	uid_t		    uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
+	gid_t		    gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
+	unsigned long	    personality;
+
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+	int		    put_count;
+	int		    ino_count;
+#endif
+};
+
+				/* Public API */
+/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
+ * time, one to search at syscall entry time, and another to search at
+ * syscall exit time. */
+static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);
+static LIST_HEAD(audit_entlist);
+static LIST_HEAD(audit_extlist);
+
+struct audit_entry {
+	struct list_head  list;
+	struct rcu_head   rcu;
+	struct audit_rule rule;
+};
+
+/* Check to see if two rules are identical.  It is called from
+ * audit_del_rule during AUDIT_DEL. */
+static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_rule *a, struct audit_rule *b)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (a->flags != b->flags)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (a->action != b->action)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (a->field_count != b->field_count)
+		return 1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) {
+		if (a->fields[i] != b->fields[i]
+		    || a->values[i] != b->values[i])
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+		if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i])
+			return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
+ * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
+ * audit_netlink_sem. */
+static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
+				 struct list_head *list)
+{
+	if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_PREPEND) {
+		entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_PREPEND;
+		list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+	} else {
+		list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void audit_free_rule(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu);
+	kfree(e);
+}
+
+/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via
+ * audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by
+ * audit_netlink_sem. */
+static inline int audit_del_rule(struct audit_rule *rule,
+				 struct list_head *list)
+{
+	struct audit_entry  *e;
+
+	/* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only
+	 * deletion routine. */
+	list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) {
+		if (!audit_compare_rule(rule, &e->rule)) {
+			list_del_rcu(&e->list);
+			call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return -EFAULT;		/* No matching rule */
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET
+/* Copy rule from user-space to kernel-space.  Called during
+ * AUDIT_ADD. */
+static int audit_copy_rule(struct audit_rule *d, struct audit_rule *s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (s->action != AUDIT_NEVER
+	    && s->action != AUDIT_POSSIBLE
+	    && s->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS)
+		return -1;
+	if (s->field_count < 0 || s->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS)
+		return -1;
+
+	d->flags	= s->flags;
+	d->action	= s->action;
+	d->field_count	= s->field_count;
+	for (i = 0; i < d->field_count; i++) {
+		d->fields[i] = s->fields[i];
+		d->values[i] = s->values[i];
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) d->mask[i] = s->mask[i];
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data)
+{
+	u32		   flags;
+	struct audit_entry *entry;
+	int		   err = 0;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case AUDIT_LIST:
+		/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are
+		   always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */
+		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_tsklist, list)
+			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+					 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_entlist, list)
+			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+					 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+		list_for_each_entry(entry, &audit_extlist, list)
+			audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 0, 1,
+					 &entry->rule, sizeof(entry->rule));
+		audit_send_reply(pid, seq, AUDIT_LIST, 1, 1, NULL, 0);
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_ADD:
+		if (!(entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL)))
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (audit_copy_rule(&entry->rule, data)) {
+			kfree(entry);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		flags = entry->rule.flags;
+		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
+			err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_tsklist);
+		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
+			err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_entlist);
+		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
+			err = audit_add_rule(entry, &audit_extlist);
+		break;
+	case AUDIT_DEL:
+		flags =((struct audit_rule *)data)->flags;
+		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_PER_TASK))
+			err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_tsklist);
+		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_ENTRY))
+			err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_entlist);
+		if (!err && (flags & AUDIT_AT_EXIT))
+			err = audit_del_rule(data, &audit_extlist);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule.  Return 1 on match, 0
+ * otherwise. */
+static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
+			      struct audit_rule *rule,
+			      struct audit_context *ctx,
+			      enum audit_state *state)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+		u32 field  = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE;
+		u32 value  = rule->values[i];
+		int result = 0;
+
+		switch (field) {
+		case AUDIT_PID:
+			result = (tsk->pid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_UID:
+			result = (tsk->uid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_EUID:
+			result = (tsk->euid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_SUID:
+			result = (tsk->suid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_FSUID:
+			result = (tsk->fsuid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_GID:
+			result = (tsk->gid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_EGID:
+			result = (tsk->egid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_SGID:
+			result = (tsk->sgid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_FSGID:
+			result = (tsk->fsgid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_PERS:
+			result = (tsk->personality == value);
+			break;
+
+		case AUDIT_EXIT:
+			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
+				result = (ctx->return_code == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
+			if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
+				result = (ctx->return_code >= 0);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR:
+			if (ctx) {
+				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+					if (MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+						++result;
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_DEVMINOR:
+			if (ctx) {
+				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+					if (MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev)==value) {
+						++result;
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_INODE:
+			if (ctx) {
+				for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
+					if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) {
+						++result;
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_LOGINUID:
+			result = 0;
+			if (ctx)
+				result = (ctx->loginuid == value);
+			break;
+		case AUDIT_ARG0:
+		case AUDIT_ARG1:
+		case AUDIT_ARG2:
+		case AUDIT_ARG3:
+			if (ctx)
+				result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0]==value);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_NEGATE)
+			result = !result;
+		if (!result)
+			return 0;
+	}
+	switch (rule->action) {
+	case AUDIT_NEVER:    *state = AUDIT_DISABLED;	    break;
+	case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;  break;
+	case AUDIT_ALWAYS:   *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
+ * completely disabled for this task.  Since we only have the task
+ * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
+ */
+static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	enum audit_state   state;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) {
+		if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return state;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+}
+
+/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
+ * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
+ * also not high enough that we already know we have to write and audit
+ * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or  AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
+ */
+static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
+					     struct audit_context *ctx,
+					     struct list_head *list)
+{
+	struct audit_entry *e;
+	enum audit_state   state;
+	int		   word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
+	int		   bit  = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
+		if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit
+ 		    && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return state;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
+}
+
+/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
+						      int return_valid,
+						      int return_code)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
+
+	if (likely(!context))
+		return NULL;
+	context->return_valid = return_valid;
+	context->return_code  = return_code;
+
+	if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {
+		enum audit_state state;
+		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_extlist);
+		if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
+			context->auditable = 1;
+	}
+
+	context->pid = tsk->pid;
+	context->uid = tsk->uid;
+	context->gid = tsk->gid;
+	context->euid = tsk->euid;
+	context->suid = tsk->suid;
+	context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid;
+	context->egid = tsk->egid;
+	context->sgid = tsk->sgid;
+	context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid;
+	context->personality = tsk->personality;
+	tsk->audit_context = NULL;
+	return context;
+}
+
+static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+	int i;
+
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
+	if (context->auditable
+	    ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
+		       " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
+		       " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
+		       __LINE__,
+		       context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
+		       context->name_count, context->put_count,
+		       context->ino_count);
+		for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+			printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
+			       context->names[i].name,
+			       context->names[i].name);
+		dump_stack();
+		return;
+	}
+#endif
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+	context->put_count  = 0;
+	context->ino_count  = 0;
+#endif
+
+	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+		if (context->names[i].name)
+			__putname(context->names[i].name);
+	context->name_count = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+	struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+
+	while ((aux = context->aux)) {
+		context->aux = aux->next;
+		kfree(aux);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
+				      enum audit_state state)
+{
+	uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid;
+
+	memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
+	context->state      = state;
+	context->loginuid   = loginuid;
+}
+
+static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context;
+
+	if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
+		return NULL;
+	audit_zero_context(context, state);
+	return context;
+}
+
+/* Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
+ * if necessary.  Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
+ * specified task.  This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
+ * needed. */
+int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context;
+	enum audit_state     state;
+
+	if (likely(!audit_enabled))
+		return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
+
+	state = audit_filter_task(tsk);
+	if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
+		audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+				/* Preserve login uid */
+	context->loginuid = -1;
+	if (current->audit_context)
+		context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid;
+
+	tsk->audit_context  = context;
+	set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+	struct audit_context *previous;
+	int		     count = 0;
+
+	do {
+		previous = context->previous;
+		if (previous || (count &&  count < 10)) {
+			++count;
+			printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
+			       " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
+			       context->serial, context->major,
+			       context->name_count, count);
+		}
+		audit_free_names(context);
+		audit_free_aux(context);
+		kfree(context);
+		context  = previous;
+	} while (context);
+	if (count >= 10)
+		printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	ab = audit_log_start(context);
+	if (!ab)
+		return;		/* audit_panic has been called */
+	audit_log_format(ab, "syscall=%d", context->major);
+	if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
+	if (context->return_valid)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " exit=%d", context->return_code);
+	audit_log_format(ab,
+		  " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
+		  " pid=%d loginuid=%d uid=%d gid=%d"
+		  " euid=%d suid=%d fsuid=%d"
+		  " egid=%d sgid=%d fsgid=%d",
+		  context->argv[0],
+		  context->argv[1],
+		  context->argv[2],
+		  context->argv[3],
+		  context->name_count,
+		  context->pid,
+		  context->loginuid,
+		  context->uid,
+		  context->gid,
+		  context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
+		  context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+	while (context->aux) {
+		struct audit_aux_data *aux;
+
+		ab = audit_log_start(context);
+		if (!ab)
+			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
+
+		aux = context->aux;
+		context->aux = aux->next;
+
+		audit_log_format(ab, "auxitem=%d", aux->type);
+		switch (aux->type) {
+		case AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM: {
+			struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+			audit_log_format(ab, 
+					 " qbytes=%lx uid=%d gid=%d mode=%x",
+					 axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+			}
+		}
+		audit_log_end(ab);
+		kfree(aux);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
+		ab = audit_log_start(context);
+		if (!ab)
+			continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
+		audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i);
+		if (context->names[i].name)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " name=%s",
+					 context->names[i].name);
+		if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1)
+			audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o"
+					     " uid=%d gid=%d rdev=%02x:%02x",
+					 context->names[i].ino,
+					 MAJOR(context->names[i].dev),
+					 MINOR(context->names[i].dev),
+					 context->names[i].mode,
+					 context->names[i].uid,
+					 context->names[i].gid,
+					 MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
+					 MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
+		audit_log_end(ab);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Free a per-task audit context.  Called from copy_process and
+ * __put_task_struct. */
+void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context;
+
+	task_lock(tsk);
+	context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
+	task_unlock(tsk);
+
+	if (likely(!context))
+		return;
+
+	/* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
+	 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. */
+	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
+		audit_log_exit(context);
+
+	audit_free_context(context);
+}
+
+/* Compute a serial number for the audit record.  Audit records are
+ * written to user-space as soon as they are generated, so a complete
+ * audit record may be written in several pieces.  The timestamp of the
+ * record and this serial number are used by the user-space daemon to
+ * determine which pieces belong to the same audit record.  The
+ * (timestamp,serial) tuple is unique for each syscall and is live from
+ * syscall entry to syscall exit.
+ *
+ * Atomic values are only guaranteed to be 24-bit, so we count down.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Another possibility is to store the formatted records off the
+ * audit context (for those records that have a context), and emit them
+ * all at syscall exit.  However, this could delay the reporting of
+ * significant errors until syscall exit (or never, if the system
+ * halts). */
+static inline unsigned int audit_serial(void)
+{
+	static atomic_t serial = ATOMIC_INIT(0xffffff);
+	unsigned int a, b;
+
+	do {
+		a = atomic_read(&serial);
+		if (atomic_dec_and_test(&serial))
+			atomic_set(&serial, 0xffffff);
+		b = atomic_read(&serial);
+	} while (b != a - 1);
+
+	return 0xffffff - b;
+}
+
+/* Fill in audit context at syscall entry.  This only happens if the
+ * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
+ * filters demand the audit context be built.  If the state from the
+ * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
+ * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
+ * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
+ * be written). */
+void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int major,
+			 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
+			 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
+	enum audit_state     state;
+
+	BUG_ON(!context);
+
+	/* This happens only on certain architectures that make system
+	 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
+	 * with direct calls.  (If you are porting to a new
+	 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
+	 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
+	 *
+	 * i386     no
+	 * x86_64   no
+	 * ppc64    yes (see arch/ppc64/kernel/misc.S)
+	 *
+	 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
+	 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
+	 */
+	if (context->in_syscall) {
+		struct audit_context *newctx;
+
+#if defined(__NR_vm86) && defined(__NR_vm86old)
+		/* vm86 mode should only be entered once */
+		if (major == __NR_vm86 || major == __NR_vm86old)
+			return;
+#endif
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+		printk(KERN_ERR
+		       "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
+		       " entering syscall=%d\n",
+		       context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
+#endif
+		newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
+		if (newctx) {
+			newctx->previous   = context;
+			context		   = newctx;
+			tsk->audit_context = newctx;
+		} else	{
+			/* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
+			 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
+			 * will be lost).  The only other alternative is
+			 * to abandon auditing. */
+			audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
+		}
+	}
+	BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
+
+	if (!audit_enabled)
+		return;
+
+	context->major      = major;
+	context->argv[0]    = a1;
+	context->argv[1]    = a2;
+	context->argv[2]    = a3;
+	context->argv[3]    = a4;
+
+	state = context->state;
+	if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT)
+		state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_entlist);
+	if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED))
+		return;
+
+	context->serial     = audit_serial();
+	context->ctime      = CURRENT_TIME;
+	context->in_syscall = 1;
+	context->auditable  = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT);
+}
+
+/* Tear down after system call.  If the audit context has been marked as
+ * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
+ * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
+ * message), then write out the syscall information.  In call cases,
+ * free the names stored from getname(). */
+void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int return_code)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context;
+
+	get_task_struct(tsk);
+	task_lock(tsk);
+	context = audit_get_context(tsk, 1, return_code);
+	task_unlock(tsk);
+
+	/* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
+	 * called __put_task_struct. */
+	if (likely(!context))
+		return;
+
+	if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
+		audit_log_exit(context);
+
+	context->in_syscall = 0;
+	context->auditable  = 0;
+	if (context->previous) {
+		struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
+		context->previous  = NULL;
+		audit_free_context(context);
+		tsk->audit_context = new_context;
+	} else {
+		audit_free_names(context);
+		audit_free_aux(context);
+		audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
+		tsk->audit_context = context;
+	}
+	put_task_struct(tsk);
+}
+
+/* Add a name to the list.  Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). */
+void audit_getname(const char *name)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name)
+		return;
+
+	if (!context->in_syscall) {
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
+		       __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
+		dump_stack();
+#endif
+		return;
+	}
+	BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES);
+	context->names[context->name_count].name = name;
+	context->names[context->name_count].ino  = (unsigned long)-1;
+	++context->name_count;
+}
+
+/* Intercept a putname request.  Called from
+ * include/linux/fs.h:putname().  If we have stored the name from
+ * getname in the audit context, then we delay the putname until syscall
+ * exit. */
+void audit_putname(const char *name)
+{
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	BUG_ON(!context);
+	if (!context->in_syscall) {
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
+		       __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
+		if (context->name_count) {
+			int i;
+			for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++)
+				printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
+				       context->names[i].name,
+				       context->names[i].name);
+		}
+#endif
+		__putname(name);
+	}
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+	else {
+		++context->put_count;
+		if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
+			       " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
+			       " put_count=%d\n",
+			       __FILE__, __LINE__,
+			       context->serial, context->major,
+			       context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
+			       context->put_count);
+			dump_stack();
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Store the inode and device from a lookup.  Called from
+ * fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). */
+void audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode)
+{
+	int idx;
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	if (!context->in_syscall)
+		return;
+	if (context->name_count
+	    && context->names[context->name_count-1].name
+	    && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name)
+		idx = context->name_count - 1;
+	else if (context->name_count > 1
+		 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name
+		 && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name)
+		idx = context->name_count - 2;
+	else {
+		/* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no
+		 * associated name? */
+		if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED)
+			return;
+		idx = context->name_count++;
+		context->names[idx].name = NULL;
+#if AUDIT_DEBUG
+		++context->ino_count;
+#endif
+	}
+	context->names[idx].ino  = inode->i_ino;
+	context->names[idx].dev	 = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
+	context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode;
+	context->names[idx].uid  = inode->i_uid;
+	context->names[idx].gid  = inode->i_gid;
+	context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev;
+}
+
+void audit_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
+		     struct timespec *t, int *serial)
+{
+	if (ctx) {
+		t->tv_sec  = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
+		t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
+		*serial    = ctx->serial;
+		ctx->auditable = 1;
+	} else {
+		*t      = CURRENT_TIME;
+		*serial = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+extern int audit_set_type(struct audit_buffer *ab, int type);
+
+int audit_set_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx, uid_t loginuid)
+{
+	if (ctx) {
+		struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+		ab = audit_log_start(NULL);
+		if (ab) {
+			audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
+				"old loginuid=%u new loginuid=%u",
+				ctx->pid, ctx->uid, ctx->loginuid, loginuid);
+			audit_set_type(ab, AUDIT_LOGIN);
+			audit_log_end(ab);
+		}
+		ctx->loginuid = loginuid;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+	return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
+}
+
+int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
+{
+	struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
+	struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+	if (likely(!context))
+		return 0;
+
+	ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ax)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	ax->qbytes = qbytes;
+	ax->uid = uid;
+	ax->gid = gid;
+	ax->mode = mode;
+
+	ax->d.type = AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM;
+	ax->d.next = context->aux;
+	context->aux = (void *)ax;
+	return 0;
+}