diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index f1a5bd9..a326d6e 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -763,8 +763,14 @@
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int dummy_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-				   int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+					  int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
+}
+
+static int dummy_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata,
+					 u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b65c201..5b16196 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3318,24 +3318,38 @@
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
-				     int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
+					    int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+	u32 peer_sid = 0;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
-	if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+
+	/* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
+	if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
+		ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+	}
+	else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
+		peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
+
+		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	else {
 		err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
-	
-	err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -3356,6 +3370,23 @@
 	return err;
 }
 
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	u32 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
+
+	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, secdata, seclen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 {
 	return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
@@ -4344,7 +4375,8 @@
 	.socket_setsockopt =		selinux_socket_setsockopt,
 	.socket_shutdown =		selinux_socket_shutdown,
 	.socket_sock_rcv_skb =		selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
-	.socket_getpeersec =		selinux_socket_getpeersec,
+	.socket_getpeersec_stream =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
+	.socket_getpeersec_dgram =	selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
 	.sk_alloc_security =		selinux_sk_alloc_security,
 	.sk_free_security =		selinux_sk_free_security,
 	.sk_getsid = 			selinux_sk_getsid_security,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 8e87996..a7f388b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb);
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 #else
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index b2af7ca..dfab6c8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -225,6 +225,74 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
+ * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
+ * association used to connect to the remote socket.
+ *
+ * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
+ */
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
+		goto out;
+
+	dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
+	if (!dst)
+		goto out;
+
+ 	for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+      	     dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+		struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+ 		if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+	 	 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+			peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	dst_release(dst);
+
+out:
+	return peer_sid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
+ * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
+ *
+ * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
+ * type SCM_SECURITY.
+ */
+u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sec_path *sp;
+
+	if (skb == NULL)
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+
+	if (skb->sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP)
+		return SECSID_NULL;
+
+	sp = skb->sp;
+	if (sp) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = sp->x[i].xvec;
+			if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+				return ctx->ctx_sid;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return SECSID_NULL;
+}
+
+/*
  * LSM hook that controls access to unlabelled packets.  If
  * a xfrm_state is authorizable (defined by macro) then it was
  * already authorized by the IPSec process.  If not, then