tree 2eb9604f47c6d3a334447dbc834eeace0057be2a
parent f63c4824aa1b745cf283453fd53385230307d8d1
parent 392a546dc8368d1745f9891ef3f8f7c380de8650
author Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 1384625955 -0800
committer Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 1384625955 -0800
mergetag object 392a546dc8368d1745f9891ef3f8f7c380de8650
 type commit
 tag random_for_linus
 tagger Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> 1384394235 -0500
 
 The /dev/random changes for 3.13 including a number of improvements in
 the following areas: performance, avoiding waste of entropy, better
 tracking of entropy estimates, support for non-x86 platforms that have
 a register which can't be used for fine-grained timekeeping, but which
 might be good enough for the random driver.
 
 Also add some printk's so that we can see how quickly /dev/urandom can
 get initialized, and when programs try to use /dev/urandom before it
 is fully initialized (since this could be a security issue).  This
 shouldn't be an issue on x86 desktop/laptops --- a test on my Lenovo
 T430s laptop shows that /dev/urandom is getting fully initialized
 approximately two seconds before the root file system is mounted
 read/write --- this may be an issue with ARM and MIPS embedded/mobile
 systems, though.  These printk's will be a useful canary before
 potentially adding a future change to start blocking processes which
 try to read from /dev/urandom before it is initialized, which is
 something FreeBSD does already for security reasons, and which
 security folks have been agitating for Linux to also adopt.
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Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random

Pull /dev/random changes from Ted Ts'o:
 "The /dev/random changes for 3.13 including a number of improvements in
  the following areas: performance, avoiding waste of entropy, better
  tracking of entropy estimates, support for non-x86 platforms that have
  a register which can't be used for fine-grained timekeeping, but which
  might be good enough for the random driver.

  Also add some printk's so that we can see how quickly /dev/urandom can
  get initialized, and when programs try to use /dev/urandom before it
  is fully initialized (since this could be a security issue).  This
  shouldn't be an issue on x86 desktop/laptops --- a test on my Lenovo
  T430s laptop shows that /dev/urandom is getting fully initialized
  approximately two seconds before the root file system is mounted
  read/write --- this may be an issue with ARM and MIPS embedded/mobile
  systems, though.  These printk's will be a useful canary before
  potentially adding a future change to start blocking processes which
  try to read from /dev/urandom before it is initialized, which is
  something FreeBSD does already for security reasons, and which
  security folks have been agitating for Linux to also adopt"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  random: add debugging code to detect early use of get_random_bytes()
  random: initialize the last_time field in struct timer_rand_state
  random: don't zap entropy count in rand_initialize()
  random: printk notifications for urandom pool initialization
  random: make add_timer_randomness() fill the nonblocking pool first
  random: convert DEBUG_ENT to tracepoints
  random: push extra entropy to the output pools
  random: drop trickle mode
  random: adjust the generator polynomials in the mixing function slightly
  random: speed up the fast_mix function by a factor of four
  random: cap the rate which the /dev/urandom pool gets reseeded
  random: optimize the entropy_store structure
  random: optimize spinlock use in add_device_randomness()
  random: fix the tracepoint for get_random_bytes(_arch)
  random: account for entropy loss due to overwrites
  random: allow fractional bits to be tracked
  random: statically compute poolbitshift, poolbytes, poolbits
  random: mix in architectural randomness earlier in extract_buf()