Linux-2.6.12-rc2

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d139f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+/*
+ * This is <linux/capability.h>
+ *
+ * Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com>
+ * Alexander Kjeldaas <astor@guardian.no>
+ * with help from Aleph1, Roland Buresund and Andrew Main.
+ *
+ * See here for the libcap library ("POSIX draft" compliance):
+ *
+ * ftp://linux.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.2/
+ */ 
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+
+/* User-level do most of the mapping between kernel and user
+   capabilities based on the version tag given by the kernel. The
+   kernel might be somewhat backwards compatible, but don't bet on
+   it. */
+
+/* XXX - Note, cap_t, is defined by POSIX to be an "opaque" pointer to
+   a set of three capability sets.  The transposition of 3*the
+   following structure to such a composite is better handled in a user
+   library since the draft standard requires the use of malloc/free
+   etc.. */
+ 
+#define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION  0x19980330
+
+typedef struct __user_cap_header_struct {
+	__u32 version;
+	int pid;
+} __user *cap_user_header_t;
+ 
+typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
+        __u32 effective;
+        __u32 permitted;
+        __u32 inheritable;
+} __user *cap_user_data_t;
+  
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
+
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+/* #define STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS */
+
+#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
+
+typedef struct kernel_cap_struct {
+	__u32 cap;
+} kernel_cap_t;
+
+#else
+
+typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;
+
+#endif
+  
+#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE  (2*sizeof(__u32))
+#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE     (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
+
+#endif
+
+
+/**
+ ** POSIX-draft defined capabilities. 
+ **/
+
+/* In a system with the [_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED] option defined, this
+   overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
+   ownership. */
+
+#define CAP_CHOWN            0
+
+/* Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if
+   [_POSIX_ACL] is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
+   CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
+
+#define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE     1
+
+/* Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files
+   and directories, including ACL restrictions if [_POSIX_ACL] is
+   defined. Excluding DAC access covered by CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. */
+
+#define CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH  2
+    
+/* Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
+   file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
+   is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions. */
+
+#define CAP_FOWNER           3
+
+/* Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID
+   shall match the file owner ID when setting the S_ISUID and S_ISGID
+   bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
+   supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting
+   the S_ISGID bit on that file; that the S_ISUID and S_ISGID bits are
+   cleared on successful return from chown(2) (not implemented). */
+
+#define CAP_FSETID           4
+
+/* Used to decide between falling back on the old suser() or fsuser(). */
+
+#define CAP_FS_MASK          0x1f
+
+/* Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
+   process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID
+   of the process receiving the signal. */
+
+#define CAP_KILL             5
+
+/* Allows setgid(2) manipulation */
+/* Allows setgroups(2) */
+/* Allows forged gids on socket credentials passing. */
+
+#define CAP_SETGID           6
+
+/* Allows set*uid(2) manipulation (including fsuid). */
+/* Allows forged pids on socket credentials passing. */
+
+#define CAP_SETUID           7
+
+
+/**
+ ** Linux-specific capabilities
+ **/
+
+/* Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid,
+   remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid */
+
+#define CAP_SETPCAP          8
+
+/* Allow modification of S_IMMUTABLE and S_APPEND file attributes */
+
+#define CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE  9
+
+/* Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024 */
+/* Allows binding to ATM VCIs below 32 */
+
+#define CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE 10
+
+/* Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast */
+
+#define CAP_NET_BROADCAST    11
+
+/* Allow interface configuration */
+/* Allow administration of IP firewall, masquerading and accounting */
+/* Allow setting debug option on sockets */
+/* Allow modification of routing tables */
+/* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
+   sockets */
+/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
+/* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
+/* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
+/* Allow clearing driver statistics */
+/* Allow multicasting */
+/* Allow read/write of device-specific registers */
+/* Allow activation of ATM control sockets */
+
+#define CAP_NET_ADMIN        12
+
+/* Allow use of RAW sockets */
+/* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
+
+#define CAP_NET_RAW          13
+
+/* Allow locking of shared memory segments */
+/* Allow mlock and mlockall (which doesn't really have anything to do
+   with IPC) */
+
+#define CAP_IPC_LOCK         14
+
+/* Override IPC ownership checks */
+
+#define CAP_IPC_OWNER        15
+
+/* Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit */
+/* Modify cap_bset */
+#define CAP_SYS_MODULE       16
+
+/* Allow ioperm/iopl access */
+/* Allow sending USB messages to any device via /proc/bus/usb */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_RAWIO        17
+
+/* Allow use of chroot() */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_CHROOT       18
+
+/* Allow ptrace() of any process */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PTRACE       19
+
+/* Allow configuration of process accounting */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PACCT        20
+
+/* Allow configuration of the secure attention key */
+/* Allow administration of the random device */
+/* Allow examination and configuration of disk quotas */
+/* Allow configuring the kernel's syslog (printk behaviour) */
+/* Allow setting the domainname */
+/* Allow setting the hostname */
+/* Allow calling bdflush() */
+/* Allow mount() and umount(), setting up new smb connection */
+/* Allow some autofs root ioctls */
+/* Allow nfsservctl */
+/* Allow VM86_REQUEST_IRQ */
+/* Allow to read/write pci config on alpha */
+/* Allow irix_prctl on mips (setstacksize) */
+/* Allow flushing all cache on m68k (sys_cacheflush) */
+/* Allow removing semaphores */
+/* Used instead of CAP_CHOWN to "chown" IPC message queues, semaphores
+   and shared memory */
+/* Allow locking/unlocking of shared memory segment */
+/* Allow turning swap on/off */
+/* Allow forged pids on socket credentials passing */
+/* Allow setting readahead and flushing buffers on block devices */
+/* Allow setting geometry in floppy driver */
+/* Allow turning DMA on/off in xd driver */
+/* Allow administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
+   extra ioctls) */
+/* Allow tuning the ide driver */
+/* Allow access to the nvram device */
+/* Allow administration of apm_bios, serial and bttv (TV) device */
+/* Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver */
+/* Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space */
+/* Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver */
+/* Allow setting up serial ports */
+/* Allow sending raw qic-117 commands */
+/* Allow enabling/disabling tagged queuing on SCSI controllers and sending
+   arbitrary SCSI commands */
+/* Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_ADMIN        21
+
+/* Allow use of reboot() */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_BOOT         22
+
+/* Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different
+   UID) processes */
+/* Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling on own
+   processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by another
+   process. */
+/* Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_NICE         23
+
+/* Override resource limits. Set resource limits. */
+/* Override quota limits. */
+/* Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem */
+/* Modify data journaling mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling
+   resources) */
+/* NOTE: ext2 honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so 
+   you can override using fsuid too */
+/* Override size restrictions on IPC message queues */
+/* Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock */
+/* Override max number of consoles on console allocation */
+/* Override max number of keymaps */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_RESOURCE     24
+
+/* Allow manipulation of system clock */
+/* Allow irix_stime on mips */
+/* Allow setting the real-time clock */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_TIME         25
+
+/* Allow configuration of tty devices */
+/* Allow vhangup() of tty */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG   26
+
+/* Allow the privileged aspects of mknod() */
+
+#define CAP_MKNOD            27
+
+/* Allow taking of leases on files */
+
+#define CAP_LEASE            28
+
+#define CAP_AUDIT_WRITE      29
+
+#define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL    30
+
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
+/* 
+ * Bounding set
+ */
+extern kernel_cap_t cap_bset;
+
+/*
+ * Internal kernel functions only
+ */
+ 
+#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
+
+#define to_cap_t(x) { x }
+#define cap_t(x) (x).cap
+
+#else
+
+#define to_cap_t(x) (x)
+#define cap_t(x) (x)
+
+#endif
+
+#define CAP_EMPTY_SET       to_cap_t(0)
+#define CAP_FULL_SET        to_cap_t(~0)
+#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET    to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP))
+#define CAP_INIT_INH_SET    to_cap_t(0)
+
+#define CAP_TO_MASK(x) (1 << (x))
+#define cap_raise(c, flag)   (cap_t(c) |=  CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+#define cap_lower(c, flag)   (cap_t(c) &= ~CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+#define cap_raised(c, flag)  (cap_t(c) & CAP_TO_MASK(flag))
+
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_combine(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t b)
+{
+     kernel_cap_t dest;
+     cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) | cap_t(b);
+     return dest;
+}
+
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_intersect(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t b)
+{
+     kernel_cap_t dest;
+     cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) & cap_t(b);
+     return dest;
+}
+
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_drop(kernel_cap_t a, kernel_cap_t drop)
+{
+     kernel_cap_t dest;
+     cap_t(dest) = cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(drop);
+     return dest;
+}
+
+static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(kernel_cap_t c)
+{
+     kernel_cap_t dest;
+     cap_t(dest) = ~cap_t(c);
+     return dest;
+}
+
+#define cap_isclear(c)       (!cap_t(c))
+#define cap_issubset(a,set)  (!(cap_t(a) & ~cap_t(set)))
+
+#define cap_clear(c)         do { cap_t(c) =  0; } while(0)
+#define cap_set_full(c)      do { cap_t(c) = ~0; } while(0)
+#define cap_mask(c,mask)     do { cap_t(c) &= cap_t(mask); } while(0)
+
+#define cap_is_fs_cap(c)     (CAP_TO_MASK(c) & CAP_FS_MASK)
+
+#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
+
+#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */