ipc: sysvsem: refuse clone(CLONE_SYSVSEM|CLONE_NEWIPC)
CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_SYSVSEM interaction isn't handled properly. This can cause
a kernel memory corruption. CLONE_NEWIPC must detach from the existing undo
lists.
Fix, part 3: refuse clone(CLONE_SYSVSEM|CLONE_NEWIPC).
With unshare, specifying CLONE_SYSVSEM means unshare the sysvsem. So it seems
reasonable that CLONE_NEWIPC without CLONE_SYSVSEM would just imply
CLONE_SYSVSEM.
However with clone, specifying CLONE_SYSVSEM means *share* the sysvsem. So
calling clone(CLONE_SYSVSEM|CLONE_NEWIPC) is explicitly asking for something
we can't allow. So return -EINVAL in that case.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: Pierre Peiffer <peifferp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index f5d332c..adc7851 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -139,6 +139,18 @@
goto out;
}
+ /*
+ * CLONE_NEWIPC must detach from the undolist: after switching
+ * to a new ipc namespace, the semaphore arrays from the old
+ * namespace are unreachable. In clone parlance, CLONE_SYSVSEM
+ * means share undolist with parent, so we must forbid using
+ * it along with CLONE_NEWIPC.
+ */
+ if ((flags & CLONE_NEWIPC) && (flags & CLONE_SYSVSEM)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
new_ns = create_new_namespaces(flags, tsk, tsk->fs);
if (IS_ERR(new_ns)) {
err = PTR_ERR(new_ns);